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EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CIVIL WAR

BY

OLIVER P. TEMPLE

Formerly an Equity Judge of Tennessee, and Author of "The Covenanter, the Cavalier, and the Puritan"

With Portraits and Map

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To the People of East Tennessee,

in grateful remembrance

of their kindness to me

in the past.

EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CIVIL WAR

INTRODUCTION.

The object of the author in preparing this work was twofold: First, to rescue from oblivion certain important historical facts, fast fading from the memory of men, connected with the struggle in East Tennessee from 1861 to 1865; secondly, to vindicate the course of the Union people of East Tennessee in separating from their friends and kindred in the South, and in adhering to the National Government. Their constancy and fortitude, their trials and sufferings for what they deemed right, have no parallel in the history of this country. To present these in connected and permanent form it is believed will add a new and missing chapter to the history of the great drama known as the Civil War.

The aim and desire of the author have been to discuss and present the facts of the struggle in East Tennessee with candor and truthfulness, and yet without offensiveness. The author was Southern by birth, education and residence, and bound to the South by the ties of interest, association and many long friendships. On the other hand, he was drawn toward the North by a strong love of the Union, and an ardent desire for its preservation. He was a slaveholder, and in sympathy with the peculiar institutions of the South. Besides, time has softened his feelings, and to a certain extent modified his views regarding some of the questions formerly dividing the two sections. These facts, as he conceives, fit him for setting

forth dispassionately not only the apparent, but the inner motives that influenced the Southern people in their movement for independence in 1861. In addition, the circumstance that he was an eye-witness of many of the occurrences he describes, and an active participant in them, gives him peculiar qualifications for this work.

The author wishes to return his grateful acknowledgments to Prof. Edward S. . nes, LL.D,, of South Carolina College, and to R. R. Sutherland, D.D., of Knoxville, Tennessee, for assistance and suggestions kindly given in the preparation of this work. He also extends his thanks to General Marcus J. Wright, of the War Records Office, Washington, D. C., for important documents. He especially expresses his most earnest appreciation of the kindness of Colonel John B. Brownlow in furnishing him with much valuable information, for many suggestions and numerous documents, and for the use of files of the Knoxville Whig, edited by his distinguished father.

THE AUTHOR.

KNOXVILLE, TENN., *September* 9, 1899.

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EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CIVIL WAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE WATAUGA ASSOCIATION.

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In the wonderful group of lofty mountains—fifty or sixty in number and all five or six thousand feet in height—in Western North Carolina and Eastern Tennessee, which render that region one of the most picturesque on the continent, near the Tennessee line, stands Grandfather Mountain, in lofty grandeur and venerable majesty. Just south of it, and by its side, in graceful modesty rises Grandmother Mountain, its queenly consort. At the base of the former, on an elevated plateau, within a radius of less than a quarter of a mile in diameter, three streams of water burst from the ground, all fresh and sparkling: the first, the Linnville, the source of the Catawba River, flowing southwardly into the Atlantic; the second the source of the New River, flowing northwardly into the Ohio; and the third the source of the Watauga, flowing westwardly into the Holston and the Tennessee. Certainly few spots combine so much matter of interest to the student of nature.[1]

[1] In 1892 the author visited this spot, and drank out of one or more of these springs.

The Watauga has become historic, because on its green banks the first settlement in Tennessee was planted. As the river emerges from the mountains, in a clear, sparkling, silvery current, flowing over beds of white shell, sand, and pebbles, and rapidly gliding onward through a charming valley, no more beautiful stream can be found in the land. In 1770, the first pioneers began to gather on its banks at the point where it debouches from the mountains. The spot is enchantingly lovely. There must have been poetic eyes among the stern, brave settlers, which led them to select for their homes such a bewitching scene of beauty and grandeur. On this stream was the cradle of Western civilization.

The valley for some miles swells out into a magnificent, gently undulating plain, of surpassing fertility. Off southwardly, five or six miles, though seemingly within two or three miles, so transparent is the pure atmosphere, rise up and spread out in graceful outlines the great blue mountains, solemn and still in their loneliness, forming as lovely and as restful a sight as the eye ever looked upon. Surely human vision never beheld a more beautiful spot. Into this romantic region, in 1760, came the renowned Daniel Boone to hunt.[1]

Soon there came to the settlement two men who were destined to play leading parts in the history of Tennessee. They were just the men who were needed. These were James Robertson, who came from North Carolina, and John Sevier, who came from Virginia. Robertson was a Covenanter in blood, while Sevier was a Huguenot. Robertson was a plain, strong man, wise in council, far-seeing

[1] On a beech tree in Washington County, not many miles west of the Watauga, Boone carved the following words:

D. B*oo*n

*Cill*ED A. BAR On *Tree*

in T *h* E *y*EAR

1760

in wisdom, powerful in action, and skillful in execution. He contributed by his good judgment and happy discretion largely to the safety and the success of the early settlements in East Tennessee. He finally became the founder and the leader of the settlements of Middle Tennessee. In this capacity he manifested a high order of statesmanship and patriotism. His memory is justly cherished with pride by every Tennessean, as one of its distinguished founders.

Sevier had been a captain in the army of the royal governor, Dunmore, of Virginia, and perhaps a courtier in his palace. He was a favorite of that functionary and enjoyed his smiles.[1] In some respects he was the very opposite of Robertson. He was tall, graceful, athletic, and handsome. French sprightliness, vivacity, and kindliness bubbled up in him like a mountain spring. Men at once recognized in him a friend and a leader. In sagacity and ability he was no ordinary man. No inferior or common man could have run such an unbroken career of success, in high and honorable positions in perilous times, for forty-three years, with such distinguished enemies arrayed against him a part of the time as Andrew Jackson, Governor Archibald Roane, John Tipton, and others, without being overthrown and destroyed. And yet, to the last, he was the undoubted leader and favorite of the people. In a large measure, the remarkable ascendency which Sevier held over the minds of the early inhabitants of Tennessee was due to his natural genius for war, and his willingness to fight. But there was more in him than these elements of strength. He possessed as well the talent for governing—high administrative ability. Above all, he had a heart in sympathy with universal humanity.

It was well that two such men as Robertson and Sevier came early to the Watauga settlement. Soon the coolness and the judgment of the former, and the daring and military

[1] Address of Hon. W. A. Henderson, on John Sevier.

ability of the latter, were needed. The great tribe of Cherokee Indians, whose home was but a hundred miles Southward, had from the first fixed their eyes, glaring with rage and murder, on the infant settlement. It was marked for destruction. When the Revolution burst upon the country, urged on by British agents, and stimulated by British gold, the moment for putting into execution their long-concealed purpose of destroying the settlements on the Watauga, the Holston, and the Nolichucky, had come. Seven hundred warriors, as silently and as stealthily as a panther, crept through the dark forest on their murderous mission toward the settlements. Fortunately the good Indian woman, Nancy Ward, then and ever afterward the friend of the whites, had notified the settlers of the approaching danger. Being thus warned and prepared, wherever the Indians appeared they were defeated. A part of their warriors, under Old Abraham, one of their wisest and most cunning chiefs, led their force against the little rude fort on the Watauga, where the settlers, men, women and children, to the number of two hundred, had taken refuge. For six days the fort was besieged. Most fortunately Captain James Robertson and Lieutenant John Sevier were in command, and successfully defeated every effort of the wily enemy for the destruction of the settlers. After six days, the savages, having been defeated everywhere else, silently and sullenly withdrew, after losing a number of their warriors. This was but the beginning of the war with the Cherokees, which continued for nearly twenty years, in which also the powerful Creek nation, the fiercest of all the Southern tribes, sometimes took a part.

Before proceeding in chronological order I return to a period anterior to the attack on the fort at Watauga. The early settlers, both on the Watauga and on the Holston, supposed they were within the limits of Virginia. But when the line between the two colonies of Carolina and Virginia was run, it was discovered that those on both sides of the Holston were under the jurisdiction of North

Carolina. A purchase from the Indians, for the benefit of Virginia, of the territory where the settlements existed, still further complicated matters, and left the question an unsettled one as to which state the settlers owed allegiance. No one could tell of which state he was a citizen. Neither state gave the settlers protection against the Indians, nor the benefit of its laws and civil jurisdiction. No courts were established for the security of their lives and property, or for the peace and repose of society.

North Carolina was reluctant and indeed unwilling to extend its laws over a distant people, surrounded by Indians, with whom conflicts were almost certain, and where the expense of maintaining an army and a civil government would outweigh every advantage that could accrue to her. On the other hand, Virginia was perhaps not certain of the validity of her title to the territory. So the settlers received no protection from either colony.

In this emergency the Anglo-Saxon instinct for self-government, perhaps I should say, rather, Covenanter love of liberty, order, law and independence, solved the difficulty. A majority of the settlers, who were at this time south of the Holston, were the Covenanters who had lately fled from persecutions in North Carolina. They were naturally unwilling to fall again under the jurisdiction of that colony. It is easy to believe that they readily acquiesced in the claims of Virginia, on whose soil they at first thought they had settled.

But whatever may have been their opinions, or their wishes, it was a "condition" and not a "theory" that confronted them. They were without law, without government. The settlers of the Holston, the Watauga and of Carter's Valley, therefore, in 1772, assembled at Watauga, and deliberately proceeded to frame and organize a government for themselves. They entered into a written agreement, known since as the "Watauga Association." A written constitution was formed and adopted, which unfortunately has been lost. A committee of thirteen was

elected as a general legislative body. Out of these five commissioners were selected by the thirteen, in whom was lodged the executive and judicial power. These, in turn, elected one of their body as chairman, who presided in their courts. They had a clerk, a sheriff and an attorney. Courts were held at stated periods. The laws of Virginia were adopted for their guidance as far as they were applicable. John Carter was selected as chairman and John Sevier as clerk of the court.

The names of the thirteen who composed the legislative body are worthy of being preserved. They were: John Carter, Charles Robertson, James Robertson, Jack Isbel, John Sevier, James Smith, Jacob Brown, William Bean, John Jones, George Russell, Jacob Warnack, Robert Lucas and William Tatham. Of these John Carter, Charles Robertson, John Sevier, James Robertson and Jack Isbel were selected to administer the laws and manage the affairs of the settlements. Their decisions were final. No appeal lay to any other tribunal. The decisions were made with promptitude and executed with vigor. These men must have been inspired with a high sense of justice, for no account, no tradition even, has come down to later generations of any injustice or oppression on the part of these executive—judicial—officers. The high and exalted reputation which at least three of them, John Carter, John Sevier and James Robertson, bore for uprightness and justice throughout their long lives, in honorable and responsible positions, seems to forbid any suspicion of official injustice on their part. Indeed, we may assume that the remarkable success of this unique little republic was due largely to the wisdom and justice of its executive officers.

Here was an anomaly: a government under the direction of five men, exercising for six years all the rights of sovereignty, such as making treaties, purchasing lands from the Indians, confiscating property, and inflicting capital punishment for crimes, existing on the very outer frontier

of civilization, where there naturally came, as is always the case, many desperate, lawless characters ready to defy all authority, and yet, so wise and strong was the executive administration, that order was preserved, property protected, life made secure, and not a complaint of an injustice done to any one. But let it be borne in mind that the ruling class, the back-bone of these little self-governing communities, were strong, earnest, educated, law-loving men, mostly of the Covenanter race, who had not braved the dangers and the hardships of the wilderness in a spirit of reckless adventure, but had come to build up for themselves and their posterity a free state and a Christian civilization. These austere, determined men would tolerate no lawlessness in their midst. They were an intelligent, a law-abiding and a God-fearing people. This was the power back of the executive administration which gave it force, steadiness, and success.

Roosevelt says of these pioneers: "They formed a written constitution, the first ever adopted west of the mountains, or by a community composed of *American-born freemen.*"[1] Again he says: "They were the first men of American birth to establish a free and independent community on the Continent."[2]

Ramsey says that this was "the first written compact for civil government anywhere west of the Alleghanies."[3] It was not, as is sometimes assumed, the first written constitution in the colonies. As early as 1637, the three towns of Hartford, Windsor and Wethersford, in Connecticut, formed a written compact and constitution, republican in form, under which that colony and state lived for nearly two centuries. "This was the first written constitution in America, if not in the world."[4]

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[1] Roosevelt's "Winning of the West," Vol. I, pp. 163, 164, and notes on pp. 162 and 163.

[2] Id., p. 183.

[3] Ramsey's "Annals of Tennessee," p. 107.

[4] Bryant's "Popular History of the United States," Vol. II, p. 21.

At first only the three original settlements lived under the articles of the Watauga Association. But, in 1775, the Nolichucky settlement joined it, and became identified with it.

It is sometimes supposed, and even asserted, that these early settlers on the Holston, the Watauga, and the Nolichucky were a rough, uneducated set of men. Nothing could be further from the truth. For the most part, they belonged to the Covenanter race, commonly called the Scotch-Irish. The Covenanters were the best educated people in the colonies, possibly excepting the early Puritans, and it is by no means clear that this exception ought to be made. Douglas Campbell says of the Covenanters who settled in the colonies before the Revolution:

"In the first place, it should be noticed that they were not socially poor peasants, such as Ireland has contributed to America in later days. Among them were wealthy yeomen, and in their ranks were the most intelligent of Irish manufacturers. Nor were they children of ignorance. Although their schools had been closed by law (in Ireland), they had all found means of private instruction in the common branches; while those desirous of a higher education—and they were numerous—had made their way to the Presbyterian Universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow. When they came to America, these Scotch-Irishmen were not only among the most industrious and virtuous, but they were, like the early settlers of New England the best educated, of the English speaking race."[1]

Again the same author says that "for nearly a century before the Revolution, they" (the Scotch-Irish or the Covenanters) "conducted most of the classical schools south of the province of New York."[2]

Theodore Roosevelt says of these early settlers: "As in Western Virginia, the first settlers came, for the most part,

[1] "The Puritan in Holland, England and America," Vol. II, p. 479.

[2] Id., p. 486.

from Pennsylvania; so, in turn, in what was then Western North Carolina and is now Eastern Tennessee, the first settlers came mainly from Virginia, and, indeed, in great part, from this same Pennsylvania stock. . . . They were a sturdy race, enterprising and intelligent."[1] Again he says: "But the bulk of the settlers were men of sterling worth, fit to be the pioneer fathers of a mighty and a beautiful state."[2]

The pioneers above spoken of, as being of "the same Pennsylvania stock," that had settled in Virginia, were a part of that great Covenanter race which had emigrated from Ireland in such numbers between the years 1728 and 1775, and had landed in Philadelphia. Many of them passed over into Virginia, and found homes in the beautiful valley of Virginia, or the Shenandoah. Finally, many of them crossed the Blue Ridge and the Alleghanies, and settled on the Holston and the Watauga. These formed a part, possibly the larger part, of the first settlers of Tennessee.

Fortunately we are not left in doubt either as to who they were, or as to their moral standing and intellectual attainments. Roosevelt has resurrected a manuscript left by the Hon. David Campbell, a son of one of the Holston pioneers, giving an account of the early settlers on the Holston, in South-west Virginia. The settlers on the Lower Holston, in Tennessee, were but an overflow of the same race of men from the Upper Holston, only a few miles away. Campbell in his manuscript says:

"The first settlers on the Holston river were a remarkable race of men for their intelligence, enterprise and hardy adventure. The greater portion of them had emigrated from the counties of Botetourt, Augusta and Frederick and others (counties) along the same valley, and from the upper counties of Maryland and Pennsylvania; were

[1] "The Winning of the West," Vol. I, p. 162.

[2] Id., p. 173. Quoted from a MSS. left by David Campbell, a son of one of the early settlers on the Holston in Virginia.

mostly descendants of Irish stock (Scotch-Irish), and generally where they had religious opinions were Presbyterians. A very large proportion were religious, and many were members of the church."[1]

Among these early Covenanter settlers, in South-west Virginia, on the very borders of Tennessee, were the Prestons, the Campbells, the McDowells, the Robertsons and other historic families, who became distinguished in the history of that state and of the nation. The same race of men followed the Holston a few miles lower down, and came into Tennessee. They were all of the same type.

"The first settlers on the Watauga," says Roosevelt, "included both Virginians and Carolinians. But many of these Carolina hill people were, like Boone and James Robertson, members of families who had drifted down from the North. The position of the Presbyterian churches in all the western hill country shows *the origin of that portion of the people who gave the tone to the rest.*"[2]

This statement is not as definite as it should be. At the same time that the Covenanters, many of whom finally reached the Holston and the Watauga country, were passing over from Pennsylvania into Virginia, and passing westward up the valleys of that state, many others of the same race were passing on through Virginia into North and South Carolina, and settling on the upper waters of the Catawba, the Broad, the Yadkin, the Saluda and other streams, which rise on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge. In the meantime, other Covenanters from Ireland and Scotland were landing in Charleston and Wilmington, and were moving westward and northward (the coast region being occupied by older settlers, mostly English) into the interior, and finding homes on the waters of those same upper streams. And thus the mountain country, or, as Mr. Roosevelt calls it, "the hill country," of North and South Carolina, was

[1] "Winning of the West," Vol. I, p. 167.

[2] Id., Vol. I, p. 163, note 1.

filled with a brave, adventurous Covenanter population, who were all Presbyterians in religion, and all lovers of liberty. Some, perhaps, of these liberty-loving people had rebelled, in 1771, against the royal authority in North Carolina, and, after their defeat in the battle of the Great Alamance, fled to the Watauga settlement.

Some of these men who had taken part in this rebellion—possibly a good many—according to Mr. Bancroft, crossed the mountains, and made their homes on the Watauga, where the long arm of oppression could not reach them. These were among the first settlers. And from time to time larger numbers continued to come, as the fame of the beauty of the newly-discovered country west of the great mountains was carried back to their kindred in North Carolina. So, it is true, that the first settlers in Tennessee were, in a sense, "both Virginians and Carolinians." But with rare exceptions they were not of the English race which first mainly settled Virginia and Carolina, but largely, and indeed nearly exclusively, of the Covenanter stock, with one or more families of Huguenots and Welshmen. The same race of men also first settled Kentucky and Middle Tennessee. In Kentucky they came from the Covenanter settlements of West and South-west Virginia, and from the great hive of Covenanters in Western Pennsylvania.

A braver, purer or better class of men than those early settlers in Kentucky and Tennessee never founded a state. No state in the Union was settled by men superior to them. Nearly all those of the Covenanter stock (and we have seen that most of them were of this stock) were well educated, and some of them highly so.[1]

On this point, evidence of the most emphatic character is furnished by Mr. Roosevelt. He says:

"In examining numerous original drafts of petitions

[1] As to the characteristics of these people, refer to "The Covenanter, the Cavalier and the Puritan," by the author, p. 150.

and the like, signed by hundreds of the original settlers of Tennessee and Kentucky, I have been struck by the small proportion—not much over three or four per cent at the outside—of men who made their mark instead of signing."[1]

This statement is partially confirmed by the petition of the commissioners, or officers, and of a part of the citizens of the Watauga Association, sent in 1776 to the legislature of North Carolina. Out of one hundred and four persons, all but two seem to have signed their own names, leaving a fraction less than two per cent who made their mark. Additional confirmation of the fact that the Covenanters who settled the colonies were an educated people may be found in the Historical Society of New Hampshire. A petition to the governor, by certain Covenanters who wished permission to settle on certain lands, is preserved in said society, which was signed by three hundred and nineteen persons, and all but thirteen signed the document in their own proper hand. Here again there was only four per cent of the persons who made their mark.[2]

The government of the Watauga Association was remarkable in several respects. The deep-rooted conviction in the minds of the pioneers, at so early a day after their arrival in the wilderness, of the necessity of law, order and of government, clearly shows not only a keen moral sense, but the high and refined state of their civilization. Had their state of social, moral and mental development, bordered on, or been but slightly above, half savagery, or even the condition of an ignorant and a rude people, they would have preferred to let society run riot in its wantonness and disorder. On the contrary, they cheerfully, and by the free consent of every member of the community, imposed restraints upon themselves, and limitations on

[1] "Winning of the West," Vol. I, p. 180, note.

[2] Address of A. L. Perry, before Scotch-Irish Congress, "Proceedings," etc., Vol. II, p. 187.

their own conduct, and agreed to yield to those they chose as the representatives of the authority of the community, the obedience due to the majesty of law.

But to my mind the most remarkable thing about this little republic was its comparatively long existence in peace and tranquillity, and its freedom from discontent, disorder or rebellion. The government was in the hands of strong and pure men. But that was not sufficient. Its strength and its success lay in the intelligence and in the high moral and religious sense and conviction of that stern, brave, determined race who constituted a majority of the first population. Here was the source of their security and of their peace, and of that obedience and tranquillity which prevailed throughout the settlements.

It is sometimes said that lawless, desperate characters constituted a large part of the early population. This is a great mistake. Desperate men, such as horse-thieves, and sometimes murderers, did come to the settlements; and after the commencement of the Revolution, tories also, who had fled from Virginia or the Carolinas, sometimes sought refuge in these remote regions; but in every such case, the strong, firm arm of authority reduced such persons to speedy obedience, or drove them from the community.

These pioneers were not hunters. More than two centuries before they had passed the hunter stage in development. They were husbandmen, artisans, teachers, preachers, earnest, serious, brave men, for whom life had an awful significance and mission. Solemn and great duties were to be done. They were to plant the church, build school-houses, fell the forest, and spread the blessings of a benign civilization around them, for themselves and for their children. These sturdy, austere men had neither the time nor the inclination to indulge in the light-hearted amusements, sports and festivities then so universal among the gay and frolicsome Cavaliers of Old Virginia. No, life was too serious, too full of dangers, hardships and solemn

duties for fiddling and dancing, for feasting and visiting, or for following a pack of hounds in the wild chase over the hills and the plains. With them

"Life was real, life was earnest."

It may be well to add a few more words as to who these people were. Of what race and of what religion were they? I have assumed that a majority of them were of the Covenanter race and religion. This, I believe, is the opinion expressed by all writers who have given the question any investigation, such as Roosevelt, David Campbell and Douglas Campbell. But I wish to test this question in a different way. If they were not Covenanters and Presbyterians, who were they? They were certainly not Puritans nor the Dutch of New York, nor Swedes. They were not Quakers nor Germans, though there may have been present a few of these, but we have no account of such a fact. Aside from two noted families—the Seviers and the Shelbys—we have no record of any Huguenots nor Welshmen among the early settlers. Carter was the name of an old Virginia family, and very likely was of Cavalier origin. But excepting this family there is no reason for supposing that there was another Cavalier in the settlements. There may have been a few persons of English blood from Virginia, but they were not Cavaliers. The Cavaliers were quite satisfied with their paradise in the old colony, and had no motive to leave it. They were generally attached to the established Church, and yet there was not a congregation of that faith established in all Upper East Tennessee for more than sixty years after these early settlements.

There were possibly a few Baptists among the settlers, but if so, they were obscure and few in number. It is barely possible that in the early days of the Watauga Association there may have been a Methodist here and there among the settlers, but this is not at all probable, since at as late a period as 1784, there were only seventy of that denomination in all the region including Upper East Tennessee

and South-western Virginia.[1] So, it is clear that the early settlers were not Quakers, were not Episcopalians, not Baptists, nor Methodists, nor of any of the other then existing denominations. A majority was unquestionably of the Covenanter race and of the Presbyterian religion. Previous to that time, or at a period not greatly anterior to it, the terms "Covenanter" and "Presbyterian" were identical in meaning. But about the time indicated, when the Presbyterians began to intermarry with other sects, the term "Covenanter" ceased to indicate certainly, a sect, and gradually came to signify only a race. That is its meaning to-day, and in this sense I use the word.[2]

There is another point in connection with the government of the Watauga Association worthy of observation. It was absolutely free, or democratic, both in theory and in practice. There existed no caste, no conventional distinctions. All citizens were equal before the law. Unlike Massachusetts and Virginia, there were no religious tests. No man was forced under heavy penalties to pay for the support of a church whose doctrines and polity he did not approve. No preference was given to one church over another. No one was compelled to attend church under the penalty of banishment. In a word, there was a free state, a free religion, and perfect freedom of conscience.

[1] Dr. J. B. McFerrin's "History of Methodism in Tennessee," Vol. 1.

[2] I use the term "Covenanter" instead of "Scotch-Irish," because it is more comprehensive as well as more definite in its signification. By it I mean that great body of Scottish people, who in the sixteenth century, signed or approved the Great Covenant of religious liberty, and all their descendants wherever found, especially those in this country. For a long time the term was merely synonymous with that of Presbyterian, since the early Covenanters were of that faith. But in the course of time, by changes in faith, and by intermarriages with other races and sects, it ceased to indicate with certainty a sect, and came to mean a race or a people. In this sense I use the word Covenanter. It is used as a racial or generic term, and is intended to include all persons of Scotch Covenanter blood, whether pure or mixed, and whatever the form of faith they may have adopted. I thus avoid the solecism of using the words Scotch-Irish, which mean Scotch-Scotch, or Irish-Irish, as men prefer to interpret them. See "The Covenanter, the Cavalier and the Puritan," pp. 230, 231.

And thus these Covenanters, with the aid of the Huguenot Sevier, set the example of erecting a republican government, where all men and all religions were on a perfect equality before the law.

There is another singular fact connected with the history of this little republic. It will be remembered that some of the first settlers were the hero patriots who had resisted royal authority at the battle of the Great Alamance, in 1771, and who, being persecuted and outlawed after their defeat, fled to the wilderness beyond the mountains and settled on the Watauga. These men came to the wilderness bringing with them no tender affection for the old mother colony, but bearing in their hearts the memory of many bitter wrongs. Besides, North Carolina had treated the Watauga people with the coldest neglect. They were literally cast off into the wilderness. They had no law, no protection, no government of any kind, except that created by their own courage and their own remarkable capacity for self-preservation and government. It need excite no surprise, then, that these men had no love for their unnatural mother, and preferred living in Virginia.

When the Revolutionary War came on, these settlers were remote from danger, except from the Indians. No hostile army probably would ever invade their secluded retreats. And yet these patriotic men, with a nobility and loftiness of spirit rarely found among any people, hastened to tender their assistance and their means to the parent state in behalf of the common cause.

In a memorial addressed "To the Honorable, the Provincial Council of North Carolina," in 1776, signed by all the members of the legislative and executive committee of the Watauga Association, and by about ninety-one other settlers, they say among other things: "This committee (willing to become a party in the present unhappy contest) resolved (which is now on our records) to adhere strictly to the rules and orders of the Continental Congress, and in open committee acknowledged themselves *indebted*

to the united colonies, their full proportion of the continental expense."

In the conclusion of this remarkable document, these men say: . . . "We pray your mature and deliberate consideration in our behalf, that you may annex us to your province (whether as county, district or other division) in such manner as to enable us to *share in the glorious cause of liberty* . . . and that nothing will be lacking or any thing neglected that may add weight (in the civil and military establishments) to the glorious cause in which we are now struggling." . . . Noble words!

When all the circumstances surrounding these Watauga people are considered, it may be safely affirmed that, in all the records of the Revolution, no higher example of pure, unselfish patriotism can be found than that manifested by by these noble pioneers of Tennessee. They had been neglected and cast off by their mother, but when dangers threatened and encompassed her like filial children they hastened to her defense. They begged to be reannexed to the mother state in order that they might "share in the glorious cause of liberty." The part they bore in the Revolution was too important to be overlooked. Passing over the heroic part they took in the decisive victory of Musgrove Mill, their capture of a strongly fortified fort on the Pacelot River, and their share in the splendid battle of Guilford Court House, in all of which these men took a leading part, under either Colonel John Sevier, or Colonel Isaac Shelby, or Major Charles Robertson, their share in the brilliant victory in the battle of Kings Mountain, from its importance and decisive character, demands a fuller notice, and will be reserved for another chapter.

CHAPTER II.

BATTLE OF KING'S MOUNTAIN.

Perilous condition of the patriot cause in North and South Carolina in 1780—Cornwallis overrunning the country—Insolent message of Colonel Ferguson to the "over-mountain men"—Sevier and Shelby meet to consult—Agree to march with their militia across the mountain to destroy Ferguson—The call on Colonel Campbell to join them—He does so—Sycamore Shoals the rendezvous—Little army assembles there—Incidents before the march—Army sets out on the expedition across the mountains—The long march—Joined on the way by other commands under McDowell, Cleveland, Williams, and others—Campbell selected to command under direction of other officers—Twelve days on the march—Distance marched two hundred and twenty miles—Find Ferguson posted on King's Mountain—Arrangements for attack—The battle described—Ferguson killed—His army destroyed—Effect of the victory on the patriot cause—Character of men engaged in the expedition—Eulogy on Sevier, Shelby, William and Arthur Campbell, James Robertson and John Tipton—Influence of their descendants—The true name of John Tipton.

But little has been known until recent years of the battle of King's Mountain outside of the region which furnished the brave men who participated in it. Historians have passed it over with a few brief words, as if it were too insignificant for the pages of dignified history. And yet it was one of the most important as well as one of the most thrilling and heroic deeds of the Revolution,

In discussing this battle it must be kept in mind that the number of persons capable of bearing arms, in all of the settlements west of the North Carolina mountains, in 1780, was less than one thousand men. Colonel John Sevier at that time commanded the militia of Washington county, and Colonel Isaac Shelby that of Sullivan county. Both were brave and determined men, and both had had some experience in war previous to the Revolution. Shelby had been with his father, Captain Evan Shelby, in the hard-

fought battle of Point Pleasant, or the Kenhawa, and afterward had been with Boone in Kentucky. Sevier had been inured to arms from the days of his young manhood, when he was a captain in the royal army in Virginia. He had had much experience on the frontier in fighting the Indians, from the day he and Robertson defended the fort at Watauga against the attack of the wily old Indian chief, Abraham. As we shall see, Sevier afterward became the first Governor of Tennessee, as Shelby became the first of Kentucky.

The expedition to King's Mountain was unlike any other important military movement of the Revolution. It had its origin and its execution entirely with volunteers. It was ordered by no state or continental authority. It grew out of the voluntary uprising of a patriotic people in defense of their liberties. Toward the autumn of 1780, all of South Carolina and Georgia, and a part of North Carolina, lay prostrate at the feet of the British army. Cornwallis was on his triumphant march through the latter state towards Virginia, in eager expectation of soon reducing that state to submission. In all these three Southern states, there was not, at any one point, a patriot force sufficient to withstand the veterans of Cornwallis for one hour. Colonel Tarlton and Colonel Ferguson, the most daring and skillful partisan officers of the British army, at the head of their justly dreaded commands, were ranging the country on either flank of the main army, arousing and enrolling the tories, and overawing the patriots. The little bands of patriot soldiers which still held together were fleeing for safety to the recesses of the western mountains, and in one or two instances beyond them. In his victorious career Colonel Ferguson had advanced westwardly into the very border of the great mountain range which separated the older settlements from the new on the distant Watauga. It was indeed a dark hour for the patriot cause. The Southern States seemed to be irretrievably lost.

Early in September, remembering how the mountain

men under Shelby, Sevier and Major Robertson had snatched victory from the British army on several occasions during the last previous months, Colonel Ferguson released a prisoner, named Samuel Phillips, and in his haughty arrogance, sent him with a verbal message to the officers commanding beyond the mountains, saying: "that if they did not desist from their opposition to the British army, he would march his army over the mountains, hang their leaders, and lay their country waste with fire and sword."[1]

The brave, proud spirited men on the Holston, the Watauga and the Nolichucky, to whom this insolent message was sent, were quick to resent the insult, and accept the haughty challenge it contained. Colonel Isaac Shelby, to whom the message was delivered, road at once forty miles to consult Colonel Sevier, and to concert measures for their protection. After many long hours—some authorities say two days—of anxious consultation, they decided on the bold and daring plan of summoning their followers, marching at once across the mountains, and surprising and destroying their haughty enemy. When all the facts are taken into account, perhaps no bolder or more audacious enterprise was ever conceived or undertaken. But it was in perfect harmony with the nature and spirit of these daring men. It was agreed that Colonel William Campbell, commanding in Washington county, Virginia, adjoining Sullivan county, should be invited to join the expedition with his force. He at first declined to do so, because he thought he could do more effective service on the southern border of his own state in resisting the advance of Cornwallis. But on a second request from Colonel Shelby he changed his mind. He accordingly called out two hundred men, and promptly marched to the place of rendezvous, at Sycamore Shoals, on the Watauga. Colonels Shelby and Sevier each called out two hundred

[1] "King's Mountain and its Heroes," by Lyman Draper, p. 169.



SAMUEL DOAK, D.D.

Founder and First President of Washington College, 1780.

and forty men from their respective commands. Not another man could be spared. They were needed at home to defend the settlements against the hostile Cherokees, who were ever ready to fall upon them. The money necessary for the expedition was raised on the personal credit of Shelby and Sevier. It was borrowed from John Adair, the entry taker of North Carolina, for Sullivan county. Said he when approached on the subject: "The money is not mine. I have no right to touch one cent of it. But if our cause is lost, it will do the state no good. If by its use, we can save our liberties, surely I can trust that country to justify and vindicate my conduct. Take it." A reply worthy to be engraved on marble.[1]

On the ever memorable 25th of September, 1780, there was witnessed on the banks of the Watauga a scene which will go down in history as one of the striking events of the Revolution. Here was assembled nearly every human being belonging to the settlements of the Holston, the Watauga and the Nolichucky, as well as many from Southwest Virginia. Here was the soldierly Colonel Campbell—ruddy and fair, like his kinsmen the renowned Argyles of Scotland—with two hundred devoted followers from over the border. Here was Colonel Isaac Shelby, stern and stalwart, almost a youth, and yet a veteran in service, with two hundred and forty men from the sparse settlements on the Holston. And here was Colonel John Sevier, sprightly, alert and fascinating, with two hundred and forty men gathered from the settlements of the Watauga and the Nolichucky. All these were virtually volunteers. They had mustered on their own volition. They had come together from a common impulse of patriotism. Here also was the scholarly young pioneer minister, the celebrated Samuel Doak, who had come from his infant church and classical school at Salem, nearly

[1] John Adair afterward settled in Knox county, where he died in 1827, aged ninety-five years. He was a member of the first Constitutional Convention of Tennessee, in 1796.

thirty miles away, to lend by his presence his influence to the great occasion. And here were the aged fathers and mothers, the wives and the sisters of the patriots, come to say good-bye, and to bid them God-speed in their perilous expedition. All was bustle and excitement as the hasty preparations went forward.

Anxiety with deep determination sat on each brow. Nearly every man present wished to go. But that was impossible. Some must remain behind to guard against an Indian outbreak. "Here," exclaimed "Bonnie Kate," the young second wife of Colonel Sevier, pointing to a lad of sixteen, "here, Mr. Sevier, is another of your boys who wants to go with you and his brothers to the war, but, poor fellow, we have no horse for him, and it is too great a distance for him to walk." But either with or without a horse, we do not know which, brave James Sevier did go.[1]

While preparations went forward the patriots were thrown into a tumult of rejoicing by the unexpected arrival of Colonel Arthur Campbell, the cousin and brother-in-law of Colonel William Campbell, with two hundred more gallant men from Virginia. After the departure of Colonel William Campbell with two hundred men, Colonel Arthur Campbell became anxious about the fate of the brave men who were about to undertake this long and perilous expedition. So he raised two hundred more men in South-west Virginia and hastily marched at their head to the Watauga. He arrived in time for them to join the main force, then on the point of marching. Among the many examples of noble and sublime patriotism, so conspicuously shown on this occasion by both leaders and soldiers, none surpass, in heroic devotion to the great cause of American liberty, that of this eminent man. By reason of this splendid contribution to the signal success of the expedition, he is

[1] Draper's "King's Mountain," p. 179.

justly entitled to be ranked as one of its heroes.[1] Having delivered his men to Colonel William Campbell he hastened back home, says Draper, "to anxiously watch the frontiers of the Holston, now so largely stripped of their natural defenders.[2]

Never was there gathered together a more determined nor a more patriotic body of men than that day assembled on the banks of the beautiful Watauga. They were for the most part the pious, austere descendants of the brave old Covenanters of Scotland who more than two hundred years before at Gray Friars Church had signed (some with their own blood we are told) the great Covenant and League, and with hands uplifted to heaven had sworn to defend their religion and their liberties "all the days of their lives." And most nobly had they and their descendants kept the great Covenant through trial, persecution and battle in Scotland, in Ireland and in the colonies from that day till the gathering at Sycamore Shoals, September 25, 1780.

All things being ready for the march, early on the morning of the 26th, the men were drawn up to receive a benediction. The Rev. Samuel Doak invoked the divine blessing on the little army, and set each pious Covenanter heart on fire by a reference to the slaughter of the Midianites by Gideon under the guidance of the Lord. He gave them, in conclusion, as a battle cry, as of old: "The sword of the Lord and of Gideon."[3]

Assuredly great captains would be needed to lead this

[1] Colonel Arthur Campbell was the grandfather of the eminent Governor William B. Campbell of Tennessee, more fully noticed elsewhere, so distinguished fifty years ago as a jurist, a gallant officer in the Mexican War, and for his many virtues.

[2] Draper's "King's Mountain," p. 175.

[3] There is a tradition that it was either the Rev. Charles Cummins, of Virginia, or the Rev. Samuel Doak who officiated that day. The venerable Dr. J. G. M. Ramsey, the historian of Tennessee, told the author a few months before his death that his best opinion was that it was Doak. He said he preached from the Scripture quoted.

little army. They were to penetrate a country two hundred miles wide held by a large victorious army, and were to encounter the daring Ferguson, with Tarlton near at hand, each having a larger command than the attacking force. The region they were to enter was swarming with tories, stirred into unwonted zeal and activity by the presence of royal armies. These tories, it was known, would constantly annoy and impede the advance of the little patriot force, and furnish their friends with news of its every movement. They would hang on its flanks and in its rear, thus greatly enhancing its danger and retarding its retreat in case of disaster. On every side there was extreme peril. According to all military probability, as we know the facts now, the patriot force could hardly escape.

Early on the morning of the 26th of September the bugle sounded the signal, and the little army on the banks of the Watauga took up its march. Soon it was lost in the depths of the mountains. Its way lay for nearly a hundred miles through the great ranges and lofty peaks of the Apalachies. A constant succession of stupendous mountains impeded their progress. The country was literally a wilderness. Not an open road, not a habitation, not a sign of human life was to be seen in these vast mountain solitudes until Burke county was reached. There were only bridle paths to guide the march.

On reaching the settlements in Burke and Rutherford counties the over-mountain men were, from time to time, joined by small forces under Colonel Charles McDowell, Colonel Cleveland, Major Winston, Colonel Hambright, Major Graham and Major Chronicle, of North Carolina, and by Colonels Lacy, Hill, and Williams, of South Carolina. The entire army when united numbered about eighteen hundred men.

In the commencement of the march from the Watauga, the officers agreed to meet each night, and determine the plan of operations for the next day. No one was in chief

command, and no one claimed this right The senior officer, whoever he was (probably Colonel Shelby), intent only on the success of the great cause of human liberty, entirely ignored himself and his own claims and thought only of his country. Now, however, as there were several more officers present, as they were in the enemy's country, and were approaching the object of the expedition and a final conflict with a daring enemy, a more "*efficient organization*" was needed. Accordingly, Colonel Shelby, who in all things seemed animated alone by a supreme love of the cause of independence, magnanimously proposed that Colonel Campbell, who had marched the greatest distance and commanded the largest number of men, should be placed in chief command, until they could send to General Gates for General Morgan or some other ranking officer. This proposition was generously acceded to by the other officers, and thus Colonel Campbell became the commander of the expedition. Campbell, in a noble spirit, urged that Shelby should accept the command for himself. But the latter firmly refused, saying that the officers—all of whom were older than himself—would not willingly serve under one so much younger than they. Colonel Charles McDowell, a good patriot and a competent officer, was in fact entitled to the command, but it was thought by Shelby that he was not sufficiently active and alert for the great enterprise they were then pushing forward. McDowell gracefully yielded to the decision of his companions, and by request set out for the headquarters of General Gates to ask that a high officer be sent forward. Major Joseph McDowell then took charge of his brother's troops, and with them rendered faithful service in the impending battle.[1]

"Campbell," says Draper, "now assumed the chief command, in which, however, he was to be directed and regulated by the determination of the colonels, who were to meet every day for consultation."[2] Colonel Hill said that

[1] Draper's "King's Mountain," pp. 186–190. [2] Id., p. 190.

he was made commander "in courtesy to him and his regiment, who had marched the greatest distance."[1] Colonel Campbell thus became the executive officer to carry out the orders agreed upon by the general council.

Ferguson on the first appearance of the patriots south of the mountains retreated. When he reached King's Mountain, confident of his own skill and the strength of his position, and perhaps despising the men from the "Back Water country," as he called the patriots, he halted to accept battle. But it must be remembered that several days before this he had sent dispatches to Cornwallis, at Charlotte, thirty miles away, gently hinting that he needed help, and that he finally asked that Tarlton might be sent. Fortunately for our little band of heroes the first couriers were captured, or so delayed on the way by the many little bands of patriots then in motion, that the request for help did not reach Cornwallis until the day of battle. He also sent to Colonel Cruger, at Ninety-six, for reinforcements. Except for these failures, the patriot army, in all probability, would have encountered Tarlton as well as Ferguson. The latter remained in his fancied strong position in the expectation every hour of receiving reinforcements. He impiously declared "that God Almighty could not drive him from it." He was too proud spirited to retreat in the face of his previous boasts. But there can scarcely be a doubt that he would have done so if he had not been confident of help. It thus appears how narrowly the patriot army escaped the hazard of a doubtful contest with a greatly superior force. It must be kept in mind that these patriots went, not on a modern "raid" to destroy property, but to fight. Their purpose was to destroy the man who had sent them the insolent message a few weeks before. They would have fought just as readily, if he had had twice or thrice the force he actu-

[1] Draper's "King's Mountain," p. 226.

ally had. They knew no fear, and were determined to conquer.

The last two days of the march were occupied by a hurried pursuit of Ferguson. The patriots feared he might escape by falling back on Cornwallis. So they determined to rid themselves of every incumbrance, and to make a forced march to overtake him. They therefore selected the best horses and men in order to move with the greatest celerity. These amounted to nine hundred and ten. Thus, from Campbell's men, two hundred were taken; from Shelby's one hundred and twenty; Sevier's one hundred and twenty; Cleveland's one hundred and ten; McDowell's ninety; Winston's sixty; Lacy's one hundred; Williams' sixty, and Graham and Hambright's fifty. The Georgians were united with Williams' little force, while Chronicle's men united with Graham's.[1] Besides the horsemen thus selected, there seems to have been a few men following on foot, who failed to reach the battle-field.

Thus reorganized, the patriots pushed on all night, through a drizzling rain, which was excessively hard a part of the time. The night was very dark. At sunrise they forded the Broad River, the stream being deep and, as its name indicates, broad. They had now been in the saddle, with only a short rest, about twenty-four hours. They were still fifteen miles from King's Mountain. The rain continued to fall so heavily during the stormy forenoon that it was proposed by some of the officers to halt and rest. But the stern and determined Shelby, eager and impatient for the battle, positively refused to stop a minute. They therefore hurried forward with all the speed they could put into their horses. About noon the rain ceased, the clouds passed away, and the sun came out—a happy presage of victory.

A brief council of war was held while the army was

[1] Draper's "King's Mountain," p. 227.

still in motion. The patriot force was arranged in four columns, led respectively by Campbell and Sevier on the right and Shelby and Cleveland on the left. Ferguson was posted on an oblong mountain, in South Carolina, a short distance beyond the North Carolina line, some six hundred yards long, and on the top from sixty to one hundred and twenty wide. The plan of battle was to surround the mountain, and simultaneously attack Ferguson from the four sides. When positively assured that the enemy remained on the mountain, the patriots broke into a gallop, and dashed forward until they were within a mile of the object of their long pursuit. They had now marched, according to the daily record made at the time, two hundred and ten or perhaps two hundred and twenty-five miles. Here they dismounted, quickly tied their horses, reprimed their guns, and made hasty arrangements for the battle. A second opportunity was given to any of the men who might desire to retire, to do so, but to the honor of this immortal Spartan band, there was not a coward among them.

At three o'clock, or a little later, October 7, 1780, the several columns rapidly moved out to their respective positions. Soon the sharp crack of the celebrated Deckard rifle rang out on the clear mountain air.[1] Then the yell of the patriots, as they dashed up the rocky sides of the mountain, was heard, announcing that the battle had begun. As they reached the top, the shrill silver whistle of Ferguson was heard above the din and noise of battle, sounding the signal for a bayonet charge. The trained veterans, with dreadful momentum and celerity, rushed forward with their death-dealing bayonets, driving the

[1] The patriots were largely, if not almost entirely, armed with this celebrated gun, manufactured at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, by a man named Deckard. It carried a ball running from thirty to seventy bullets to the pound. The gun was remarkable for its precision and long range. My grandfather, Major Temple, carried in this battle one of these guns of twenty-five balls to the pound, and it was afterwards called "Old King's Mountain."

patriots down the mountain. Now the silver whistle was again heard, recalling the pursuers. While the patriots on one side of the mountain were recoiling from the deadly bayonets of Ferguson's serried phalanx, other patriot columns had appeared on the summit, and were pouring their fatal shot into the rear of the enemy. High above all this noise the silver whistle was again heard, ordering a charge on the other side of the mountain. Again the mountain men fell back before the terrible bayonets, and again the pursuers were recalled to meet new enemies, who constantly appeared on the mountain crest. Three times Shelby's and Campbell's men were driven down the mountain—the last time the retreat becoming almost a rout—and three times they were rallied and led back to the fight by their brave leaders. The mountain smoked like a volcano. A flame of fire encircled it and flashed from every side. Closer and closer the cordon of fire was drawn around the doomed army of Ferguson. Wherever the danger was thickest, there was Ferguson, urging on his veteran soldiers. Wherever the battle raged the fiercest, there was ever heard the shrill sound of the whistle of this dauntless officer. With sword in hand, he was everywhere seen encouraging his men. Twice flags were run up by his men, in token of surrender, and twice Ferguson indignantly struck them down. He was urged by Major De Peyster, his second in command, to surrender. He swore he would "never yield to such a d—d banditti."

The British had been pressed into a narrow space on the mountain-top by the impetuous mountain men, who were pouring deadly volleys into the huddled mass from every quarter. Ferguson, seeing that all was lost, determined to cut his way out. With a few followers, and with desperate courage, he spurred forward into the midst of his enemies, cutting and slashing with his sword until it was broken. But keen eyes were fastened on him. Soon he fell in death, pierced by half a dozen bullets. White handkerchiefs were now hoisted on ramrods as signals of sur-

render. But more or less firing still continued on the part of the hot-headed young men, who remembered the savage treatment Tarlton had given Colonel Buford on a previous occasion. "Quarter! Quarter!" imploringly shouted the British, as the firing still went on. The intrepid Shelby, seeing that they still retained their arms in their hands, rushed forward on horseback and shouted, in his extraordinary voice: "D—n you, if you want quarter, throw down your arms!" Quickly this was done, and the firing ceased.

The battle lasted just one hour and five minutes. In this dreadful time, short as it was, two hundred and twenty men on the enemy's side had perished, and one hundred and eighty were wounded. Four hundred out of eleven hundred—a frightful havoc! Either six or seven hundred (the authorities differ as to the exact number) were taken prisoners. General Greene gave the number of prisoners taken as "upward of six hundred." This is probably as near the truth as the discrepancies will allow. Of those present in the fight, not one escaped. On the side of the patriots, twenty-eight were killed and sixty-one wounded. Among the former were the brave Colonel Williams, of South Carolina, Major Chronicle, of North Carolina, and Captain Robert Sevier, from the Nolichucky, mortally wounded, besides a number of other officers.

No enterprise of the Revolution was more daring in conception or more skillful in execution than this. The expedition to Canada and the attempt on Quebec, in 1777, under General Arnold, were perhaps as daring and as dangerous, but they failed of success. The dash of Colonel Ethan Allen on Ticonderoga was certainly one of great boldness. But it sinks far below King's Mountain, whether considered in reference to the numbers engaged, or the importance of the success to the general cause of independence. The capture of Stony Point by General Wayne, in 1779, was a brilliant affair and, from a military point of view, of the greatest importance to the patriot cause. But

Wayne had four regiments of men at his command, was backed by all the resources of the main army under Washington; the garrison to be attacked was feeble in numbers, and the distance to be marched only a few miles.

In boldness of conception and in marvelous success in execution, the expedition of General George Rogers Clarke into Illinois, in 1780, is the only one during the Revolution that will bear a successful comparison with that of King's Mountain. In its immediate consequences, in its influence on the great contest then going on in the colonies for independence and freedom, the conquest of Clarke, brilliant as it certainly was, had but little potency.

There seems to have been but little of ordinary military discipline and military forms in this expedition and in this battle. Shelby said to the army: "When you encounter the enemy, don't wait for the command. Let each one of you be your own officer. . . . If in the woods, shelter yourselves and give them Indian play; advance from tree to tree. Never shoot till you see the enemy, and never shoot without bringing down your man."

There was indeed but little regular training and discipline among the common soldiers of this expedition. They were not of the material of which armies are usually composed. They needed but little training. They were almost entirely the intelligent, independent proprietors of their own little farms from the Upper Holston, in Virginia; from the Watauga, the Nolichucky and the Lower Holston, in what is now East Tennessee; from the Yadkin and the Broad River region of North Carolina, and from York and Chester counties, in South Carolina. Many of the latter, from South Carolina, had seen service under Sumter. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that this little army was made up of raw recruits wholly unused to war. While they were not trained veterans, there was scarcely a man among them who had not before seen active service in one or more short campaigns against either the British or the In-

dians. Many of them had been inured to irregular warfare from their boyhood. From their frontier life they had been accustomed to danger in all its forms. Many of them had just served in the short but successful campaign in South Carolina, under Shelby and Robertson. They had been with these brave officers at Musgrove Mill, at Cedar Spring and Thickety Fort. Many others had seen much hard service of a more regular character, under McDowell, Cleveland, Winston, Hambright, Lacy, Graham and Williams. And others still had gained hard experience in short campaigns, under Colonels William and Arthur Campbell, in Virginia, or Colonel Sevier in Indian fights in Tennessee. And the roll shows that a number of tried men at King's Mountain had served with Colonel Evan Shelby in the memorable battle of Point Pleasant, in 1774. While, perhaps, all these men had seen some service in the field, they by no means constituted a trained army.

Worthless characters, such as often hang on the outskirts of society, not identified in interest and sympathy with the community, had from the first been speedily disposed of in a summary manner by Sevier and Robertson, in the Watauga settlements, and by the Campbells in Virginia. Never were communities more exacting in the selection of their members. None but persons above all reproach, none but those who came to identify themselves with a noble movement to build up a pure civilization, based on the principles of freedom and Christianity, were permitted to remain.

Draper says of these men:

"Those from the Holston, under Campbell, were a peculiar people—somewhat of the character of Cromwell's soldiery. They were almost to a man Presbyterians. In their homes, in the Holston Valley, they were settled in pretty compact congregations, quite tenacious of their religious and civil liberties, as handed down from father to son from their Scotch-Irish ancestors. Their preacher, Rev. Charles

Cummins, was well fitted for the times; a man of piety and sterling patriotism, who constantly exerted himself to encourage his people to make every needed sacrifice and put forth every exertion in defense of the liberties of their country. They were a remarkable body of men, both physically and mentally. Inured to frontier life, raised mostly in Augusta and Rockbridge counties, Virginia, a frontier region in the French and Indian War, they early settled on the Holston, and were accustomed from their childhood to border life and hardship; ever ready at the tap of the drum to turn out on military service; if, in the busiest crop season, their wives, sisters and daughters could, in their absence, plant and sow and harvest. They were better educated than most of the frontier settlers, and had a more thorough understanding of the questions at issue between the colonies and their mother country. These men went forth to strike their country's foes as did the patriarchs of old, feeling assured that the God of battles was with them, and that He would surely crown their efforts with success. They had no doubts, no fears. They trusted in God—and kept their powder dry. Such a thing as a coward was not known among them.

"Lacy's men, mostly from York and Chester counties, South Carolina, and some of those under Shelby, Sevier, Cleveland, Williams, Winston and McDowell were of the same character—Scotch-Irish Presbyterians; but many of them, especially those from the Nolichucky, Watauga and Lower Holston, who had not been very long settled on the frontiers, were more of a mixed race, somewhat rough, but brave, fearless and full of adventure. They were not a whit less patriotic than the Virginians, and were ever ready to hug a bear, scalp an Indian, or beard the fiercest tories wherever they could be found." [1]

The distinction drawn in the foregoing extracts between the people of Washington county, Virginia, and those

[1] Draper's "King's Mountain," p. 242.

dwelling across the state line, in Tennessee, on the Lower Holston, on the Watauga and on the Nolichucky, is not well founded. All these settlements were formed of people of substantially the same race and the same origin.

A large majority of these early settlers, both in Southwest Virginia and in East Tennessee, as I attempted to show in the preceding chapter, were of Covenanter, or Scotch-Irish, blood, of the same characteristics, the same intellectual advancement and the same religion. Of the former the Rev. Charles Cummins and the Campbells were representative types, and of the latter the Rev. Samuel Doak and James Robertson.

It is therefore evident that the people on the Tennessee side of the line, in 1780, were in nowise inferior to those on the Virginia side. Mr. Draper has cited no authority in support of his statements in this regard, and it is believed he had none. He has drawn a disparaging distinction between two people, when in fact no material difference existed. Both Douglas Campbell and Theodore Roosevelt, as we have seen, sustain this view, of Mr. Draper's error.[1]

The three leading men of this expedition, and the three who became most eminent by their achievements, were Colonel William Campbell, Colonel Isaac Shelby and Colonel John Sevier.

On the occasion of the seizure of the arsenal and arms of the Colony of Virginia by the royal governor, Dunmore, Colonel Campbell had raised a company, and had marched from the extreme south-western part of the state to Williamsburgh—a distance of probably four hundred miles—to aid in defense of the state. From that time until 1780 he had been active in the service of the colonies, a part of the time serving in the field. He was a brave and skillful officer. As early as January 27, 1775, he and Colonel Arthur Campbell and other prominent citizens of

[1] Roosevelt's "Winning of the West," Vol. I, p. 180, note.

Fincastle county, from their little settlement on the remote Holston, had sent an address to the Continental Congress, declaring their determination to "live as freemen," or to die in the defense of "liberty and loyalty."[1]

Colonel Shelby, as we have seen, when a mere youth, had served as a lieutenant under his father, Captain (afterward General) Evan Shelby in the great and desperate Indian battle of Point Pleasant.[2] In the summer of 1780, he served in the South with distinguished honor as colonel in the engagements at Thickety Fort, Cedar Springs, and Musgrove's Mill. In each he displayed dauntless courage and high military capacity. He was, in fact, a natural commander of men.

It is difficult to read Draper's elaborate history of this expedition without being forced to the conclusion that the master spirit of it was Shelby, though he was evidently not the hero of the author. Aside from Shelby's agency in originating (in conjunction with Sevier) this enterprise, and successfully putting it on foot, in every step subsequently taken his paramount influence was manifest. It was he who successfully settled the question of command, which, if not settled, might and doubtless would have weakened, delayed and finally defeated the object of the expedition. One little incident related by Draper reveals the kind of man Shelby was in war. On the morning of the day of the battle, after having traveled hard through the rain since the evening before, many of the horses having given out, and the men being hungry and exhausted, Campbell, Sevier and Cleveland, concluded that it was best to make a halt and refresh the men and horses. So they rode up to Shelby and informed him of their determination. He replied roughly, with an oath: "I will not stop until night, if I follow Ferguson into Cornwallis' lines." With-

[1] Campbell's "Puritan in Holland, England, and America," Vol. II, pp. 479, 486.

[2] Draper's "King's Mountain," p. 381.

out a word of reply the other officers returned to their several commands.[1] Shelby was in stature of great size; his aspect was grave, dignified and stern; his eyes bright and penetrating; his voice stentorian, and his countenance lighted with intellectual activity. A glance at him showed the observer that he was no ordinary man. In courage and determination he was equal to the demands of the most exacting situation. He pursued his object with unfaltering energy. His subsequent career was full of unusual honors and patriotic services. Having moved to Kentucky, he was chosen the first governor of the state, and served in that honorable position for two years. When the country was shrouded in the deep gloom of the War of 1812, his fellow-citizens again turned to him for wisdom and guidance, by electing him for the second time chief executive of the commonwealth. In 1813, he led the Kentucky troops in the Canadian Campaign, which resulted in the glorious victory of the Thames. In 1817, he was appointed Secretary of War by President Monroe, which high office he was compelled to decline on account of advancing age. In 1818, he was appointed by President Monroe, together with Andrew Jackson, to negotiate a treaty with the Chickasaw Indians, by which the title to all the land west of the Tennessee River, in Tennessee and Kentucky, passed to the United States.

The third of these three remarkable men, Colonel John Sevier, was not less worthy or distinguished than the other two. He had been a soldier from the time he held a commission as captain in the royal army in Virginia, under Governor Dunmore. He had been in many fights with the fierce Cherokees, and was the recognized defender of the settlements. It was he who was the author of the remarkable address from the Independent Watauga Association to the Provincial Council of North Carolina, in 1776, in which, as we have seen, that body asked to be allowed

[1] Draper's "King's Mountain," p. 227.

to contribute their part of the expenses of the Revolution, and to "share in the glorious cause of liberty." The uniform leadership accorded to Colonel Sevier, the high honors achieved by him, and his almost unexampled influence from his first advent in the settlements of East Tennessee, in 1770 or 1771, down to his death, in 1815, conclusively prove the remarkable strength and integrity of his character. A man who was able to defy and successfully withstand the opposition of General Jackson, as he did, was surely no ordinary person. In person, he was tall, graceful and handsome; in manners, vivacious and knightly. He was born to be the idol of men, and, therefore, their leader. For nearly forty years, his sway over the hearts and minds of the people among whom he dwelt was unbroken, and as absolute as that of a Scottish chief over his clan in the sixteenth century. His genius for command in battle, especially such as the "hurly-burly" of King's Mountain, was proven in more than thirty successful Indian battles. His rules of war were: rapidity of movement, a surprise, an impetuous charge. The whole campaign of King's Mountain was in perfect accord with his practice in war. Honors crowned his whole civil life, until its close, in 1815. Honored by an election as the first chief magistrate of the state, as his intimate friend and associate in war had been in Kentucky, he was subsequently five times re-elected to the same high office. He was, at intervals, three times elected a member of congress, and, finally, while absent on an important mission in the Creek nation, under an appointment of President Madison, was again elected, without opposition, for the fourth time by his devoted constituents. But he never returned to fill this position.

The honors won by these men in the brilliant victory of King's Mountain were about equal. Where each had an honorable position, and an independent command assigned to him, and each did his full duty in action, it would be unjust to claim any higher honors for one than for the

others. The same is true of Colonel Cleveland also—the fourth division commander. But this brave officer had no share in the honor of the early part of this glorious expedition.

Before closing this chapter, I may appropriately refer to the great influence that has been exerted upon society during the last hundred years by the Shelbys, the Campbells, the Seviers, and the Robertsons, and their collaterals in blood. To these I may properly add the name of Major John Tipton, since he was the second in command in Sevier's regiment at King's Mountain, at Guilford Court-house, and on other fields of valor during the Revolution. He was unquestionably one of the bravest and best patriots of the Revolution. The great and widely-extended influence that has been exercised by the families bearing these honored names, and by those of their blood, but not of the family name, show how strongly our people cling to the glory of noble deeds and illustrious names. In each of these families there has descended to their posterity, not only exalted names, but many of the lofty virtues, and much of the nobility of soul, which distinguished their ancestors. There have appeared in each generation, in the ever-widening circle in descent, much of that genuine robustness, that strength of character which belonged to their distinguished ancestors. Marked traits of character, such as courage, determination, eloquence, honor, stateliness and majesty of person, marvelous will-power, and the faculty to fascinate and lead—these, or some of these, are constantly appearing in the descendants of these old families.

These numerous descendants, multiplied by five or six generations, have swollen into almost tens of thousands. They are to be found in almost every Southern and in many of the North-western states. They have furnished honored, and in some cases, brilliant and distinguished representatives, to the National Senate and House of

Representatives, governors of states, judges and members of the bar, legislators of the states, high officers in war, in the pulpit, and in all the walks of private life. They have given at least four United States senators to the nation, six governors of states, a number of generals and representatives in congress, and many legislators and judges and other high functionaries.

So distinguished were the founders of these families, that, in an earlier age and in a royal government, titles of nobility would have rewarded their services, and descended to their posterity, It would be difficult to name in the Southern States five families that have exercised such wide influence, and combined on the whole so many high and noble qualities.[1]

As we recede from the revolution, I fear that its great events become less and less sacred and inspiring. In the

[1] It is singular how writers and even relatives, have become confounded as to the Christian name of John Tipton. In Lyman Draper's exhaustive history of "King's Mountain and its Heroes,"—the only full history of that battle ever written—the major who was second in command under Sevier, in that and in other battles is called Jonathan Tipton. Draper says that Jonathan Tipton died in Overton county, Tennessee, in 1832, aged eighty-three. Haywood and Phelan, both historians of Tennessee, call the officer who was major under Sevier, John Tipton. Ramsey, another historian, while generally calling him John, in two or three places speaks of Major Tipton as Jonathan Tipton.

Seeing this discrepancy, and knowing the general accuracy and high character of Draper as a historian, I was naturally led to an investigation of the question: Which is the correct name? For this purpose I set on foot an extensive inquiry. This, for a while, resulted in worse confusion. One direct descendant, who had traced out the history of Tipton with great care, said that John and Jonathan were the same persons, known by both these names. Another person, who professed to know all about the Tiptons, and who had studied the early history of Upper East Tennessee more minutely than any one within my knowledge, said very positively that the true name was Jonathan Tipton, and that he died while a member of the legislature in Nashville, in 1836, and was buried there, receiving the honor of a public funeral on the part of the state. A number of relatives and intelligent gentlemen, to whom I applied, were unable to give any information.

Finally, I was indebted to Dr. A. Jobe, of Elk Park, North Carolina, a great grandson of John Tipton—a gentleman of education and intelli-

rush of passing events, we are forgetting the sacrifices, the toils and the heroic deeds of our patriot forefathers. Would that we could have one spark of the fire of seventy-six to warm our hearts with a patriotic glow. For one, I would uncover my head, at the name and in the presence of the majestic men of the Revolution.

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gence—for a solution of this question. He says the name was John and not Jonathan Tipton. He does not say in so many words that John Tipton was never called Jonathan until recently, but it is clear from his statement that he was not. Instead of dying in Overton county, in 1832, or in Nashville, in 1836, and being buried in one of these places, or in both, according to the different accounts, he died and was buried on his farm in Washington county, Tennessee, one and one-half miles south of Johnson City, where he lived at the time of his battle with John Sevier. He had nine sons. Two of these were Jonathan and John. The first settled in Blount county, Tennessee, and represented that county in the legislature again and again. According to the account I have, he was no doubt mistaken by some persons for his father and confounded with him. It is probable he was buried at the public expense when he died as a member of the legislature. John Tipton, the youngest son, remained in Carter county and became somewhat distinguished. He served on the staff of General Jackson at New Orleans, and was complimented by the old hero for his daring and courage. It is a reproach to the state, or to the people of the state, or to his numerous friends and relatives, that "no rock shows the last resting place" of one of the bravest heroes and best patriots of the Revolution.

CHAPTER III.

THE EARLY INHABITANTS OF EAST TENNESSEE.

Early inhabitants—Covenanters—Establishment of colleges and grammar schools—Cession of territory by North Carolina—"Territory Southwest of the River Ohio" established—Constitutional Convention of 1796—Bill of Rights—Safeguards of liberty—Error in not providing for universal education—Error of states in reference to same—Wisdom of congress—Older states received no benefit from act of 1785—Universities and colleges—Waste of public lands on railroad corporations—Folly of congress as to universal education—Land-owners the conservative force and the main-stay of the Republic—Character of early settlers of East Tennessee—All were toilers—The women—Spinning and weaving—The Sabbath in early times—Attending church—political discussions—Religious controversies—People well informed on these subjects—Leisure of the people.

In my last chapter I briefly referred to the coming of the Covenanters into East Tennessee, and the part they took in the Revolutionary War. They had borne a great and honorable part in achieving our independence. The war was now over. Henceforth they were to tread the quiet paths of peace. Yet their history was to be no less honorable in peace than it had been in war. Wherever they had been, they had been the friends of education. In every place where they had settled, they had at once provided the means for the higher education of their people. As far as possible they established schools for every congregation. Colleges and grammar schools were provided for larger districts, as recommended at an early day by the Synod of North Carolina. The preacher, in those days, and even down to a much latter day, was a teacher also. These schools were generally theological as well as classical. The ministers were educated in all the learning of the day. While they still resided in Ireland, they received their training in the great universities of Scotland, at Glasgow

and Edinburgh. When they came to the colonies, these same men opened classical schools in the wilderness for the higher education of young men. They brought to the New World the learning of the Old, and by means of their numerous grammar schools and colleges, it was transmitted to their successors. But there could not be, except by the state, and there was not, free and universal education. Before the close of the century these educated ministers had established and put into successful operation, in East Tennessee, three institutions of learning: Washington College, Greeneville College and Blount College, the first in 1780. These all became great centers of learning, and all survive to this day. Washington College was the first educational institution in the Mississippi Valley.[1]

The legislature of North Carolina, in 1789, ceded her western territory, now known as Tennessee, to the Government of the United States. Congress having accepted the deed of cession, passed an act for the establishment and the government of this territory, under the name of the "Territory South-west of the River Ohio." Why it should have been spoken of as the "Territory South-west of the River Ohio," is certainly singular, when it is remembered that this territory nowhere touched the Ohio River, the State of Kentucky intervening between Tennessee and that river.

In 1796, the people of Tennessee, through their chosen delegates, assembled in convention at Knoxville, to frame their state constitution. Their work is a monument of

[1] It is a singular fact that precisely the same claim is made in Kentucky, for Transylvania Seminary, at Lexington. The facts on which this claim is based are these: In 1780, the legislature of Virginia chartered Transylvania Seminary as an educational institution. But it seems that it was not ready to receive students until 1788. Eight years after Samuel Doak opened his school at Salem, and five years after it was incorporated as Martin Academy. It thus appears that Washington College is the oldest educational institution put into operation in the Mississippi Valley.—Carl Schurz' "Life of Henry Clay."

their foresight and intelligence. If they had not been taught by recent sad experience, and by volumes of tradition full of warning, many of the safeguards to be found in that constitution would not have been put there. Every declaration in the "Bill of Rights" has an historic cause, full of warning and significant import. No people ever had greater reason for exercising wisdom and caution than these Covenanters. Of the thirty-two articles composing the "Declartion of Rights," all but three were intended to close the door forever against the exercise of arbitrary power on the part of all persons in authority. Nearly every one of them was the sequence of some great wrong which they or their ancestors had suffered, a repetition of which was thus to be prevented. How full of meaning to the descendants of the old Covenanters were the following articles:

"II. That government being instituted for the common benefit, the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive to the good and happiness of mankind.

"III. That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship the Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can, of right, be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship or to maintain any ministry against his consent; that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience; that no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship.

"IV. That no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust in this state."

It would seem that the convention might have been satisfied with these safeguards for the security of their religion; but it was not. It closed the door by the following article against the very men who had been the most active in the colonies in preaching and teaching armed resistance to the British crown:

"VIII. Whereas, ministers of the gospel are, by their

profession, dedicated to God and the care of souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their functions; therefore, no minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatever, shall be eligible to a seat in either house of the legislature."

There seems to have been a little undercurrent of irony in this article, when the exclusion of ministers from legislative honors and duties is placed on the ground that "they ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their functions." It may be noted that there was at least one minister who was a member of the convention, namely, Stephens Brooks, a prominent Methodist in his day, and a good man, and that he voted to retain this clause.

There was still one more clause necessary, in the opinion of the convention, for the complete security and perpetuity of religion, and that was this:

"No person who denies the being of God or a future state of rewards and punishments, shall *hold any office* in the civil department of the state."

Our fathers builded wisely and solidly. If their work should perish and pass away, it will be no fault of theirs. Everything was done that human wisdom could do to secure for themselves and their posterity the blessings of freedom and religion.

The only great error of this convention was in not providing in some way for the universal education of the people. Had that been done, it is highly probable that our wealth to-day would be nearly double what it is, and our population much larger.

The people of New England were in no sense superior to the men who settled in the southern colonies. The one, at an early day, established universal education; the other did not. The one has grown rich and prosperous, and has extended her empire of mind to some extent all over the west; the other has grown, it is true, but not with that marvelous rapidity which her boundless resources justified. An educated people, unless enfeebled

by slavery, is always an active, industrious, pushing people. They conceive and project great enterprises. No intelligent people is, or can be, a lazy people. Ignorance is weakness, dependence, inferiority.

It presents a curious question for speculation why the three southern colonies, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, did not do as the New England colonies did in reference to education. It is easy to see why Virginia did not. That state was more or less under the influence of an aristocracy. The southern colonies were not. The Covenanters largely controlled North Carolina. They and the Huguenots were in the ascendency in South Carolina, and were largely so in Georgia. These people, and certainly it is true of the Covenanters, were in intelligence and culture quite equal to the New England colonists. They had been accustomed to education before they came to America. As early as 1692, "The Estates" in Scotland passed a law requiring every parish to provide for a school house and for the pay of a schoolmaster. Under the influence of this law the Scotch became the most intelligent people in Europe. The Scotch colonists in Ireland also were superior in intelligence to the English who were planted by their side. But universal education could only be established by the state and not by congregations.

If the New England and the New York colonists had the example of the people of Holland before them in providing for common schools, so likewise the Covenanters had the example of Scotland, as well as that well-defined influence always exerted by the Presbyterian Church in that direction. Why, then, I repeat, did they not, wherever they were in the majority and controlled the state, provide for universal education.

Looking back to the early days of our Republic another fact seems remarkable. At the close of the Revolutionary War the states in their sovereign capacity were the owners of all the public lands within their respective boundaries. New York owned a large territory west of her present

western boundary. Virginia not only owned the State of Kentucky, but also a vast territory north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi Rivers, by virtue of its conquest by General George Rodgers Clarke. North Carolina owned the territory comprising the present State of Tennessee. And Georgia owned the territory comprising the present States of Alabama and Mississippi. All this vast territory was at different dates generously and magnanimously ceded by the several states owning it to the old Confederation, or to the United States, to help to pay the national debt incurred in achieving our independence, amounting to seventy-five millions of dollars.

In 1789, as we have seen, the State of North Carolina ceded the territory west of the Alleghany Mountains, now composing the State of Tennessee, to the United States. A striking fact about the cession of the territory now forming the State of Tennessee is that there is no reservation of any portion of this land for educational purposes. Here, as it seems at this day, was a singular want of forethought.

I can recall no single act in the history of our country so wise, so beneficent, so far reaching in its results, as that of the congress of 1785, in setting apart from our public lands every sixteenth section in each township for school purposes. In 1858 an additional section in each township was granted by congress for this purpose. The old states, of course, can receive no benefit from this last act, for in them all the public land of any value is entered or sold. Indeed, many of the old states never received any benefit from the grant made by the act of 1785. Tennessee, although not admitted into the Union until eleven years afterward, was only partially benefited by that grant, because previous to that time all of the best land, both in East and Middle Tennessee, had been entered, or covered by military land warrants or certificates issued by North Carolina. So East Tennessee derived

but little benefit from this beneficent policy of the Government.

Grants of land to the states under acts of Congress for educational purposes amount at this time to 78,000,000 acres, a larger area, if in one body, than Great Britain and Ireland combined.[1] The expenditures for common schools in the United States, in 1888 and 1889, amounted to $130,000,000, besides about $40,000,000 for high schools.[2] In addition to what the national government has done for common schools by the foregoing acts, may be mentioned the splendid grants of land, under the Morrill and Hatch Acts, in aid of agriculture and the sciences.

Suppose Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia, when they ceded their public lands to the United States for the common benefit of all, had reserved, as it was perfectly competent for them to do, one-fifth, or even one-tenth of their lands, for the benefit of common schools. Who can estimate the consequences that would have followed such an act? Few will doubt that the result in Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama and Mississippi would have been most momentous. It would have changed and modified the destiny of those states in a degree hardly appreciable to-day.

Our fathers seemed to think that the way to educate a people was to begin at the top. They chartered and established colleges without stint, but with no endowments. They failed, at least in the Southern States, to begin at the bottom and work upward, through a thorough system of free common schools. Had this been done, colleges would soon have followed. Even congress, when feebly providing for two colleges and for county academies in Tennessee, out of her public lands, when the state was formed into a territory, seemed to act as if that were all that was necessary for the education of the people. Mr.

[1] "The Puritan in Holland, England and America, by Douglas Campbell, Vol. I, p. 31.

[2] Id., p. 37.

Jefferson worked forty years in trying to build up a great state university in Virginia, as well as common schools and academies. He finally succeeded as to the university. But does that university, great as it is, meet the pressing wants of the people? Not at all. Only a fraction of her population can ever at one time be directly benefited by it. But leaven the mass below and it will soon leaven the superincumbent mass above. Educate the great body of the people, and the demand for higher and still higher opportunities will surely follow. Colleges and universities would appear, as naturally as the fruit follows the flower. They would take care of themselves at the proper time. But both the college and the common school could have been secured, as in Texas, if the proper use had been made of the public lands.

Virginia neglected to some extent her great opportunity. At the close of the Revolution, she was the leading state in the federation, both in population and in the ability of her statesmen. Her climate, soil, resources and geographical position were all that could have been desired. But she neglected to foster common education, as she should have done, and trusted too much in her great names. She rested too confidently in the influence of her first families and in her university, and from that day her greatness began to wane.

Some of these days, and the time may not be distant, this generation, as well as the preceding one also, will be challenged before the tribunal of history for the unparalleled waste of our public lands. Already we hear the mutterings of the coming storm. At the close of the Revolution in 1783, there were probably not twenty-five thousand English speaking inhabitants west of the State of New York and the Alleghanies, in all that vast region belonging to us or afterward acquired. All that immense territory, sufficient for a great empire, was practically unoccupied by the white race, except by a few inconsiderable settlements. Thus we had a vast region open for settle-

ment with its lands at the disposal of the national government. The folly of the states that ceded these lands to the government, without reserving any interest in them for educational purposes, has already been hinted at.

But the stupendous folly of congress in not providing for a system of universal education, for all the states, out of these lands, and those that might be subsequently acquired, is equally as great. Suppose one-fifth of the public lands had been devoted to this object, what wonderful results might have followed, nay, rather, would have followed. Our people to-day would be in all the branches of learning, except perhaps in music, the fine arts, and in the classics, very far ahead of any nation in the world. The waste of the public domain, by the extravagant grants of land to railroad corporations and for canals and wagon-roads, is still more apparent and criminal. Under extreme circumstances, such as aiding in building one or even two or three lines to the Pacific, as a means of national security, reasonable appropriations of land might have been justified, especially in time of great public peril. But, conceding this, the grants that have been made have been extravagant and reckless. If, however, the grants had been confined to two or three great highways, connecting our remote possessions, there would be a plausible, if not a real, justification of them. This, unfortunately, is not the case. Grant after grant, in countless numbers, have been made in all the north-western and in all the new states. Indeed, they have been made wherever we had public lands. Many of them were for objects purely local, and in no sense national. This was unjust to posterity and grossly unjust to the older states. Florida, Louisiana, New Mexico, Arizona, California and other states were purchased with the common treasure of the nation. And yet the older states have received no part of the proceeds of the public lands (except a small sum distributed among them, perhaps, in 1835), either for the purpose of building

railroads, or for educational purposes, until recently, under the three bills known as the Morrill and the Hatch Acts. And these were intended to promote higher education. The people of these older states have been left to build railroads as best they could, with their own means, while a large part of the public land has been given away to railroad corporations with a prodigality unparalleled in the history of legislation.

Tennessee and Kentucky, or, probably, I should say, North Carolina and Virginia, did more toward the "Winning of the West," and in securing the Mississippi instead of the Alleghanies as our western boundary line in 1783, than any, or, indeed, all, of the other states, and yet, if those states have ever received the benefit of an acre of public land for railroads, or wagon-roads, or canals, I am not aware of the fact.

Our legislators have acted as if they thought our public domain would last forever. Vain delusion! In a few more brief years, the honest settler will hunt in vain for his free homestead. Our magnificent domain has been wasted on grasping, gigantic corporations. And the older states have stood by, consenting to the monstrous spoliation, until, in a short time, their sons will not be able to find a homestead in all our national territory.

The early inhabitants of East Tennessee were genuine patriots. With them, liberty was not a meaningless word. They knew its price. They had suffered and fought for it. Within its wide import was gathered the memory of three centuries of trial, endurance, suffering and battle for its sake. If ever a people knew the cost of liberty, it was they. For three hundred years their ancestors had struggled for it. For it, they had bled on the Pentland Hills and at Bothwell Bridge. For it, they had wandered as fugitives and outcasts on the snow-clad mountains of Scotland to escape their pursuers. For it, they had hidden in caves, had been pinched with hunger, or shivered on the barren heath. For it, they had wandered for years in



WILLIAM BLOUNT.

Territorial Governor and First U. S. Senator.

the hills, followed by baying dogs and the bloody dragoons of the cruel Claverhouse. For it, also, they had resisted for years the heavy hand of prelacy in their new home in Ireland. For its sake, they had quitted their homes in Ireland, to escape the exactions and the despotism of the British government. They left with no love for England in their hearts, and longed for the day of relief, if not of vengeance. England had unwittingly prepared a whole people for revolt. They were a brave, self reliant race of men. The timid and the worthless did not seek the dangers of the wilderness. It required true manhood to encounter its perils and endure its privations. These men were, as a whole, the best citizens this state has ever had, not alone in virtue, piety and true manhood, but also in intelligence. In proof of this, I refer to the first constitution of Tennessee, which Mr. Jefferson pronounced "the most republican of all the constitutions adopted by the states." This was the work of such historic men as Jackson, Robertson, Tipton, Anderson, Rhea, Roane, Cocke, Outlaw, Blount and McMinn.

Wherever these Covenanters settled in East Tennessee, they got possession of the best lands, laid out the towns, framed and administered the laws, filled the public offices and gradually gathered into their hands the larger part of the wealth of the country. So far as I can ascertain the first territorial legislature and the "Legislative Council" were composed entirely of Covenanters, except John Sevier, who was a Huguenot by descent. Judging in the same way, at least thirty, and perhaps a much larger number, of the fifty-six men who formed our first constitution, were of this same race.[1]

These brave men were everywhere tenacious and jealous of their rights. Their most marked trait was their zeal for and their earnest devotion to their religion. With

[1] For a more detailed history of the Covenanters, I refer the reader to "The Covenanter, the Cavalier and the Puritan."

this was combined an unquenchable love of freedom. Their fathers had fought and won the great battle of religious liberty in Scotland against the combined power of the Anglican Church and the English Crown. They left the liberty thus won, through a century of trial and suffering, as a rich legacy to mankind. Under the providence of God, the world to-day owes its civil and religious liberty more to the austere Covenanter of Scotland and to the despised psalm-singing Puritan of England than to all other agencies and influences, and quite as much to the former as to the latter. And as these Scotch-Irish claimed and demanded, and would have freedom of conscience for themselves, so, contrary to the spirit and practice of the age, they conceded these rights to all others. The long centuries of fiery persecutions which they had endured, as well as the solemn teachings and doctrines of Calvin and Knox, had given to their minds an austere bent and a gloomy coloring. With them life was an awful reality. It had great duties to be performed. A solemn sense of religious obligation was the mainspring of every act. Religion with them was the chief end of man. It was not a mere form and ceremony. It was an eternal reality. Though their religion was somewhat gloomy and awful, as viewed from our softer age, it gave the sweet hope and peaceful assurance of endless bliss hereafter, and thus offered compensation for present trials and sufferings. So, these men, when wrapt in the contemplation of the awful mysteries of their religion, felt within their souls the presence of a great spiritual light, cheering and making strong their faith in the final reign of righteousness.

These early inhabitants were farmers, merchants, teachers and preachers. They were too earnest for a life of idleness. Love of country, love of freedom, love of home, love of religion, and the desire to build up a pure civilization in their new homes in the forest, all spurred them to work. The descendants of the men who had scaled the

Alleghanies and the Blue Ridge, and hidden themselves in the depths of the forests of the Holston, the Watauga and the Nolichucky, all for the sake of religious and civil freedom, were not the kind of men to turn back into a state of semi-barbarism.

Nor were they men of such wealth that they could live a life of idleness. The most favored were only in moderate circumstances. To work in some form was a necessity. On the eastern shore of Virginia, as we are told by a recent writer,[1] the early planters spent their time in hunting, fishing and visiting, and in feasting and frolicking. Those on the coast were in the habit of running up a flag when a sheepshead was caught.[2] This was a signal for all those who saw it to come the next day and dine. The great heads of families had retinues of slaves, blooded horses and packs of hounds. These were the sons of the younger English nobility or gentry. To work was in their estimation degrading to a free citizen. All labor was done by slaves. Their houses were at all times open to a generous hospitality. The sound of mirth and revelry was constantly heard. Even the grave and thoughtful Jefferson when a young man, like a strolling musician, always carried with him his violin when visiting or traveling.[3]

How different the life led by the first settlers of Tennessee. They lived in plain log houses with puncheon floors. Their fare was of the simplest kind. There were no "Sheephead" dinings. The women carded and spun the wool, and wove the web of linsey and jeans, out of which the bed-clothing, and the garments for both males and females were made. From Monday morning until Saturday afternoon, in spring and summer, busy toil and industry filled the fleeting hours. But from such nurseries came heroes and patriots. Finally, when these people had passed the stage of actual want and had reached that of abundance,

[1] "Memoirs of a Southern Planter," by Susan Dabney Smedes.

[2] A delicious fish.

[3] "Parton's Life of Jefferson.'

there remained no longer any high incentive for great exertion, for there was no accessible market for their surplus products. Had they looked out on the ocean, or possessed a good all-the-year-around navigable river or a railroad, the development now taking place in East Tennessee would have been commenced nearly a century ago.

The planters of Virginia were mostly Cavaliers. They were the firm supporters of royalty, of titles and distinctions, and of an established church. From their lofty elevation they looked down on the poor plebeians, and upon all dissenters, with severe contempt. But while they frolicked and feasted, and drank bumpers and made merry, there was silently creeping up the great valleys, overleaping the mountains, and spreading over the western part of the state, that stern, determined, unconquerable and masterful people who were to overthrow royalty and titles, and tithes and an established church, and give liberty and equality to all the people of the state. That race was the Covenanters, who finally settled East Tennessee. These were the people from the "Upper Counties," referred to by Mr. Jefferson, when speaking of the influence of Patrick Henry, during the struggle for independence, when he said his "boldness and their votes overawed and controlled the more timid aristocratic gentlemen of the lower part of the state."[1]

All the household goods of the first settlers were brought across the mountains on pack-horses. There were no roads then; only trails or "bridle-paths." These articles were few and simple. The household affairs of our grandmothers, and even those of the next generation, were exceedingly simple. Cooking-stoves, furnaces, pianos, sofas, divans, and many of the luxuries, and even the conveniences of modern households, were absolutely unknown. She was a proud woman whose simple but clean cupboard was graced by rows of bright, shining pewter plates and

[1] Proceedings of the Scotch-Irish Society for 1889, p. 118.

spoons. Cards for carding wool and flax, a little and a big spinning-wheel, and a loom, were as much a necessary part of the outfit of every well-to-do housewife as a looking-glass and a brush and comb are now. The hackle for working flax was also in every house, and the flax-brake on every farm. With rare exceptions, everybody—both men and women, rich and poor—wore homespun goods. Even General Washington was inaugurated as first President of the United States in a suit of brown homespun goods.

All the year around the women were as busy as bees; yes, more so, for the bees rest at "dewy eve," but these women did not cease their toil till the midnight hours. They were cooking and sewing, carding and spinning, and weaving flax and wool for the use of the family, and in some cases a surplus for sale. The carpets, blankets, sheets, towels, tablecloths and goods for personal attire were all, or nearly all, made by the women. And beautiful, too, were the colors which they wove into their dresses and carpets. Emulation and pride made many of them experts in dyeing, spinning, and weaving. Each mother strove to dress her daughter in a more beautiful garment than that of her neighbors' daughters. And the belles of those days moved as proudly, and looked as beautifully arrayed, in the handiwork of their mothers, as do their granddaughters now in their silks, satins, and velvets. The hickory, the walnut, the sumach, under the intelligent touch of the good matron, yielded up their delicate dyes, and the indigo and Turkish red lent their brilliant tints. Though our grandmothers often had their hands and arms blue or brown with dye, in their efforts to make their homes beautiful, and to adorn their daughters and husbands in fine and elegant garments, they were a refined and a grand race of women, well worthy of their noble descendants. Sweet and fragrant and tender forever be their memory!

Let not the proud dames of this generation shake their heads at these statements; for there is scarcely a descend-

ant of the first settlers in East Tennessee to-day, nor in the state, whose grandmother or great-grandmother did not card and spin, and probably weave also, and dip her hands and arms in the dye-pot, in those early days. It was both a necessity and the fashion of the times. And they not only spun and wove, but also sewed and made garments for their husbands and daughters, and sometimes for their sweethearts also.[1] Every young lady was expected to be able to spin and weave. If not regarded as accomplishments, these were at least indispensable in the domestic economy. The spinning-jenny—that great labor-saving machine—had not yet been invented, or come into general use. Young ladies often vied with each other in friendly

[1] I find this interesting incident, related by the Rev. A. T. Rankin, a Presbyterian minister of Greensburg, Indiana, at the dedication of a bronze bust and a granite monument to the memory of his father, the Rev. John Rankin, at Ripley, Ohio, May 5, 1892, contained in a pamphlet giving an account of the ceremonies on that occasion. John Rankin married Jean Lowry, a daughter of Adam Lowry, of Salem, Washington county, East Tennessee. She was the granddaughter of the pioneer preacher and teacher, Samuel Doak, the celebrated founder of Washington College, by whom she and her husband were both educated. John Rankin was born in Jefferson county, East Tennessee, and became a celebrated Abolitionist. More will be said of him hereafter.

Mr. A. T. Rankin said of his mother: "My mother made the coat in which my father was married, also the one in which he celebrated the golden wedding, and the same busy fingers made the entire outfit in which I delivered the valedictory of my class in college. . . . the same hand fashioned the clothes in which I did the honors at Lane Seminary, and then buttoned up for my own wedding. Though she had nine boys to sew for, none went in rags."

Another son, the Rev. S. G. Rankin, said of the same noble Scotch-Irish mother, that "such was her devotion and patriotism for the country's salvation during the late civil war, that she said to me, as I was on my way down to the Cumberland: 'Samuel, you will see Arthur on your way?' 'Yes,' I replied, 'have you any message for him?' 'Yes, tell him he is the only one left, and I only hold him as a reserve. As soon as he hears of a break in the lines, tell him to step into the gap. God be with him, and I will take care of his children.'" Never Spartan mother spoke nobler words!

While this noble woman was sending eight sons and one grandson to the front, holding one as a reserve, her kinsman, Robert H. McEwen, and his wife, kept the national flag floating over their house in Nashville during the entire war. If pulled down, they put it up again.

rivalry, as to which should spin the greatest number of "cuts" in a day. Round and round went the whizzing, singing wheel from early morn until late at night. With lithe and graceful forms, with elastic steps, and with glowing cheeks and flashing eyes, they sped back and forth drawing out the long attenuated thread, while the swift, whirling wheel made music for the household. Thus many a belle of matchless form and beauty, all radiant with the fresh bloom of young womanhood, beguiled the long, weary winter hours in healthful toil.

Those were hard days for women, yet they were not unhappy. From Monday morning until Saturday night, busy toil and industry kept step with the passing hours.

When Sunday morning came, a solemn stillness ushered it in and marked the day. Each Covenanter house became a miniature Sabbath school. Bible reading, studying the catechism, singing psalms, and attending divine service by the whole family, however remote the place of worship, occupied the day. All secular pursuits were interdicted and ceased. Everywhere a solemn sanctity and religious awe attached to the Sabbath. It can not be denied that the austere manners of these people gave a severe and gloomy tinge to their mental and moral nature. But these homes were the nurseries of noble men and lovely women. In many a house in East Tennessee the touching scenes of Burns' "Cotter's Saturday Night" were repeated in those days, when "the saint, the father and the husband" invoked the Divine blessing on the family.

The Sabbath still holds its place among them as a holy day, notwithstanding the tendency of the times to weaken its hold on the hearts and minds of men. It is unnecessary to say that these people have always been brave and daring. History attests this fact, from King's Mountain down to the late civil war. Every war, and nearly every battle-field, have witnessed their valor. Patriotism is more than a sentiment; it is a part of their being. They love their country—their own locality—because it is their home

and their possession. Each man feels that the country is in part his own.

These people became exceedingly fond of political discussions. In proof of this, I copy the following from the *Atlantic Monthly*, edited by James Russell Lowell, for August, 1870, taken from the journal or diary of Lucian Minor, a Virginian. It was written from Rogersville, Tennessee, November 29, 1823. After telling about stopping at a little inn in that town, kept by ex-Governor McMinn, and how he went "bustling about the tavern, at once as landlord, barkeeper and head waiter, administering entertainment to guests of every degree," Mr. Minor said of the people of East Tennessee:

"This is indeed a country where the democratic spirit of liberty and equality prevails to the utmost extent. I already see, or think I see, a *bolder, loftier carriage in ordidinary men.* Everyone seems to feel himself an efficient member of the body politic. No free male citizen being excluded from a vote in the choice of law-givers and governors, everyone takes an interest in the acts of those public servants, and you hear proceedings of the legislature and other political matters canvassed by men whose appearance would, amongst us, bespeak them both unknowing and careless of the most important public concerns. It would surprise you to see the warm and active feelings of these people in regard to the presidential election. Of the Louisa (his home in Virginia) people, I believe not a tenth part, even of the freeholders, have yet bestowed a thought or expressed a wish on the subject. In Tennessee every heart is roused, every tongue is busy; old and young, male and female, all look anxiously forward to the result; all wish, and would fight for (if need be), the success of Jackson. Never, surely, were a people so nearly unanimous. The citizens of Sevier county met the other day to express their sentiments and adopt resolutions in favor of their hero, when there were for Clay 3, for Craw-

ford 2, for Adams 1, for Calhoun *none*, for Jackson between 600 and 700."

And yet so independent were these people of Sevier county, that, in 1840, when their favorite of 1823, General Jackson, tried to force Van Buren on them for President, that they indignantly repudiated him, and voted nearly unanimously for General Harrison. They admired Jackson because many of them had fought under him in 1812–1814, but they firmly refused to yield to his dictation. In fact, great independence of thought has always characterized the people of East Tennessee. When they have once informed themselves in reference to either political or religious questions, and become satisfied as to the right or wrong involved, no power on earth can move them from their mature convictions. No higher illustration of the firmness of these people can be found in the political annals of any people than the tenacity with which they clung to the Union through all the dark days of the late Civil War,[1] though deserted by the rest of the state, and by many of their leaders. They stood almost as a compact body, losing only a few from their ranks.

More than once in the course of this narrative I have said that the early inhabitants of East Tennessee were a religious people. The next generation inherited from them this trait of character This feeling was manifest in their fondness for religious controversy. The day of actual religious warfare had gone. The day of peaceable controversy had come. The conscience was no longer to be convinced by the sword, the rack, or the thumb-screw, but by the force of argument. Persecution had gone forever. In its stead came gentle toleration. But men might still war in words, over creeds, dogmas, and forms of worship. Down to within the last forty years the churches of the

[1] In February, 1861, in the election ordered by the legislature, when the question was, not in words, but in substance, secession or no secession, these people of Sevier county voted *unanimously* against secession. Perhaps no county in the Union has such a record as that.

country rang with the clangor of hostile controversy, and the religious press teemed with bitter sectarian literature. This was perhaps especially so in this region. Sabbath after Sabbath the Methodists poured forth denunciations of "election and predestination." Week after week, from Presbyterian pulpits, the doctrines of the Methodists were hammered, ridiculed and laid bare to public inspection. From the press came forth cart-loads of pamphlets and books on the respective sides. Now and then a Baptist champion would stand forth, and challenge the world to a discussion of the doctrines of immersion and adult baptism. The sermons in those days were long and dry, and generally of a doctrinal character. The people were fond of these discussions. Nothing pleased them so much as to hear their ministers launch their thunder-bolts of argument, sarcasm, and ridicule, and even hate, against other sects.

But I am not sure that these controversies, after all, bitter as they sometimes were, did much harm. They quickened the public mind. They set it to thinking and reading. Anything is better than mental or spiritual stagnation. Under a quickening influence of these controversies, and the vast amount of information given to the public by them, the people of East Tennessee became better posted as to theological doctrines and religious history than any other people of similar development. A fact, not sufficiently noticed, heretofore, contributed to this proficiency in and fondness for religious, as well as political, discussions. This was the leisure of the people. Previous to the time of the entrance of railroads, about 1851, there was but little commerce or trade with the outside world. There were virtually no manufactures. There was no bustle, no rush, no excitement in business. Men had leisure for thought and contemplation. Attending church and camp-meetings was a pleasant pastime as well as a solemn religious duty. With a commercial, or manufacturing, or a busy people, such things are impossible, except

on the Sabbath. For the same reason, attending political discussions and talking politics were always common. The people were not pressed for time; they had ample leisure and came to delight in political meetings. General Jackson early became a candidate for the Presidency. He was hot-headed, and made the state a boiling cauldron of political excitement. Politicians and people alike were stirred by this imperial, tempestuous man. All turned to talking politics. And so it has ever continued to be. Wherefore it came about, that the people of East Tennessee were in political and religious intelligence far above what might have been expected from the general condition of education in the state.

CHAPTER IV.

THE PRESENT INHABITANTS OF EAST TENNESSEE—THE MOUNTAIN AND THE VALLEY PEOPLE.

East Tennessee described—A long valley surrounded by mountains—Valley three-fourths of area—Mental and moral condition of the valley people—Colleges and academies—Churches—People turn to religion—The Sabbath and Sunday schools—People of the valley—Vindicated against misrepresentations—An excellent population—Superior to many of their neighbors in culture—The great mountain region lying beyond the valley—Testimony as to the character of the people.

The people of East Tennessee[1] are usually spoken of by writers as a "mountain people." The designation, as generally applied and understood, is misleading. It is true that a part of them are a mountain people, but the larger part, strictly speaking, are not. To understand this statement, I must explain.

East Tennessee is a valley about three hundred miles in length, with an average width of fifty or sixty miles, lying between two high mountain ranges. It is separated from Georgia and North Carolina by the Alleghanies, sometimes called the "Blue Ridge," and from Virginia and Kentucky by the Cumberland Range. Inside of the state line, on the northern and the southern borders, with considerable exceptions, there is a rim or border of mountains, varying in width from three to fifteen miles. On the western side, the Cumberland, which separates East from Middle Tennessee, swells out into a large plateau, forty or fifty miles wide On the south, these mountains are exceedingly high, varying from three to six thousand feet. On the

[1] The terms "East Tennessee," "Middle Tennessee" and "West Tennessee" are recognized by the constitution and the laws of the state, as constituting grand divisions thereof, with well defined natural boundaries. East Tennessee is separated from Middle Tennessee by the Cumberland Mountains, and the latter from West Tennessee by the Tennessee River.

north, they are from three to four thousand feet high. For the most part, this border or rim is separated from the lowlands by steep mountains, and, in some cases, by precipitous walls.

The region lying beyond these mountain walls, but inside of the state lines, is clearly a mountain country. But this region constitutes only a small part of East Tennessee. A gentleman of intelligence,[1] who visits every county once a year, estimates that this mountain rim, including the Cumberland Plateau in East Tennessee, is about equal to one-fourth the area of the whole region of East Tennessee, and at most not equal to one-third. Another gentleman,[2] who had occasion to investigate this very question some years ago, estimates that this mountain region is about one-fifth of the territory of East Tennessee.

The people dwelling in the territory above the valley are a genuine mountain race. But one, going among them, expecting to see wild, uncivilized savages, would surely be disappointed. He would not find much education, it is true, nor many material comforts. He would discover a low state of general intelligence, and, in some localities, a deplorable state of morals. But this is not the general, and certainly not the universal, condition. On the contrary, a majority of the people have due respect for the Sabbath, love the Bible, regularly attend church and the Sunday school, and outwardly observe in their humble walks the common decencies and proprieties of civilized life. Among the better classes, baseness and immorality are condemned and discountenanced. With a large majority, marriage vows and contracts are regarded as sacred. There are but few divorce suits in the courts, perhaps fewer than in the towns and cities in more advanced society. Honesty, in a partial sense, is not only inculcated and revered, but, in many cases, the higher and more delicate rules that bind society together by the ties of honor

[1] Rev. Isaac Emory.

[2] Rev. John F. Spence, D.D.

are likewise observed. This is gradually lifting the people up to a condition where noble sentiment takes the place of ignorant force. Indictments for theft, robbery, arson and burglary are rare, and, even for lewdness and adultery, far from common. Murder, however, is very frequent.

It is not surprising that there is much ignorance and considerable immorality in these mountain districts. The state has done but little to aid the people in educational facilities. Until within the last thirty years it gave them but little assistance. And even now the sum devoted to this purpose, arising from state and county appropriations, amounts to very little in sparsely-settled communities. Often in such communities the school-house is so distant from many of the families that their children almost inevitably grow up in ignorance. Even where the population is more dense the school fund is not sufficient to keep the public schools open, upon an average, more than from three to four months in the year. Limited as are the advantages afforded by these schools for acquiring a good education, they are nevertheless doing great good. They are lights set on a hill. This generation is being educated far beyond those of the past. In these schools many a bright boy or girl is catching the spirit of education, and will be impelled by it to seek elsewhere for higher advantages. And thus education and knowledge are growing and spreading from year to year through the mountain regions.

But these people need help in the way of better educational facilities. They need a college on the Cumberland Mountains, in Scott or Morgan county, for the benefit of the boys and girls of that partially destitute region. An industrial school, similar to the one so successfully conducted at or near Asheville, is sorely needed for the girls of that mountain region.

For at least a small part of each year many of the bright mountain boys and girls are now engaged in learning the rudiments of a common English education. In

1891, in passing from Cranberry to Linville, in western North Carolina, through the highest range of mountains, I was astonished at suddenly coming upon a fair sized two-story brick college building, handsomely painted, with comfortable new houses surrounding it, and at seeing about one hundred or more young ladies and gentlemen, pupils in this college, fair, ruddy and bright looking, as well dressed as village people generally are, engaged in playing games on the lawn, it being recess hour. And such sights as this can be seen at other places in these mountains. Indeed, only a few miles from this place, in Carter county, the extreme eastern part of Tennessee, in a spot of marvelous beauty, is situated Milligan College. The site of this institution has an altitude of about four thousand feet. A more enchanting spot can not be found in all this wonderful region of beauty and sublimity. The college has from seven to nine professors and instructors, with an attendance of about two hundred students, girls and boys.

And in the same mountain country, about twenty miles distant, at a place called Butler, there is another flourishing institution of learning, called Holly Spring's College, situated on the banks of the beautiful Watauga River. This college has an enrollment of two hundred young men and women. Thus, in the midst of this great mountain region, the wildest in Tennessee, or western North Carolina, within a radius of twenty-five or thirty miles, are situated three chartered colleges, one in North Carolina and two in Tennessee, with an aggregate enrollment of from five to six hundred scholars.

Nor is this all. In the next county, north (Sullivan), at Bristol, King's College is situated, an institution of deserved popularity, with an enrollment of about two hundred scholars. About forty miles south-west from Bristol and Holly Springs is situated Washington College. Then fifteen miles further west, in Greene county, is Greeneville-Tusculum College. The two latter are both very

flourishing schools and the oldest institutions of learning in the state.

It thus appears that there are six prosperous colleges in this small section of country, three of them literally in the mountains, and the other three near them and almost under their shadow, and all but one in the eastern half of the First Congressional District. I take no note of the academies to be found in every county and in nearly every town. These remarkable facts show that this whole mountain region is keenly alive to the great question of education.

Before the school house had appeared in these mountains, the modest church edifice had arisen in nearly every thickly settled neighborhood. At regular periods the faithful Methodist circuit rider comes along to look after his little flock. On an eminence overlooking a rapidly flowing mountain stream there stands also the plain edifice, in which the Baptists weekly worship. The good man who ministers here week after week, labors to build up his congregation in the faith of his sect. Occasionally, too a Presbyterian evangelist or missionary comes along, and presents the gospel to such persons as can be gathered together on short notice. And sometimes too, though infrequently, the way is opened for a Presbyterian Church, and one is seen to arise in the solitude of these mountains.

And thus all over these highlands, Sabbath after Sabbath, the voices of sincere praise, supplication and thanksgiving ascend as grateful incense to heaven. No great, costly organs send forth their deep-toned notes, rising and swelling on the mountain stillness, and then sinking into a whisper. But from these lofty places of worship, the voices of humble worshipers are heard, in praise and thanksgiving, breathing the very spirit of devotion. These children of the mountain sing as the birds sing—they sing from the heart. It is nature's outburst of joy, ecstasy and triumph. No cold formality restrains these humble worshipers.

And since distilleries have in a large measure disappeared; since quiltings, log rollings, musters, shooting

matches, dances and frolics are becoming rarer and rarer in these mountains, more sober and weightier matters now occupy the minds of the people. Men must have something on which to expend the vast and ever-accumulating reserve of energy and life wrapped up within them. If these find vent in innocent amusements and sports, it is well. But far better, if in a simple primitive and emotional religion is found the satisfaction demanded by the bounding force of nature. In this very mode, because no other alluring object stands in the way, because no tempting, fleeting pleasure attracts them aside, a whole people may turn to religion, and find in it a peace and a satisfaction suitable to their mental condition. Such certainly is the tendency of these mountain people. Everything around them leads to reverence and worship. The simplest savage perceives in the rushing river, in the dark, gathering tempest, the flashing lightning, the thunder of the clouds, and in the great mountains uplifted to the skies, the evidence of almighty power. In nature's sublime presence, he is filled with fear and awe. Much more would a people of traditional piety, such as these are, be filled with the spirit of reverence amid such awe-inspiring scenes. I know not accurately how far history bears testimony to the truth of this theory, but logically, all high mountain peoples ought to be more spiritually inclined than those dwelling in the plains. The elastic buoyancy of the atmosphere, as well as the grandeur of the scenery, tend to a high moral and mental exaltation. Solitude also tends to elevate the mind. In the absence of the entertainments and the amusements common in cities and towns, men naturally turn to the Church, to the Sunday school, to the Bible, or inwardly to their own minds for entertainment. In these mountains the theater and the lecture-room, card parties and receptions, dinings and germans, clubs and Christian associations, libraries and reading-rooms, and many kinds of charitable entertainments,

do not absorb the time and keep the people in a rush all the year around.

In the absence of most of the popular amusements of cities, it would be strange if religion were not the highest and the first concern of the better class of such a people. So, it certainly is. And since religion and education are fast gaining ground with these people, it may be safely affirmed that civilization has firmly planted its feet on our mountain tops, and that henceforth it will march apace with its advancing development in other quarters.

Descending from this high mountain region, we enter a country totally unlike that I have been describing. This is the valley of East Tennessee. Through this valley flow the many beautiful rivers with their crystal waters which debouch from the mountains of North Carolina and Virginia, and flowing westwardly unite in this state, forming the graceful Tennessee. The people dwelling in this valley constitute about five-sixths of the population of East Tennessee; in other words, the mountain population is about one out of every five or six of the entire population.

This valley region is no more like the region I have just described, or that of Northern Georgia, or Western North Carolina, or South-eastern Kentucky, and a large part of South-west Virginia, than it is like Colorado. The utmost that can be said is, that it is a hill or an upland country. Its physical aspects (shutting our eyes against the great mountains which wall in this enchanting valley) are very similar to large districts of country to be found in Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, and Missouri. To the grand mountain scenery, everywhere meeting the eyes of the tourist passing through this lovely valley, is to be added the charm of the clear, sparkling, rushing streams, as they flow down through the green hills, and waving fields, and verdant pastures. At every turn of his course, he will see scenes of quiet beauty, or of startling grandeur, such as fill the mind with dreamy reveries, or fire it with lofty thoughts.

The inhabitants of this region lying in between these great mountains should appropriately be called the valley people or the people of the plain. The whole valley, however, is greatly elevated above the sea level. From the point where the Tennessee River passes out of the state into Alabama to the extreme eastern point on the White Mountain, there is a constant ascent. Shellmound, near where the river passes out of the state, is 636 feet above the sea; Chattanooga, 670 feet; Knoxville, nearly 1,000 feet; Greeneville, 1,585 feet; Bristol, 1,780 feet; and Mountain City, nearly 3,000 feet. High as this is, it is perhaps fifteen hundred or two thousand feet below the average of the mountains which encircle the valley. Nor is it nearly so elevated nor half so wild as Western North Carolina and parts of South-west Virginia.

In one sense the people dwelling in this region are mountain people; that is, they live in constant sight of these great mountains. From the cradle to the grave they breathe the pure air wafted down from their summits, they feel the inspiration caused by their ever majestic stillness and awful presence, and they imbibe the spirit of the wonderful scenes surrounding them. So they become thereby larger, better, braver men and women. The farmer as he sits on his piazza, in the cool of the summer's evening smoking his pipe, sees away off in the distance the form of these blue mountains lifted up in mighty outline against the sky. He sees the dark clouds swelling up the mountain sides and gathering into a storm as they sweep along the summit. At night he gazes upon the lightning as it leaps and plays on these lofty heights. From every high eminence, in East Tennessee, these mountains loom up into view. The farmer, as he plows in his field, or rides into the nearest village, or drives to church on the Sabbath, looking up, beholds in the distance these same great peaks which he gazed upon in his boyhood, now as then, so still, so lonely, so solemn. Such are the surroundings of the people of East Tennessee.

Now, as to the mental and moral peculiarities of the people themselves. Writers in the North and the South, losing sight of the difference I have pointed out between the valley of East Tennessee and the great mountain region surrounding it, often represent the people of this region as being ignorant, immoral, intemperate, and lawless. They are frequently spoken of as "the poor whites of the South;" sometimes as "the mountain whites of the South."

So far as these names and descriptions apply to the people of East Tennessee dwelling in the valley, they are largely baseless, the result of the grossest ignorance, or of deliberate intention at misrepresentation. People who thus write draw no distinction between those dwelling in this valley and those beyond it. The difference is marked and manifest. The people of this valley are not, and never have been, as they are sometimes represented to be.

It is so easy and perhaps so natural for sensational writers to take exceptional or rare characters and clothe them with fictitious and exaggerated qualities, and then present them to the public as representatives of whole communities or districts of country, that we should not be surprised at such things. Such representations are taken to be true by those who never saw the originals, and yet they are often gross caricatures. The more extreme and grotesque these representations, the more sensational they are. No better illustration of the truth of all this can be found than in the accounts usually published concerning the "mountain whites of the South." No such people, as a community or as a whole, anywhere exists in this vast region. There are exceptional characters and cases, and there are exceptional neighborhoods, to which these descriptions may in a qualified sense apply, but when applied to the people of the whole section, or to the people as a whole, they are gross exaggerations and misrepresentations. They are especially false when applied

to the people of the valley of East Tennessee. As a rule, these people of the valley are equal, in most of the leading qualities that constitute a good population, to the average citizens of any section. In virtue, integrity and religion, they can safely challenge a comparison with the citizens of the most advanced states. There are some exceptional neighborhoods in certain counties of which this is not true. But the general rule is as I state it.

I appeal to facts. Let it be kept in mind that the first settlers of East Tennessee were an educated people and the friends of education. Several years before the close of the eighteenth century, as previously shown, they had put three colleges into successful operation. Since that time colleges and universities have gone on increasing until there are now fifteen or sixteen within our limits. Besides these there are many academies and high schools. In common schools, in colleges, in Sunday schools, in temperance reforms, in church work, in agricultural and manufacturing development, the valley of East Tennessee, as statistics show, is quite abreast of the other divisions of the state.

The people living in the valley are superior, very much superior, in intelligence, civilization, wealth and general advancement to the inhabitants living in the high mountain regions of Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia and Kentucky. This great mountain uplift, as I have shown, lies for the most part beyond and outside of East Tennessee. Here is the great distinction that is constantly overlooked by those writing about this region. No distinction is ever drawn between the inhabitants of the picturesque, fertile and beautiful valley of East Tennessee and those of the wild mountain region encircling it. And this wild mountain region is the one that tourists delight to describe. The scenery is nearly as grand and picturesque as that of Colorado. This whole region, including the valley, is full of thrilling historical incidents of the Revolution, of King's Mountain, of Daniel Boone, John Sevier, James Robertson,

Isaac Shelby, William Campbell, John Tipton and of Andrew Jackson. Here are the historic streams—the Watauga, the Holston and the Nolichucky—on whose banks western civilization was first planted. Here was the cradle of the state. And here was enacted at an early day its most thrilling history. It is full of Indian legends and traditions. These give ample scope and material for the fertile imagination of tourists and letter writers, for northern newspapers and illustrated periodicals. Writers of romance, with genius and fervid imagination, like Charles Egbert Craddock, find in this region a people scarcely known to those of us familiar with it from our infancy. Writers, too, like the author of the pamphlet entitled "The Mountain Whites of the South," whose motive was good, portray the inhabitants in such colors as to amount almost to a slander.

In answer to such representations, as are often made by writers for Northern papers, the Rev. D. Atkins, of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, published a letter in the "Christian Union," of December 31, 1892, from which I make some extracts. Mr. Atkins stands deservedly high where he is known. I copy from the "Baltimore Sun":

. . . "As a Methodist minister," he says, "I have gone into the most out of the way places, and mingled freely with all sorts of people in twenty counties of North Carolina and Virginia and in nearly all the worst parts of East Tennessee. I have visited these people at their homes, have eaten with them, slept in their houses and seen them in every condition." Yet Mr. Atkins never beheld the slum scenes Mrs. Paddock described in a recent number of the "Christian Union." "Your correspondent," he said, "must have found some secluded spot I never saw; for in all my travels I never saw the things she writes of, and it seems strange that I should not even have heard of such things in all these years. There is poverty here and ignorance too, but neither is in that

prevalent form you would suppose from the article of Mrs. Paddock." . . .

The following is an extract from a letter written by Mr. M. L., for the "Washington Star," of November 17, 1893:

[Written for "The Evening Star:"]

"An interesting article appears in the 'Star' of the 7th inst., purporting to give results of observations by Dr. J. H. Porter, while prosecuting scientific researches among the Southern Alleghanies. Some popular fallacies are exposed, while others more hurtful are reiterated. I was born and reared among these same mountains, and as school teacher, timber agent, special deputy collector, and special examiner for the bureau of pensions, have had ample opportunity to study the natives, and know fairly well their peculiarities of belief, vernacular and habits. There is scarcely a section, however remote, in western North Carolina, East Tennessee, South-western Virginia and South-eastern Kentucky with which I am not familiar with every cross-roads and by paths.

. . . "The men of the mountains do use whiskey—that is, some of them—but a careful comparison justifies the statement that a vastly smaller proportion are addicted to its use, or abuse, than in the cities of the South elsewhere. . . . Habitual drunkenness is looked upon by the mountain people as a great disgrace, and the use of whiskey for other than medicinal purposes is regarded as ground sufficient for the expulsion of the offender from almost any church." . . .

"The popular belief on this point" (education) "is quite misleading. Among the older people signing by mark is too common. They had little opportunity to acquire education. They, or their fathers, were pioneers of the mountains. They cleared the forests, built roads, erected rude structures for worship, and were kept hard at work to keep the wolf from the door. . . . There are few of the younger generation who can not read and write,

and 'cipher, too.' There are few young men, especially in the mountains of East Tennessee, who have not mastered the rudiments of English grammar and the common-school arithmetic. For the latter they seem to have particular aptitude. A large percentage of them have a fair knowledge of algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and some of them would give Yale and Harvard graduates points on integral and differential calculus and idiomatic Latin and Greek. In one of the wildest sections of that whole mountain region, of my personal knowledge, nine young men have taken classical courses—three of them at Yale. They did not belong to families above the average, and literally worked their way through college. Some of them took high rank in their classes; none of them were below the average."[1]

Fortunately, there is much evidence from the most reliable sources on these points. The latest is that of Dr. W. C. Gray, the able editor of that widely-circulated religious paper, "The Interior," of Chicago. He has recently (October and November, 1897,) been traveling through parts of the mountain regions of Kentucky, Virginia, Tennessee and North Carolina, studying with care the habits, language and condition of the native population. In his paper of October 28th, there is a letter of his from Cumberland Gap, from which I make some extracts. The Rev. A. A. Myers, referred to in this letter, has been a missionary for thirty-three years in the mountain region of Kentucky, Tennessee and Virginia, and during that time he and his faithful wife have erected forty-four public buildings for educational or religious purposes. He is now president of "Harrow School," at Cumberland Gap. Dr. Gray studied these mountain people by going among them, visiting them in their little homes, and by talking to them on every-day topics. I gladly avail myself of his evidence, as it confirms my statements, and also one of my theories:

[1] As to education, I think the statements of this writer are a little too strong and general.

"I was expecting an interesting philological study of the mountain dialect attributed to this people by Miss Murfrees (Charles Egbert Craddock) and by her imitator, the Rev. Dr. William Barton, of Boston; but I could not catch a word of it in the cabins nor on the mountain trails. Their speech is the only true English there is in that of the middle belt which extends between New England and the South, and which is occupied by New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, the Middle West, old North-west, and on to the Pacific. A Britisher can not speak English, nor a Yankee, nor a Southerner. I never heard English, the genuine article, spoken by any man who was not a Scotch-Irishman, or some one to whom he had taught the language. . . . I talked also with a mountaineer, who was all patches and tags, and was surprised by his shrewdness. 'One good judge,' he said, 'can make more Christians than a heap of preachers.' 'Good citizens, you mean,' I answered; 'you do not mean that the enforcement of good laws will make good Christians.' 'Well,' he said, 'I didn't say good Christians; I said Christians. Christians are as different as persimmons. Some are sweet and meller, and some are hard and puckery, and it 'pears like they stay so. I'll tell you how it goes among our people. Get a judge that 'll jerk 'em, and they 'll quit shootin' and bummin'; and then, because they have nowhere else to go, they 'll go into the churches. They 've got to go somewhere, and when they kayn't get "moonshine" they 'll get religion.' There is sense in that remark!

" . . . On our return home at supper, I said to Dr. Myers that I was disappointed in not hearing the mountain dialect. 'There is no such thing,' he said with some warmth. 'Why, Miss Murfrees and her imitator, Dr. Barton, have made their fortune out of it. It must be somewhere,' I answered. 'It is nowhere,' said Mr. Myers. 'I am familiar with every nook of these ranges, three hundred miles north and south, and I never heard it, and no one ever did. What they have done is to pick up odd and

ignorant characters and set them up as types of our people. It has done us a great deal of harm among Northern people.' ''

In a subsequent letter, written in North Carolina, Dr. Gray gives some of the distinguishing characteristics of the mountain people, as follows:

"Now, a word about these mountaineers in general. They are not the 'poor whites' of the South—the waste of the white population of the slave states. They are as unlike them as distinct races. They have the usual characteristics of mountaineers—independent, passionately devoted to liberty, hardy, brave, and so attached to their mountains that they would rather live in poverty there than in wealth in the cities, or even in the plains. . . .

"And yet the women of this class are passionately desirous for the education of their children, and, through education, for the betterment of their condition, which is simply one of arrested progress. . . . The old longing for education bursts into a flame when schools are reachable; and, as I have said, the family Bible and the pastor's prayer are cherished as they are not among us. The men are slender, wiry and usually tall. The women are good looking, some of them beautiful." . . .

Hon. Eben Alexander, late minister to Greece, formerly professor of Greek in the University of Tennessee, now filling the same chair in the University of North Carolina, a good many years ago, wrote a communication for one of the New York papers, in which he discussed the dialect given to the mountain people of Tennessee by Miss Murfrees. He declared that he had never heard such a dialect spoken. Prof. Alexander, for a number of years, was in the habit of spending a part of each vacation in traveling and fishing in the Smoky Mountains, where Miss Murfrees found the peculiar language she puts into the mouth of her characters.

In a late number of the "Knoxville Journal," edited by Captain William Rule, commenting on a communication

recently published, as reported in the "New York Independent," that paper said:

"The 'Journal' took occasion to observe, yesterday morning, that, in the wide range of subjects discussed in the press in these latter days, more ignorance is manifested by the average man or woman who pretends to write either fact or fiction about the mountain people of this section, than upon almost any other subject imaginable. The country has a goodly number of penny-a-liners who make pin money by grossly exaggerating the weaknesses of these mountain people, or by inventing lies about them and getting them printed wherever they can get pay for their miserable stuff. The writer of the paragraphs above quoted is either an ignoramus or an unmitigated falsifier.

"The statement that there are 400,000 children of southern highlanders who have no chance to acquire an education is unqualifiedly false, as the writer might have seen had he taken time to consult the census reports before he wrote his slanderous article. It is a fact that there is more ignorance, infinitely more vice, more degradation, more people who never saw a Bible, more of everything that is loathsome in men and women and children, in sight of the Trinity Church spire in the great city of New York, than there are in all the mountain counties of East Tennessee, Western North Carolina, Virginia and Kentucky combined." . . .

So far as the people of the mountains of East Tennessee are concerned, there is no question as to the fact that letter writers and tourists have greatly misrepresented and slandered them. From my earliest recollection, I have known and seen much of these people. I have traveled among them, have practiced law and held courts in a number of the so-called mountain counties; I have slept in their houses and eaten at their tables more or less for over fifty years, and I think, from unusual opportunities of seeing these people, that I know a good deal about them, about their condition, about their state of morals, intelligence

and general civilization. From my own observation and knowledge, I do not hesitate to bear unequivocal testimony as to the general truthfulness of the statements contained in the foregoing extracts. There is considerable vice, drunkenness and illiteracy; but these are fast disappearing. To say that these are universal, is unjust as well as untrue. In point of morals, religion and the observance of the laws of the land, it is really surprising how advanced they are, when we consider their remoteness from the civilizing and refining influences that lift up and educate a people. I can only account for the qualified moral tone existing among them, their general observance of the Sabbath, their regard for chastity and honesty, and their respectable sense of good faith and fair dealing, by remembering that they are the descendants of the educated and the severely moral and religious Covenanters who first settled East Tennessee, the seeds of whose teachings and the example of whose lives even a century of isolation, poverty and neglect have not entirely destroyed.

Another reason why these mountain people of East Tennessee are in advance of their neighbors, dwelling in similar regions in adjoining states in all the ways and arts of civilization, may be found in the fact that they live so near their neighbors in the valley below. The intercourse between them is so constant and easy that the inhabitants above are gradually growing into the habits and ideas of those below. So, with the wonderful progress they have made in the last thirty years in education and civilization, these mountaineers are rapidly approximating the condition of the valley people.

Keeping in mind the difference I have pointed out between the mountain rim on the outer edge of East Tennessee and the great valley lying below, I can safely assert that the great body of the people dwelling in this valley are reasonably intelligent for a laboring class. Many of them are well educated, having had the advantages of training in colleges and academies. A still larger number

have a tolerably fair education, and most of them have enough for the ordinary business transactions of life. Not many of them are entirely without education. The last are mostly old men who were reared before the recent means of mental improvement existed. The spirit of mental improvement is abroad among these people. They know enough to see, and do see, the immense advantage an educated boy or girl has over an uneducated one. The less education the father has, the more he is impressed with the necessity of providing for the education of his children. Hence he sacrifices everything for this end. Property for his children, in the estimation of such a man, is nothing in comparison with a good education. It is surprising how largely this feeling has prevailed among uneducated men since the war.

The people dwelling in this valley are generally industrious, moral and well-to-do in the world. A majority of them own their own farms; some of these indeed are small and poor. But they are sufficient to secure an independent living. Many of these farms are large, rich and productive. The owners of such lands are independent, not to say wealthy. They gather around them fine stock, and the latest and most approved means of farming. They improve their houses, have their family carriages, their parlors, their pianos or organs, their books and newspapers. They send their sons and daughters to school. Such homes and families can be found in every neighborhood, and often many of them.

The people living in the rich valleys, and a majority of those in the hills also, are either independent or comfortable livers. The soil and climate permit the growth of nearly every article of food necessary for the sustenance of man and beast. This is in fact a land of fatness and abundance. The people have long been celebrated for their hospitality and good living. Hospitality, generous and sincere, is the law of each household.

I repeat, great changes have taken place, and are still

going on, in all this great mountain-encircled valley. The people as a general rule are wide awake, and pressing to the front. Old things have already become new. The old East Tennessee of forty years ago no longer exists.

The native East Tennessean, especially the native mountaineer, is a proud spirited man. He will neither submit to wrong nor brook an insult. The man who insults or wrongs him must expect to answer for his offense.

Many of these men know nothing of lineage, and care nothing about it. They have inherited in some way a brave, proud spirit that feels no inferiority even in the very highest presence. Breathing from infancy the subtle ether of his mountain elevation, he feels within himself an irrepressible spirit of individualism that forgets and ignores all social distinctions.

Speaking on this very point, "In the Tennessee Mountains," Charles Egbert Craddock, who has so admirably portrayed the character in many respects of these people, but not their language, says: "The pride of the Southern mountaineers is so intense that it recognizes no superior, so inordinate, that one is tempted to cry out: 'Here are the Republicans,' or indeed, 'Here are the only aristocrats.'"

Slavery was never so universal or so powerful as to become all controlling in East Tennessee. With it, there never arose in this region, great lordly proprietors, whose influence over those below them was irresistible. There was no headship, no clanship. All were equals. In the dense, slave-holding communities of the South, this headship or leadership of the powerful was everywhere dominant. The poor whites became their willing followers. With base subserviency, they yielded a blind allegiance to the wealthy slave-holding lords.

Here, on the contrary, both the mountaineer and the valley men, have been singularly free from leadership or headship domination. Such a thing is absolutely unknown, except in so small a degree as to be of no import-

ance. Personal influence and popularity have their place, and justly, too, but there is no abject subserviency, no surrender of noble manhood, to the exacting demands of arrogant headship, or personal imperialism.

Strangers have remarked that the rural population of East Tennessee, especially those of the mountain regions, are a sad, silent, almost a sorrowful looking people. There is unquestionably some truth in the observation. They are certainly not gay and vivacious like the French. nor sociable like the Germans. Their hearts are but moderately set on sports and amusements. Solitude and silence are often preferred to the noise and frivolity of fashionable society. The causes for this mental and moral development are obvious and numerous.

For many generations the ancestors of a majority of these people had endured sufferings, trials, and persecutions such as rarely fall to the lot of men. Care and anxious solicitude were ever present with them. Their bitter struggles with their enemies, with the hardships of the wilderness, with fierce savages, and often with want, stamped their countenances with an austerity and a gravity amounting almost to sadness. Then the Revolution came on, with its long years of suffering, of anxiety, hopes, and fears, and by the subtle laws of heredity these outward expressions, in the course of time, became fixed and were transmitted to their descendants.

If, during these long years, the impress and the shadow of sorrow have settled on their brows and all cheerfulness has fled from their hearts, it need not be surprising. Nature would have been false to her teachings if these conditions, existing for hundreds of years, had not produced a grave, a stern, and a sad, a severe-looking race of men. This was the eternal law of heredity.

There is another reason why these people, in their habits and appearance, seem to incline toward the grave and the sad side of life. The religion of the early settlers was gloomy and austere, and full of awful mysteries, as

well as startling certainties. It would have been strange indeed if an impressible, deeply religious people, who had heard sermons all their lives like those of Jonathan Edwards, and at a later day like those of Francis Asbury, had not been grave and serious. Unquestionably the deep solemnity of their religion, and the profound reverence observed by its practice in life, were well calculated to produce among its followers a race of stern and almost sorrowful people. They endured the hardships of life with heroic fortitude and with unfaltering faith. Silently, uncomplainingly, and with devout submission to a higher will, they went forward, fulfilling their appointed mission. They bowed with meek submission to the eternal decrees by which they were guided.

In East Tennessee, the stillness and the solitude of the wilderness were first broken by the sturdy pioneers on the banks of the Watauga. Here the first self-imposed civil government west of the Alleghanies, the "Watauga Association," under which the pioneers governed themselves and preserved order for many years, was established. Here the countless battles with hostile Indians took place, and from it many expeditions into the Cherokee and the Creek country were led by Evan Shelby, John Sevier, and James Robertson. Here originated and was planned by John Sevier and Isaac Shelby the most glorious event in our history—the expedition to King's Mountain. Here arose and existed for a number of years the historic State of Franklin—that ill-fated and perhaps ill-advised, self-independent, revolutionary state, so full of stirring incidents. Here the territorial government was organized, the first territorial legislature convened, and here was the seat of government for many years. Here the first Constitutional Convention assembled, and here the State of Tennessee was launched on its high destiny. From this section came our first governors and our first senators. And later, in common with Middle Tennessee, East Tennessee shared in the great victories of General Jackson over the Creek Indians and in the undying glories of New Orleans.

CHAPTER V.

SLAVERY IN EAST TENNESSEE.

Slaves and the slave trade—Not many slaves in East Tennessee—Men indifferent at first about the moral question involved—Emancipation societies at last appear—Early societies in East Tennessee—Names of originators—John Rankin the Abolitionist—His labors—Dr. David Nelson—The first emancipation paper in the United States edited by Elihu Embree, at Jonesborough, Tennessee—The predecessor of Benjamin Lundy—Lundy's "Genius" published at Greeneville—History of two papers—Methodist Church in East Tennessee strongly anti-slavery—Records of as to—Action of General Conference in 1844 in silencing Francis A. Harding and Bishop Andrew because slaveholders aroused intense bitterness in that church in the South—Great change of sentiment—The church separates—The Southern branch becomes almost solidly pro-slavery—Important influence of separation of churches in bringing on secession in the South.

At the time of the formation of the constitution of Tennessee, in 1796, the slaves in the state numbered ten thousand six hundred and thirteen. The total population as shown by the census then taken was seventy-seven thousand two hundred and sixty-two. The slaves in East Tennessee numbered eight thousand one hundred and forty-nine, or in a total population of sixty-five thousand three hundred and thirty-eight, about twelve and one-half per cent. West of the mountains, the slaves numbered two thousand four hundred and sixty-six, out of a population of eleven thousand nine hundred and twenty-four, or more than twenty per cent.

By this constitution "every freeman" of the proper age, having had his residence as prescribed, "and possessing a freehold in the county" was entitled to vote for members of the general assembly. This provision gave to free colored men "possessing a freehold" the elective franchise. This shows that the colored men were regarded by the

whites in the early years of our state with more favor than at a later day.[1]

Our forefathers, though generally in moderate circumstances, brought slaves with them to East Tennessee from North Carolina and Virginia. This region was poorly adapted to the culture of cotton, rice or indigo. Yet at that day, and for many years afterward, every farmer had his "cotton patch." This was for the purpose of raising a supply for domestic use. While cotton could be raised even in the eastern and more elevated counties, the region could not be classed as a cotton country.

That, however, was not always, and perhaps not generally the question. Men who desired to possess slaves did not stop to inquire into the question of profit or loss. There was always connected with the ownership of slaves a sense of pride and independence, a supposed badge of superiority, that attracted men. Few in that day could resist the temptation of having some one to do for them the hard work of life, to relieve them of all drudgery, to wait upon them obsequiously, and to be ever present to do their will. It was flattering to human pride to be able to say to men, "Go," and they went, and "Come," and they dared not disobey. No doubt the fact that the wise and good men who framed the constitution, in 1787, had given twenty years longer to the planters in which to import a full supply of slaves before shutting the doors against them, had much to do in encouraging the purchase of slaves. They were enabled to "stock" their plantations with negroes, as if they were stocking them with horses and cattle for future profit. These distinguished men lent the moral sanction of their great names not only to slavery, but also to man stealing for twenty years

[1] A tradition has come down to this generation, said the Hon. Horace Maynard, in an address at Nashville, in 1863, that a proposition was made in the convention to make Tennessee a free state, and that this was defeated by only one vote.

longer. That is what it all amounted to when reduced to its simplest form.

Our forefathers, in East Tennessee, at an early day, so far as we can ascertain by the lights before us, do not seem to have cared very much about the moral aspect of slavery, either one way or the other. Those who were able, and felt so inclined, purchased and held slaves. But much the larger number seemed not inclined to own them.

That there should have been during the closing years of the last century, and the first years of this, an indifference to the moral aspect of the question of slavery, a dullness, an apathy of conscience, is not in the least surprising, when it is kept in mind that the foreign slave trade, under the sanction of the Convention of 1787, was then active and in full operation, and that slavers laden with human beings were entering every port. Slaves were lawful merchandise, as much so as rum and broadcloth. As the period of limitation was rapidly running out, there must have been unusual activity in shipping in slaves, as there sometimes is in importing certain articles of merchandise just before higher duties are to be imposed under a new tariff. The effect of all this was to create a speculative excitement in the slave market, and make men forget the moral questions lying beneath.

But as time wore on, thoughtful men began to reflect on the question. Now and then the inherent wrong of slavery forced consideration on their minds. New light dawned on them. Then the question arose: What shall be done to get rid of this evil? Logically co-operation was suggested and adopted. Emancipation societies began to spring up. This was especially the case in Kentucky and East Tennessee. So far as East Tennessee is concerned, it appears that on the 25th of February, 1815, the "Tennessee Manumission Society" was organized, at Lost Creek Meeting House, in Jefferson county.

The originators of this movement were largely Quakers and Covenanters. On the day named, eight persons or-

ganized themselves into a society for the purpose of "promoting the manumission of slaves." These persons were Charles Osborne, John Canady, John Swan, John Underwood, Jesse Willis, David Maulsby, Elihu Swan and Thomas Morgan. The first article of the constitution adopted was, "each member is to have an advertisement in the most conspicuous part of his house, in the following words, viz.; 'Freedom is the natural right of all men. I therefore acknowledge myself a member of the Tennessee Society for promoting manumission of slaves.'" On the 21st of November, 1815, the first general convention was held at "Lick Creek Meeting House of Friends," in Greene county. The second annual convention was held in Greeneville on the 19th or 20th of November, 1816. Soon after the first society was formed, in 1815, other societies were organized in Greene, Washington, Sullivan, Cocke and Knox counties. One society was formed in Knoxville.[1] There were sixteen branches or societies in East Tennessee, with 474 members. No members or branches are mentioned from beyond the Cumberland Mountains, and therefore the conclusion is that the society was confined mainly to East Tennessee.

As it is interesting to know who were formally identified with the anti-slavery movement, I give the names of those persons present at the annual convention in 1822. From Greene county, Stephen Brooks, John Marshall, Samuel McNees, David Stanfield, James Jones, James Galbriath, Lawrence Earnest and Wesley Earnest and probably Isaac Jones and Isaac Hammer.

Blount county branch: David Dalyel, Aaron Hackney, Wm. Lee, John Coulson and Andrew Cowan.

Bethesda branch: Isaiah Harrison.

Washington county: Joseph Tucker.

Turkey Creek: William Milliken.

French Broad branch: Wm. Snoddy and John McCroskey.

Holston branch: Jesse Lockheart and James McCampbell.

[1] Goodspeed's "History of Tennessee," title, Greene county, pp. 881–882.

Jefferson county: John Caldwell, James Caldwell, Elisha Hammer, John Swan and John Swain.

Middle Creek: John Kerr.

Knox county: Robert M. Anderson.

Besides the above, the names of Thomas Doan as clerk, Asa Gray as treasurer, and that of Abraham Jones appear as members.[1]

These names stand for the very best of the old East Tennessee families. Nearly every one of them is well known to-day through their descendants. I well recollect at least four of these men, namely, that good and rather strong man in his day, Rev. Stephen Brooks, a pioneer Methodist preacher, who was a member of the Constitutional Convention of 1796; that strong, brave, clear-headed Covenanter Presbyterian, John Caldwell; that pure, bright and intelligent Quaker, William Lee;[2] and that other strikingly strong man, Robert M. Anderson. In June, 1861, in a conversation with the Hon. Horace Maynard and myself, Mr. Caldwell referred with just pride and satisfaction to the part he had taken away back in early days in favoring emancipation, and, in part, in anticipat-

[1] Much of this information is obtained from Goodspeed's "History of Tennessee," East Tennessee edition.

[2] This was unquestionably Ephraim Lee, the father of William. Ephraim died at eighty-six in 1866. I am confirmed in this by a conversation with T. R. Lee, a son of William Lee, and a grandson of Ephraim, a most worthy gentleman residing at Friendsville, Blount county, the old home of Ephraim. From him I learned the following anecdotes related of his grandfather: He and the Rev. Dr. Isaac Anderson, referred to above, another emancipationist, were talking of exchanging horses, but could not agree, because each was afraid that he was getting the advantage of the other in the trade. Ephraim was a strong Union man during the war, as the Friends were nearly everywhere. He had all his horses taken from him by Confederate soldiers, excepting one. On one occasion, when these soldiers were around, he took the remaining horse to a cedar thicket near by, and tied it out. On his return, he met some soldiers, who said to him: "Old man, what did you do with that horse?" He answered: "He is hitched up among those cedars." The horse was taken. When some of his grandchildren said to him: "Grand-pa, why did you answer in that way?" he said: "I could not tell a story."

ing the troubles then looming up in the country on account of slavery. In 1861, he was still true to his original convictions. He was most ardently devoted to the Union, and remained so to the end of his life, which did not close till he had seen every slave in the land set free from bondage. John Caldwell was naturally a remarkable man—robust, determined, conscientious; a perfect type of our old Scotch Covenanters. In the days of the American Colonization Society, while Mr. Clay was its president, he was one of its vice-presidents.

Robert M. Anderson became a distinguished circuit judge. Of wonderful physical development and with magnificent intellectual endowments, no one who ever saw him could ever forget him. He was a keen wit, an inimitable humorist, a profound judge, and a noble, high-toned gentleman. He was a brother of the estimable Judge Samuel Anderson; also a brother of the remarkably great lawyer, William E. Anderson, as well as a brother of the great theologian, Dr. Isaac Anderson, the founder of the Southwestern Theological College at Maryville. Truly there were giants in the land in those days.

It does not appear from any records available what became of the Manumission Society of Tennessee after 1822. Doubtless it continued to hold its meetings until the slavery sentiment became so intolerant as to make it unsafe to do so. To fix the date when this happened is impossible, but probably it was sometime between 1825 and 1834. That there was a strong anti-slavery feeling in East Tennessee, about 1820, is proven by tradition as well as by such historical facts as we have bearing on the question. In 1826, there were 143 anti-slavery societies in the United States, of which number 103 were in the South.[1]

Another East Tennessean, who was at an early day associated with the anti-slavery movement, and at a later day with abolitionism, was the Rev. John Rankin. He

[1] Wilson's "Rise and Fall of the Slave Power," Vol. I, p. 179.

was a native of Jefferson county. Mr. Rankin was a Prebyterian of Covenanter blood. He belonged to an old, influential and very large family in East Tennessee, many members of which have become Presbyterian ministers. In 1814, says one of his sons, "he joined an abolition society in Jefferson county." This was probably in 1815, as the first anti-slavery society in that county was organized in that year. In 1817, he determined to leave Tennessee and move to Ohio. He left on account of slavery, being unwilling to raise a family in a state whose soil was "polluted" by that institution. On his way to Ohio, he was induced to stop at Paris, Kentucky, where he accepted a "call" to a church and spent four years. At the end of this time, he moved to Ripley, Ohio, where he was the pastor of a church for forty-four consecutive years. During all this time he was incessant in his work in favor of the abolition of slavery.

In 1824, Mr. Rankin published a series of letters in opposition to slavery. Two years later these were gathered together and published in book form, and scattered widely over the country. They are said to have produced a deep impression on the public mind. While residing in Kentucky, he had lectured and written much on this subject. In 1836, he was employed by the Ohio State Abolition Society to travel and lecture for one year. "While on this lecturing tour," says his son, in a late letter to the author, "he was mobbed perhaps a hundred or more times." "Stones and fire brands and eggs were often thrown at him, and windows smashed, though he was never hurt."[1]

Mr. Rankin seems to have been one of those brave, intensely earnest men who could not be silent on the subject

[1] For these facts, and many others, I am indebted to Captain R. C. Rankin, a son of John Rankin, by a letter of December 5, 1892. I am also indebted to Mr. J. C. Leggett for facts, appearing in an address delivered by him at Ripley, Ohio, May 5, 1892, on the occasion of the "dedication of a bronze bust and granite monument" to the memory of John Rankin, which address with others has been published in a pamphlet.

of slavery. He made no compromise with what he considered a great crime. Being one of the earliest, as well as one of the bravest and ablest of the early Abolitionists, his teachings had a wide influence.

Mr. Rankin once said that in his boyhood "a majority of the people of East Tennessee were Abolitionists."[1] He frequently remarked that in his youth "it was much safer to make an anti-slavery speech in the South than it became during his middle life to make the same speech in the North, not that the people had changed so materially, but greed had taken the place of justice."[2] For many years he favored some peaceful means of getting rid of slavery. One of these was to pay for the slaves at certain fixed prices, taking the states one at a time.

"But, for ten years before the late Civil War, he had lost all hope of a peaceful solution of the question, and wished that the conflict, which he said must come, might come as speedily as possible. And, when it did come, he gave eight sons and one grandson to the Union. He was a genuine Abolitionist. He believed slavery was a great crime, which must be destroyed, peaceably, if possible, forcibly, if necessary. His house was for many years the first station of one branch of the famous 'underground railroad,' and always the 'refuge of the oppressed.' In his house at Ripley, Ohio, was sheltered 'Eliza Harris,' of Uncle Tom's Cabin, a young slave from Kentucky, who fled from home with her child, to avoid separation by sale. She crossed the Ohio by leaping, in her desperation, from one mass of floating ice to another, sometimes in the water to her waist, and finally, exhausted and nearly frozen, she was pulled ashore by a man waiting on the Ohio side."[3]

Another native of East Tennessee, who early moved to the West and became identified with the anti-slavery cause, was the Rev. Dr. David Nelson, a Presbyterian minister,

[1] Wilson's "Rise and Fall," etc., Vol. I, p. 178.

[2] "Address of Leggett," etc. [3] "Washington Post," of March 8, 1896.

widely known as the author of the "Cause and Cure of Infidelity." He was a native of Washington county, and, like Mr. Rankin, was educated at Washington College, under the venerable Dr. Samuel Doak. He was somewhat advanced in years before he became a preacher. Not long after this, he moved to Kentucky, and at a later day became connected with Center College. No doubt can exist as to the fact, that in the pulpit he was one of the most wonderful men this country has ever produced.

In June, 1835, Dr. Nelson was driven out of Missouri by an "infuriated blood-thirsty mob of pro-slavery men," of Marion county. Taking refuge in the river bottom, just west of Quincy, Illinois, and surrounded by the water of "the raging, swollen Mississippi," a refugee and a wanderer here was suggested to him and composed that sad, touching song found in all Presbyterian hymn books, commencing with the line:

"My days are gliding swiftly by."

It is a fact not generally known, that the first out-and-out emancipation paper in the United States was published at Jonesborough, in the mountains of East Tennessee, the oldest town in the state, and a place rendered immortal by its connection with the memory of Governor John Sevier, Andrew Jackson and William G. Brownlow. Nevertheless, this is a fact. Some time early in the year 1819, Elihu Embree, a Quaker, commenced the publication of an anti-slavery paper in that town, called the "Manumission Intelligence," a copy of which paper, dated July 19, 1819, I have seen.[1] It was printed by J. Howard for the "Manumission Society." J. Howard was the father of Mrs. Judge Samuel Milligan, Mrs. Prof. Safford, and the brilliant Major John K. Howard, who was killed in one of the early battles of the late Civil War in Virginia.

[1] This paper is the property of Colonel Moses White, of Knoxville, to whom I return my acknowledgment for its use. I hear of eight more numbers in Washington county.

Elihu Embree was a brother of the most estimable Elijah Embree, who built and for a long time operated an extensive nail factory in Embreeville, Washington county, East Tennessee. Elijah married a granddaughter of Governor John Sevier. He was distinguished alike for his splendid virtues and for his disinterested public spirit.

After publishing this paper for nearly two years, Mr. Embree died, and here commences a part of history not generally understood. On the death of Mr. Embree, the subscription list and the good-will of this paper were sold, and the work commenced by him was continued at Mt. Pleasant, Ohio, by the celebrated Benjamin Lundy, under the name of the "Genius of Universal Emancipation." The first number was dated July, 1821. Nine months later, in March, 1822, Lundy moved with his paper to Greeneville, Tennessee, where he continued to publish his monthly paper until July, 1823. He may have published it somewhat longer. It will be remembered that he moved with his paper to Baltimore, in 1824. At that place, his paper appears as No. 1, Vol. 4.[1]

As far as I can see, East Tennessee was regarded at that time as a more favorable field for anti-slavery work than Ohio. The anti-slavery sentiment at this time was stronger in the South, and particularly so in Tennessee and Kentucky, than it was in New England.[2] This statement is corroborated by the fact that at the convention to promote the abolition of slavery, held in Baltimore, in 1826, which Lundy attended, of the eighty-one societies represented there, seventy-three were from the South.[3]

The history of the two papers, Embree's and Lundy's, is then briefly as follows: In 1816 or 1817, one Charles Osborne started a paper at Mt. Pleasant, Ohio, called the "Philanthrophist." No one asserts that this was an open, unequivocal emancipation paper. Osborne after a while

[1] Autobiography of Benjamin Lundy.

[2] Wilson's "Rise and Fall," etc., Vol. I, p. 170.

[3] Id., p. 170.

invited Lundy to join him in this enterprise. Lundy agreed to do so, but before he could execute his promise, he had to go with some saddlery to St. Louis. He remained in St. Louis until 1820 or 1821, when he went to Mount Pleasant, Ohio. In the meantime, Osborne had failed, and his paper had been sold to Elihu Embree, and was being published in Jonesborough, East Tennessee, under the name of the "Manumission Intelligencer." In 1820, or the early part of 1821, Embree died, and his paper was purchased by Lundy, at least the latter commenced in July, 1821, publishing the "Genius." In other words the "Genius" was the successor of the "Emancipator" or "Manumission Intelligencer." In 1821, after publishing nine numbers of the "Genius" in Ohio, Lundy left that state, and in July of that year, issued in Greeneville, Tennessee, No. 10, Vol. 1, of his paper.

From the foregoing facts, gathered largely from Lundy's autobiography, and also from Wilson's "Rise and Fall," etc., Greeley's "Civil Conflict," and the "American Cyclopaedia, it appears:

First. That Lundy as is generally asserted, even by men of the intelligence of those above named, did not publish the "first distinctively and exclusively anti-slavery paper" in the United States, but that this honor belongs to Elihu Embree.

Second. It is incontestably clear that this paper was published at Jonesborough, East Tennessee.

Third. That Lundy's paper, as is often asserted, was not published at Jonesborough, but at Greeneville, Tennessee.

It is most probable that Lundy only secured the good will and the subscription list of the "Emancipator," when he commenced the publication of the "Genius" in Ohio, for it appears that at first it was published twenty miles away. When he came to Tennessee, in 1822, it appears that he published his paper from the material of the

"Emancipator."[1] At the same time he published a weekly paper and a monthly agricultural journal.

Mr. Lundy's statement in his life is as follows (page 19): "Before I left St. Louis, I heard that, as I had stayed from home so much longer than had been anticipated, Charles Osborne had become quite tired of the employment of editor, and had sold out his printing establishment to Elisha Bates, and also that Elihu Embree had commenced the publication of an anti-slavery paper, called the 'Emancipator,' in Jonesborough, Tennessee. I therefore made up my mind to settle with my family in Illinois. But on my way home I was informed of the death of Embree. . . . I determined immediately to establish a periodical of my own. I therefore removed to Mount Pleasant, and commenced the publication of the 'Genius of Universal Emancipation,' in January, 1821. . . ."

"When the friends of the deceased Elihu Embree heard of my paper, they urged me to remove to Tennessee, and use the press on which his had been printed; I assented, and after having issued eight monthly numbers of the 'Genius' in Ohio, I started for Tennessee. I traveled eight hundred miles, in going there, one-half on foot, the rest by water."

As before stated, in 1824, Mr. Lundy decided to move his paper to Baltimore. He accordingly did so in that year. In 1829, William Lloyd Garrison was prevailed on to join him in this enterprise. They found Baltimore a hot place for the publication of Abolition sentiments. Mr. Garrison was indicted, and on trial convicted for the publication of a criminal libel on a slave trader, and was cast into prison. Mr. Lundy was assaulted on the street for something he had written in reference to a slave trader. His assailant was indicted for the act, found guilty, and fined lightly, while Mr. Lundy had the satisfaction of being assured by the learned jurist presiding on the trial that he

[1] Greeley's "Civil Conflict," Vol. I, p. 113.

had only received in the assault on him what he deserved. That must have been very soothing to his wounded feelings! After their experience in Baltimore, no wonder Lundy and Garrison determined to transfer their paper to Washington City.

Both Horace Greely and Henry Wilson, in their respective works, give the pre-eminence to Mr. Lundy over John Rankin as an early anti-slavery advocate. They rank the former as the leading man among the early workers in this cause. I doubt if this estimate is correct. The greatest part of the reputation of Mr. Lundy has arisen out of the belief that he published the first anti-slavery paper in the United States. This, as I have shown, is an error. This distinction belongs to Elihu Embree. Lundy and Rankin commenced their labors about the same time, namely, in 1816 or 1817, and both of them, by lectures and writings, devoted their lives to the work. But Lundy died comparatively young, while Rankin lived to see the yearnings of his heart satisfied at the close of the war, after nearly fifty years of unceasing labor. Rankin was a better scholar than Lundy, with as much or more ability, and very much more force of character. He was equally as earnest and as brave. He was decidedly aggressive, while Lundy was cautious, if not somewhat timid.

The Methodist Church in East Tennessee, as well as in Middle Tennessee, at an early day, was strongly and almost unitedly opposed to slavery. Between 1818 and 1822, the Quarterly and Annual Conferences were constantly troubled with this vexed question. Session after session, they promulgated rules on the subject, and as frequently altered or modified them, but always in opposition to or in retraint of slaveholding and the buying and selling of slaves. This spirit was very manifest about 1822. Thus John B. McFerrin, D.D., in his history of Methodism in Tennessee, Vol. 2, p. 243, speaking of the Rev. Wm. Garrett, says:

"In 1822, at the age of forty-eight, he was licensed to

preach. In this work he was hindered for two or three years on account of his connection with slavery. James Axley, as presiding elder, and Enoch Moore, as circuit preacher, were anti-slavery in the administration of discipline, and not only refused to license slaveholders to preach, but actually denied them the privilege of exhorting, or even leading in prayer-meeting, and going so far as to denounce slaveholders as no better than thieves and robbers."

From the same work, page 494, I quote a part of a letter from Rev. Wm. Garrett, of April, 1869:

"Wesley Harrison, another layman, emigrated to Ohio, in 1817, under the influence of the anti-slavery feeling which began to spread about this time. Indeed, there was a large emigration of Methodists from East Tennessee to the North-west in those years, and until 1822, on account of slavery. James Axley traveled and preached in that section extensively, and took decided ground against the slaveholders having anything to do in managing the affairs of the Church, and especially preaching. Much irritation of feeling was produced, and what with the emigration of a great many to a 'free state,' in the style of those days, and the unfriendly administration of discipline upon the slavery cause, the Church came to a standstill, and was in a measure paralyzed and powerless for good. As a means of averting greater evils and saving the Church, if possible, colonization and emancipation societies were formed, and it was believed by many that such organizations did a great deal to prevent a serious rupture in the Church till the storm passed over. The anti-slavery feeling culminated in 1820 (and was strengthened, doubtless, by the agitation of the question in congress in connection with the admission of Missouri) under the administration of James Axley as presiding elder, and Enoch Moore, preacher in charge. So far did they go in proscription that a man who owned slaves was not allowed even to lead a public prayer meeting, and

thus many good men, who were in a condition to be useful, were held back from exercising their gifts until this regime passed away."

At the Annual Conference held at Liberty Hill, on October 7, 1808, the following rules were adopted:

WESTERN ANNUAL CONFERENCE.

"Question. What method shall be taken with those members of our Society that shall enter into the slave-trade?

Answer. Every preacher who has charge of a circuit shall upon information secured cite every such member or members so buying or selling a slave or slaves to appear at the ensuing Quarterly Meeting Conference, and there to submit his or her case to the judgment of said Quarterly Conference, who shall proceed to determine whether the person or persons have purchased or sold said slave or slaves from speculative motives or from motives of justice and mercy; and if a majority of said Conference shall judge that he, she or they have bought or sold such slave or slaves from speculative motives, they shall expel such person or persons from their societies.

(Signed,) FRANCIS ASBURY.
WILLIAM MCKENDREE.

Test: WILLIAM BURK, *Secretary*.
TENNESSEE, LIBERTY HILL, *October* 7, 1808."[1]

At another conference held at Bethlehem Meeting House, October 28, 1816, a committee reported rules for the government of the Church, as follows: first declaring that "we sincerely believe and declare it as our opinion that slavery is a moral evil," also that slavery is a "curse" to the Church of God.

[1] I am indebted to the late lamented Rev. W. C. Graves for this document, copied from the records of the early Tennessee Conferences in his possession.

"1. If any member of our Society shall buy or sell a slave or slaves in order to make gain, or shall sell to any person who buys to sell again for that purpose, such member shall be called to an account as the discipline directs, and expelled from our Church; nevertheless, the above rule does not affect any person in our Society, if he or she make it appear that they have bought or sold to keep man and wife, parents and children together."

"2. No preacher, traveling or local, shall be eligible to the office of deacon in our Church, unless he assures us sentimentally, in person or by letter, that he disapproves of slavery, and declares his willingness to execute, wherever it is practicable, a legal emancipation of such slave or slaves conformably to the laws of the state in which he lives."

Perhaps I may be going back a few years, as I find it impossible to get dates from the book I am quoting, but I give the following as the action taken by the "Tennessee Conference" held at "Fountain Head" about 1815, in reference to a member who owned slaves:

"Leven Edney, recommended from Nashville Circuit; his character examined and approved, Learner Blackman being security that he 'll set his slaves free, when practicable."

"When practicable," exclaims the author, Dr. McFerrin, "so many promised and gave 'security,' but in few instances was it found to be practicable."[1] It would seem from this that the spirit of greed and the lust of power were stealing into the Methodist Church in spite of the discipline and the rules adopted by its conferences.

At an Annual Conference held at Franklin, Tennessee, in 1817, the subject of slaveholding again came up for consideration, and the following rules were adopted, namely:

"First. That if any local elder, deacon or preacher, should purchase a slave, the Quarterly Conference should

[1] "Methodism in Tennessee," Vol. II, p. 161.

say how long the slave should serve as a remuneration for the purchase money, and that the purchaser should enter into a written obligation to emancipate such slave at the expiration of the term of servitude, provided emancipation were permissible under the laws of the state, but that if the laws of the state should continue to oppose emancipation, then the next Quarterly Conference held after the expiration of the term of servitude, should determine the future *status of the slave.*

"Second. The same rule applied to private members, except that their cases were to be managed by a committee appointed by the preacher in charge, and in all cases of preachers, deacons, elders or private members, the children of slaves purchased, born during bondage, or term of servitude, were to be manumitted upon arrival at the age of twenty-five, provided the law should then admit of emancipation, but if the law did not, the cases of all such children were to be submitted to the Quarterly Conference or the committee, as the case might be."

The rule in reference to the selling of slaves by a preacher or member is very curious. It required the preacher to submit his case to the Quarterly Conference, and a lay member to the committee, which conference or committee, as the case might be, should determine for what term of years the slave should be sold, and it required the seller to record in the county court the emancipation of the slave at the expiration of said term.[1]

At the conference held in Nashville, October, 1819, Peter Buram and Gilbert D. Taylor were recommended to be admitted on trial,[2] and both were rejected because they were slaveholders. A number of persons who were applicants for deacons' orders, were likewise rejected for the same cause. Some of the members at the conference protested against this action. An appeal was taken, but no decisive action was taken on the appeal.

[1] Goodspeed's "History of Tennessee," p. 668. [2] Id., p. 670.

In the conference held at Columbia, Tennessee, in 1824, in reply to an address from the "Moral Religious Manumission Society of West Tennessee," the following resolution was adopted:

"Resolved, That the address from the Moral Religious Manumission Society be returned to committee accompanied with a note stating that so far as the address involves the subject of slavery we concur in the sentiments that slavery is an evil to be deplored, and that it should be counteracted by every judicious and religious exertion."[1]

Up to this date (1824) the sentiment seemed to be well nigh universal in the Tennessee Conference that slavery was a great moral evil, a curse to the Church, and slaveholding a sin, not to be tolerated by the Church after the time should come, which seemed to be anticipated, when the laws of the state would permit emancipation.

As late as 1835, the Church still held to its former decisions on the subject of slavery, as appears by the following extract from a letter to the author from the late lamented Rev. W. C. Graves, of Morristown, Tennessee, dated February 16, 1893, in which he says:

"In 1835, Conference (Holston) was held in Abingdon, Va. Thos. Stringfield was charged with having sold a slave. The punishment inflicted was the withdrawal from him for twelve months of the parchment by which he held the office of an elder. It was the year to elect delegates to the General Conference. Some votes were cast for Stringfield. He requested those who voted for him to cease voting for him. He did not wish to go to the General Conference in his crippled condition. But in that crippled condition, the General Conference elected him editor of the 'South-western Christian Advocate,' a new Church paper to be published in Nashville, Tenn."

Little did those pious men anticipate that the Church would be rent in twain, in 1844, on the subject of slavery,

[1] Goodspeed's "History of Tennessee," p. 670.

and that the Southern branch would range itself, and rightfully too, under the circumstances, distinctly on the extreme Southern side of the issues immediately involved in the separation. Much less could these good men, who looked at slavery "as an evil to be deplored," pierce the future and behold the whole Methodist Church, South, in 1861, except a "remnant" in East Tennessee, ranging itself on the side of slavery, and for its sake striving to destroy the government. The issue came in 1844. The General Conference met in New York in that year. This was a memorable meeting. The ever-present subject of slavery came up to mar and destroy the harmony of that great representative body of Christians. Two cases came before that body involving the moral right to hold persons in bondage. The first was that of Francis A. Harding, who had been suspended by the Baltimore Conference from the office of minister for refusing to manumit five slaves belonging to his wife at the time of their marriage, and which by the laws of Maryland remained the property of the wife after marriage. The Baltimore Conference adopted the following preamble and resolution:

"Whereas, the Baltimore Conference can not and will not tolerate slavery in any of its members." . . .

"Resolved, that Brother Harding be suspended until the next annual Conference, or until he assures the Episcopacy that he has taken the necessary steps to secure the freedom of his slaves."

The fact that the slaves were still the property of the wife and, therefore, not subject to the disposition of the husband ought to have been a sufficient answer to this charge. But it was not. On appeal to the General Conference, the action of the Baltimore Conference in suspending Mr. Harding from the ministry was affirmed by a vote of 117 to 56.

A still more noted case came up for consideration in this Conference: it was that of Bishop James O. Andrew, of Georgia. He had become, contrary to his will, the owner

of two slaves. In addition to these, on a second marriage, he found himself interested in some slaves belonging to his wife. Unwilling to occupy this position, he had the slaves secured to his wife by a trust deed, divesting himself of all interest in them. But he was still the owner of two others, one received by will, and the other inherited from his first wife. Whether he made any effort to manumit the last one does not appear. He did make an effort to send the first to Africa, but the slave refused to go. As to that one, he was clearly not guilty of any offense, provided the laws of the State of Georgia, like the laws of nearly all of the slaveholding states, forbid the emancipation of the slaves, except upon the condition that they were sent out of the state, which it is assumed was the case. Under these circumstances the following preamble and resolution were passed by an affirmative vote of 111, and a negative vote of 69:

"Whereas, the 'Discipline' of our Church forbids the doing of anything calculated to destroy our itinerant General Superintendence; and, whereas, Bishop Andrew has become connected with slavery, by marriage and otherwise, and this act having drawn after it circumstances which, in the estimation of this General Conference, will greatly embarass the exercise of his office as an itinerant General Superintendent, if not, in some places, entirely prevent it, therefore,

"Resolved, That it is the sense of this General Conference that he desist from the exercise of the office so long as this impediment remains."

The clause in the Discipline on which this action was based was as follows:

"We declare that we are as much as ever convinced of the great evil of slavery, *therefore*, no slaveholder shall be eligible to any official station in our Church hereafter where the laws of the state in which he lives will admit of emancipation, and permit the liberated slave to enjoy freedom. When any traveling preacher becomes the owner of

a slave or slaves by any means, he shall forfeit his ministerial character, unless he execute, if it be practicable, a legal emancipation of such slaves conformably to the laws of the state in which he lives."

The delegates from the Tennessee Conferences, and indeed all the members from the slaveholding states, except four from the Baltimore Conference, and one from Texas, voted against the action of the majority. Those representing the Holston Conference were E. F. Sevier, S. Patton and Thomas Stringfield. The first of these was a slave owner, the grandson of Governor John Sevier. The last was the same person who had been suspended in 1835, for selling a slave.

The action of the General Conference, as to Mr. Harding, according to the Constitution of the Church, was clearly illegal. It is not so easy to determine in the case of Bishop Andrew, for all the facts necessary for a correct judicial opinion, do not seem to have been before the conference when he was on trial.

Be that as it may the decision was a most unfortunate one. It immediately led to a division of the Church into two bodies, separated by a geographical line, and holding widely antagonistic views on the great and all-absorbing question of slavery. Up to this time no religious denomination, having a sure foothold in the South, except the Quakers, had perhaps been so stedfastly opposed to slavery as the Methodist. As a general rule it had been conscientiously opposed to that institution. Now the whole matter was changed. With one voice that denomination condemned the action of the conference in suspending Bishop Andrew from office. Almost at once the minds of Southern members, under the influence of this wrong as they esteemed it, changed from a state of opposition to slavery, or of mild indifference, to its open advocacy. From this time, this active, earnest Church in the South became pro-slavery in almost every fiber. And when Civil War came on in 1861, no Church was more united in the Southern

cause, except in East Tennessee, than the Methodist Episcopal Church South.

Waiving any consideration of the legal question involved in the case of Bishop Andrew, under the Constitution and the law of the Methodist Church, I do not hesitate to say that here was a great blunder on the part of a majority of the General Conference, not to say a wrong or a crime. It aroused a bitter spirit of indignation as well as alarm in the Methodist Church throughout the entire South. Bishop Andrew was a great and a good man. He was justly very popular. A keen sympathy was awakened in his behalf. But this was not all. By this decision of the General Conference, every Methodist slave owner felt that the same intolerant spirit of the majority in the North which had stricken down the great Bishop Andrew might soon be directed against him and his property also. The result was a universal cry for separation. Thus one bond which held the Union together was rudely snapped asunder. This was to the Southern people what the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was to the Northern people ten years later. Then, a few years later, followed the split in the Presbyterian and in the Baptist Churches on the same subject, and their division into separate bodies according to geographical lines. And thus other bonds were severed, and the minds of men became prepared for the secession of the Southern States.

The important influence exerted by the division of the three great churches, caused directly by the question of slavery, in preparing the minds of the Southern people for a separation from the general government, cannot be overestimated. It has heretofore received too little consideration in tracing out the causes which led to and culminated in the great conflict of arms in 1861. Leaving out of consideration the mad passions engendered by this division, the feeling of hate and distrust it aroused, and the severing of the strongest ties which bind men together in sympathy—church relations—the evil extended far beyond

these. It everywhere relaxed the bonds of the Union. The reasoning in favor of a separation of the states, however incorrect and fallacious, became plausible and obvious to the dullest intellect. If the church could divide and separate and prosper, why not the states likewise? If a geographical line, dividing the slave from the free states, were proper in reference to religion—the most sacred and universal of all institutions, which draws men together in bonds of unity and love as nothing else can do—how much more natural and proper such a line as the means of separating diverse interests and antagonistic institutions, between which there was an irrepressible and an enduring conflict. Thus men in the South unconsciously looked at and reasoned about this question. And though the original cause which divided the churches has long since ceased to exist, the separation still continues, with a Chinese wall between the two Christian communities holding the same faith and preaching the same doctrines.

CHAPTER VI.

SLAVERY IN THE STATE OF TENNESSEE.

Early Presbyterians were slaveholders—Become aroused to the sin of slavery—Commence emancipating their slaves—Legislature forbids emancipation—The freedmen must be sent to Africa—Free colored men might sell themselves into slavery—One case of this kind—Introduction of slaves into the state for sale forbidden—Strong sentiment against slavery—Effort in constitutional convention of 1834 to abolish slavery—Friends of slavery apologize for opposing emancipation—A long controversy over the subject—An effort to strip slavery of some of its prestige fails—Constitution closes the door to general emancipation—Slavery protected by constitution of the United States and that of the state—Folly of the men who, in 1861, threw away their safeguards—All opposition to slavery hushed under the omnipotent despotism of public opinion—No man bold enough to question slavery.

I have thus dwelt at length on the relation the Methodist Church in Tennessee sustained toward the subject of slavery, partly because of the number and great influence of that denomination, and partly because of the abundance of historical material to be found on that subject. But when we come to the Presbyterian Church, which at an early day was far more numerous and powerful than the Methodist in East Tennessee, we find less material relating to that subject out of which to construct a satisfactory narrative. There can be no doubt of the fact that in the early settlement of this section of the state the Presbyterians were largely slaveholders—in fact, owned most of the slaves. There is much evidence tending to show that when the anti-slavery societies began to spring up, about 1815, and the subject of emancipation began to occupy the thoughts of men, the Presbyterians became greatly aroused on the subject, and took a prominent, if not the leading, part in the movement in favor of emancipation. Many of the members of these early anti-slavery societies are known

to have been Presbyterians. So strong was this feeling among them that they began voluntarily to emancipate their own slaves, and to send them to Liberia. Among those who thus set their slaves free were the Rev. Dr. Frederick A. Ross, Samuel Rhea, Hon. Seth J. W. Lucky, Ebenezer Mathes, and Valentine Sevier, all Presbyterians. These five persons together liberated perhaps fifty or more slaves.

So strong was the disposition among the people to emancipate their slaves, and so numerous were the free colored people becoming, that the legislature of 1831 passed an act forbidding emancipation, except upon the condition that those emancipated should be immediately removed from the state. Bond was to be given to that effect before the county court could give its assent to emancipation. Two reasons perhaps influenced the legislature to pass this act. Both were in the interest of slavery. One was to throw obstacles in the way of emancipation, which was becoming too common. The other was to obviate the evil influence on the slaves, caused by presence of free negroes in slaveholding communities. When the slaves saw numerous free persons of their own race and color, who were spending most of their time in idleness, it tended to make them restless and discontented. Besides, there was danger of having the slaves tampered with by the free colored people. It mattered not that the latter did not live or dress as well as the slaves. This was as nothing in comparison to the sweet boon of working only when and for whom they pleased.

Thus the slave owners, in order to make secure their property, were constantly compelled to hedge it around with new and more stringent safeguards, ever increasing in severity. Nearly every Southern state, perhaps every one, passed laws similar to the one referred to above. In the meantime some of the Northern states were closing their doors against the admission of free colored people. Finally the legislature of Tennessee, in 1854, passed an act requiring all persons of color who might

thereafter be emancipated, either by contract or will, to be transported to the western coast of Africa, unless unable by reason of age or disease to go. If no fund existed for paying the expenses of transportation, the slave was to be hired out until a sufficient sum for that purpose should be raised.

By an act passed in 1858 or 1859, it was provided that any free person of color, at the age of eighteen years, might choose a master and sell himself into slavery, by filing a petition for that purpose in the chancery court of the county in which he resided, setting forth his desire to go into slavery, giving the name of the proposed owner, and making publication for one month, giving due notice of the filing of the petition, and having notice served on the petitioner and the proposed purchaser to appear before the court at its next term. It was the duty of the judge to examine these persons separately, and any other persons he saw fit, to ascertain whether there was any fraud or imposition in the case, and also to appoint persons to report on the reasonableness of the price offered. If the judge was satisfied on all these points, the proposed sale was to be approved, and the petitioner was to go into slavery. One peculiar fact about this abnormal proceeding was that the money offered as the price of the person so sold was to be paid into the county treasury, for the use of the county schools.

One case of sale and voluntary enslavement under this law occurred in Hawkins county, East Tennessee, in 1858. The following is a part of the record in the case:

"Petition for Voluntary Enslavement.

In Chancery at Rogersville, Tennessee.

Ben, a man of color, and William Miller, Esq.

Notice is hereby given that Ben, a man of color, has this day filed his petition in our said court, asking to become the slave of said Miller, under an act of the General

Assembly of said state, passed the 8th day of March, 1858. R. C. Fain, *Clerk and Master.*[1]

May 29, 1858."

The legislative records of the state, including the Constitutional Convention of 1834, furnish a good index of the state of public sentiment, and the changes taking place in reference to slavery, down to a comparatively recent period. Thus, the act of the legislature of 1801, which conferred on the county courts of the state the authority to emancipate slaves, which authority had been exercised by the legislature previous to that time, contains this significant preamble, showing the pressure for emancipation which then existed:

"Whereas, the number of petitions presented to this legislature praying the emancipation of slaves not only tends to involve the state in great evils, but are also productive of great expense," etc.

In 1790, there were less than four thousand slaves in the state. By 1810, the number had increased to upward of forty-four thousand. This rapid increase, as it at that time seemed, induced the legislature, in 1812, to prohibit the introduction of slaves into the state for sale. This fact furnishes very strong incidental proof of the weak hold slavery had at that time on the hearts of the people. In a previous chapter, the rise and growth of the many manumission societies, which sprang up in East Tennessee about 1815, were traced out: also the position of the Methodist Church on the subject of slavery. There are still other evidences of an almost general concurrence of sentiment at that time in condemnation of slavery. One of these is "An Address delivered by a Member of the

[1] The late chancellor, Seth J. W. Lucky, my friend and afterward my associate as one of the chancellors of the state, so justly distinguished for his learning and goodness, who had liberated his own slaves thirty years before, determined this case, but, as his worthy son informs me, not until he had examined privately the petitioner as to the reasons for his singular action.

Manumission Society of Knoxville, Tennessee, on the 17th of August, 1816, by order of the Society." The name of the author does not appear.[1] One object of the address, as it announced, was to show "that the principles of slavery are [were] inconsistent with the laws of nature and revelation." It proceeds to arraign slavery, at great length and with striking force, for its cruelty and its inhumanity. The author argued that in no part of the world was slavery so inhuman as in the United States. This address was not the mere individual opinion of its author, as appears by the following note that was appended to it:

"The foregoing has been examined by the inspecting committee and approved.

Attest: JAMES JONES, *President.*

Nov. 20, 1896."

I might quote at length from this address, but I have sufficiently indicated its spirit.

In 1821, a petition was presented to the legislature, praying for the passage of a law making the terms on which emancipation would be permitted in the state easier on the owners of slaves; also praying for the emancipation of slaves on their reaching thereafter a certain age, and for a law to prevent the separation of husband and wife, parent and child. This petition was referred to a committee, of which Jacob Peck, afterward one of the supreme judges of the state, was chairman. This committee concurred in all the propositions presented in the petitions, and denounced the policy of forcing men by unjust restrictions to hold slaves in bondage, contrary to the dictates of conscience and humanity. The committee proposed a law preventing the separation of husband and wife. They also say:

[1] I am indebted for these facts and others to the address of the Hon. Horace Maynard, delivered at Nashville, July 4, 1863, kindly furnished to me by Colonel John B. Brownlow.

"Your committee are of the opinion that it is worthy the consideration of the legislature to examine into the policy of providing for the emancipation of those yet unborn. [Signed] J. Peck, *Chairman.*" [1]

This is only one more proof of the strong anti-slavery feeling prevailing in the state from 1815 to 1824. There is no evidence that this feeling died out for many years after this time. Between that time and 1834, we have not so much historical evidence in the way of public or private documents to prove the existence of this sentiment. But we are not wholly without proof. It is within the memory, no doubt, of old citizens that some time between those dates a public meeting was held in Knoxville by its leading citizens in favor of emancipation. While the names of these citizens can not be given in full, some of them can be recalled, and among them Samuel R. Rodgers and Dr. W. J. Baker, both Presbyterians, and both then or afterward slave-owners. Baker, when the civil war came on, espoused the Confederate cause, while Rodgers adhered unflinchingly to the Union.

But the journal of the Constitutional Convention of Tennessee, which convened in 1834 to amend the constitution, furnishes full and plenary proof of the strength of the anti-slavery feeling, particularly in East Tennessee, even at that late day, when the two antagonistic forces in reference to slavery were becoming fiercely arrayed against each other on the floor of the lower house of congress. Between 1796, the date of the first constitution, and 1834, the date of the constitution under consideration, slavery had become an important interest in the state. The number of slaves had grown from 10,613 to 150,000, as estimated by the convention. During this time the rich cotton lands of Middle and West Tennessee had been opened up and largely brought into cultivation.

[1] Judge Peck was a citizen of Jefferson county, East Tennessee, and lived until 1870, being then aged about ninety years.

During the first week of the session of the convention, Mr. Terry H. Cahal presented the petition of "sundry citizens of Maury county" (one of the rich cotton counties of the state, and at that time the home of James K. Polk), "on the subject of emancipation." Other similar petitions were afterward presented from the counties of Robertson, Lincoln, Bedford, Overton, Roane, Rhea, Knox, Monroe, McMinn, Blount, Sevier, Cocke, Jefferson, Greene, and Washington, praying "that all the slaves shall [should] be made free against the year 1866." The signers numbered upward of 1,800, of whom more than one hundred were slaveholders.[1]

During the second week of the convention, Mathew Stephenson, a farmer of Washington county, Tennessee, introduced this resolution:

"That a committee of thirteen, one from each congressional district, be appointed to take into consideration the propriety of designating some period from which slavery shall not be tolerated in this state, and that all memorials on that subject that have or may be presented to the convention be referred to said committee, to consider and report thereon." (Journal, p. 53.)

A few days later, this resolution was taken up, on motion of Mr. John McGaughey, of Greene, when Mr. Adam Huntsman moved to lay it on the table until the first day of the ensuing January, which motion prevailed by a vote of 38 yeas to 20 nays. As the day named was beyond the time that the convention would be in session, it was in effect an adverse decision on the proposition. The nays were Messrs. W. B. Carter, of Carter, president of the convention; Hugh C. Armstrong, of Overton; Richard Bradshaw, of Jefferson; Willie Blount (formerly governor of the state), of Montgomery; Robert L. Cobb, of Maury; James Gillespie, of Blount; James L. Greene, of Roane; Isaac Hill, of Warren; John Kelley, of Marion; Bradley

[1] Address of Mr. Maynard, before referred to, page 110.

Kimbrough, of Monroe; Robert J. McKinney, of Greene; Joseph A. Mabry, of Knox; John McGaughey, of Greene; John Neal, of McMinn; William C. Roadman, of Cocke; Mathew Stephenson, of Washington; William T. Senter, of Rhea; William C. Smart, of Warren; Henry Sharp, of Lawrence; and Isaac Walton, of Sumner.

It is remarkable that the several members *whose nativity had been in some of the free states all voted*, says Mr. Maynard in his address, *in favor of laying the resolution on the table.* This was in keeping with what was largely the case during the late civil war, in East Tennessee, at least, namely, a large part, possibly a majority of Northern born citizens became ultra-friends and advocates of secession, and often the most bitter ones.

It will be observed that thirteen of these twenty members who were *prima facie* in favor of emancipation were from East Tennessee. It will be observed further that of the sixteen counties from which petitions were sent to the convention, praying for the emancipation of slaves, eleven were in East Tennessee, a proportion greatly larger than that of the counties of Middle and West Tennessee praying for the same thing.

The champion of this cause in the convention was Mathew Stephenson, of Washington county, a most worthy man, who the next year was the unsuccessful opponent of Andrew Johnson in his first race for a seat in the legislature for Greene and Washington counties. Mr. Stephenson was ably seconded in his efforts by Robert J. McKinney, a rising young Scotch-Irish lawyer from Greene county, who afterward achieved great eminence as a lawyer, and won high distinction as a profound and learned jurist on the bench of the supreme court of the state at the time of its greatest renown. He was also warmly aided by John McGaughey, of Greene county, and by Joseph A. Mabry, a large slaveholder from Knox county. Of all these men, many of whom I knew, only two were

alive when the civil war came on in 1861, namely, John McGaughey and Judge McKinney. Both survived the war for several years. Both were good men and good citizens—far beyond most men. The former remained true to the Union, while the latter cast his lot with the secessionists.

The most significant fact connected with this question in the convention is, that the majority felt called on to explain their action to the public. Surely we of this day, who were familiar with the arrogance of the slave power in the latter days of its dominance, can scarcely realize that, in 1834, it should have humbled itself by stooping to explain why it voted against prospective emancipation. There must have been behind these twenty men a much stronger anti-slavery sentiment in the state than we can possibly realize to-day. Feeble minorities, standing almost alone, often explain their votes; great majorities, backed by overwhelming odds, seldom or never do.

On motion of Mr. Allen, of Smith, the following resolution was adopted:

"Resolved, That a committee of three (one from each division of the state) be appointed to draft the reasons that governed this convention, in declining to act upon the memorials on the subject of slavery."

Messrs. John A. McKinney, Godfrey M. Fogg and Adam Huntsman, the two former being the most eminent lawyers in the state, were appointed as this committee. Huntsman was also a good lawyer, and afterward won great notoriety in the state as a successful candidate for congress against the celebrated and lamented David Crockett.

Mr. McKinney, as chairman, submitted afterwards a very able and ingenious report. The deplorable condition of the free persons of color in the state was alleged as the main basis of the opposition to emancipation. On this point, the report said among other things:

"The condition of a free man of color, surrounded by persons of a different caste and complexion, is the most

forlorn and wretched that can be imagined. He is a stranger in the land of his nativity; he is an outcast in the place of his residence—he has scarcely a motive to prompt him to virtuous action, or to stimulate him to honorable exertion. At every turn and corner of the walks of life, he is beset with temptations strong—nay, almost irresistible—to the force of which in most cases he may be expected to yield, the consequence of which must be that he will be degraded, despised and trampled upon by the rest of the community. When the free man of color is oppressed by the proud, or circumvented by the cunning, or betrayed by those in whom he reposed confidence, do the laws of the land afford him more than a nominal protection? Denied his oath in a court of justice, unable to call any of his own color to be witnesses, if the injury he complains of has been committed by a white man, how many of his wrongs must remain unredressed—how many of his rights be violated with impunity—how poor a boon does he receive when receiving freedom, if what he receives can be called by that name? Unenviable as is the condition of the slave, unlovely as slavery is in all its aspects, bitter as the draught that the slave is doomed to drink, nevertheless his condition is better than that of a free man of color in the midst of a community of white men, with whom he has no common interest, no fellow feeling, no equality. If the slave is sick, he has a master or mistress whose own interest will prompt to furnish him with food and medicine, and attendance suited to his situation; but when the free man of color is laid upon a bed of sickness, who cares for him, what hand supplies his wants, who will step to his humble bed of straw and feel his pulse, or inquire into the symptoms of his disease, or even hand him a cup of cold water to allay his thirst? . . . The slave is almost always exempt from care. When his day's work is done, he lies down and sleeps soundly; if the crops are destroyed by mildew or blasting, his peace of mind is not disturbed thereby; and when old age overtakes him,

and his limbs require rest, and his hands can work no longer in his master's house, the law has provided him with a home and secured him a maintenance. He knows not at any time what it is to have his children ask for bread when he has none to give them; they, too, are provided for. But who supplies the wants of the free man of color when old age overtakes him and he is unable to provide for himself? He has to contend with all the ills of poverty, aggravated by a sense of his own degraded situation, compared with those around him."

Then the explanation insists that the proposed emancipation would result in the expatriation of the slaves; that they would be transported for sale, or for use, to the Southern States of Mississippi, Louisiana or Arkansas, to be held as slaves. It also argues that the slaves in Tennessee were kindly treated, not overworked, and that the system of slavery here was as mild as in any part of the world.

This was indeed a gloomy, but a truthful picture of the condition of the free colored people of that day, much of which is true of them at this day, notwithstanding the glories of the latter half of this century. But it is worthy of remark, that while the main objection urged against emancipation was the degraded condition of the colored people already free, this convention degraded them still lower, by taking from them the only insignia of honorable citizenship, conferred on them by the fathers of the state, in the constitution of 1796—the qualified right to vote.

I quote a few more sentences, not in their order, to show what were the sentiments of slaveholders, and men speaking for slaveholders, in Tennessee, in 1834:

"But the friends of humanity need not despair; the memorialists need not dread that slavery will be perpetual in our highly favored country. Providence has already opened a door of hope, which is every day opening wider and wider. . . . The ministers of our holy religion

will knock at the doors of the hearts of the owners of slaves, telling every one to let his bondsman and his bondswoman go free, and to send them back to the land of their forefathers, and the voice of the holy men will be heard and obeyed. . . . In this way, under the approving smile of Heaven, and the fostering care of Providence, slavery will yet be extinguished in a way that will work no evil to the white man, while it produces the happiest effects on the whole American race. The last thirty years have produced a great change in public sentiment on this subject, and it can not be doubted that the next thirty years will produce a still greater one. . . . So a premature attempt on the part of the benevolent to get rid of the evils of slavery would certainly have the effect of postponing to a far distant day the accomplishment of an event devoutly and ardently desired by the wise and the good in every part of our beloved country.'"[1]

And now followed a prolonged controversy, most unusual and most remarkable, between the friends of emancipation and the apologists. The lengthy and able apology presented by Mr. McKinney speaking as chairman for the majority of the convention, called forth an earnest and able protest from Mathew Stephenson and Messrs. McGaughey, Bradshaw and Gillespie. Against the specious defense of slavery they appealed to the principles of Christianity and common humanity. Then followed another protest of marked ability from Dr. Joseph Kincaid, of Bedford county. This paper answers with great force and clearness the argument made by the majority, that a state of slavery was better than the "forlorn and wretched" condition of the free man of color in the state.

Then followed a supplemental report from the committee, fortifying and defending the positions assumed in the first report. This called forth a second protest from brave Mathew Stephenson and his associates. All these papers

[1] "Journal," pp. 92, 93.

were placed on the journal, as if both sides were appealing to posterity. We can scarcely realize that this calm and dispassionate discussion of the evils of slavery (for both sides admitted this) took place in a Southern state at as late a date as 1834, when we remember how sensitive the South became a few years later on this subject.

In justice to the memory of Mr. John A. McKinney, the able author of the apologies, it should be stated that he was a pure and an upright man, a native of the North of Ireland, a Covenanter Presbyterian, who by his industry and great ability as a lawyer left a large fortune, and the heritage of a good name to his children.

Having failed in their efforts to secure prospective emancipation, the friends of the measure tried to strip slavery of some of its prestige and power. Mr. Mabry, of Knox, introduced the following proposition:

"Resolved, That the present Constitution of the State of Tennessee be so amended as to prevent and prohibit the sale of *slaves or people of color* by virtue of executions founded on all contracts made and entered into after the first day of January, 1835."

This proposition failed. The obvious effect of its adoption would have been to diminish the value and desirability of slaves, and greatly to lessen the transfers of this kind of property.

Mathew Stephenson offered a proviso "that no free man who is now a resident of this state, and who has heretofore exercised the right of voting, shall be debarred from that privilege." Voted down 35 to 22.

The convention instead of seeking to ameliorate the "forlorn" condition of free persons of color, as portrayed in the apology, by conferring on them the right to hold office, to sit on juries, and to testify in courts of justice, took away from such as were then freeholders the right to vote conferred on them by the constitution of 1796, and limited

suffrage to "free white men."[1] And to effectually close the door against emancipation, and to provide a further safeguard for slavery, the following clause was put into the constitution:

"The general assembly shall have no power to pass laws for the emancipation of slaves without the consent of their owner or owners."

Thus the delusive hope and promise held out by the committee, speaking for the majority of the convention, that slavery would not be "perpetual," was falsified, and the door to emancipation closed and barred apparently forever. Slavery was already protected by the Constitution of the United States, and now it was securely enthroned in that of Tennessee, from which it could only be dislodged by the slaveholders themselves. But in the course of time infatuated men arose who cast away the first safeguard, and thereby lost the second. The slaveholders, in an evil hour, challenged to battle a people as brave as they, of infinitely larger resources, and of nearly three times their numbers. With incredible folly, they threw away all the sacred guarantees which slavery possessed, and in the deadly conflict which followed, as many wise men had foreseen and predicted, slavery perished.

Soon after the events I have been relating, the anti-slavery current, which had been running so strongly for the past twenty years in favor of emancipation, in parts of the South, turned back in its course, and was lost in the maelstrom of slavery propagandism. Men who had once clamored for emancipation were either hushed into silence, or eagerly followed the swelling current of Southern thought. Many men who had denounced slavery, away back in emancipation days, now hastened to set themselves

[1] Journal, p. 76. Those who voted against restricting the right to vote to white men were: Messrs. Allen, Armstrong, Gillespie, Gray, Hill, Kincannon, Kincaid, Kelley, Robert J. McKinney, Mabry, McGaughey, Montgomery, Neil, Roadman, Richardson, Robertson, Stephenson, Smith, Smart, Scott, Walton, White, and Webster.

right with their neighbors by purchasing slaves. Every voice, every whisper of opposition to slavery, was silenced. Universal acquiescence, if not universal approval and advocacy, succeeded. If a few doubted, if a few still had conscientious scruples as to the system, they were hushed into silence in the dread of an overpowering public opinion. No man in the South was bold enough to open his lips in opposition to slavery. No man dared to suggest any longer either its amelioration, much less its extinction. To be suspected of abolition sentiments, was to bring on one's self the curse of social outlawry; to become as a loathsome leper shunned by every one. The boldest men who had had scruples on the moral side of the question stood petrified and confounded in the presence of this omnipotent despotism of public opinion. By it, all resistance was crushed out. Only one parallel to this can be found in all history. In the dark ages, the thunders of the Vatican often caused the proudest princes and potentates to shake and tremble, and to bow in humble and abject submission. So, the anathemas of this imperial power, Slavery, like the terrible curse of the Church of Rome, made the boldest men stand aghast, breathless and trembling, in apprehension of some awful evil.

> "Then wakes the power which in the age of iron
> Burst forth to curb the great and raise the low;
> Mark where she stands!—around her form I draw
> The awful circle of our solemn Church!
> Set but a foot within the holy ground,
> And on thy head—yea, though it wore a crown—
> I launch the curse of Rome."[1]

[1] The supersensitiveness of slaveholders as to slavery was not unnatural. They had to guard it against attack, whether from without or within, with the utmost vigilance. They could, therefore, tolerate no discussion of its moral aspects, much less opposition to it, without danger of the most serious consequences. These things may and do prove the inherent weakness of the institution. Nevertheless, it would have continued to exist for generations longer but for the mighty convulsions of the war. Through them was fulfilled God's purpose.

CHAPTER VII.

POLITICAL CANVASS IN 1860.

Excitement in political parties in 1860—Old parties disintegrating—Whig National Convention assembles—Nominates John Bell for president—Declares for the preservation of the Union—John Bell—Democratic National Convention—Splits on the platform—Stephen A. Douglas—Reassembles in Baltimore—One wing nominates Douglas, the other John C. Breckenridge—Republican party nominates Abraham Lincoln—Mr. Seward—Mr. Lincoln's Springfield speech—Man of destiny—Slavery in the territories—Presidential canvass in Tennessee—Three tickets in the field—James D. Thomas—State votes for Mr. Bell—Mr. Lincoln elected president—Gloomy forebodings in the public mind—South Carolina prepares to leave the Union—Uncertainty in the public mind following election of Mr. Lincoln—Active work done in Washington in favor of secession—Three members of Buchanan's cabinet active secessionists—General Scott ignored—Failure to strengthen forts in Charleston Harbor—Major Anderson placed in command there—Asks for re-enforcements—None sent—South Carolina secedes—Great joy in Charleston—Commissioners sent to Washington to adjust differences—Mr. Buchanan's embarrassment and vacillation—Major Anderson occupies Fort Sumter—Storm of indignation in Charleston created by it—Haughty conduct of commissioners—Holt, Stanton and Black in the cabinet—"Star of the West" sent to Charleston with troops and provisions—Driven off—The Harriet Lane with provisions fails to land—Mr. Buchanan's message to congress—"No power to coerce a sovereign state."

In the spring and early summer of 1860 all thoughtful and intelligent men felt that great events were approaching. The people of the Northern states were excited as never before. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill had maddened them into a phrenzy. This feeling had been intensified by the attempt made immediately afterwards by the slaveholders of the South to introduce slavery into Kansas. The excitement in the South, especially in the cotton states, was not less intense than it was in the North. The ultra slaveholders were disappointed, and

became desperate at their signal failure to secure Kansas. Besides this, they saw that their control of the national government, which they had held much the larger part of the time since its establishment, was slipping away from them. This still further inflamed their discontent.

In the meantime old political parties were disintegrating and new alliances were being formed. Old party lines were melting away. The Whig party had lost strength both in the North and in the South. It was too conservative and staid for those stirring times. The Democratic party was divided, hopelessly it proved to be, into two factions, one led by Stephen A. Douglas, and the other by such ultra Southern men as Davis, Toombs and Benjamin. The Republican party, young, vigorous and hopeful, led by Seward, Greeley and other great men, was making itself felt in every Northern state. It was attracting recruits from both the old parties, and especially from the Whig party, from which it had already drawn many of its greatest leaders. In fact, the gathering tide of Republicanism was sweeping over the whole North and West.

Under these circumstances the last Whig National Convention assembled in Baltimore, May 9, 1860, to nominate candidates for president and vice-president. The convention was respectable in size and ability. All the Northern states were represented, though not so numerously as in later days, while several of the Southern states had only small delegations. Tennessee had a large and distinguished delegation. Such men as Balie Peyton, Ex-Governor Neill S. Brown, Jordan Stokes, Judge John S. Brien, W. G. Brownlow, Henry Cooper, afterward the successful competitor of Andrew Johnson for the United States Senate, Gustavus A. Henry, afterward a senator in the Confederate Congress, John M. Fleming and many others were present. They were there in the interest of their distinguished fellow-citizen, John Bell for the nomination for the presidency.

The convention seemed to be deeply impressed with the

solemnity and the peril of the crisis which threatened the government. In the presence, therefor, of such alarming dangers, ignoring all ordinary questions of mere policy, and looking alone to the great problem of saving the Union, the convention unanimously adopted a platform embracing that idea only, in these words: "The Union, the constitution, and the enforcement of the laws." This was adopted in the midst of the wildest enthusiasm. Then followed the nominations. Mr. Bell was nominated for the presidency without much difficulty, and Edward Everett for the vice-presidency with even less difficulty. This was followed by the usual speechmaking. As Mr. Bell was from Tennessee, it was expected, and naturally too, that her delegates should be heard from. Mr. Gustavus A. Henry went forward to speak for the state. He was a handsome, magnificent man physically, His voice was musical and sonorous; his manner that of a finished orator. He was eloquent, fascinating, charming. For such an occasion, no man in all the land was his superior. From the beginning, he electrified the convention. Finally, in a grand climax of dramatic oratory, he declared his willingness to die for the Union. He said, with marvelous effect, that for this purpose he would ascend the scaffold with as joyous a heart and as light a step as a bridegroom ascending to his bridal chamber. The convention became wild with enthusiasm. And yet, eighteen months after that time, Henry took his seat as a senator from Tennessee in the Confederate Congress! And in twelve months, John Bell, who had just been nominated as the distinctively Union candidate for the presidency, made a speech declaring his adhesion to the Confederate cause!

After Henry had concluded and silence was restored, Mr. Hillard, of Boston, came forward to answer for Mr. Everett and Massachusetts. His speech, while not so florid as Henry's, was chaste, scholarly, and surpassingly beautiful. Seldom has a more elegant and perfect impromptu address ever been made. It, too, aroused great

enthusiasm. Thus the work of the convention was finished.

With the exception of Jno. J. Crittenden, of Kentucky, Governor Hunt, James A. Brooks, and Henry J. Raymond, from New York, Mr. Hilliard, of Massachusetts, A. H. H. Stuart and Robert Ridgeway, from Virginia, Jesse Clements, from Alabama, Judge Sharkey, of Mississippi, and Balie Peyton, Governor Brown, and Mr. Henry, from Tennessee, and Mr. Doolittle, from Wisconsin, but few of the great leaders of the old Whig party were present. In the North and West, most of them had already joined or were preparing to join the Republican party. In the Southern States, many of them were disheartened by recent defeats, or hesitated as to their duty, or were preparing to change party alliances. So, the Baltimore Convention, while quite respectable in numbers and ability, was not of that imposing character calculated to inspire confidence and enthusiasm in the country. It is doubtful whether a single well-informed delegate had a settled belief in the success of the ticket just nominated. Of course, in the then chaotic state of the public mind, no one could tell what might happen. There was a hope that the clear and distinct Union platform adopted by the convention might so strike the patriotic feeling of the country, so appeal to the sober judgments of good citizens, as to secure the election of the candidates nominated. But this proved to be a vain hope. Madness and passion, and not pure patriotism, ruled the hour. Mr. Bell only carried four states, namely, Tennessee, Kentucky, Virginia, and Maryland.

Judging by subsequent events, it is doubtful whether Mr. Bell would have been the right man for the times, if he had been elected. His honesty, his great ability and his statesmanship were unquestioned. But there was in him a want of that decision, that force of character, that moral courage, necessary for a leader and ruler in perilous times. No prompt and decisive action could have been expected of him in a great emergency. He, in all proba-

bility, would have hesitated at the critical moment. His Southern home and associations would have fettered and paralyzed him. He would not, however, have been false to the country. Whether the Southern States would have attempted to secede immediately if he had been elected, can not be told; but almost certainly they would not. That the Southern leaders intended to do so at the first favorable opportunity admits of no doubt whatever. They simply awaited such a pretext as the election of a sectional president, like Mr. Lincoln, when they could plausibly appeal to the people of the South to arise in defense of their rights and institutions. His election, therefore, produced a most profound impression throughout the South. Although it was anticipated, and the course to be pursued in that event had been predetermined and was generally well understood by the original leaders in the Southern movement, yet when brought face to face with the great question of destroying the old government, even the boldest of its advocates, we may believe, hesitated a little before taking the first fatal step in that direction. Those not in the plot, both North and South, were appalled, and turned pale with fear at the dark and gloomy prospect. And we can readily believe from his utterances, that no man in all the land realized more sensibly than Mr. Lincoln himself the awful gravity of the great crisis and the extreme peril of the country.

That the Southern leaders intended to be satisfied with nothing less than the indorsement of their extreme views by the National Democratic Convention, which assembled in Charleston on the 23d of April, 1860, was manifest from the opening of that body. The friends of Mr. Douglas were in the majority. By the adoption of a moderate platform on the subject of slavery, there was a fair chance of electing him as president. His friends were willing to adopt a simple declaration in their platform that "the Democratic party will abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States upon questions of con-

stitutional law." The Dred Scott decision had already been made by the court, and it conceded everything to the South, though that decision was everywhere assailed in the North. The anti-Douglas delegation demanded a declaration of the "rights of citizens to settle in the territories with their slaves—a right not to be destroyed or impaired by congressional or territorial legislation." They demanded a further declaration that it is the "duty of the federal government, when necessary, to protect slavery in the territories." These positions were in direct antagonism to Mr. Douglas's famous "squatter sovereignty" doctrine, that the people residing in any of the territories of the United States have the right, not merely when forming a state constitution, but at any time, to establish or prohibit slavery, as they might choose. The Southern leaders would not yield. Mr. Douglas's friends could not without destroying the last hope of carrying any Northern State for him. So, the convention divided, a minority of the members, the ultra wing, finally withdrawing. On the 3d of May the convention adjourned over until the 18th of June, to reconvene in Baltimore. On reassembling in that city, finding the differences in the party to be irreconcilable, the delegates again divided. The Southern wing, with the delegates of California and Oregon and a few scattering votes from the North, including Benjamin F. Butler and Caleb B. Cushing, nominated John C. Breckinridge for president, and Joseph Lane, of Oregon, for vice-president. The delegates from the Northern States nominated Stephen A. Douglas, and Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia.

It was manifest to all well-informed minds that, with two Democratic candidates in the field, there could be but little hope of the election of either. Douglas must draw his entire strength from the North, and Breckinridge nearly or quite all of his from the South. That which could be obtained by either would not be sufficient for an election.

Before the reassembling of the Democratic party in Baltimore, the Republican party had met in convention in Chicago. It drew together a vast throng of excited and determined men. Among these were many distinguished names, who had separated themselves from the two old political parties. This was particularly so in reference to the Whig party. The two most prominent candidates before the convention were William H. Seward and Abraham Lincoln. Both were formerly honored leaders of the Whig party. Indeed, Mr. Lincoln had only recently attached himself to the Republican party. His fame rested almost entirely on his celebrated debates with Mr. Douglas. In these debates he had suddenly sprung to the front as a great speaker, skillful and resourceful, a profound thinker and a courageous man.

It was generally expected that Mr. Seward would receive the nomination. He had been a noted leader and almost the founder of his party. He was a man of acknowledged ability and of ripe experience. But he had uttered sentiments, such as that of an irrepressible conflict between freedom and slavery, that were in advance of the times. More recently in his great speech at Springfield, Illinois, June 17, 1858, Mr. Lincoln had proclaimed doctrines just as extreme, if not more so. He had said "that a house divided against itself can not stand;"[1] "that the government can not endure permanently half slave, half free. . . . It will become all one thing, or all the other." "He did not expect the Union to be dissolved," he said, but he left his hearers to determine whether it would be all free, or all slave. This speech struck an electrical chord in the North and made him president.

The impossibility of slavery ever being introduced into the Northern States was too plain to be doubted by any one familiar with the sentiment of that section. Therefore, the other alternative presented was inevitable; that

[1] Herndon's "Life of Lincoln," Vol. II, p. 396.

the country must become all free. Yet Mr. Lincoln was never classed as an Abolitionist, and in fact was not one. On the first ballot Mr. Seward received 175½ votes, Mr. Lincoln 102, and 190 votes were scattered between Bates, Chase, Cameron, Dayton, McLean and Collamer. On the the second ballot Mr. Seward had 184½ votes, and Mr. Lincoln 181. On the third ballot Mr. Lincoln was unanimously nominated. Thus was this singular man of destiny placed at the head of a great party at the most critical time in the history of the country. And thus was made probable the fulfillment of the boastful prophecy of Mary Todd, made years before, while Mr. Lincoln was an obscure village lawyer, that she, as the president's wife, would some day occupy the White House. And thus, Mr. Lincoln was about to become the instrument in the hands of Providence of the fulfillment of his own memorable prophecy, that the "government can not endure permanently half free, half slave—it will become all one thing, or all the other."

There were now four candidates in the field for the presidency, Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Bell, Mr. Douglas and Mr. Breckenridge. Mr. Bell was the only one who was nominated by a convention composed of delegates from all the states. He was emphatically the only national candidate. All the others were either exclusively sectional in their nomination, or in the support they received. Mr. Lincoln was clearly a sectional candidate, though he received, remarkable to say, several thousand votes at the polls in some of the border slave states. Mr. Breckenridge represented a sectional idea, and received but little support outside of his section. And while Mr. Douglas stood on a national platform, he was nominated by and received nearly all of his support from one section alone.

The settlement of the slavery controversy in Kansas, settled the question for all practical purposes as to all the territories, unless there should be new acquisitions thereafter. There was no more territory where slavery would have

gone, even if unopposed, because slave labor would not have been profitable. Climate, a higher law than congressional enactments, as Mr. Webster had pointed out in 1850, in reference to New Mexico, in his famous 7th of March speech, had interdicted it by eternal decrees in all the remaining territories of the United States. So, all the quarrel over slavery in the territories had become a mere political abstraction. It was so in 1860, and the leaders of all parties knew it.

In Tennessee, three electoral tickets were put in the field; one for Bell, one for Mr. Breckenridge and one for Mr. Douglas. The contest was, however, between Mr. Bell and Mr. Breckenridge. Mr. Douglas had a few friends, who supported him because they were alarmed at the menacing attitude of the Breckenridge Democracy, and yet who, from old partisan feelings, were unwilling to support Mr. Bell. Therefore, they made a feeble effort for Mr. Douglas, and threw away, as they knew they were doing, their votes on him. The Bell electoral ticket was headed by the veteran Whig, Balie Peyton, who had made a national reputation as early as 1837–'8 as the associate and friend of S. S. Prentiss and Henry A. Wise in their daring assaults on the administration of Mr. Van Buren. Peyton was a noble chevalier of the olden times—brilliant, brave, honorable. On the ticket for the state at large with him was Nathaniel G. Taylor, who, on great occasions and when aroused, was a very eloquent speaker.

The contest in Tennessee was heated and excited. The Breckenridge Democrats everywhere charged that the institution of slavery would be endangered by the election of Mr. Lincoln, and that it would be in but little less danger by the election of Mr. Bell or Mr. Douglas. They assailed Mr. Bell as an enemy of the South. They charged and dwelt on the fact that the "Black Republican Party," as they called it, was a purely sectional party, organized solely on the idea of opposition to slavery. Strange in-

consistency, when their own party was purely sectional in its principles, and had received nearly all its support in the nominating convention, and was then receiving before the people its support from one section alone. In the cotton states it was openly proclaimed that the election of Mr. Lincoln would be a sufficient cause and should be the signal for withdrawing from the Union. In Tennessee, the leaders were more guarded in their declarations on this point. But the thin gauze which covered their real views was too transparent to hide them. In the second district, contrary to my wishes, I was chosen as the candidate for elector on the Bell-Everett ticket. I had been a delegate to the Baltimore Convention, and had done all I could to secure the nomination of this ticket. I was a personal friend of Mr. Bell, and bound to him by strong obligations. Therefore, while reluctant to give up for the time being my business as a lawyer, I could not decline to serve. Besides this, I had become seriously impressed, beyond most men, with a sense of the danger to the Union, arising from the designs of Southern leaders, and felt it to be my duty to sound the alarm as far as I could in my humble sphere.

The Breckenridge elector in the district was James D. Thomas, who was also a lawyer. He had been a delegate to the Baltimore Convention, which had nominated Mr. Breckenridge. He came back in full sympathy and thoroughly saturated with the views and feelings of the Southern wing of the Democratic party. Mr. Thomas was a college graduate and had been a teacher in an academy. He had also been a successful lawyer. His voice was deep and clear, and his manner rather animated, though never too hurried. His intellect was clear, strong and penetrating. He was wary, shrewd and logical. Withal, he was cunning and artful. He possessed talents, both as a politician and as a lawyer, that ought to have given him high rank in life. He was a competitor of no mean powers. To meet him required constant watchfulness and the fullest

information. After an exciting canvass, a majority of the people of Tennessee cast their votes for Mr. Bell.

The electors assembled in Nashville, December 5th, at the time fixed by law, and organized the electoral college by the selection of the venerable Balie Peyton as president. The vote of the state was then duly cast for John Bell as president and Edward Everett for vice-president, and immediately forwarded to Washington. This was a time of great gloom. No man could tell what was to happen. All felt the near presence of danger and disaster. At a conference held by the electors, it was proposed that they should issue an address to the people of the state, warning them of the approaching danger, and urging them to stand firm against all the designs of the enemies of the Union. John F. House opposed the suggestion, and Hon. Henry S. Foote, who happened to be present, favored it. The suggestion met with little favor, so the matter was dropped.

At this meeting, for the first time, I began to apprehend the danger there was that the large slaveholding interests of Middle and West Tennessee might exert a baneful influence on public sentiment, and on the minds of the Union leaders in those sections. This came to pass as I feared, and became most disastrous a few months later. It was already evident that the election of Mr. Lincoln, and probably still more so, the threatening action of South Carolina, had made them wary and cautious as to any immediate committals in reference to the future. This was a surprise to me, for I had come to regard the dissolution of the Union as a calamity far greater than any other which could possibly happen. I was therefore astonished to find that others were unwilling to avow this high view of devotion to the country.

The echoes of the great battle of 1860 had not died away before it became evident that a still fiercer conflict was impending. The lull which usually follows a presidential election was soon rudely broken by the action of South

Carolina. The legislature of that state assembled early in November to choose presidential electors, that right never having been confided to the people. It at once provided for the election of delegates to a convention to be assembled on the 17th of December, to consider the question of secession. Everybody knew about as well in November as after the act was accomplished that South Carolina would attempt to secede from the Union in December. Nearly all of her leading men were pledged to do so. The public mind was in a state of deep suspense. A restless uneasiness prevailed among the people. No one knew certainly what calamity was to follow. The Republican party of the North had been so constantly and so bitterly denounced by Democratic orators and by some Whigs as Abolitionists and enemies of the country, that many of the conservative men who had voted for Mr. Bell were more or less alarmed.

In this state of public sentiment, while attending court in Sevier county, in the third week of November, by request probably, I addressed a large assemblage of the people of that county on the condition of the country. It was well known that South Carolina would withdraw from the Union in a few days. In my speech I reviewed the questions affecting the South, and warned the people that they might expect an attempt to destroy the government. I denounced secession as being wholly causeless and unjustifiable—as no remedy for any existing evil—and urged them to stand firm in their loyalty to the government. This was the first Union speech made in the state after the election of Mr. Lincoln. On the conclusion of my speech, a vote of thanks was given to me, and a committee appointed to request a copy for publication. This was not given until the 1st of January, 1861, when it was published in Brownlow's "Whig," in the form of a letter to the committee appointed by the citizens' meeting. It contained the substance only of my remarks, with some new material added. Events were developing so rapidly

that much that was pertinent in November had lost its importance in January. Something new startled the country every day. I here give a few extracts from my letter:

"A month has worked a mighty change. What was then pertinent might now be considered obsolete, so rapidly are we shifting, changing and moving forward. Many things then uttered as prophecies are to-day history. Events as they pass appear as a dream or a phantom, yet they are solemn realities. It is hard for the honest masses, far removed from the scenes of active strife, and quietly enjoying the fruits of peace and security in their rural abodes, . . . to believe that any respectable portion of our people can desire to destroy the freest and best government ever instituted by man. It is difficult for them to realize that they are oppressed, insulted and enslaved, as they are told, and that this Union of ours is a failure! It is hard to convince them that demagogues and disappointed or ambitious men can become so phrensied as to deliberately set to work to overthrow the government. Let me warn them to be undeceived. . . .

"South Carolina is already out of the Union. Some, if not all, of the other cotton states will soon follow. They are attempting likewise to drag Tennessee along with them. Will the sovereign people permit it?"

In reference to Mr. Lincoln, I said:

"From Mr. Lincoln himself much harm need not be apprehended. His opinions on the whole subject of slavery are nearly identical with those entertained and often expressed by Mr. Clay to the day of his death. He expressly denies the power, the right, or any intention to interfere with it in the states. . . . Then why fret ourselves with alarms, when it is evident Mr. Lincoln has neither the power nor the inclination to interfere with slavery?"

After discussing and showing the utter fallacy and hollowness of the pretended ground for secession, that slavery was not protected, or was excluded from the territories of the United States, I said:

"And this leads directly up to one of the real causes of disunion. Its advocates know that there is no more good slave territory belonging to the Union. They therefore desire a further acquisition of territory, and the extension of slavery into Mexico, and ultimately into Central America. With these, and as a part of their scheme, they desire the revival of the African slave trade. They know that these things can never be accomplished in the present Union, and hence those who desire them are for breaking up the government. Mr. Rhett, in a late speech in Charleston, openly avowed the determination of carrying the slave empire of the South 'over Mexico, Central America, the isles of the sea, and the far-off tropics.' Are we prepared to break up the government for such a purpose? For one, I answer, no, never!

"A third real cause, with the leaders in South Carolina particularly, is a deep and settled discontent with our form of government. While professing to be democrats, they are most undemocratic in all their opinions. The mass of the people in that state have but little to do with the administration of public affairs. The government is practically an oligarchy. Mr. Rhett, the oldest and most prominent of the South Carolina disunionists, said in a late speech that the new government must be a 'slaveholding confederacy,' and that universal suffrage must not be tolerated; in other words, that none but slaveholders must have a voice in the government. If they did, he said, it would result in a 'dire conflict between want and affluence, population and capital.' . . ."

I quote one more extract from my letter:

"Disunion is a remedy for no existing evil. By it, our slaves will be rendered less secure. The fugitive slave law, and all our constitutional guaranties, will be lost. The North and the South will become alien governments, embittered against each other by many reproaches and the memory of many real or supposed wrongs. Constant feuds, conflicts, forays, and border wars will desolate and harass

Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri. In a few years, these states, wasted and worn, will either abolish slavery from a sense of its insecurity, or it will silently disappear. When this happens, these states will most probably wheel into line with the North. Thus, in a short time, Tennessee may become a border state, and then will come the time of her trials. *The only safety for slavery is in the Union under the constitution.*"

It could scarcely be expected that, at that early date, in the conflict of opinion, a Southern slaveholder, as I was, born and educated in the South, with many of the prejudices and partialities of the people of that section, should have so far forgotten and risen above the prevailing opinions of his time and section as to speak out the whole truth as we were ready to do at a later period. I could not and did not. Many of the best men in the North even did not, much less the Union men of the South. Men everywhere, even the wisest, saw only dimly, if at all, the vast consequences of the great conflict just beginning. None were sufficiently gifted with prescience as to foretell the end, the final result. In the South the bravest Union men did not dare to utter things which they said boldly only a few months later. Public opinion, intrenched behind education and old prejudices, so terrorized the minds of men that they could not rise to the acceptance and utterance of many things which became easy at a later day. In December, 1860, the question was whether there was a sufficient cause for dissolving the Union. In February following, the question was, shall Tennessee secede? In May, it was, what shall I, as an individual, do? Shall I go with my state into secession, or shall I remain true to the old government? So, with each stage of the development of the great revolution, new questions arose for the solution of each individual. And, as these new questions arose, new ideas came to those who stood firm, and also fresh courage to proclaim these new ideas. From the foregoing, it is plain to see why so many, not only in Tennes-

see, but in nearly all the Southern States, who were Union men in December, 1860, were for the South in the spring of 1861.

In deciding the question of adhesion to the old government, or joining the Confederacy of the Southern States, men had to take the questions as an entirety. If they chose to stand by the North, they must take it with its Personal Liberty Bills, its Abolitionists, its Free-soilers, its free territories; with the peculiar thoughts, prejudices, ways and isms of its people, and with their deadly hatred of slavery. If they preferred to go with the South, they must take it with slavery as the cornerstone of the Confederacy, with the doctrine of the acquisition of new territory in Cuba and Mexico, and probably ultimately in Central America to make room for its expansion, with a chance of the revival of the African slave trade. They must take it with the doctrine of the right of secession planted in the Constitution of the Confederacy, and rendered sacred and fundamental by recent experience; they must take the doctrine of states rights and of free trade; they must accept a despotic public opinion on the subject of the righteousness and the economic benefits of slavery, which would permit no one to question it or discuss it; with the degradation of free white labor, and a marked line of distinction drawn between the two classes, the slaveholders and non-slaveholders. Each man had to decide these questions for himself, and determine which government as a whole he preferred. Besides all these questions, men had to decide whether they were willing to take the chances and hazards of a great civil war, with all its dire consequences, in order to establish a Southern Confederacy. They also had to take the chances, even the probabilities, of the destruction of slavery in the great conflict of arms, and give up the guaranties of the constitution for its protection. With all these great problems staring men in the face, and the absolute certainty as to the theory and general policy of the proposed new govern-

ment, it seems almost incredible that the great majority of the Southern people should have become so infatuated and phrensied by passion as to rush recklessly into the execution of this scheme set on foot by hot-headed and ambitious leaders. Nevertheless, such was the amazing and fatal fact. It can only be accounted for on the ground that the Southern people believed the North would let the "wayward sisters depart in peace," or that its people would not, or could not, fight. Surely, if they had foreseen, even partially, the tremendous consequences of their acts, it would have "given them pause."

Poor South Carolina was the first and greatest sufferer, caused by her own precipitate action in bringing on the war. Her flourishing city, Charleston, her pride, the queen of the Atlantic, was left in a state of semi-desolation, her glory gone, her commerce destroyed, her merchant princes ruined, her refined, brave, hospitable people scattered abroad. The state was desolated by war, and her beautiful capital laid in ruins by a consuming fire. And nearly as bad as all these, now appears another Nemesis, in the person of one Benjamin Tillman, who makes war on the old aristocratic institutions of the state, arouses the people to a state of madness, and is triumphantly elected governor and senator. He deliberately plucked down and ground to dust the venerable monuments erected by the grand old aristocracy. Even her gallant and noble general, Wade Hampton, because he refused to humiliate himself before the rising autocrat, is summarily dismissed from an office apparently his for life. The sores of the state were scraped, like Job's, as if with a potsherd, and her whole system made to quiver in agony. The bitterest enemy of South Carolina could not have wished to see fall on her such multiplied woes.

The presidential election in 1860 took place on the 6th of November. On the morning of the 7th it was known in Charleston that Mr. Lincoln was elected. The news was received by the citizens with demonstrations of joy, thus

proving, what had been charged during the canvass, that the secession leaders desired his election. As far back as the spring of 1858, Henry A. Wise, then governor of Virginia, had written to a friend that the cotton states intended nominating an extremist for president, in 1860, on an extreme platform, with the express purpose of having him defeated.[1] On the 5th of October, Wm. H. Gist, governor of South Carolina, wrote letters to the governors of the several cotton states, dispatched by a confidential agent, inviting a correspondence with them as to the proper action to be taken in the event of the election of Mr. Lincoln, which he regarded as almost certain. He expressed the opinion that his state would secede alone if she had the assurance that she would soon be followed by another or other states; otherwise it was doubtful. On the 5th of November, the legislature of that state was convened by the governor, and in his message to that body, in undisguised terms, he recommended secession, and the raising and equipping of ten thousand militia. The legislature proceeded to call a convention, to be convened early in December, and at the same time placed in the hands of the governor one hundred thousand dollars to be used in arming and equipping the militia.

While these things were taking place in South Carolina,

[1] *Extract from letter of Henry A. Wise to Wm. Sergeant.*

"Richmond, Va., May 28, 1858. . . . The truth is that there is in the South an organized, active and dangerous faction, embracing most of the federal politicians, who are bent upon bringing about causes of dissolution of the Union. They desire a united South, but not a united country. Their hope of embodying a sectional antagonism is to secure a sectional defeat. At heart, they do not wish the Democracy to be any longer national, united or successful. In the name of Democracy they propose to make a nomination for 1860, at Charleston, but an ultra nomination of an extremist on the slavery issue alone, to unite the South on that one idea, and on that to have it defeated by a line of sectionalism, which will inevitably draw swords between fanatics on one side and fire eaters on the other. Bear it in mind, then, that they desire to control a nomination for no other purpose than to have it defeated by a line of sections. They desire defeat for no other end than to make a pretext for the clamor of dissolution."—Nicolay & Hay's "Life of Lincoln," Vol. II, p. 302.

still more effective work for secession was being done in Washington, under the very eyes and with the knowledge of President Buchanan. In his cabinet were three of the most active secessionists in the land, Howell Cobb, secretary of the treasury, Jacob Thompson, secretary of the interior, and John B. Floyd, secretary of war. These men were in daily and nightly consultation with the leaders of secession. Two of them, Cobb and Thompson, were open and undisguised in their sympathy for that cause. They so expressed themselves to the president, and in the cabinet meetings. Floyd was as decided in that way as they, but from some cause more reserved. They had an active ally in William H. Trescott, assistant secretary of state. Thus in the very precincts of the White House disloyalty was fostered as much as in Columbia or Charleston. On the 8th of December a committee of South Carolina congressmen called on the president to protest against his sending any re-enforcements to the forts in Charleston harbor. They told him that if he did do so, the people of Charleston should be informed of the fact, for said they "we have sources of information in Washington, so that no orders for troops can be issued without our getting the information."

Orders for the army in reference to secession movements in Charleston, instead of being issued by or passing through the hands of General Scott, the commander-in-chief, as custom and courtesy demanded, were issued verbally or in writing by Mr. Floyd himself, or by Samuel Cooper, the adjutant-general, who was also a secessionist. For months General Scott was ignored by Mr. Floyd, and kept in profound ignorance of the orders issued in reference to the forts and public property in Charleston.

There were three forts in the harbor of Charleston, Moultrie, Sumter and Castle Pinckney, all belonging to the United States. The two former were in a state badly needing repairs. Only one of them, Moultrie, had a garrison in it, and that consisted of sixty men. The other

two had only an unarmed ordinance sergeant in each. As early as October, General Scott, in his patriotic zeal, warned Mr. Buchanan of the danger to these forts from a secession attack, and urged that they should be re-enforced and put in a state of repair. No attention was paid to his recommendations. Then followed a similar request from Colonel Gardner, the commandant at Charleston. The only result of this was his removal. Then Major Fitz-John Porter, who was sent to inspect the forts, advised that they should be repaired and re-enforced. Following this, Captain John G. Foster, the engineer in charge of the repairs, previously ordered by Congress, asked for forty muskets with which to arm his workmen for the defense of the work. In the meantime, on the removal of Colonel Gardner from command, Major Robert Anderson was appointed to succeed him.

On the arrival of Major Anderson, he made an inspection of the forts, and at once made an elaborate report to the war department. He pointed out the hopelessness of holding these forts if vigorously attacked, as they were liable to be at any time, by the troops of South Carolina, then drilling in the streets of Charleston. He earnestly urged that all three of the forts should be occupied, strengthened and re-enforced. Fort Moultrie was alone garrisoned at that time. He said: "Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney must be garrisoned immediately if the government determines to keep command of this harbor. . . . I do then," said he, "most earnestly entreat that a reinforcement be immediately sent to this garrison (Moultrie), and that at least two companies be sent at the same time to Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney." Again and again he urged the necessity of these things on the attention of the secretary of war. But all in vain. Neither the recommendations of General Scott, nor those of Colonel Gardner, nor of Major Porter, nor of Captain Foster, nor the repeated entreaties of Major Anderson, were heeded by the secretary of war, nor by the president, until it was too

late. The subject was frequently discussed in cabinet meetings, but the president was so dominated by Cobb, Thompson and Floyd, and the secession leaders—was so paralyzed by fear of the South, so unnerved and vacillating—that he would do nothing. Seldom, if ever, was the preservation of a great government in the custody of such unsteady hands. Mr. Buchanan was not false to his country, but he did not have courage to do his duty.

Fort Sumter and Moultrie completely commanded the harbor of Charleston, and Castle Pinckney the city itself. If these forts had been properly garrisoned and equipped, it was the opinion of competent military men, like General Scott, that no Confederate force which could be brought against them could take them. Their strength and the difficulty of taking them will appear when it is remembered that, with all the power of the government, the war was well advanced towards a close before they were taken by the government after their capture in 1861.

The Convention of South Carolina was to assemble on the 17th of December. No one had any doubt that it would pass an ordinance of secession. In anticipation of that event, Governor Gist had sent, early in November, an agent to Washington, to negotiate with Secretary Floyd for muskets for the state. The negotiation was successful, and Floyd, in violation of the obligations of honor and duty, sold to the State of South Carolina, through G. B. Lamar, arms to be used in an attempt to overthrow the authority of the government. Seldom has history recorded such an act.

Things now moved rapidly. On the 20th day of December, the Convention of South Carolina, with great pomp and ceremony, passed an Ordinance of Secession, declaring the state sovereign and independent. The news was received by the people of the city with great demonstrations of joy. In the new condition of affairs, Francis M. Pickens was elected governor. He immediately dispatched three commissioners, Messrs. Barnwell, Adams, and Orr,

to Washington, to settle the terms of an adjustment of all questions of difference existing between the United States and the Commonwealth of South Carolina, including a settlement of the public debt and a division of public property. The theory held by the people of South Carolina was that this state was sovereign and independent, and had a right to withdraw whenever the compact of union was broken or violated, and they insisted that that condition existed at that time. The conduct of these commissioners must be viewed, in justice to them, from this point of view. Mr. Buchanan received them politely, and informed them that he could only receive them as private gentlemen of the highest distinction, and that congress would have to determine the questions they had come to have settled. While these formal courtesies were taking place between the president and these commissioners, startling news for them reached Washington. Major Anderson, early after dark on the 26th of December, quietly abandoned Fort Moultrie, after having spiked its guns and set fire to the gun carriages, and moved to and occupied Fort Sumter, a more defensible and stronger place. The city of Charleston was thrown into the highest excitement; the military companies were put under arms. Forces were dispatched as soon as possible to seize Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie. The arsenal, the custom-house, and the post-office were seized. As each of these was held alone by an unarmed ordinance sergeant, South Carolina achieved an easy victory.

In Washington, the news of the occupation of Sumter was received by the high commissioners of South Carolina and by their Southern allies with the bitterest indignation. Mr. Floyd stormed in his rage. The president was dazed and bewildered. On Friday, the 28th, the commissioners and the president held their first formal conference. The president, while declaring that he had no authority to meet them, expressed his willingness to become the medium of communicating to congress any proposition they had to

make. The commissioners, instead of meeting him in the same spirit he had manifested, proceeded in an angry tone to reproach the honor of the government, and to ask an explanation of Anderson's conduct in occupying Fort Sumter.

This was accompanied with the threat to suspend negotiations. They demanded, in conclusion, "the withdrawal of the troops," not only from Fort Sumter, but from the harbor of Charleston also, adding that "under present circumstances they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible." Perhaps in the history of civilized nations there was never manifested such proud confidence on the one side and such timidity on the other.

The demands of these commissioners, that Anderson's conduct should be disavowed, and all troops withdrawn from the harbor of Charleston, were the subject of three angry cabinet meetings.[1] Finally, Mr. Floyd having become disgraced by a damaging allegation of complicity with the loss of a million of dollars of Indian trust funds, was forced to resign.

Mr. Jeremiah Black, now secretary of state, viewing the situation from a higher plane than that of a mere politician with Southern sympathies, suddenly became broad and patriotic in mind and action. With determined will and resolution, he and Mr. Holt and Mr. Stanton were able to exercise some restraining influence on the wavering mind of the president. They succeeded in arresting his first draft of an answer to the demands of the commissioners.

[1] At one of these cabinet meetings, before Floyd had resigned, Mr. Stanton said, as he afterward related: "No administration has ever suffered the loss of public confidence and support as this has done. Only the other day, it was announced that a million of dollars had been stolen from Mr. Thompson's department. The bonds were found to have been taken from the vault where they should have been kept, and the notes of Mr. Floyd were substituted for them. Now it is proposed to give up Sumter. All I have to say is, that no administration, much less this one, can afford to lose a million of money and a fort the same week." Floyd remained silent and did not reappear in that chamber again.—Nicolay & Hay, Vol. III, p. 74.

The answer finally given by the president was half apologetic. He regretted that the commissioners deemed negotiations impossible. But he declined with all possible politeness to withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston. This reply called forth an angry and bitter rejoinder from the commissioners, in which they charged the president with duplicity, double-dealing and vacillation.

Previous to the events just narrated, on the 17th of December, Captain Foster obtained, on a previous order issued to the military storekeeper in Charleston, forty muskets with which to arm his workmen for the defense of the public property, and also for the use of the two ordinance sergeants who were in charge respectively of Forts Sumter and Castle Pinckney. This trivial transaction created the greatest excitement. An immediate assault on the forts by a Charleston mob was threatened.

The matter was referred to Washington, and Mr. Floyd at once telegraphed to Captain Foster: "If you have removed any arms, return them instantly." Foster of course obeyed the order. This was not cowardice on Floyd's part.

While the secession movement was in hot blast, Jacob Thompson, secretary of the interior in Mr. Buchanan's cabinet, was appointed an agent by the Mississippi legislature to proceed to Raleigh, North Carolina, to induce that state to secede from the Union. He accordingly went, was publicly received by the legislature, and used all his influence to accomplish the object of his mission.[1] After exhausting his influence in vain in Raleigh, he returned to Washington and resumed his seat in Buchanan's cabinet.

Early in January, 1861, Mr. Floyd having reluctantly resigned and Joseph Holt having succeeded him, it was determined by the cabinet and General Scott to send reenforcements and supplies to Major Anderson. On Jan-

[1] Nicolay & Hay's "Life of Lincoln," Vol. III, p. 99

uary the 5th, the "Star of the West" sailed from New York with two hundred well instructed recruits, and with arms, ammunition and subsistence for three months. In his position as a cabinet officer, Jacob Thompson had learned the secret of the intention of the government to provision and re-enforce Fort Sumter. On the 8th of January, he had telegraphed this fact to the authorities in Charleston.[1] On the morning of the 9th, the vessel entered the harbor of Charleston, and, crossing the bar, steamed cautiously toward Fort Sumter. Suddenly a masked and unknown battery, on Morris' Island, opened fire on it. Fort Moultrie, lately seized by the South Carolina troops, was likely to open fire also at any moment, as the course of the vessel lay in the direction of that fort. A new danger now appeared. An armed revenue cutter, recently seized by the troops of South Carolina, towed by two boats, was seen approaching. Thus beset by dangers the officers of the "Star of the West" turned about, passed out of the harbor, and sailed back to New York. Thus Jacob Thompson, though a cabinet officer under Mr. Buchanan, in his zeal for the Southern cause, furnished the information which caused the first shot of the late Civil War to be fired upon the National flag.

The "Harriet Lane" was afterward sent by Mr. Lincoln with provisions alone for the relief of the brave garrison shut up in the fort, but arriving during the bombardment, and finding it impossible to land, it had to return without accomplishing its mission.

The annual message of Mr. Buchanan submitted to congress in December, 1860, in reference to the attitude of the Southern States, was a remarkable document. In it occurs the doctrine that there is no power under the constitution to "coerce a state" which is attempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn from the Union, into submission to the national authority. This was a mere beg-

[1] Nicolay & Hay's "Life of Lincoln," Vol. III, p. 128.

ging of the question. No one asserted such a power in the form in which he put it. He might, with as much truth, have asserted that no state could be indicted for treason or insurrection. The real question was, can the individuals composing the entity, or body politic called a state, be coerced into submission to the laws and rightful authority of the United States when resisting them. Mr. Buchanan did not dare to state the question in this form, for his knowledge of the history of his own state, in the case of the Whisky Insurrection in 1794, would have overthrown his position. There, President Washington called out a part of the militia of three states, put General Henry Lee at the head of the expedition, and quelled the insurrection by the display of force. Laws are directed against and are operative upon individuals, and not against communities or aggregations of persons. Mr. Buchanan, in his account of his own administration, recognizes this distinction himself, when he says, "our Civil War was undertaken and prosecuted in self-defense, not to coerce a state, but to enforce the execution of the laws within the states against individuals." . . . Mr. Buchanan's opinion, expressed in his message, became the shibboleth of noisy Secessionists throughout the Southern States during the next few months, and no doubt added some weight to the Revolutionary movement.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FIRST GREAT POLITICAL FIGHT.

Feeling of uncertainty and apprehension among the people in November and December, 1860—Friends of disunion demonstrative—Public meeting in Knoxville, November 26th—Resolutions offered and discussed—Adjourned over to December 8th—People of the country invited to attend—A vast crowd present—Resolutions tending toward disunion offered—Discussed by both sides for several hours—Persons taking part named—Voted down three to one—Union resolutions offered and adopted by a great majority—Far-reaching consequences of this action—Meeting the turning-point in history of Unionism in East Tennessee—Other Union meetings follow—Distinguished character of men who participated in these meetings—Anomalous character of these meetings.

The only apology I can offer for using the first person and for referring to myself as I shall do in this chapter, and perhaps in subsequent ones also, is the fact that I was an active participant in the transactions about to be related, which form an important part of the history of the movement in favor of secession in East Tennessee, the omission of which would leave the narrative incomplete. Some of these facts are known only to Mr. John M. Fleming and myself, some only to myself, and some were never known to any other persons. Mr. Fleming is now, and has been for a long time, a hopeless invalid, and is therefore incapable of narrating this untold history. All other persons who were once familiar with a part of these facts are now dead. Some of these facts were so important in their immediate results, and still more so in their remote consequences, that to omit them would leave the history of secession in East Tennessee incomplete and not altogether satisfactory or truthful.

On my return from court at Sevierville, on Sunday, November 25, 1860, to which reference was made in the pre-

ceding chapter, I found the public mind in a feverish state of excitement. Secession was rapidly hastening to a culmination in South Carolina. Its friends were actively at work in Knoxville, preparing the way for a similar act in Tennessee. Everything seemed to run smoothly in that direction. There were no influences at work to counteract this movement. The Union sentiment of the country had not yet been awakened. The wild rush of disloyalty seemed to be sweeping everything before it. Not a voice had been heard in the state, in reference to the condition of national affairs, except mine the week before, in an out-of-the-way town. Federal court, presided over by West H. Humphreys, an open Secessionist—the same person who was afterward impeached and convicted of disloyalty by the United States Senate—was in session at Knoxville. The jurors, summoned by a Southern-sympathizing marshal, were nearly all open in their demonstrations of disloyalty. Some of them appeared defiantly in court and in the jury box, wearing secession badges and emblems, without any rebuke from a judge presiding over a United States court. The judge, the district attorney, the marshal, the clerk, most of the jurors, and many of the witnesses and parties litigant, were outspoken for disunion. It looked as if all were lost.

A prominent and able Whig leader, Mr. John Baxter, had just written and published a communication in "Brownlow's Whig," urging the assembling of a convention of delegates from the slave states for consultation and action. Even the brave and secession-hating Brownlow had been induced, by his great confidence in and friendship for the writer, to indorse this scheme in an editorial in his paper, possibly written by Mr. Baxter, in which he said, in substance (no doubt hoping, and possibly believing, that such a conference would be able to unite on some measure that would preserve this Union), that the policy suggested by that body might prove to be the best and

such as we could all follow, although denying the right of secession.[1]

About the middle of November, there appeared a call in the Knoxville newspapers, for a public meeting to take place on the night of the 26th of the month, to take into consideration the general state of affairs in the country. This meeting was called by the friends of secession, though not so announced. It was intended to get the people together, under the plea of consultation in reference to the public welfare, and then after the usual professions of love for the Union, to introduce and pass resolutions, covertly in the interest of secession. Apparently, the meeting was to be a very fair and patriotic one. The movers in it expected to commit the people of Knoxville to the scheme of secession before the full purpose and effect of the movement should be understood.

The situation was extremely alarming. As soon as I saw the notice of this proposed meeting, and the proposition for a convention of Southern delegates, I at once realized the danger there was in them. They seemed to threaten, if unopposed, the most fatal consequences to the Union cause. I at once, Sunday as it was, sent for Mr. John M. Fleming, a cool, clear-headed young lawyer who had just returned with me from Sevierville. I explained to him my apprehensions, in which he fully concurred, and we then held a long and anxious consultation.

On that Sunday afternoon was organized at my house the plan of opposition to the movements of the secessionists, which was afterwards so successfully carried out in two public meetings, and which resulted in such signal benefits to the Union cause. We knew that the daring aggressiveness of the secession leaders could only be counteracted by meeting them at the very inception of their schemes. The spirit of secession was abroad. It was in the very air. It

[1] Brownlow's "Knoxville Whig," weekly, November 24, 1861. In the same number, however, there are four or five editorials denouncing secession with all the force and bitterness of this Union-loving patriot.

was as contagious as a fatal epidemic. We knew also that if opposition to the schemes contemplated for the meeting on the night of the following day was to be made, it had to be made by us. There were no other public men to do it. Baxter and Brownlow were committed to another policy; Trigg was absent. Mr. Maynard, if at home (and I think he was not), was no leader for such an occasion. Mr. W. H. Sneed, Mr. James W. Humes and Mr. W. B. Reese, had joined the Southern movement. Mr. John J. Reese was neither a public speaker nor a leader. Samuel R. Rodgers alone remained to help in the fight, and he was at that time in no sense a public leader nor speaker. This was the situation on the 25th of November, 1860. The first point was to defeat the evident purpose and object of the proposed public meeting. This, it was believed, could be done best by attending and taking part in it, and voting down, if possible, any secession propositions which might be offered. This was the course agreed upon. The next point was to try to change the attitude of Mr. Brownlow in reference to the proposed conference of delegates from the Southern States. We knew he was honest and that he would abandon in a moment, and unreservedly, the hasty indorsement of that scheme, if convinced that duty to his country demanded it. The dominant sentiment of his being was love of the Union and hatred of secession. We also knew that he was proud-spirited, and would submit to nothing like dictation. It was agreed that we should call on him the next morning and discuss the matter with him in the kindest spirit. Accordingly, at the appointed hour, we went to his office. On the way we met Mr. Samuel R. Rodgers, who, at our request, joined us.

We had a frank conference with Mr. Brownlow, pointing out to him that if a conference of delegates from the Southern States were held, it would inevitably fall under the control of the most ultra men, not only from the Cotton States, but likewise from the border states; that the secessionists were everywhere active, aggressive and domineer-

ing, while the Union men were timid and yielding; that such a convention would surely indorse secession, and thus consolidate public sentiment in its favor; that in that event, the Union feeling in the South, by reason of the imposing character of such a meeting would be smothered, silenced and destroyed, and that we, of the middle and border slave states, having voluntarily gone into the convention, would be bound in honor by its recommendations and have to yield to the secession movement.

These and other arguments were used with the utmost kindness and deference. But a mere suggestion was all that was needed. Mr. Brownlow, with his keen instinct of patriotism, and his clear, honest judgment, only needed a hint as to his duty, and that he was ready to follow even to death. He yielded a cordial assent to the reasons offered, and never afterward wrote another word in behalf of a Southern Convention. Indeed, when he unguardedly, through the influence of a trusted friend, was led into that false position, it was under the belief that the step recommended was the best one to save the Union. No power on earth could have induced him knowingly to raise a hand against the government. He was impulsive, and sometimes, under the advice of trusted friends, hasty, but he was essentially honest, and never persisted in an error when his clear judgment was convinced that it was such. His mind was always open to reason.

During that day (Monday), every effort was made to prepare for the public meeting. But the time was so short that but few persons could be found who would attend it. Union men had not yet seen the danger ahead of them. They were to some extent indifferent to the great peril which threatened the country. But above this, they had not yet broken the shackles of prejudice which bound in its iron grasp the minds of all Southern people, and made of them cowards, and to a large extent blinded them in reference to all questions affecting slavery. They were timid, half paralyzed by the noisy secessionists on the streets, in

the hotels, and in the federal court. A wild stampede toward secession was dangerously imminent. In fact, it had already commenced. At no time after the election of Mr. Lincoln until the close of the war did it require so much courage to be for the Union as at this time. Timid men were skulking; nothing but a sense of patriotic duty gave men the courage to brave the danger.

It was well known that this call for a public meeting originated with the friends of disunion, and that the meeting was designed to promote that cause. There had been no test of public sentiment in the community since the presidential election. The friends of disunion were noisy and clamorous here, as elsewhere, and seemed to be sweeping everything before them. Notwithstanding the adverse appearance of things, we were determined to do all that could be done to stay this mad current of disloyalty, and, if possible, check it and turn it back.

When the meeting assembled, it was at once evident, as it was feared would be the case, that the secession element was decidedly in the ascendant. Federal court was still in session, and the demonstratively disloyal jurors and other attendants on the court were present, ready to shout, to applaud and make a noise. The Union men did not know their strength, and were held back by the fear of the slave power. In fact, many men under the changed and changing aspect of public affairs had not yet made up their minds where they would go. They were bewildered, and groped uncertainly, hunting the light.

The crowd that attended the meeting was respectable in point of numbers. One Joseph H. Walker, a secessionist sympathizer, was made chairman. A committee was appointed to report resolutions, of which Mr. John Baxter was either chairman or a member. This committee reported a set of resolutions for the consideration of the meeting. It is impossible to give these as reported, for no record exists of them, so far as can be ascertained. But, in the main, they were regarded by all the Union leaders,

except Mr. Baxter and Mr. John J. Reese, as tending toward disloyalty. They recommended in particular the convening of the legislature, and the appointment by it of delegates to a conference or convention of all the Southern States.

To a casual listener, there does not seem to be much harm in these resolutions. But we knew the men who were pushing their adoption. We had seen these men applaud with wildest demonstrations the secession utterances of Wm. L. Yancy in this city but a few weeks before. We did not look at the mere words of the resolution, but behind them—to their hidden meaning—to the ultimate purpose. Behind them, simple as they seemed, some of us saw the form of secession, as clear and distinct in outline as if painted on canvas or molded in bronze. A sword is none the less a sword, though wreathed from hilt to point in harmless flowers. We did not at that time fully realize the fierce and ceaseless aggressiveness of the spirit of secession, but we knew that it was easier to fight it in its weakness than in its well-developed strength. We felt that Hercules must be strangled in his infancy, before he became strong enough to destroy us.

Mr. Baxter, as we have already seen, was at that time in favor of a Southern conference or convention, and the main resolution was to that effect. Mr. Fleming, Mr. S. R. Rodgers, and myself regarded this resolution as the entering wedge to ultimate disunion.

In the meeting, there was much speaking on both sides and considerable noise and excitement. The discussion opened up the whole question of union or disunion. Broadly and clearly in favor of secession were Mr. William H. Sneed, Mr. John H. Crozier, and Mr. W. B. Reese, Jr. Mr. John J. Reese was in favor of a Southern conference, though at that time a warm Union man. The speakers on the Union side were Mr. Fleming and myself. Mr. Baxter advocated his own scheme. He did not fully agree with either side, but was earnestly in favor of saving the Union.

He differed from his Union friends simply as to the best mode of doing this.

As the debate progressed, it became only too evident to the friends of the Union that if the vote were taken that evening the secessionists would achieve a decided triumph. Then a game of tactics was commenced to defeat a direct vote, and secure an adjournment until a future day. Mr. Fleming, who was a skillful parliamentarian, by some artful motions, the effect of which was not clearly understood by the chairman, finally secured an adjournment until the 8th day of December, in the daytime. We had gained a great deal, indeed everything, by securing this delay.

The next trial of strength and test of public sentiment were to be made in the daytime. That gave us an opportunity to rally the people from the country, whom we knew to be as yet untainted with disloyalty. During the evening's debate, one of our speakers, believing that the secessionists would pass their resolutions, had said that if they did so the friends of the Union would appeal to the country. So, the next morning, this appeal was taken up by our friends as a rallying cry. Messages were sent all over the county, and to some extent to the neighboring counties, that we had appealed to the people to aid us against the schemes of the enemies of the Union. The effect was electrical. The country people became aroused, even maddened, at the news. On the day appointed for the final meeting, early in the morning, they poured into town, until the streets were full of excited countrymen. In one case, a considerable procession of men on horseback, from a distant part of the county, on the borders of Union, headed by a venerable old man, Isaac Bayless, marched down Gay street, with dark and ominous determination depicted on their countenances. Men were here also from adjoining counties. The news had gone to the country that the secessionists of the town were plotting to overthrow the government, and they were asked to come and

help to save it. Most gladly they responded to the summons.

At an early hour the meeting reconvened. The crowd was so great that only a portion of it could get into the court-house, where the meeting was to be held. Those who could not enter hung around the doors and windows and crowded the passage-ways, eager to catch a word or get news of what was going on within. The most intense interest and anxiety filled the minds and hearts of those present. All seemed to be unconsciously impressed with the conviction that they were in the presence, in the very shadow, of some great event. This feeling gave a profound earnestness to their minds.

At 11 o'clock the meeting was called to order by the former chairman. Fortunately we have a tolerably full account of this meeting, as reported and published in "Brownlow's Whig," of December 15, 1860.

The resolutions presented to the meeting were substantially the same which had been before it on the previous occasion.

Mr. Baxter, as chairman, reported for the consideration of the meeting, in lieu of the former resolutions, the following which had been adopted by a citizen's meeting in Nashville:

"Resolved, as the sense of this meeting, in view of the dangerous crisis in our affairs, the governor of the state be and he is hereby requested to call together the legislature forthwith, that they may provide for a state convention, to be elected by the people, the object of which shall be to bring about a conference of Southern States, to consider existing troubles, and, if possible, compose our sectional strife."

After considerable skirmishing, Mr. W. B. Reese moved the adoption of this resolution, which being seconded, the debate was opened regularly. Mr. Baxter had already declared himself in favor of its adoption, and had made a speech to that effect. The parties who now ranged them-

selves on the different sides and made speeches during the day were William H. Sneed, John H. Crozier, W. B. Reese, W. W. Wallace and James W. Humes in favor of this resolution. Mr. Baxter, as already stated, favored the resolution, but was not a secessionist. So also John J. Reese favored the resolution, but he was a decided Union man.

On the other hand, those who took part in the debate, in opposition to the resolution, were Mr. Samuel R. Rodgers and myself: Mr. Fleming not appearing on the stand until a later stage of the proceedings.

The word "secession" was not named as an end in the speeches advocating the resolution. That was kept in the background. "All we wanted," as was argued, "was to secure our rights by united council and harmonious action. Whatever was done should be done and approved by all. There could be no harm in consulting together and securing unanimity of sentiment and harmony of action among all the Southern people."

The speech of Mr. Rodgers was very brief, not exceeding eight or ten minutes. It was so unique that the condensed account of it as reported is here reproduced:

"Colonel S. R. Rodgers was then called up and spoke amid repeated applause in favor of the Union. He was opposed to convening the legislature—opposed to a Southern Conference—opposed to passing any resolution in this meeting—opposed to the meeting itself. He was for staying where we are, in the Union, and in favor of doing nothing, but 'holding plum still.'"

On the Union side the resolutions were opposed out and out, as containing in them the seeds of disunion. It was argued that the plan proposed, if carried out, would end in committing us all irretrievably to that fatal doctrine, and to an acquiescence in it with all its evil consequences. Secession was denounced as the scheme of ambitious men, without justification in any existing evil, and as a remedy for no wrong, either real or imaginary. It was insisted

that if such a conference or convention, as the one proposed, were held, it would be dominated by the spirit of the extreme men in the South, and controlled by them; that it would declare for secession, and that the Union men would be committed in its favor, and dragged into a cause they disliked, and one which they believed to be causeless and wicked. All persons present were urged to resist all open or insidious approaches of secession, come from what quarter they might, and in whatever pleasing form or shape, and to stand by the government of their fathers.

After the closing speech on the Union side, about three P. M., the secession leaders continued for half an hour to appeal to the people to sustain and vote for the resolution. After a second speech on my part, the resolution offered by the committee was put on its passage. The report says: "It was responded to by vehement and prolonged shouts of 'Aye' and 'No' alternately. Division was then had, when about three-fourths of the meeting voted down the resolution."

Mr. W. B. Reese, Jr., now indignantly said: "You have said by your vote that you are afraid to trust yourselves. You don't seem to understand the purpose of the vote you have given." (Loud cries of "We do," "Not so," and much disorder.) Mr. Reese attempted to proceed, but could not be heard. This disorder was caused by the language used by Mr. Reese.

Mr. Fleming then appeared on the stand, but yielded to Mr. W. B. Reese, Jr., who again protested, amid great confusion, against the action of the meeting. By permission of Mr. Fleming, Mr. Crozier took the stand. He spoke at considerable length, deploring the action of the meeting, and urging that we should go with the cotton states in this controversy.

Mr. Fleming then resumed the stand, and offered a preamble and resolutions which had recently been adopted by a meeting in Frankfort, Kentucky. The preamble and

first two resolutions denounced secession as illegal, unconstitutional and unjustifiable. Another resolution declared for the preservation of the Union, and a devoted attachment and loyalty to it. Another declared that Mr. Lincoln had been legally and constitutionally elected president of the United States, and that we ought, as good citizens, to submit to his election and give him a fair trial as president.

The last resolution was as follows:

"Resolved, 6th. That Tennessee is now, as she has always been, true, loyal and devoted to the union of these states; that she recognizes no constitutional right in any state, or combination of states, to *force her into an attitude of hostility to the Union.*"

The reading of these resolutions called forth repeated applause. Mr. James W. Humes and Mr. Wallace made speeches in opposition to their adoption, the latter declaring that "it looked like a party move," and that he thought "the meeting a packed jury." One of the speakers replied to him with some spirit and a little sharpness, which was always regretted by him, as Mr. Wallace was an honorable gentleman.

The report goes on: "The vote was taken upon Mr. Fleming's resolutions, which resulted in their adoption by an overwhelming majority—there being but few dissenting voices."

Mr. John J. Reese now mounted the stand, and proposed three cheers for the Union, which were given amid the wildest scenes of excitement and enthusiasm. The pent-up feelings of the people, kept in check to this hour by the solemnity of the occasion and the gravity of the great question in issue, now burst forth in unrestrained demonstrations of patriotic rejoicing. They were almost wild and frenzied. Never did the walls of the old court-house witness such a scene.

At this point, Mr. W. G. Brownlow, who had been present all day taking notes for his paper, was called for by the meeting. In response to this call, he made a five min-

utes' speech, such as he alone could make. He denounced all who favored secession as traitors, who ought to be hung. By this time the excitement of the Union men knew no limit. They saw their way clearly once more, and were strengthened and confirmed in their ancient faith.

Long before the close of the meeting, the advocates of secession had, one by one, been quietly leaving the house, so that at the close there was not one left. The meeting, therefore, adjourned, having lasted from 11 A. M. to about 4 P. M.

It will be observed that there had been two questions before the meeting: 1st. That raised by the resolution reported by Mr. Baxter, recommending the convening of the legislature, the call of a state convention, and a conference of the slaveholding states. 2d. The resolutions presented by Mr. Fleming, which, in brief, condemned secession as a heresy, and declared our unalterable attachment and determined adherence to the Union. The main fight was over the first resolution. But it must not be overlooked, that in the discussion of this, both sides looked beyond the mere words and had secession in their minds. So it became almost the sole topic of controversy. In the view of those who opposed Mr. Baxter's resolution, its adoption would have led straight along the highway of disunion. The adoption of declarations of devotion and adhesion to the Union, such as it contained, were mere vain and idle words. The position taken by Mr. Baxter and Mr. John J. Reese on the first question neutralized their influence as to the great question lying behind it. In fact, when reduced to exactness, there was but one question before the meeting, that of union or disunion.

This was by far the most important political meeting ever held in the state. It was somewhat remarkable on account of the number of persons taking part in it, who had been previously conspicuous in public life or who

afterward became so.[1] But its highest importance arose from its far-reaching consequences. It had no influence whatever, as it turned out, in preventing the convening of the legislature afterward, nor in checking the determination of the secessionists at Nashville to hurry the state out of the Union. But, in determining and fixing the status of East Tennessee, its influence was incalculable. It must be borne in mind that these meetings, as far as I know, were the first held in the state after South Carolina had in many ways unmistakably manifested her purpose to secede from the Union. Certainly this was true of the first meeting. Four or five other states were as clearly preparing to follow her example. There was, therefore, universal alarm and uncertainty among the people. They were in a fearful state of apprehension in reference to something they did not understand. Lincoln and his followers had been denounced everywhere in the South as Black Republicans, Abolitionists, enemies of their country, worthy to be hung. Few public speakers or newspapers, even among the friends of Mr. Bell, dared to say a word in vindication of Mr. Lincoln, or of his party, for fear of the injurious effect it might have here at home. This great meeting was held at the time of this uncertainty and confusion in the public mind.

It must be kept in view, also, that Knox was the largest county, and Knoxville the most important town in East Tennessee. It was situated geographically in its very center, and had always been the commercial emporium as

[1] It will be noticed that the names of neither Connally F. Trigg nor that of the Hon. Horace Maynard appear in this meeting. Mr. Trigg was absent at one of his courts. He had not yet taken any active part in the politics of this state, having moved here in 1855 from Virginia. Mr. Maynard was then in Washington, in attendance as a member of congress. A week before the meeting, I went to him and urged him to stay and take part in it. I pointed out the great importance of fixing in advance a sound Union sentiment among our people while their minds were yet open to conviction. I urged that no great harm could result from his absence from congress for a few days, as no speaker was to be elected, etc. But he left for Washington that night, greatly to my disappointment.

well as the political headquarters of this section. Here resided an unusual number of able leaders of the old Whig party, men not inferior in ability to those residing in Nashville. Here, too, the leading newspapers of the section were published, which were sent out into every county. In a majority of the other counties there were no newspapers published, and the people were therefore in the habit of looking to Knoxville not only for news, but also for the policy to be adopted in political emergencies. It can easily be imagined therefore with what eagerness and intense interest, in this hour of doubt and gloom, the proceedings of a very large meeting of both parties, lasting nearly all day, in which the leading men of the county participated, would be scanned by the people at a distance.

The news of this great uprising of the people, of the pronounced and almost unanimous determination unmistakably manifested of standing by the Union, the unequivocal condemnation of secession, and the announced purpose of giving to Mr. Lincoln, as president, a fair trial—was speedily carried to all the adjoining counties. The newspapers proclaimed it through their columns. Brownlow thundered forth this victory in triumphant tones. In a few days the fact of the great Union meeting was known to every intelligent man in East Tennessee. Where all had been gloom and uncertainty before, there followed hope, confidence and determination. The meeting, therefore, became the turning point in the history of Unionism and nationality in all East Tennessee. The development and growth of secession feeling and manifestation were at once arrested. From this hour secession became cautious and timid; loyalty became bold, outspoken and defiant. Disloyalty never recovered from the staggering blow it this day received. If it had succeeded, if it had triumphed in this meeting, the Union cause could never have withstood the tide of secession which in the next few months flowed

in on our people like a flood. The people—a large part of them at least—would almost certainly have given way to the spirit of alarm and terrorism which swept into the stream of secession the people of the other divisions of the state, who blindly followed panic stricken and nerveless leaders.

The transcendant influence of this meeting became manifest soon after it was held. Encouraged and emboldened by the loyal stand taken by Knox county, the different counties in East Tennessee soon began to hold Union meetings. In the course of the next few weeks nearly every county in East Tennessee declared through its citizens in no uncertain words in favor of the Union. The moral force and power of these public declarations were not weakened in their effect by any sickly twaddle about the "neutrality" of the state in the event of a conflict of arms. That dogma, except to a limited extent, never found a secure foothold among our people. Nor was the adherence of the people to the government a conditional and qualified one, depending upon getting certain rights alleged to be withheld from them. They went far beyond this. They lifted themselves up to the broad consideration of the single, the momentous question of the preservation of the government on the one side, or of its destruction on the other.

Another important effect of this meeting was, that it encouraged and emboldened those to whom the people were accustomed to look for advice and leadership. Had the people given way at this dark crisis, the leaders one by one would have done the same thing. Discouraged in an attempt to stem the current, already running strongly in favor of disunion, now accelerated and swollen by this new impulse, the leaders would have yielded to it, or sullenly and silently given up in despair, and retreated to their offices or places of business.

On the other side, had the leaders, those in whom the people placed confidence, by reason of their fidelity and

superior means of information, faltered and given way at the first approach of danger, as they did in Middle Tennessee at a later day, the mass of the people, though in heart devoted to the Union, fearing some unknown, vague evil to be impending, would have wavered likewise and finally given way. This was more or less true of the common people of every seceding state, and especially so in Georgia and Virginia. In each of these states a large majority of the people remained steadfast to the Union until they were deserted and forsaken by their trusted leaders.

Nor must the remote consequences flowing from this meeting be overlooked. The unyielding loyalty of East Tennessee, throughout the long civil war that followed, was unparalleled in the United States. The fact of the existence of a large territory almost in the heart of the Southern States, containing a population of over three hundred thousand souls, more than two-thirds of which were fiercely devoted to the Union, must have exerted a great moral influence on true men everywhere. It must have given some comfort and support to the president in his darkest days of gloom and anxiety. It gave hope and courage to Andrew Johnson, Thos. A. R. Nelson, Horace Maynard and Reese B. Brabson, during the winter of 1860–61, in their congressional labors. And who shall say how much this meeting of the 8th of December helped to give inspiration, form and point to the speech of Mr. Johnson, delivered in the senate on the 18th and 19th of that month, in which he for the first time declared for the Union.

A strange spectacle was witnessed that day—that of the opposing leaders coming together, in a good spirit, in the presence of the people, and dispassionately discussing for most of one entire day, and then quietly voting on the most momentous question that ever engaged the minds of freemen—the question of dissolving the bonds of the Union. No such spectacle was anywhere else witnessed in the

South. Perhaps no such thing was ever seen in the history of the world. It was in part the supreme importance of the question at issue, and the august solemnity of the great occasion, as well as the calm and dispassionate discussion by the leaders of both sides, that gave to the decision rendered that day its immediate, its wide-spread and far-reaching influence. It forever fixed the minds of the people of East Tennessee in a loyalty to the government so unalterable that nothing could ever shake or change it. Only one or two angry words were spoken that day. The occasion was too solemn in its awful consequences for hot words.

There was doubtless much suppressed feeling, but the open manifestation of bitterness was avoided by all the speakers. Both sides were somewhat timid. Each was cautiously feeling the pulse of the people. The bold attitude afterwards assumed by these speakers was not in the least manifest. Those on the Union side were still to some extent held in thraldom by the fear of pro-slavery public opinion. None but those who once resided in the South can realize the crushing force of this feeling. The secession leaders were cautious because they were not assured of the sympathy of the people. Public sentiment in East Tennessee, in reference to secession, had not yet crystallized into any very definite form. The people were at heart unquestionably attached to the Union, but they had recently heard so much about the evil designs of the Abolitionists and the "Black Republicans," that they became alarmed. They wanted information as to their duty. Those present that day, so demonstrative toward the close of the meeting, were at first quiet, anxious listeners. Mr. Brownlow was the only speaker who used bitter terms, and his were general in their application.

The rather remarkable character of the men who were the leaders in the proceedings of this great day is worthy of notice. Mr. John H. Crozier was a lawyer, a fluent speaker, a man of learning, of large and varied intelli-

gence, and of fine standing. He had been twice a prominent Whig member of congress. William H. Sneed was a lawyer of the very highest rank, of great personal worth, and of superior talents. He had once been a worthy Whig member of congress. Mr. W. W. Wallace was a man of high character and intelligence and of respectable powers. He had been twice a candidate of the Democratic party for congress. John Baxter was a man of notable force, and perhaps the ablest lawyer in the state. He was afterwards appointed by Mr. Hayes United States circuit court judge, and served as such until his death. William G. Brownlow was an editor of national reputation and a man of remarkable ability. He was afterwards twice elected governor of Tennessee, and served one term in the United State senate. Samuel R. Rodgers was a good lawyer and a man of fair capacity. He became speaker of the senate of Tennessee in 1865, and this was followed by his appointment as chancellor of the second chancery division of the state. John M. Fleming had been a member of the state legislature two or three terms. He served one term as state superintendent of public instruction. He was an astute and able lawyer. But his highest distinction was won as one of the brightest and most accomplished editors in the state. In this field he was conspicuous, having few superiors anywhere.

John J. Reese was an educated gentleman, a son of Wm. B. Reese, the late learned jurist of the supreme court of the state. He became a lieutenant-colonel in the Confederate army. William B. Reese, Jr., his brother, was a lawyer of a very active and discriminating mind. After the war, he became a learned professor in the law department of Vanderbilt University. James W. Humes was a man of noted capability. He became a colonel in the Confederate army. After the war, he made great reputation in the State of Virginia by the brilliancy of his political speeches. He was on the point of being nominated (and no doubt elected) governor of that commonwealth when he

died, while yet a young man. All of these men, except Mr. Wallace, had been Whigs in politics.

All who took part in the proceedings of that great day of the triumph of loyalty in East Tennessee, except Mr. Fleming and the author, are now dead.

In conclusion, I do not hesitate to express the decided opinion that, if the meeting of that day had declared in favor of disunion, East Tennessee would have gone with the South. Many persons would not have done so, but the majority would. That meeting fixed unchangeably its political character. An overwhelming majority of its people have never swerved in their undying devotion to the National Union. During the war, they were a political anomaly in the South. Their record is unlike that of any other people in the United States, not only that they were loyal when the life of the nation was imperiled, but they maintained their fidelity to the Union under circumstances that were exceptionally trying, and were able to render services that were made doubly valuable by their geographical position and the marked ability of the leaders.

CHAPTER IX.

CAMPAIGN OF FEBRUARY 1861.

Governor Harris calls an extra session of the legislature—Message to the legislature—Question of convention or no convention submitted to the people at the ballot box—East Tennessee prepares for the conflict—Nominates the ablest men as candidates for the convention on the Union ticket—Candidates in Knox, Sevier and Roane counties—The canvass described—Boldness of candidates—People of Sevier county—Result in Knox county—In Sevier—In Roane—In East Tennessee—In the state—Convention defeated—Union majority in the election of candidates—On the call of a convention.

In December, 1860, Isham G. Harris, governor of Tennessee, issued his proclamation convening the general assembly in Nashville, in extraordinary session, on the 7th day of January next following. Governor Harris had been a Breckenridge Democrat, holding extreme Southern views. He was a man of remarkable energy and determination; ambitious, able and daring. In him the Southern leaders had an ally as bold as Yancy or Toombs, less brilliant, but with more prudence and discretion. When the legislature assembled he laid before it his message, explaining his reasons for calling it together in extra session. The message was a long and disingenuous arraignment of the people of the Northern States for their "actual and threatened aggressions upon the well-defined rights" of the Southern States. A long list of grievances which the South had endured was set forth in burning language. The first complaint was that the Abolitionists had gained control of the House of Representatives, and had elected one of its leaders to the presidency. Now, all intelligent men knew that this was a mistake. Mr. Lincoln never had belonged to the Abolition party. Over and over again he had declared that there was no power

in the constitution to interfere with slavery in the states where it already existed, and he was unalterably opposed to any such interference. Indeed, he had only recently joined the Republican or Free-soil party. The utmost extent to which he had ever gone was in declaring that congress had the power to exclude slavery from the territories, and to abolish it in such places as belonged exclusively to the government. In all his speeches and letters he had acknowledged the constitutional obligation on the states to return fugitive slaves to their owners. Nor was it correct that it was the Abolition party exclusively which had triumphed, as a party, in the late presidential election, by the election of Mr. Lincoln and a majority of the members of the House of Representatives. It was the "Free-soil," or as they termed themselves "the Republican Party," which had thus triumphed. It is true that the Abolition party voted with the Republican party in that election, but this party was then, as it always had been, insignificantly small in all the Northern States. There were but few of this party in either House of Congress at that time, and these were utterly powerless by themselves to enact any hostile legislation. Mr. Lincoln was elected by a large majority of the popular vote of the North.

Another complaint of Governor Harris against the North was in these words:

"It demanded, and from our love of peace and devotion to the Union, unfortunately extorted in 1819–20, a concession which excluded the South from about one-half of the territory acquired from France."

This refers to the "Missouri Compromise." It may sometimes do for mere politicians on the stump to talk loosely about political questions, but a grave state paper ought to be exact in all its statements. As to the Missouri Compromise line, which excluded slavery north of the parallel of 36 degrees, 30 minutes, the South accepted, if it did not demand that line in congress, and it was estab-

lished largely by the votes of its members. It had already gotten Louisiana and Arkansas as slave states out of the Louisiana purchase, and now, by this compromise it secured Missouri also. These three states included, after the sale of Texas to Spain, all the Louisiana purchase that was supposed to be suitable for slavery. At that time the South regarded the compromise line as a great triumph for slavery.

The next complaint contained in the message was in these words:

"It" (the Abolition party) "has through the instrumentality of emigrant aid societies, under state patronage, flooded the territories with its minions, armed with Sharp's rifles and bowie knives, seeking thus to accomplish by intimidation, violence and murder, what it could not do by constitutional legislation."

The charge that the emigrant aid societies acted "under state patronage" is believed to be a mistake. They originated in the feeling of indignation aroused by the efforts of the slaveholding people of Missouri and other Southern states to force slavery on the people of Kansas against what was alleged to be the will of a majority of the people of that territory. It was the emphatic protest of the North against the efforts of pro-slavery men in the border counties of Missouri, styled in that day "border ruffians," to control all elections in the Territory of Kansas by unfair methods. It was overwhelmingly established by proofs before the Congressional Investigation Committee that in the March election of 1855, for members of a territorial legislature, these "border ruffians" cast 4,908 illegal votes. During this long and protracted struggle for the control of Kansas, both parties were finally guilty of violence, outrages and bloodshed. It is undeniable that many and terrible outrages were committed in Kansas by the Free-soil men of the North, as well as by Southern men.

Governor Harris enumerated twenty-three grounds of

complaint against the people of the Northern States. He pointed out five amendments to the Constitution of the United States which he thought, if adopted, would satisfy the South, not one of which had the slightest chance of ever being ratified by the North. In the course of his message, he said: "Whatever line of policy may be adopted by the people of Tennessee with regard to the present federal relations of the state, I am sure that the swords of her brave and gallant sons will never be drawn for the purpose of coercing, subjugating or holding as a conquered province any one of her sister states, whose people may declare their independence of the Federal Government, for the purpose of being relieved from a 'long train of abuses and usurpations.' "

East Tennessee at once took up the challenge which Governor Harris had so boldly given to the friends of the Union, and girded itself for the coming conflict. The Union men knew that it would be a desperate struggle. They realized that his message was a hot blast intended to blow the smothered fires of secession into a burning flame and a mighty conflagration. So they at once prepared to meet it, whatever might be their fate. Promptly the legislature, under the influences of the hour, and breathing the hot atmosphere of Nashville and Middle Tennessee, passed an act, appointing the 9th day of February for an election of delegates to a convention to be held February 25th, "to consider the then existing relations between the Government of the United States and the government and the people of the State of Tennessee, and to adopt such measures for vindicating the sovereignty of the state and the protection of its institutions as shall appear to them to be demanded." The act provided that the people, while voting for delegates to the convention, should also vote on the question of "Convention" or "No Convention." It also provided that no ordinance or resolution of secession which might be adopted should "be of any binding force or effect until it is submitted to and rati-

fied and adopted by a majority of the qualified voters in the state."

Not being in the least daunted or intimidated by the inflammatory appeal of the governor, the loyal people of East Tennessee at once organized for the approaching contest. The ablest and strongest men were selected in every county as candidates for the convention. Nathaniel G. Taylor was nominated in Carter county, James W. Deadrick in Washington, R. A. Crawford in Greene, John Netherland and W. C. Kyle in Hawkins, R. M. Barton in Jefferson, John F. Henry in Blount, John Baxter, Connally F. Trigg and myself in Knox, and a like class of men in the other counties of East Tennessee.

During these exciting days, Mr. Brownlow, through his "Whig," was writing in favor of the Union in his bravest words. Thus, in his paper of the 26th of January, he said, among other things:

"Now let our Union people bring out able and true men, irrespective of old party associations. We have no parties but Union men and Disunionists. Let the good people of East Tennessee see to it that not a single Disunionist shall go to this convention. There is no dodging the issue. Hold them to it and require every candidate to speak out. We must face the real issue. . . ."

On the 26th of January, the people of Knox county assembled in Knoxville for the purpose of nominating candidates for the convention. I will quote from the "Whig" an account of the meeting:

"The meeting of Saturday last was an unusually large meeting of the kind. The wind and snow utterly failed to intimidate the Union men of the county, or to dampen their ardor in the glorious cause of our country. We have never witnessed greater enthusiasm on any similar occasion in Tennessee. The meeting was a complete success, one spirit, one mind, one sentiment pervading the glorious Union crowd.

"It will be seen from the proceedings that John Baxter,

Oliver P. Temple and Connally F. Trigg were nominated as candidates for the state convention. After the nominations, which were made with great unanimity, and amidst deafening applause, the candidates addressed the crowd, accepting the positions assigned them, avowing their sentiments and their determination to let their right arms fall from their sockets before they would sign an ordinance of secession. The enthusiasm with which these speeches were received was never excelled in any meeting we have ever held here."

Again he said:

"The enthusiasm with which the nominations of John Baxter, O. P. Temple and C. F. Trigg was received on Saturday—the unanimity and good feeling with which these nominations were agreed upon—and the loud, hearty and prolonged cheers with which their speeches, avowing their principles and their acceptance of the nominations, were received, clearly indicated the heavy vote and the overpowering majorities they are to receive on the 9th of February. Knox, Roane and Sevier may well be proud of such men in the approaching convention. . . . They are able and experienced men, good debaters, bold and firm, and withal, they are as sound Union men as ever took seats in a convention. . . ."

Baxter was nominated for Knox county. His competitor was William H. Sneed, of whom I have already spoken in complimentary terms. Trigg was nominated for Knox and Roane counties, and his competitor was Wilburn W. Walker, a wholesale merchant of Knoxville and a worthy gentleman. I was nominated for Knox and Sevier counties, and my competitor was Dr. James Paxton, an old citizen of the highest worth and standing. Of Baxter I have already spoken, and I shall have occasion to speak of him again hereafter. Trigg was a lawyer, and just the kind of a man for those stirring times. He was bold, daring, impassioned, possessing a clear and vigorous intellect, with intense convictions of duty.

The several candidates at once entered the canvass. The first appointment was a joint one, at French's meeting house in Knox county. Brownlow, who was present, spoke as follows of that meeting in his paper:

"Temple led off with a speech of an hour and a half; Trigg followed in a speech of an hour and thirteen minutes, and Baxter followed in a speech of one hour. Suffice it to say that these gentlemen sustained their reputations as public speakers, and upheld the Union cause to the entire satisfaction of their hearers. . . . We have never witnessed such feeling, or such a determined spirit to resist secession, let it come in whatever shape it may."

The candidates now separated, Trigg going to fill appointments in Roane county, and Baxter and I filling appointments in Knox for three days. Then, leaving Baxter at work in Knox, I went to Sevier to fill my appointments there. I first spoke to a large crowd in Sevierville. The next day I went to Fair Garden, in the eastern end of the county, not far from the lines of Cocke and Jefferson. Here I was honored by the presence of an immense crowd, numbering from one thousand to twelve hundred persons, gathered from a rather sparsely-settled country, but from all the surrounding region, far and near, and even from the coves of the mountains. This was the first speech the people had heard in that quarter since secession came so suddenly and threateningly before the country, and with many it was the last. A number of the mountain men had their guns with them, significant of the use they were to make of them in the near future. I spoke outdoors, with all the earnestness of my nature, for between two and three hours. As I unfolded to the people the secession plot to break up the government of their fathers, indignation and determination settled on their brows. A grave and terrible calamity presented itself, which could only be averted by a united people at the ballot-box. And never was there a more determined crowd than this one. There was not a disloyal man in it. A

few, a very few, of those who were then present may have become Confederates afterwards; but they were all true on that day, and true at the election five days later.

Many were there from the coves which nestled in among the mountains near by. Some were there who dwelt on the sides of the Great Smoky Mountain, forming the boundary between Tennessee and North Carolina. These were not learned men; but they had a simple, pure, unwavering love of country. They had learned by tradition, handed down from father to son, of the great Revolutionary struggle for independence, of Washington and his unclothed army at Valley Forge, of Yorktown and the surrender of Lord Cornwallis, of Colonels Sevier and Shelby at King's Mountain. Their forefathers had shared in the glory of these achievements. The republic was therefore as dear to them as was the sacred Ark of the Covenant to the Israelites.

The next day the speaking was at Wayland's, in the western part of the county, not far from the lines of Knox and Blount, between twenty and twenty-five miles from Fair Garden. The crowd there was scarcely less than the one of the day before. It was a raw, chilly day in February. The large academy building would not hold a third of the persons present, so the speaking again had to be done out-doors. Notwithstanding the chilly weather, the people stood listening for two hours in breathless attention. This crowd was apparently as unanimous in its loyalty as the one of the day before; but there were several considerable slaveholders present, who stood off on the outskirts of the crowd. I had my apprehensions aroused as to them. However, they all either voted the Union ticket three days afterwards, or they abstained from voting, for no secession votes were cast in that region. A number of these slaveholders, however, later on, deserted the Union cause.

From Sevier county, I at once returned home, and filled in the time till election day in Knox county. In the

JOHN SEVIER.

Colonel at King's Mountain and First Governor of Tennessee.

meantime, Baxter and Trigg were speaking at their respective appointments in Knox and Roane. It would be feeble praise to say that they did splendid work. They were both able, fearless, and intensely in earnest, and they convinced and aroused wherever they spoke. In all the Union speeches made in this canvass there was an utter absence of all timidity, ambiguity, or apologizing for the advocacy of the National Government, at least this was so as far as I heard them. They were aggressive in the extreme against secession. The declarations of the speakers were accompanied with no conditions. There was a broad, universal, unqualified loyalty in every sentence. The speakers were sustained and encouraged by a patriotic public sentiment that was almost unanimous. They felt strong in this powerful support. The memory and the words of Jackson and Clay were invoked in behalf of the imperiled Union. Finally, the zeal and indignation of the people outran that of the speakers, and they became ready to take up arms. This feeling never abated. It grew stronger and more bitter until after the June election, when irresistible force compelled prudent silence. The canvas was wound up the night before the election by speaking and a torchlight procession in East Knoxville, at which Fleming and I made speeches. It had been conducted in all the other counties of East Tennessee with energy, boldness and determination. The names of those taking part in it will be given hereafter, as far as they can be ascertained.

That the Union party would gain a decided victory at the polls in East Tennessee on the 9th of February was a foregone conclusion, and yet none expected it to be as overwhelming as it proved to be. The majority for Union delegates was twenty-five thousand, five hundred and thirty-two in twenty-nine counties. In the entire state it was sixty-four thousand, nine hundred and fourteen.

It is difficult, indeed it seems impossible, to give with absolute certainty the vote in February on one branch of

the proposition submitted to the people, namely, whether or not there should be a convention. In the "Manual of Tennessee," prepared by Charles A. Miller, perhaps while he had access to the official returns as secretary of state, the vote is given on this question thus: for convention, 57,789; no convention, 69,675; majority against a convention, 11,877. These figures are adopted by Nicolay and Hay in their life of Lincoln, and yet they seem to doubt their correctness.[1] In the real test in that election—in the selection of delegates to the proposed convention—according to all accounts, the Union majority in the state was 64,114.

The result in Sevier county has no parallel in this state, and it is doubted whether there was another county in the

[1] In a note, Nicolay and Hay say: "We have taken these figures as we find them in the newspapers of that period and as they are copied into the 'Annual Cyclopædia' for that year." They then proceed to question their accuracy, and to suggest that they have been "tampered with in the counties, or erroneously announced at Nashville." They further say: "In a recent work by ex-Confederate writers ('Military Annals of Tennessee—Confederate,' published in 1886, p. 60), it is stated that 'the majority against calling a convention was nearly or quite sixty thousand.' So, also, Mr. N. A. Goodspeed, of Chicago, writing to the editors of 'The Century,' under date of May 2, 1888, says: 'In the preparation of our history ("History of Tennessee," 1887), we found it impossible to ascertain the exact majority, but we did ascertain to a certainty that it was not far from sixty thousand.'" Nicolay and Hay, Vol. IV, p. 250.

The discrepancy between the majority for Union delegates (64,114) and that against the calling of a convention (11,877) is so great as to excite remark. While it is contrary to my vague recollection, and is in conflict with the authorities just quoted, I am confident that it is nearly correct. I can see no reason for believing that the returns were tampered with or erroneously announced in Nashville. I can see no reason why the returns should have been correctly announced as to the majority for the Union delegates and erroneously as to the convention. While the Union leaders generally took decided ground against a convention, some Union men, and possibly a great many, voted for a convention. The true test of Union sentiment in that election undoubtedly was expressed in the election of delegates. I am not absolutely certain that the majority given by me against a convention is correct, but it seems to be sustained by the weight of authority. The returns in the office of the secretary of state are:

For a convention, ...	56,232
Against a convention, ...	69,389

United States where the Union would have been sustained as it was there.[1] The vote stood:

For Crawford, Union, . . .	1,302
For Temple, Union, . . .	1,301
For Paxton, Secession, . .	1
Total vote, ...	1,302

The vote against me was on personal grounds, for which I could not complain.[2]

Thus, the people of East Tennessee had gloriously stood by the Union. And yet it was a fearful thing, in 1860–61, to encounter the prejudices of the Southern people against those who allied themselves with the Republican and Abolition parties, even for the purpose of saving the Union. That was what the Union party apparently had to do. It required more than mere courage to do this; with this there had to be the most intense conviction of patriotic duty. It was easy to go with the South—to go with one's section, friends and kindred. It was hard, very hard, to turn away from these. And yet, in the face of obloquy, reproaches and hatred, these Union men stood unflinchingly for the government. It thus came to pass, as often happens in the affairs of nations, that two parties, both influenced by a sincere desire for the good of their country, but differing as to their views of duty, separated along divergent lines of action.[3]

[1] Sevier was the banner county of the state in 1840. It got the silk banner presented by the Whig ladies of Nashville for the largest Whig majority in the state in proportion to population.

[2] Some time before this in the trial of a cause I had criticized severely the evidence of the man who cast this vote, and he took this occasion to pay me back.

[3] In Knox county, where the great fight was made for the Union, the vote was:

For Baxter, ...	3,252
For Sneed, ...	237
Baxter's majority, . . .	3,015

For Trigg,	3,268
For Walker,	266
Trigg's majority,	3,002
For Temple,	3,281
For Paxton,	226
Temple's majority,	3,055

The vote in Knoxville was:

Baxter,	834
Sneed,	111
Trigg,	836
Walker,	130
Temple,	842
Paxton,	113

The vote in Roane county was nearly as strong for the Union as it was in Knox.

The "Nashville Union and American," of February, 1861, on file in the state library, at Nashville, which I recently examined, gives the following as the vote of East Tennessee, and is believed to be nearly correct:

For the Union (as expressed in the election of delegates),	33,299
For Secession,	7,767
Majority,	25,532

In Brownlow's "Knoxville Whig" it was stated after the election, without giving the vote in detail, that each of the congressional districts in East Tennessee had voted for the Union by 10,000 majority, making a total majority of 30,000. This is believed to be an error. The vote taken from the "Union and American," in favor of virtual secession, is smaller by several thousand than it was in the June following.

CHAPTER X.

SECOND CANVASS OF 1861.

A second effort made by Governor Harris in April, 1861, to detach Tennessee from the Union—Reconvenes the legislature—Emissaries of secession active—Leaders in Knoxville at work—Union leaders active and alert—Local leaders alone won the victory of February—Brave and able men—Johnson, Maynard and Nelson now join them—Grand Union meeting in Knoxville—Addressed by Baxter, Maynard, Nelson, Trigg and Temple—Character of officers and speakers—Johnson and Nelson address an immense assemblage April 27th—Threatening incident while Johnson is speaking—Desperate efforts to frighten and draw the people into secession—Splendid canvass made by Union leaders—Secession orators brought from a distance to convert the people—Johnson and Nelson make a joint canvass—Vast crowds greet them—Work of the other leaders—Great Union meeting at Strawberry Plains—Stirring incident there—Last speech of the author at Concord—Declares for the Union in preference to slavery—Johnson and Nelson close at Kingston—Eulogy on Union leaders—Vote in East Tennessee—Glorious victory—Causes of success of Union leaders—Anomalous character of Unionism in East Tennessee—No analogy to it anywhere—Its far-reaching consequences.

Before the 1st of April it had become quite evident that another terrible contest, perilous to the integrity of the government was at hand. Affairs were rapidly approaching a crisis in Charleston Harbor. In a few days the country was to be startled by the most thrilling event which had occurred in its entire history. The bold and restless governor of Tennessee was as active as before his crushing defeat in February. He was preparing for another effort to detach the state from the Union, through the legislature and the forms of a popular election, or, failing in this, to cut it loose perhaps in a summary way. He had already convened the legislature to meet a second time in extraordinary session on the 25th of April, and in a few days thereafter the state was to be severed from its federal relations, by the unconstitutional Military League

with the Confederacy. Nashville had become a hot-bed of secession. To it flocked the emissaries of the Confederacy from the seceded states, to make inflammatory speeches, and urge on the work of disrupting the government. Memphis, too, was perhaps even more thoroughly alive with a disloyal feeling and purpose than Nashville. The leaders in Knoxville, though only able to cast 130 votes for secession in February were unsubdued by their late humiliating defeat. They were again active in their efforts to reverse the popular verdict. Every senator or representative in congress, returning from Washington, who could be prevailed upon to stop for the purpose, was arrested on his journey and put forward to address our citizens in favor of disunion. The leaders in Knoxville were bold, able, unyielding. They were William H. Sneed, a former member of congress; John H. Crozier, also an ex-member of congress; William G. Swan, a former attorney-general of the state; William M. Churchwell, a former member of congress; Thomas C. Lyon, one of the ablest lawyers in the state; Campbell Wallace, president of the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad; Dr. J. G. M. Ramsey, the historian of the state, and a number of others of less prominence and ability. These were men not to be silenced by one defeat. They were already at work preparing for another struggle.

But on the other side, the Union leaders were equally active and alert. Never was there a braver or more determined set of men. All through the months of February and March, Brownlow had made the columns of his widely circulated paper red-hot with arguments and facts in favor of the Union, and with the most terrible denunciations of secession. The other leaders, all through East Tennessee, were busy making speeches, as occasion occurred, confirming and encouraging the timid or wavering, and breathing their own dauntless spirit into the minds of the people. Hitherto the battle had been fought, and the unparalleled victory of February won, by the local volunteer leaders

alone. Johnson, Nelson and Maynard were then in congress and their voices had not been heard. Their influence was not felt directly. Indeed, the first canvass was near its close before their position on the great question was generally and positively known. Many of the voters of East Tennessee did not know certainly their views until after their return from Washington in April. Johnson's position was best known, for he was the earliest in declaring his views after secession was inaugurated. Those of Nelson and Maynard might have been easily anticipated, especially those of the former, from their well known antecedents, but these were times of changes, and men of a life-long adherence to certain views, in the new aspect of public affairs, had to define their positions anew. So, nearly all the honor of the great victory of February belongs to the patriotic people and to the local leaders in the party. And it must be confessed that these leaders had conducted a canvass with but little, if any, less ability, and with no less courage, than that possessed by the eminent men then absent on public duty.

Now, however, those who had been absent had returned to their homes, and were ready to throw the weight of their great talents and influence into the scale in behalf of the Union. Nelson opened the canvass in his district in March. It is not known positively when Maynard first began making speeches, but it is certain that he spoke at a mass meeting in Knoxville on April 22d. Johnson, for some cause, lingered in Washington for several weeks after the adjournment of congress, and it was some time in April before he took the stump. In the meantime, on every suitable occasion, Baxter, Fleming, Trigg and others were making speeches.

On the 22d of April, according to previous announcement, there was a large mass meeting held in Knoxville. The crowd in attendance was an immense one, filling Main street from the court-house to the Franklin House, and as far on the right and left as people could hear. The

speaking took place from the platform of the old court-house. As this was a representative meeting, and the formal opening of the second canvass in East Tennessee, I copy the account given of it in Brownlow's "Knoxville Whig" nearly entire, as it may prove of interest to those who come hereafter to know how Union men felt and talked in April, 1861, after the great Civil War had opened:

"Meeting of the People.

"Pursuant to public notice, the real people of the ancient and loyal county of Knox met here in large numbers. A procession extending almost the length of the business portion of Gay street marched with the stars and stripes to receive the Hon. T. A. R. Nelson at the depot, and conducted him to the city. On the platform, in front of the court-house, the meeting was called to order by appointing the following gentlemen to act as officers:

John Baxter, *President.*

F. S. Heiskell,
John Williams,
James S. Boyd,
R. H. Armstrong,
Caleb H. Baker,
} *Vice-Presidents.*

William G. Brownlow, *Secretary.*

"Colonel Baxter addressed the meeting at considerable length, and was unusually clear and forcible—taking bold ground against the heresy of secession, and exposing, with a master hand, the Southern leaders in the movement and those who brought our country to the verge of ruin. His speech was well received by an immense and enthusiastic crowd of as good Union men as live.

"Colonel Temple, who is always right in his positions, and who is equally fearless and bold in avowing his sentiments, entertained the large and attentive audience with a telling speech . . . in opposition to secession. He was most enthusiastically cheered, showing that the hearts of the people were with him. . . .

"Hon. Thos. A. R. Nelson was then introduced, and for an hour and a half riveted the attention of all parties, making a speech which, for eloquence, candor, patriotism and popular effect, excelled any effort we have ever heard him make. He declared his unalterable attachment to the Union—denied the right of secession—exposed the whole plot of the secessionists on the part of the Cotton States—repudiated the slavery agitation of the North—and boldly asserted that while he regretted the war now raging, he maintained that Lincoln's call for volunteers was lawful and constitutional, and that under the circumstances, with his oath of office resting on him, he could not have done less than call out the militia. He was no Lincoln man—adhorred the doctrines of the sectional party he was at the head of—did not approve his policy—but believed that a purpose existed on the part of the Southern disunionists to march upon the capitol, and that it was the sworn duty of the president to meet the issue as he was doing.

"The Hon. H. Maynard next addressed the crowd in a speech of one hour and a quarter. He spoke with more ability and force than we have ever heard him. He denied the right of secession—exposed the duplicity and tyranny of the disunionists, the complicity of Floyd in the work of breaking up the government, the neglect of duty by Buchanan—declared his unalterable attachment to the Union. . . .

"Colonel Trigg concluded the speaking in one of those bold, manly and straight-out speeches for the Union, and in opposition to the whole scheme of disunion, which he is accustomed to make on all occasions. . . .

". . . This meeting was a decided success, and made a deep, lasting and profound impression. The meeting adjourned to meet again on Saturday of this week, when the meeting will be addressed by Governor Johnson and Mr. Nelson."

As this was one of the largest and one of the most fairly representative meetings of the canvass, some reference to the men who took part in it may be appropriate.

They were men of the first standing and prominence, socially, morally and pecuniarily in East Tennessee or in the state. It is a significant fact that the president, all of the vice-presidents and all of the speakers were slaveholders, two of them being among the largest in the county.

On the 27th of April, Senator Johnson and Mr. Nelson addressed a very large meeting in this same city. In consideration of the distinguished character of these persons, I here copy nearly in full the report of the meeting from "Brownlow's Whig":

"Two Noble Speeches.

"We had two noble—and we are not mistaken when we say telling—speeches here, on Saturday, from Governor Johnson and Hon. T. A. R. Nelson. . . .

"There was an immense crowd in town and many persons were present from other counties. At ten o'clock the meeting was called to order by Colonel Baxter, and Governor Johnson was introduced to the audience from a stand erected on Gay street, in front of Morrow's bank, and spoke for more than two hours with great effect. He came out manfully on the side of his country—in favor of the enforcement of the laws, and the preservation of the Union, at whatever cost. He held up the movers and originators of secession to merited scorn and contempt. He traced their treason back to the days of South Carolina Nullification—quoted from General Jackson on them—argued the question of secession—and in a word, delivered arguments at once unanswerable and convincing on the part of the people. His speech was received with great applause and highly commended by men of talent, who have never heretofore agreed with the governor in sentiment. . . . In a spirit of fraternal feeling, he re-

ferred to the past political conflicts that had engendered heartburns and acrimonious feelings, during which Democrats had said things hateful to the Whigs, and Whigs had alike wounded the feelings of Democrats; but now that our beloved country was imperiled, he counseled the exercise of a forgiving spirit—the blotting out of all past differences. Turning to Mr. Nelson, who had arrived after he commenced speaking on the down train, he passed a just and handsome compliment upon him, and stated that while they battled against each other for years, in a courteous and honorable warfare, they were now shoulder to shoulder in battling for our common country.

"Mr. Nelson followed in a speech not half so long, as he had spoken at length the Monday before, but in one of marked ability, patriotic and eloquent, and it was received with frequent bursts of applause. . . ."

While Mr. Johnson was in the midst of his speech an incident happened, which for a while threatened to become a very serious and bloody one. A brass band, which had come up with two companies of Confederate soldiers from Monroe county, began to play upon Gay street on which the platform was erected, at just such a distance as to interrupt the speaker and the crowd. Soon thereafter the two military companies, with drums and secession flags flying, started toward the Union meeting. A bloody collision seemed inevitable, for many of both parties were armed. The speaking ceased for the time, and the Union mass stood in expectation of a deadly conflict. It was cool and determined. Johnson was always so in the midst of danger. It was evident that the purpose was to break up the meeting, and probably wreak vengeance on Johnson and others. The Union men were determined that these things should not take place. When the Confederate procession, which was plainly visible to the meeting, had arrived within perhaps one hundred yards of the stand, and was still marching forward, two Confederate gentlemen, Colonel David H. Cummings and Mr. Joseph A. Mabry,

seeing the consequences, and disapproving of such conduct, interfered, silenced the band, and by their timely and determined exertions and influence kept the procession from marching any further. Thus a conflict, which would certainly have resulted in the death and wounding of many persons on both sides, was averted, for the Union men were determined not to yield. Too much praise can not be given to Colonel Cummings, who was a brave and manly soldier, and to Mr. Mabry, who was a man of high courage, for their honorable and noble conduct on this perilous occasion.

The speaking went on after the danger was passed. To those of us who were present it looked at one time as if a conflict could not be avoided.

From this time the canvass in East Tennessee went on vigorously and incessantly. Indeed, for some time previously, it had been actively prosecuted in Knox county, and to some extent in adjoining counties, by the home leaders. They entered the field flushed with the splendid victory of February, cheered and encouraged by the enthusiastic and invincible spirit manifested by the Union party. They knew the people of East Tennessee were with them, and they were determined to hold this section firm and steadfast, whatever might be the result in other parts of the state. Secession had once more, under the impulse imparted to it by the firing on Fort Sumter, and other rapidly succeeding events, become bold, arrogant and aggressive. These things did not in the least daunt nor arrest this brave, patriotic people. They became even bolder and more embittered than they had been in January and February. Many of them began to arm themselves as best they could. In some counties, notably in Roane and Blount, companies of "home guards" were organized and drilled. In Knox it was hard to restrain the infuriated Union men from acts of violence against the disunionists. More than once the leaders had to restrain them from marching into Knoxville in a body, and as they

called it, "clearing out the secessionists in the town." Of course, the leaders could give no countenance to violence. All through the month of May and up to the 8th of June, Johnson and Nelson went through East Tennessee filling joint appointments and speaking to vast crowds of people with wonderful power and effect. While this was going on, Maynard, Trigg, Baxter, Fleming and Temple were equally as busy in Knox and in the adjoining counties. Many other persons, in their respective counties, were also at this time, by speeches and otherwise, engaged in rallying and holding the people firm in their faith.

It would be a great mistake to imagine that the Union leaders had an easy time in keeping the people firm. Desperate efforts were made to frighten them from their devoted allegiance to the government of their fathers. Appeals were made to them to stand by their Southern friends in defense of their liberties. Every base epithet that could be thought of was applied to the Northern people. The newspapers teemed with telegrams, sometimes false, and nearly always exaggerated, intended to fire the Southern heart. The East Tennessee Railroad, from Georgia to Virginia, running through our principal towns, became almost a continuous flame of secession fire. On these trains were always to be found the noisy leaders, who, forsaking all business, went from town to town stirring up the people. The arrival of a train in a village, or town generally containing Confederate soldiers, was the signal for the outpouring of all the disloyal people shouting and cheering for Jefferson Davis and for the Confederacy, and for groans and hisses for Lincoln and his "hirelings." The harangues made on such occasions were wild and extravagant in the extreme, always predicting a grand triumph of Confederate arms, and sometimes telling how Confederate soldiers would soon quaff champagne in the guilded halls of New York. The result of all this was that the towns all along the railway line, except Knoxville, became disloyal in sentiment. Union men soon learned to stay away from

the stations. To a casual observer it seemed as if all the people had forsaken the Union.

To increase the zeal of the Confederates and swell their ranks, the women soon began to appear as a powerful factor in this contest. With the first sight of a uniformed soldier, and the sound of the first tap of the drum, or note of the fife, they enthusiastically espoused the Southern cause. The young ladies were first in manifesting this feeling; then followed the mothers, then the brothers and lovers, and finally the father had to yield. Thus was many a head of a family and devoted friend of the Union led to join the Southern cause. The father was generally the last to yield. The zeal and the enthusiasm of these ladies were intense. Base and craven, indeed, was the young man, in their estimation, often expressed in words, who did not promptly enlist in the army and prepare for battle. With the all-powerful influence of the women on the side of secession, few were the young men in our towns who did not take up arms in its behalf.

Realizing the necessity of converting the Union men of East Tennessee, the leaders in the other divisions of the state sent eminent orators to East Tennessee to make speeches. Gustavus A. Henry, who had always been a favorite, came for this purpose. He had been the Whig candidate for governor in 1853, against Andrew Johnson. He was a genial, noble fellow, of most pleasing address and splendid person, with a glowing, thrilling eloquence that always delighted his hearers.

Ex-Governor Henry S. Foote also came, and canvassed East Tennessee. He made very mild and gentlemanly speeches, but they had no effect whatever. John F. House also came over. He had been on the Bell-Everett ticket as elector the year before, and was distinguished as a strong debater. Since the war he has served several terms in congress, and made a high reputation as a man of talents.

Colonel Moses White, a former citizen of Knoxville, and a representative in the legislature for two sessions from

Knox county, came from Memphis to try his influence on his old friends. He was a man of honor and standing, and regarded as one of ability and great promise. A. W. Sales was also sent from Memphis.

None of these men produced the slightest effect on the minds of the Union men, and they soon returned to their homes, no doubt mortified and chagrined at the utter barrenness of their work. Greater men than they dwelt among us, and had before their coming aroused the people to the danger which threatened their country.

There was not at that time a county in East Tennessee, perhaps, in which there was not made daily one or more Union speeches. Profoundly impressed with the magnitude and peril of the crisis, men who never had spoken before, unable to keep silent, took the stump, and pleaded earnestly and feelingly for the Union. Men almost universally forsook their business to attend political meetings. Passion ran high. On both sides there was ill-humor. An accident might have produced a serious conflict at any time. It must be confessed that the speeches made by the Union orators were not calculated to allay this feeling. They were bold, bitter, and denunciatory in the extreme. The speakers sincerely counseled peace on all occasions, and yet their speeches were calculated to lead to conflicts. Indeed, they often had to use all their influence to keep down violence. They were perfectly sincere in desiring to preserve peace, for they had sense enough to know that no one could see where this terrible contest was to end.

In the month of May, Johnson and Nelson, who had been speaking separately, commenced a joint canvass in East Tennessee. Vast crowds attended their appointments. Aside from the reputation of the speakers, the people everywhere were wild with excitement and anxiety. Many had never heard either of them speak, and all were eager to hear them in this grave crisis. And never before did these distinguished men display such power on the stump. Great occasions call forth the exercise of great powers.

Here, in our own midst, was a life-and-death struggle taking place, with strong and undaunted men engaged in it, striving to save the state and preserve the government. The issue was a mighty one. These men felt the solemnity and the importance of the contest. They put forth powers equal to the great occasion. I doubt if, at that time, in all the states, such speeches from day to day were anywhere heard. Johnson's speeches were the more argumentative and convincing; Nelson's more eloquent and stirring. Both were bitter, daring and denunciatory. No danger could appall these men. Often they were threatened and in real danger. In such emergencies their courage and coolness only became the more conspicuous. In Sullivan county, an old democratic county, one of the few secession strongholds in East Tennessee, the danger of a conflict was so great that their friends petitioned them not to attend their appointment. They yielded to this request, when threats would have been in vain. At Concord, Johnson was notified by the secessionists not to attend in peril of his life. When Mr. Nelson spoke there, after the speaking an attempt was made to intimidate him, but he turned on his assailants in such a storm of haughty defiance that they fled from his terrible presence.[1]

While Johnson and Nelson were thus engaged, the other leaders all over East Tennessee were actively at work. I take the following from the "Knoxville Whig" of May 25, 1861, as a specimen of the activity which prevailed in Union circles:

"Last Saturday's Work.

"Saturday last was a great day in portions of East Tennessee. Baxter and Johnson addressed a mass meeting in Greeneville of between four and five thousand—the procession extending *three-fourths of a mile*, four deep. The

[1] The late lamented John F. Pate, a decided Southern man, was my authority for this statement.

right spirit prevailed and the cause of secession is losing ground in Greene.

"On the same day, Col. Temple addressed an enthusiastic crowd of *fifteen hundred persons* at Thorn Grove, in the corners of Knox, Sevier and Jefferson counties. He spoke two hours, and some who had acted with the secessionists in February were in the procession.

"On the same day, Mr. Maynard spoke to a glorious crowd of five to seven hundred, for two hours and a half, at Ellejoy, Blount county. The right spirit prevailed there, and curses loud and bitter were heaped upon the unconstitutional and corrupt acts of the legislature.

"On the same day, Col. Trigg spoke three hours to an enthusiastic crowd at Whortleberry Camp Ground, where the people too are incensed at the action of a corrupt legislature.

"On the same day, Mr. Fleming spoke to a crowd of true men at Ball Camp, in this county, and it told on the tyrannical conduct of Harris and his Rump legislature. . . . East Tennessee is good for a majority of twenty thousand against the heresy of secession."

On the 28th of April, the following dispatch was sent to the representatives of Knox county in the legislature:

"KNOXVILLE, *April* 28, 1861.

TO MESSRS. J. S. BOYD, JOHN WILLIAMS AND R. H. ARMSTRONG:

By firmness and deliberation the state may be saved. With reasonable time for a canvass, East Tennessee will give twenty thousand majority against secession.

(Signed,) ANDREW JOHNSON,
T. A. R. NELSON,
HORACE MAYNARD,
C. F. TRIGG,
O. P. TEMPLE."[1]

[1] The majority was 19,151. The result I give makes a larger majority than the official figures, or at least than the figures usually show. But in

On the 5th of May, a mass meeting was called to be held at Strawberry Plains, in Jefferson county, near the corner of Knox, Sevier, and Jefferson, fifteen miles east of Knoxville. A large crowd of several thousand persons attended. A horseback procession of from 800 to 1,200 men, four deep, marched from the depot, with banners flying, to a grove a quarter of a mile away, where the speaking took place. At the station there was a train of cars standing, having on board some Alabama Confederate soldiers. The train remained there about three hours. I quote here from the "Knoxville Whig" an account of what occurred:

"After our procession had passed into the gap of Mr. Meek's inclosure, leading into his grove, where the stand and seats were erected, and where a much larger assemblage, among whom were several hundred ladies and children, were seated, awaiting the arrival of the procession, at the head of which were Messrs. Maynard, Temple and Fleming, who were to address the meeting, the train started towards us at a very slow rate. Speaking had not yet commenced, though Col. Thornburgh was up making some preliminary remarks, as the remnant of the vast crowd was coming in and crowding around the stand. At the suggestion of Mr. Meek, an old man, who had served in the War of 1812, and who owned the premises, the few scattering persons still at the (fence) gap were urged to come in, and did so, quietly, disturbing no one. But here we will let Mr. Meek tell the tale just as it occurred:

"STATEMENT.

"At the request of Mr. Brownlow and other gentlemen, I walked from the stand down to the railroad, to hurry up our Union men, and to urge them not to say or do any-

them the vote of Union county is omitted, which was 1,100 for the Union and 92 for secession, making the majority as I state it. Another account makes the majority 19,251. These are the official figures. The majority is less by 815 votes than it appeared to be by the returns as published in some of the public prints at the time.

thing to the train then slowly coming by. Our men came within the inclosure quietly and I was about twenty feet from the fence, inside of my field, the railroad and wagon road passing along close to the fence. There were two men in uniform on top of one of the cars, each had a revolver in his hand, and one of them had a stone which he threw at me with great force and precision, and I barely dodged it. This was followed by one of them deliberately firing at me. One of them knew me, for he had previously come to my house, and asked for water to fill his canteen, which I assisted him in filling, treating him as politely as I knew how. This was the commencement of the firing and it was without any provocation whatever.

[Signed.] A. K. Meek, Sr.

"The correctness of this statement was attested by fourteen other reputable gentlemen who were present at the commencement of the difficulty."

No sooner were the first shots fired, than they became the signal for the opening of a general fire from both sides. Bullets whistled around the stand in considerable numbers, near which I was at the time, fired by both those in and on the train. Such of the Union men as had pistols, and the few who happened to have guns, returned the fire The train consisted of box cars, and therefore the great body of soldiers was not exposed. The Union men continued to fire until the train was away beyond reach of small arms. The soldiers also continued their fire on the assemblage until they passed out of range.

The "Whig" further states:

"The bullets actually whistled over the heads of our crowd around the stand, cutting off leaves and sprigs, to the consternation of the ladies and men.

"But a wild and terrific scene occurred instantly by the rush of one thousand men, insulted and infuriated, upon the track, with threats to tear up the track and to burn the

bridge over the Holston. Colonel Thornburgh, Temple and Dr. Mynatt, Mr. Meek himself and the editor of this paper, all repaired to the track, made short appeals to the crowd, and implored them not to disturb the road. With difficulty they were quieted."

The following resolution was offered by Mr. Montgomery Thornburgh and adopted by the meeting:

"We, a large portion of the people of the counties of Jefferson, Knox and Sevier (men, women and children), who have assembled to-day at Strawberry Plains, to the number of from 3000 to 5000, to consult together for our common good, having been wantonly and without provocation, assaulted during our peaceful deliberations, by a missile thrown and shots fired from the train of cars in very slow motion, by certain troops in the service of the so-called Confederate States, do hereby *unanimously* declare to the world, that while we ever have been and still are ready to comply with every constitutional obligation of the citizen, we can never be *driven* or *coerced*, into abject or unmanly submission, and we hereby pledge to each other our lives, our property and our sacred honor, in the common defense of ourselves, our firesides, our wives and children from any assault, no matter from what quarter it may come."

One of the strange things about this collision between soldiers and citizens was, that no one was injured, so far as I could ever ascertain. The bullets from the train seemed to range over the heads of the crowd. There must have been two or three thousand persons present, for the most part gathered in a mass, ready for the speaking. The distance to the railway did not exceed one hundred yards, and possibly not more than seventy-five. Many shots were unquestionably fired on both sides, and yet not one of that great crowd was hit. It was reported at the time and afterwards, too, that one or more soldiers were wounded or killed, but there never was any confirmation of the report. Whether the soldiers were fully armed or not, is not known.

Probably not, for if they had been, they would have stopped the train, and dispersed our crowd, as they could have done easily. A number of them were unquestionably armed, for they fired quite a little volley, and kept it up until the train passed out of range.

The coolness and courage displayed by the Union men, when fired upon, showed the spirit which animated them, and that they stood ready to fight for their country. It also gave evidence of that dauntless spirit which enabled them to endure, steadfastly and heroically, the trials and hardships which were soon to follow. Neither then, nor at any subsequent time, did they turn back in the day of battle.

Mr. A. K. Meek, who made the statement as to the origin of the difficulty, was an old man of high character and standing. He had Revolutionary blood in his veins, and was a slaveholder and a man of property. He lived until August, 1890, being then ninety-two years of age, leaving a good record behind him.

It need hardly be said that the speeches made on that occasion were pitched on a pretty high key of defiance.

My last speech during this ever-to-be-remembered campaign was made at Concord, fourteen miles west of Knoxville, on the East Tennessee Railroad, on the day before the election. This was in the best and wealthiest part of the county. The lands in that neighborhood and for miles away were rich and productive. There were many considerable slaveholders and independent gentlemen in that neighborhood. Nearly every one of them had espoused the Southern cause after the firing on Fort Sumter. Still, the majority of the people had not gone with them. I had many warm friends among the slaveholders, and possibly this was the reason I was sent there. I felt that it was a dangerous place at which to make a Union speech at that late day, for it was at this place that Mr. Nelson came near being mobbed a short time before. I believed, however, that I had friends among the leading secessionists

whom I knew to be honorable men, and who would protect me from harm if it should become necessary. At one time it seemed that I was to have trouble. There was a very violent and dangerous man in the crowd who had killed his man. He was a rabid secessionist. He took his seat not far from me. I think some one whispered to me to keep my eyes on him. As I progressed in my speech and presented fact after fact bearing hard on the secession cause, he became restless and interrupted me. It was expected in the crowd that he would draw a pistol and begin shooting. But a very powerful and active blacksmith, who was a Union man and a friend of mine, anticipating that this man would create a difficulty, had quietly gotten near him, a little in his front, and sat there watching him with eagle eyes, ready to spring on him at the first demonstration. I felt perfectly safe as soon as I saw my powerful blacksmith ready for action. So it fell out that nothing happened.

My speech on this occasion was unusually calm and considerate. I was speaking to my old personal and political friends. It was not the time nor the place for the indulgence of rhetoric or hard words, but for argument and facts. I took the ground that there was no adequate or justifiable cause for secession. Then I argued that secession would fail, and showed by facts and figures that the government had the ability to put down secession, and the will to do so, and that it would be done. I told the crowd in plain terms that the seceding states "would be whipped back into the Union." Then I discussed the slavery question. I argued that it was then in no possible danger; that, with the guaranties of the constitution, it was absolutely safe; that its highest safety was in the Union under the constitution, and that, whenever slaveholders abandoned that stronghold, the institution would be destroyed. I insisted that, as a Union man, I was a better friend of slavery than the secessionists. But I also said that, if we had to choose between the government on the one side with-

out slavery, and a broken dissevered government with slavery, I would say, unhesitatingly, "Let slavery perish and the Union survive."

The crowd seemed almost startled at these bold words, but preserved its composure. No such words had ever perhaps been heard there before, and, indeed, publicly anywhere in the South. If I had not been known to be a slaveholder myself, a native Tennessean, and had not been among friends, I might have been in danger.

Thus, I had made my last speech, had entered my last protest against the folly of secession. My last was the calmest, the most dispassionate, and at the same time, the boldest of all I had made. I had now been in the field, speaking on this great issue, Union or disunion, almost constantly since early in August the year before—a period of eight months. Having been the elector in this district in the canvass of 1860, I naturally had to bear the brunt of that battle. And so it came about, a month after it closed, that when the new campaign opened up, with increased passion and excitement, I was again, by reason of recent leadership, as well as by other circumstances, forced to assume a prominent part in the new struggle, which began then and lasted till June 8th. Feeling in my heart the solemnity of the crisis, as I think few felt it, I labored with an earnestness such as I had never experienced before.

On the same day that I made my closing speech, Johnson and Nelson spoke at Kingston, forty miles west of Knoxville. They had been all through the mountain counties east of Cumberland. The night of the day they closed their brilliant canvass, Senator Johnson came in a buggy with John B. Brownlow, son of W. G. Brownlow, to Knoxville, traveling by night.[1] The next day he left in

[1] Mr. Brownlow heard in some way that there was a plot on foot to have a regiment of Confederate soldiers on the train which Mr. Johnson would take at Loudon, on his way home from Kingston, and that he was to be assassinated by them. He and Johnson had not then spoken for nearly

a private conveyance for his home in Greeneville, crossing the river at this point, and going through Sevier and Cocke counties, to avoid all danger of being intercepted and killed on the way. It would have been dangerous in the extreme for him to travel on the train at that time. By what way Mr. Nelson returned to his home in Jonesborough I know not. But he was not in the same danger as Mr. Johnson.

Thus closed the most remarkable canvass that ever occurred in the United States. The fame and great ability of a part of the speakers and actors, and the but little less ability of several others, unknown to fame, would of themselves under any ordinary circumstances, have marked this canvass as one of great interest. But when we add to this the momentous and overshadowing issue involved, nothing less than the integrity and perpetuity of the Union, and consider that all the mad passions of civil war had broken loose—brother against brother and neighbor against neighbor—swaying men as the tempest sways the forest, we can imagine how these facts would call into action the highest faculties of the speakers, and make them give forth utterances equal to those of any age or country. The very dangers, both personal and political, which encompassed them, heightened and intensified the exaltation and power of their minds. No wonder, then, that the sturdy Union patriots of East Tennessee were stirred as the sea is stirred by the storm. No wonder that with such a fiery baptism of patriotism, no power could ever move them from their enthusiastic and steadfast love of the old flag.

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twenty years. He accordingly, when he heard the news, sent his son in a buggy forty miles to Kingston, to bring Mr. Johnson to Knoxville, over the old stage road, instead of the railroad. Johnson protested, saying that he was a stockholder in the railroad, and that all the Confederates in the South should not prevent him from traveling along the common highway, which in part belonged to him. However, after being reasoned with against the folly of his course, he was induced to come to Knoxville in the buggy. They traveled all night. I doubt whether there was any deliberate purpose of the kind, though Mr. Brownlow believed there was.

On the morrow after the close of the canvass, *thirty-four thousand and twenty-three* of the Union men of East Tennessee, with no fear, no hesitation, went to the polls and cast their ballots in favor of the government of their fathers. *Fourteen thousand eight hundred and seventy-two* men, equally as sincere and earnest, voted for a new flag and a new government. Thus East Tennessee, a second time, vindicated her claim to the gratitude of all lovers of the Union. Knox county led with the largest Union majority, Scott with the smallest vote (19) in proportion to population for secession, beating Sevier, the Union banner county in February, 1861, by a mere fraction.[1]

[1] The detailed vote of the several counties was as follows:

	No Separation.	Separation.
Anderson,	1,278	97
Bledsoe,	500	197
Blount,	1,766	414
Bradley,	1,382	507
Campbell,	1,094	60
Carter,	1,343	86
Cocke,	1,185	518
Claiborne,	1,243	250
Grainger,	1,756	495
Greene,	2,691	744
Hamilton,	1,260	854
Hawkins,	1,260	845
Hancock,	630	279
Johnson,	788	111
Jefferson,	1,987	603
Knox,	3,196	752
Monroe,	774	1,096
Morgan,	630	38
Marion,	600	414
McMinn,	1,148	904
Meigs,	267	481
Polk,	317	738
Rhea,	202	360
Roane,	1,568	454
Scott,	521	19
Sequatchie,	100	153
Sevier,	1,528	60
Sullivan,	627	1,586
Washington,	1,445	1,022
Union,	1,100	92

The majority in the state in favor of separation was 57,675. In February, the same people had voted against secession by about 64,000 majority. Thus the revolution had swept forward in its course.

The remarkable success of the Union leaders in East Tennessee, in the canvasses of 1860 and 1861, was mainly due to two causes: First, they entered the field in opposition to secession on the first manifestation of that movement, and never retired as long as there was a ray of hope. They took the start of their enemies in appealing to the popular mind. Second, they "fired the hearts" of the people in favor of the Union, as Mr. Yancy had urged should be done with the Southern people in favor of secession.

From December till the 9th of June, there was little cessation in the active and earnest work done in trying to preserve the government. During this time, there were either five or six great Union meetings held in Knoxville, the central point in East Tennessee. In consequence thereof, the Union men held that town firmly, and its influence was all the time kept in the right direction. But the reliance of the leaders from the beginning was on the country and the country people. Every effort was made by speaking and otherwise to hold these people firm and united. They were kept at a fever heat of enthusiasm. Secession was denounced most unsparingly. Speakers went into nearly every neighborhood to arouse and consolidate the people. Outside of the towns and railroad lines, with the exception of two or three counties, the country became almost a unit, a solid compact body, in favor of the Union. A public sentiment was molded and shaped in behalf of the Union, which ultimately became as overpowering and as terrible to the disunionists as was the sentiment further South in an opposite direction.

At last the country people became so enraged that it was dangerous for secessionists to attempt to make speeches, except in the towns and in two or three counties.

Nearly everywhere the latter apprehended danger, and would in fact have been in danger of personal violence in many places if they had dared to attempt to advocate a dissolution of the Union. Secessionists often complained that the inflammatory addresses of the Union orators were calculated to endanger their personal safety. But the Union leaders believed then, and knew afterwards, that their own safety and the safety of their party and principles depended upon a bold and aggressive canvass. They saw, if they yielded to timidity, or to any sickly sentiment of generosity, that they, in turn, would be overwhelmed and probably driven out of the country. So it was in fact a life or death struggle in which they were engaged. Each side was striving for supremacy. Each where it had the ascendancy was arrogant. Later on, in the canvass, Mr. Johnson was notified from three points, Blountville, Rogersville and Concord, that it would not be safe for him to speak at these places.

The history of Unionism in East Tennessee is altogether marvelous. It has no analogy anywhere in the country. The States of Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri furnish no parallel. None of those states actually seceded from the Union. All would have done so, possibly excepting Kentucky, but for the restraining influence of the presence of federal armies. It is questionable whether Maryland and Missouri were ever loyal to the Union. A majority of the people of Kentucky were loyal in 1861, but everything since that time indicates that a great change in that respect took place as the war progressed. The intense spirit of chivalry existing among her people naturally and irresistibly drew a large part of them, and especially the wealthy young men, toward the South. The example of John C. Breckenridge, George B. Crittenden, John Morgan and General Simon B. Buckner, all of whom were themselves comparatively young, aroused the wildest enthusiasm among these young men in favor of the South. They fled South in vast numbers to join the Confederate

army. Kentucky became a vast recruiting ground for the armies of the South, and, like Missouri and Maryland, was only kept in the Union by the presence of Union armies.

West Virginia seems at first to furnish nearly a parallel to East Tennessee. But closer scrutiny reveals marked differences. From the beginning of the war, her loyal people were protected and encouraged in their devotion to the Union by the presence of federal soldiers. Northern people may not be able to realize the full import of this fact, but the Union people of East Tennessee, who dwelt for nearly thirty months, and some of them for nearly four years, under the Southern Confederacy, can understand its significance. How loyal and true to the Union a majority of the people of West Virginia were during the war can perhaps never be fully known, since there was during all that time a federal force there sufficient to suppress any uprising in favor of the South, if any such disposition in that direction had existed.

Look at the contrast: East Tennessee was situated almost in the heart of the South. It was surrounded on all sides, except by Kentucky on the north, by secession states. It was practically cut off from Kentucky by a wide mountain wilderness. The people of East Tennessee therefore had but little sympathy from their neighbors in their brave and noble struggle for the Union. After April, 1861, the loyal element in adjoining states, except as above indicated, seemed to disappear. There was no moral support left for our struggling people. They were left alone to fight their own great battle. If they had imitated the example of their neighbors, they would have yielded. But they did no such thing. In this dark hour, encompassed with appalling dangers, threatened, denounced and watched, neither the leaders nor the masses of the people faltered in their high purpose. After Tennessee voted for separation, in June, they remained for months as defiant and as unsubmissive, though quiet, as before the

election. And here is the striking contrast. In Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, which states enjoy the honor of not having seceded from the Union, it required the constant presence of federal armies to restrain the disloyal people from rising in behalf of the Southern Confederacy. On the contrary, in East Tennessee, a Confederate army was necessary to keep the Union men from rising in behalf of the national government. Even after all open opposition had been crushed out, and everything had become as still as the chamber of death, the dread of that great, determined Union element, which had been so sublimely evoked by danger and by revolution, still haunted the minds of the Confederate leaders. This fact induced them to retain Confederate soldiers all over East Tennessee, to keep in subjection the few unarmed Union men who had not fled to the Union army in Kentucky. No parallel, no analogy even to this can be found anywhere in our history.

Now consider the consequences following this unexampled display of constancy and patriotism. It put thirty-five thousand Union soldiers from East Tennessee into the federal army.[1] In battle, these thirty-five thousand were equal to the same number of Confederate soldiers. Suppose these men had gone into the Confederate army; then it would have made a difference in favor of the Confederacy of seventy thousand men. But this is not all. It took from five to ten thousand Confederate soldiers to watch and keep the Union men of East Tennessee quiet.

[1] Thirty-one thousand is the number that entered East Tennessee regiments. But there were a great many who joined commands from other states. They joined the first command they came to in their flight. Mr. William R. Carter, who served with the First Tennessee Cavalry (Col. James P. Brownlow), and who is the historian of his regiment, estimates the number of those who thus joined other commands at four thousand, thus giving thirty-five thousand as the correct number which should go to the credit of "East Tennessee." Brevet Brigadier-General James P. Brownlow estimates the number at seven thousand.

Whether the regiments of Colonel W. B. Stokes, Colonel Isaac Hawkins and Colonel Fielding Hurst are included in this estimate, or are independent of it, I am unable to say; but I presume they are included.

This force would have swelled the number above given to seventy-five thousand or more in favor of the Confederacy had East Tennessee joined the South. The direct and positive influence of these thirty-five thousand men in deciding battles may not be accurately estimated. But it is morally certain that it was important. How many skirmishes, how many battles and enterprises, were decided by the presence of these soldiers, no one can tell. But as one element in all battles and campaigns is the weight of the columns engaged, it follows that the soldiers from East Tennessee counted as much in all these enterprises as any other like number of men. In valor they were certainly equal to any other soldiers on the field, either from the North or the South.

The moral consequences flowing from the stand taken by the Union men of East Tennessee were scarcely less important than the material advantages. Moral support, more than physical, was needed by Union men in the North in 1861. Who can ever know or estimate how much the heavy heart of Mr. Lincoln was cheered, amid his many discouragements in those days of gloom, by the knowledge that away down in the South there were thirty-five thousand men, in one compact body, who defiantly refused to join the Confederacy. The courage and fidelity displayed by these people also served to revive and strengthen the national heart, and to give hope to the friends of national unity. It touched men's hearts with a higher and purer love of country, with a keener sense of patriotism. All over the North, it was encouraging to those who were faithfully struggling to save the Union to know that they had in the South brave and determined friends, who were engaged in the same patriotic work with themselves. Men to fill the armies were abundant in the North, but a brave, high, national spirit, sufficiently strong to paralyze opposition at home, was everywhere needed. This the brave Union men of East Tennessee gave by a heroic constancy and a sublime fortitude seldom surpassed in the history of patriotic achievement.

CHAPTER XI.

TENNESSEE ORDINANCE OF SECESSION.

Governor Harris, in message to the legislature, recommends a formal declaration of the independence of Tennessee and passage of an ordinance of secession—Disregard of constitution of state—Passage of ordinance—An army of 55,000 provided for—Military league with Confederate States—Army and military resources turned over to the Confederacy—Competency of legislature to pass these acts denied—Revolution, and not peaceable constitutional secession—Did the Union men commit an error in February in voting against a convention?—Governor Harris—Andrew Jackson, Sam Houston, John Bell, Andrew Johnson, and other great men—Address of Union leaders of Middle Tennessee, April 18, 1861, a surrender—Union masses follow their leaders into secession—Vote in senate and house on ordinance of secession—Names given.

Notwithstanding the crushing condemnation of disunion by the people of the state, in the February election, Governor Harris was not discouraged. He determined to make another effort to ally the state to the fortunes of the Confederate government. Accordingly, in April, as we have seen, he issued another proclamation, convening the legislature the second time in extra session, on the 25th of April, 1861.. His message submitted to the legislature on that day breathed the same fiery spirit which pervaded the first one. He now took bold ground in favor of the adoption of an ordinance "formally declaring the independence of the State of Tennessee of the Federal Union, renouncing its authority, and reassuming each and every function belonging to a separate sovereignty," the ordinance to be submitted to the people at the ballot box, to be by them adopted or rejected. He also recommended that an ordinance be also passed having in view the admission of the state as a member of the Southern Confederacy, and that this ordinance also should be submitted to a vote of the

people for their adoption or rejection. At the first extra session the governor had recommended that the question as to the secession of the state should be referred to a convention of delegates to be elected by the people. The people were to vote on the question of "Convention" or "No Convention," at the same time that they elected delegates. Now he proposed a shorter course. He asked a legislature, the members of which were elected nearly two years previously, before the question of secession had come before the people, and who were clothed with no authority to alter or amend the constitution, except the right to propose amendments as therein provided, to proceed at once to exercise an act of the highest sovereignty, overthrowing, so far as Tennessee was concerned, the Constitution of the United States. This was revolution. The fact that its action might be, or was afterwards, ratified by the people at the ballot box, gave no sanctity, no validity, to this action of the legislature. Nothing but a convention, called in a constitutional way, could alter or amend the constitution in this short way, much less dissolve the relation of the state to the United States. No convention, however called or inaugurated, had the power, according to the theory of Union men, to do the last act. But the time had arrived when no questionable constitutional provisions were to stand in the way of the revolutionary schemes of Governor Harris. And yet, in the very act of advising the overthrow of our state and federal constitutions, he coolly urged the legislature "to forget past differences and whatever may tend in the least to distract your counsel in the present momentous crisis, in which we have been involved by the unprovoked and tyrannical usurpation of a people who, forgetting the lessons of their fathers, have overthrown the finest government upon earth, in the mere wantonness of an unnatural sectional prejudice amounting to sectional hate, and a disregard of those great principles of justice and equality upon which the federal union was based."

The legislature proved to be ready to carry out the views of the governor, except a small minority of brave men, mostly from East Tennessee. The ordinance of secession proposed provided for an election on the 8th of June, at which time "the declaration of independence" and the ordinance "dissolving the relations between the state and the United States," were to be submitted to the people for approval or rejection. At the same time they were to vote on another ordinance, adopting and ratifying the constitution of the provisional government of the Confederate States of America.

Governor Harris scarcely attempted to conceal his disregard of the constitution of the state. He openly advised such a course. Hear him in his message to the legislature:

"Under existing circumstances I can see no propriety for incumbering the people of the state with the election of delegates (to a convention) to do that which it is in my power to enable them to do directly for themselves." In another place he said that the passage of an ordinance of secession could not be "regarded other than as a question of detail, inasmuch as a very large majority of the people regard themselves as being forever absolved from all allegiance" to the old government.

Here was a proposition to change the constitution of Tennessee in reference to a matter of the highest importance that could possibly engage the attention of the people; that is, dissolving their relations with the federal government. It was the exercise of an act of supreme sovereignty as far as that lay in the hands of the people. It is universally admitted that no mere legislative act can change the constitution. This can be done in Tennessee, in only two ways: one is by passing an act submitting the question to the voters of the state whether or not they will have a convention to change the constitution, as was done in February, 1861. The other is, by one legislature proposing certain specific amendments, which must be adopted

by two-thirds of the members of the next succeeding legislature, and approved by a majority of the voters of the state in the next regular election. If thus adopted, the proposed amendments become a part of the constitution.

It will be seen that Governor Harris and the legislature were hedged in by two difficulties. It would take nearly three years to secure a change of the constitution by proposing amendments through the legislature. So, they could not wait for that slow process. The other mode, that of calling a convention, had been tried and rejected by the people, and it was unsafe to appeal to them another time. Besides, that plan involved delay also. "Why wait?" said these men. "Why run any risk of a second defeat?" "It is a mere question of detail," "a mere form anyway." Thereupon, they proceeded to pass an Ordinance of Secession and a Declaration of Independence. This was accomplished on the 6th of May, 1861. In order that coming generations may know who the men were who thus carried the state into secession, I give the vote in the senate and in the house in a foot-note at the end of this chapter. Both those who voted for and those who voted against secession are doubtless proud of their record.

In order to secure the adoption of the Ordinance of Secession at the ballot-box, the legislature proceeded to disregard another provision of the constitution of the state. That instrument required as a qualification for voting that the voter should have been a resident of the county in which he offers to vote six months before the day of election. In other words, no man could vote out of his own county. And yet, an act was passed authorizing the soldiers of the state "to vote in all cases where, if in the state, they would be entitled to vote," that is, soldiers on duty in Virginia, or elsewhere, could vote and did vote as if at home in their own county. Twenty-seven hundred and forty-one soldiers in different places thus voted under this act, twenty-four hundred and fifty-six out of the state, and

every one for separation.[1] It has been published that a majority of the soldiers in the field, who voted in the June election, voted "against separation." This, as will be seen, is a mistake.

It is not forgotten that in the elections in some of the Northern States, perhaps in all, at a subsequent period, federal soldiers voted out of their states. If this were done contrary to the constitutions or laws of those states, it only proves how ready both sides were to disregard constitutional obligations during the Civil War.

"But," says some one, "the people ratified the action of the legislature afterwards in the election in June, and thus cured the constitutional defect." As we have seen, this was the idea of Governor Harris. This position admits the unconstitutionality of the act of secession. If it were unconstitutional, it remained so until ratified by the people. Tennessee still remained a member of the Federal Union until the act of ratification. By what right, then, did the state enter into a military league with the Southern Confederacy, and turn over to it "its whole military force and military operations," and transfer the allegiance of its people to a foreign government before the ratification? By what right did it raise, equip, arm and put into the field an army, with the openly-avowed purpose of making war on the United States, sending its soldiers to the field to fight for this foreign government? By what right did it displace the national flag on the capitol of the state and hoist in its place a foreign flag? All these things were done early in May, one month before the ratification of the act of secession on the 8th of June.

But it is denied that any act of ratification can make

[1] Through the kindness of Hon. W. S. Morgan, the polite secretary of state at Nashville, I have been furnished with the returns of the vote of the Tennessee soldiers in this election, at the several camps where they were stationed. These returns are on file in the secretary's office. I am also indebted to him for other kind courtesies.

valid an unconstitutional act. No breach of the constitution can be mended this way. The passage of the ordinance of secession, in 1861, was an act of the highest sovereignty, beyond the jurisdiction of any legislature, and only within the power of a convention, through delegates duly elected by the people, even according to the theories of secession. It is believed that no lawyer will risk his reputation by denying these propositions. I need hardly add, that, from a Union point of view, even a constitutional convention of delegates, chosen in the most regular form, had no power to dissolve the bonds binding the state to the Union.

The legislature, on the same day, May 6th, proceeded to provide an army of fifty-five thousand men, twenty-five thousand to be called into immediate service, and thirty thousand to be held as a reserve "ready to march at short notice." The act also provided for the issuance and sale of five millions of the bonds of the state, bearing eight per cent interest, to meet the expenses of the army. It also provided for raising by the county courts of the state "a home guard of minute men, consisting of companies of not less than ten for each civil district, whose duty it should be to 'procure a warrant from some justice of the peace, and arrest all suspected persons, and bring them before the civil authorities for trial, to prevent the assemblage of slaves in unusual numbers,'" etc. By another act, the governor "was authorized and requested to place at the disposal of the Confederate States the volunteer forces of the State of Tennessee, the same to be mustered into the service of said states."

But the crowning act was a joint resolution passed May 1st—six days before the ordinance of secession was passed—authorizing the governor to appoint "three commissioners on the part of Tennessee, to enter into a military league with the authorities of the Confederate States." Accordingly, the governor appointed Gustavus A. Henry, O. W. O. Totten and Washington Barrow such commissioners.

On the 7th day of May, these high functionaries, clothed with authority by a mere legislative act to transfer a sovereignty, entered into a "temporary convention, agreement and military league" with Henry W. Hilliard, the duly authorized commissioner of the Confederate States. It was agreed by and between the high contracting parties that, until "the said state" (Tennessee) "shall become a member of said Confederacy according to the constitution of both powers, the whole military force and military operations, offensive and defensive, of said state, in the impending conflict with the United States, shall be under the chief control and direction of the president of the Confederate States."

Totten, Henry and Barrow were lawyers. Totten had once acted for a number of years as one of the supreme judges of the state. It certainly would have been difficult for them to find in the constitution of Tennessee any provision authorizing the state to become a member of the Confederacy "according to the constitution of both powers." And yet that is what is provided for in this remarkable league.

It will be observed that the ordinance of secession was passed on the 6th of May. And yet, on the 1st of May, while the state was still a member of the Union, according to the theory of both sides, the legislature authorized the governor to appoint these commissioners on the part of Tennessee to enter into this league. On the 7th, the said league, as we have seen, was consummated, and the "whole military force, and military operations, offensive and defensive, of said state, were turned over to the Confederate States. And long before the 8th of June, the time for the election, the national flag, by resolution of the legislature, had been hauled down from the capitol, and the flag of the Confederacy floated over it, almost in sight of the grave of Andrew Jackson, who had crushed nullification in South Carolina.

Here was a mere legislative body, elected twenty-one months before that time, in the face of a popular majority

of sixty-four thousand votes, given in the previous February against secession, disrupting the ties of government, passing an ordinance of secession, transferring the allegiance of the people, and turning over all the freemen of the state liable to bear arms, and all its military resources, to a foreign power, then waging war on the United States. All this was done in the name of the constitution, and all before there was any pretended ratification of these acts by the people at the ballot-box! The claim of justification for these acts would sink to the level of the ludicrous, if it were not for the fact that, by and through them, the people of the state tasted the desolation of civil war for four years.

One provision of the Constitution of the United States is this: "No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation." And yet these men, while the state was still a member of the Union, entered into an "alliance or treaty" with the Confederate States, a foreign power, according to their own theory and admission. If they had done these things under the open avowal of revolutionary measures; if they had boldly overthrown the old government and inaugurated in its place "a provisional government," their action would not appear so inconsistent. These things they had the right to do, according to the Bill of Rights, whenever the government became oppressive. But they claimed to act all the time under the forms of the constitution and not by way of revolution. Intelligent men could not have been deceived by these professions, yet, such was the excitement of the hour, that these acts met the hearty approval of the followers of secession. The withdrawal of Tennessee from the Union, in 1861, was, in fact, the wildest of revolutions, under the guise of peaceable, legal, constitutional secession. Even admitting the right of the state to withdraw, the act in this case lacked the dignity and authority of a convention of the people to give it validity.

Suppose a majority of the people of the state, in the

election in June, had voted against the ordinance of secession, would Governor Harris and his followers have acquiesced in the result? Of course, it is impossible to say certainly what they would have done, but, judging by their previous and subsequent acts, it can scarcely be doubted what their course would have been. They would have taken no backward steps. They could have taken none. The destiny of the state was already linked to the Southern Confederacy by means of the military league. Its army and all the able-bodied men of the state had been transferred to that power. The allegiance of the people, so far as could be, had been changed from the old to the new government. Armies, commanded by Confederate officers, were within the state, ready to do the will of the new government. The money, the arms and the authority of the state were all in the hands of men who had hazarded their all on the success of the Southern cause. All had been hazarded on the success of separation, and he could not turn back. The army of the state had been transferred to the Confederacy, and there was no retreat left open. And what could that majority have done? Nothing, absolutely nothing. It must have bowed its neck to meek submission.

In the ordinance of secession the legislature intimates that its action was based on the right of revolution, and not on the right of constitutional secession. It said: "We, the people of the State of Tennessee, waiving any opinion as to the abstract doctrine of secession, but asserting the right, as a free and independent people, to alter, reform or abolish our form of government, in such manner as we think proper, do ordain," etc. The ordinance then declares "that all the laws and ordinances by which the State of Tennessee became a member of the Federal Union of the United States of America, are hereby abrogated and annulled, and that all obligations on our part be withdrawn therefrom," etc. The absurdity of a mere legislative body passing a legal and constitutional ordinance of secession

was too transparent for this intelligent body of men, inflamed even as they were by the fury of the storm then sweeping over the South. So, they fell back on the right of "revolutionary secession."

Who gave this mere legislative body, elected in August, 1859, the authority to revolutionize the state, or to declare its secession from the Federal Union? Who gave it the authority "to alter, reform or abolish" the state government in such manner as it thought proper?

It is submitted that the only power on earth capable of these acts was the sovereign people, through a convention of delegates chosen for that purpose. Such an assembly alone would have been clothed with the sovereignty of the people, and have been capable of altering, reforming or abolishing the state government. And then it would have been, according to the Union theories, a revolution, and not constitutional secession.

However artfully the legislature may have expressed itself in the ordinance of secession, it was universally understood, and proclaimed at the time, that this was peaceable, legal and constitutional secession, binding on all the people of the state. If it had been proclaimed as a revolution, thousands who yielded to it, because it was believed to be a constitutional measure, would have resisted it if placed on the ground of a revolution. If secession were legal, and legally accomplished, then such an act bound every citizen of the state. If secession was merely revolution, it left every man free to join it or resist it as he might choose. The leaders understood the difference, and therefore they kept the idea of a revolution in the background, and openly talked of peaceable and constitutional secession.

But whether this act were secession, peaceable and constitutional, or revolutionary secession, or whether it were pure revolution, it was equally beyond all legislative authority.

Tennessee stands preeminent in her disregard of forms in her secession or revolutionary work. All the other se-

ceding states observed certain forms, and preserved an august dignity in the solemn crisis of revolution, by apparently, at least, evoking the sanction of the people in destroying and building up governments. They at least acted through and by conventions representing the sovereignty of the people. But Tennessee, in the face of the sixty-four thousand majority in opposition, assumed to exercise an act of sovereignty unknown in constitutional governments. It overrode all constitutional principles and precedents, and substituted the will of a mere legislative body for that of the people, expressed in the most solemn form through a convention of delegates duly chosen by them.

Now, these were not bad men who did these things. Some of them were exceptionally good. They were the peers of the very best of the land. From their point of view, they were animated by the purest patriotism. They loved their state with intensest devotion. They were simply seized with the mania of the hour. The spirit of a great revolution was around them. They saw, as it appeared, the old government dissolving and melting away. They believed the Union was gone. The Constitution of the United States, as they believed, had been violated and set at naught by the Abolitionists. The compact of union had been broken. Therefore they felt absolved from its obligations. Each state was at liberty to form its own future alliances. The revolution had shattered the old Union into fragments. The people could form a new one as they chose. Thus reasoned these men. But they overlooked the great fact that in war—in revolutions—*force* is the ultimate arbiter. Theories must always yield to superior power. And it was most fortunate that in this case superior power and the public good were on the same side. However honest these men may have been, however patriotic as they saw matters, the folly of their acts and the deplorable consequences resulting, will forever remain the same.

It has been questioned whether the Union men in February, 1861, did not commit an error in opposing and voting against a convention. Possibly they did, but it is by no means certain. To prove that the Union party was wrong in its policy the fact is pointed to, that nearly all the members elected to the proposed convention were open and avowed Union men, while a large majority of the members of the legislature which was convened by Governor Harris after the people voted down the proposition for a convention, and which passed the ordinance of secession, were disloyal. Some of these members of the legislature, in voting for the ordinance, unquestionably misrepresented their constituents. The question is, would the members of the convention, or a majority have remained faithful to their pledges to the people. If that body had completed its work, and had adjourned before the 12th of April, the day of the firing on Sumter, it is almost certain that no ordinance of secession could have been adopted. The proposed convention was to meet on the 25th of February. That would have given six weeks for its work—ample time for discussing and deciding the question. If, however, the convention had remained in session beyond that time, in the wild and insane stampede that followed the firing on Sumter, no one can tell what it would have done. Judging by the example of Virginia, North Carolina and Arkansas, under very similar circumstances, the convention, in all probability, would have yielded to the panic—to the wild delirium of the hour—and passed an ordinance of secession. We know that many of the men who were elected as delegates, notably such men as James E. Bailey and John F. House, after that event, rushed wildly and enthusiastically into the support of secession. So a convention might have done just what the legislature did.

If, however, the convention had remained firm and refused to bow to the storm, can any one doubt that Governor Harris would have called the legislature together

again, and secured the passage of an ordinance separating the state from the National Union? That bold, ambitious man had his whole mind and heart set on this project, and no means for its accomplishment within his power would have been left untried. His previous earnestness showed the length he was prepared to go. It is therefore manifest that after the violent revolution following the firing on Sumter, there remained little hope of saving the state. In the hurtling clamor that followed, reason was silenced. Only wild uproar and unreasoning passion were heard. In East Tennessee only was the voice of protest lifted against this supreme folly.

It is sometimes said that great as was the influence of Governor Harris in causing the secession of Tennessee, he could not have accomplished this act alone; that it was the great events rapidly following each other in the spring of 1861 that caused the withdrawal of the state, and that if he had opposed secession to his uttermost, the state still would have seceded. It is probably true that he alone could not have carried the state out of the Union. But that he exercised in this direction a more potent influence than any other man admits of little doubt. His position as governor, to say nothing of his ability, daring and exceeding aggressiveness, gave him immense power. With him alone was lodged the right and the discretion of convening the legislature, which right he exercised twice, by means of which the state was finally withdrawn from the Union. Suppose he had persistently refused to convene the legislature, how could secession have been accomplished? The friends of that measure would have been powerless, except by an open revolution, until a new legislature was elected in August, and had convened in October. And before that body could have passed all necessary measures to carry the state out, and an election of the people could have been held, a federal army might have been in the state and arrested the whole movement, for it will be remembered that Fort Donelson fell February 16th,

and that Buell's army entered Nashville February 25th, 1862. There can scarcely be a doubt of the fact that a federal army would have been pushed forward much earlier, if the position of the state had depended on it.

On the other hand, suppose there had been a determined Union man in the office of governor, does any one believe he would have convened the legislature twice in extra session, to consider our relations with the National Government? And can we believe he would have convened it a second time, after secession had been condemned by such an overwhelming majority as was given against it in the February election?

The love of the Union on the part of the people of Tennessee was perhaps deeper than it was in any other state or section. Jackson's example and patriotic teachings were deeply implanted in the minds and hearts of the people. Conspicuous as he was for his many striking and grand qualities, in none was he so conspicuous as in his pure, intense and undying love of the Union. The people of Tennessee had caught his spirit. Another hero, Sam Houston, in many respects greatly resembling him, was beloved of Tennessee, almost as the old hero of the Hermitage had been. He was at that time struggling in Texas with all his power to save the Union, and the example of that great patriot helped to inspire in Tennessee a deeper attachment for the government of our fathers.[1] Two other persons, though always political enemies, and altogether unlike, had respectively great influence in the state—greater than any other two men. Each had his friends, who would follow their leader wherever he might go. These were John

[1] In the History Building of the Tennessee Exposition, in 1897, there was on exhibition an engraving of Sam Houston, "Presented by General Andrew Jackson to Major Andrew Jackson Donelson."

Underneath the *fac-simile* of Houston's signature is this utterance of the Tennessee-Texas hero and patriot:

"I wish no epitaph to be written to tell that I survived the ruin of this glorious Union."

Bell and Andrew Johnson. Until the 18th of April, 1861, both were known to be ardent Union men. Each had more devoted friends and a larger following than Governor Harris.

Besides the influence of the four great names I have given in favor of the Union, there were a number of other distinguished men, in Middle Tennessee, who were at first opposed to secession. Among these I mention Balie Peyton, Meredith P. Gentry, Neill S. Brown, Gustavus A. Henry, Felix K. Zollicoffer, Edwin H. Ewing, Ex-Governor William B. Campbell, Jordan Stokes, W. B. Stokes, John S. Brien, R. J. Meigs, John F. House, A. S. Colyar, Samuel M. Arnell, John Trimble, Russell Houston, Robert Hatton, and James E. Bailey, all Whigs; and the following distinguished Democrats, namely: Henry S. Foote, Justice John Catron, Andrew Ewing, Hon. George W. Jones, W. H. Polk, and Cave Johnston.

These, together with Mr. Bell, by long odds constituted the best talents and the greatest influence then existing in Middle Tennessee. The preponderance in these respects over the leaders in favor of secession was indeed overwhelming. It left no conspicuous names in favor of secession except A. O. P. Nicholson, then a senator in congress, and Governor Harris; and the former, though intellectually the superior of the latter, was almost powerless in a revolution.[2] As we have seen, in the February election, Middle Tennessee, in common with the other divisions of the state, voted by a decided majority for the Union. And I insist, as I have done elsewhere, that if these great Union leaders had

[2] A. O. P. Nicholson was intellectually one of Tennessee's greatest sons. His career was crowned with honors. Several times a member of the legislature, once a chancellor, then the able editor at Washington of the organ of his party, twice a senator in congress, twice offered distinguished positions of trust and honor by presidents, one in the cabinet and one abroad; finally becoming chief justice of the supreme court of the state, in which position he achieved for himself a fame that places him in the same rank with the great jurists who had preceded him. Certainly he was a very noteworthy man.

done in April and May what the Union leaders did in East Tennessee; if they had shown a bold, determined front, and had not only appealed to the people, but had led the people, as became brave men, the probabilities are very strong that the state would not have seceded. We can not suppose that the love for the Union was originally much stronger in East Tennessee than in Middle Tennessee. The effect of the firing on Sumter was felt in one section as well as in the other. Men were amazed, staggered and bewildered by it in one place as well as in the other. The difference was this: The leaders in East Tennessee denounced that act, and told the people that it constituted another and higher reason for standing by the government.

In marked contrast to the course pursued in East Tennessee, certain leaders of Middle Tennessee, on the 18th of April, 1861, issued an address to "the people of Tennessee," in which they commended the action of the governor in refusing to furnish troops in response to the call of Mr. Lincoln. They "unqualifiedly disapprove," they say, "of secession, both as a constitutional right and as a remedy for existing evils;" they condemned "the policy of coercion," and did not think it the duty of the state "to take sides against the government;" they did not think "she ought to join either party," but maintain "her grand mission as a peacemaker." "Her mission should be to maintain the sanctity of her soil from the hostile tread of any party." "But should a purpose be developed by the government of over-running and subjugating our brethren of the seceded states, we say unequivocally that it will be the duty of the state to resist at all hazards, at any cost, and by arms, any such purpose or attempt." "And to meet any and all emergencies it should be *fully armed.*" . . .

This address was signed by Neill S. Brown (ex-governor), Russell Houston, E. H. Ewing (ex-member of congress), Cave Johnston (ex-postmaster general under Polk), John Bell, R. J. Meigs, S. D. Morgan, John S. Brien (ex-chancellor), Andrew Ewing (ex-member of congress), J.

H. Callender, M. D., and Balie Peyton. Notwithstanding their declaration of unqualified disapproval of secession, "both as a constitutional right and as a remedy for existing evils," this paper was regarded at the time as a surrender to secession. Balie Peyton and John S. Brien, it is believed, never became secessionists at heart, but their voices became silent. Return J. Meigs remained loyal to the Union as long as he lived. Soon after this he left the state, settled in Washington, and never returned to Tennessee. All the other signers at once united their destinies with the Southern Confederacy. From that time their influence was all on that side.

About this time, Henry, Foote, Jones, Gentry, House, Zollicoffer, and most of the other Union leaders, also gave up the Union and sustained secession. The only men of prominence who remained true and faithful were Meigs, Catron, Trimble, Dr. W. P. Jones, W. H. Polk and Ex-Governor Campbell. These were utterly powerless to stem the tide now running with irresistible force in favor of separation. When the Union masses saw their trusted leaders, such as Bell, Henry, Peyton and Brown—the men they looked to for guidance in this dark, trying hour—forsake the Union, they naturally concluded that all was lost. They, too, surrendered to what seemed inevitable. The fight was over. Everything in the wild sweep of passion and madness tended in the direction of secession and war. Long before the election in June, Middle and West Tennessee became a vast military camp of Confederate soldiers. And thus by the active aid of these once honored Union leaders, Isham G. Harris was enabled to carry the state of Jackson out of the Union and into the Southern Confederacy—a thing believed to have been impossible without their aid. Tens of thousands of Tennesseans who thus joined the secession movement, like the illustrious Meredith P. Gentry, did so not because they believed in the right of secession, nor that it was a remedy for existing evil, but because their neighbors, their friends, their

kindred were going that way. They went with their people, their state, their section, still believing that secession was wrong in principle, and an act of stupendous folly. And now that secession was accomplished, every man in favor of it was expected to enter the army, and nearly all did enter the army to fight for it. And never did soldiers behave more gallantly, more heroically than these Tennesseans on the field of battle. I need only mention the fact that nearly half of Johnston's army, in the great campaign from Dalton to Atlanta, was composed of these men. In the fight of Peach Tree, near Atlanta, it was a Tennessee —an East Tennessee—regiment, the 19th Confederate, commanded by Colonel Frank Walker, that came out of the charge nearly annihilated.

Conspicuous for their courage as generals on every battlefield where they fought were William B. Bate, Benjamin H. Cheatham, Napoleon B. Forrest, Felix K. Zollicoffer, Leonidas Polk, James D. Porter and others. The private soldiers were no less so. And thus through the secession of the state, Tennessee put one hundred and twenty thousand brave soldiers into the Confederate army, and thirty-five thousand equally brave soldiers into the Federal army.

Note.—Vote in the Senate on the Question of Secession.

Senators voting in the affirmative were: R. W. Bumpass, of Madison, Haywood, Lauderdale and Tipton; Reese T. Hildreth, of Overton, Fentress, Morgan and Scott; Judson Horn, of Stewart, Robertson and Montgomery; R. W. Hunter, of Giles, Wayne and Lawrence; James M. Johnson, of Marshall and Bedford; Jas. T. Lane, of McMinn, Meigs, Polk and Monroe; James E. Mickley, of Benton, Humphreys, Perry, Decatur and Henderson; Jno. A. Minnis, of Rhea, Bledsoe, Bradley, Hamilton and Marion; Geo. R. McClellan, of Johnson, Carter, Washington and Sullivan; Thomas McNeilly, of Maury, Lewis, Hickman and Dickson; Taz. W. Newman, of Franklin and Lincoln; Robert G. Payne, of Shelby and Fayette; George B. Peters, of Hardiman, McNairy and Hardin; S. S. Stanton, of Jackson, White and Macon; Jas. E. Thompson, of Smith and Sumner; Ed. J. Wood, of Coffee, Grundy, Van Buren, Cannon and Warren; B. L. Stovall, of Henry, Weakley and Obion, elected speaker vice Taz. W. Newman, resigned to enter the Confederate service.

Those voting in the negative were: V. S. Allen, of Gibson, Carroll and Dyer; James S. Boyd, of Knox and Roane; Wm. M. Bradford, of Hawkins,

Hancock and Jefferson; M. V. Nash, of Claiborne, Grainger, Anderson and Campbell; John W. Richardson, of Rutherford and Williamson; Jordan Stokes, of Wilson and De Kalb; and D. V. Stokeley, of Greene, Cocke, Sevier and Blount.

In the house of representatives, those voting in the affirmative were: Messrs. W. N. Baker, of Perry and Decatur; Sam'l Baker, of Weakley; Wm. H. Barksdale, of Smith, Sumner and Macon; Wm. M. Bayless, of Washington; S. T. Bicknell, of Blount; R. H. Bledsoe, of Scott, Morgan and Fentress; R. B. Cheatham, of Cheatham, Davidson, Montgomery and Robertson; H. N. Cowden, of Marshall; Phillip Critz, of Hawkins; J. W. Davidson, of Benton and Humphreys; John R. Davis, of Wilson; N. B. Dudley, of Montgomery; William Ewing, of Williamson; W. T. Farley, of Shelby; John Pat. Farrelly, of Shelby; J. J. Ford, of De Kalb; C. Frazier, of Henry; George Gantt, of Maury; W. W. Grey, of Hardeman; Richard R. Harris, of Bradley; George V. Hebb, of Lincoln; R. W. Ingram, of Fayette; W. E. B. Jones, of Overton; W. R. Kenner, of Jackson; T. J. Kennedy, of Lincoln, Marshall and Giles; B. J. Lea, of Haywood; H. C. Lockhart, of Stewart; Wm. L. Martin, of Wilson; J. G. McCabe, of Cannon; J. S. Morphis, of McNairy; Robert C. Nall, of Obion; Joseph G. Pickett, of Smith; J. D. Porter, Jr., of Carroll, Gibson, Madison and Henry; Stith Richardson, of Dyer and Lauderdale; D. A. Roberts, of Hardin; J. M. Shield, of Grundy, Coffee and Van Buren; John Smith, of Warren; Jas. M. Sowell, of Lawrence; J. F. Trevitt, of Sullivan; A. J. Vaughn, of Monroe; C. H. Whitmore, of Fayette, Tipton and Shelby; Madison Williams, of Franklin; John J. Williams, of Hickman; John Woods, of Rutherford; and Mr. Speaker W. C. Whitthorne, of Williamson, Maury and Lewis—46.

Those voting in the negative were: R. H. Armstrong, of Knox and Sevier; William Brazelton, Jr., of Jefferson; James Britton, of Greene; R. R. Butler, of Carter and Johnson; A. Caldwell, of McMinn; James W. Gillespie, of Rhea, Bledsoe and Hamilton; T. S. Gorman, of Cocke; A. L. Greene, of Roane; James S. Havron, of Marion; Robert Johnson, of Greene, Hawkins, Hancock and Jefferson; A. Kincaid, of Anderson and Campbell; John W. Kincaid, of Claiborne; P. B. Mayfield, of Polk, McMinn and Meigs; J. Morris, of Wayne; John Norman, of Carroll; W. M. Russell, of White; D. W. C. Senter, of Grainger; A. G. Shrewsbury, of Henderson; J. B. White, of Davidson; John Williams, of Knox; and John Woodard, of Robertson—21.

Mr. W. H. Wisener, of Bedford, a Union man, was paired with Mr. William R. Doak, of Bedford and Rutherford.

CHAPTER XII.

GUBERNATORIAL CONVENTION IN 1861.

Delegates start to Gubernatorial Convention in May, 1861—Incidents on the way—Meet Colonel Turney's regiment of Confederate soldiers—The first regiment in the state—Its departure from home—Union convention—Appearance of a mob—Ex-Governor W. B. Campbell nominated as Union candidate—Convention hurriedly adjourned—Campbell declines—W. H. Polk substituted—Wild excitement in Middle Tennessee in favor of secession—A conversation with Ex-Governor Brown and Judge Brien—Both professed devotion to the Union—Both under the prevailing influences—Brown soon yields to the secession clamor—A good man—The old Whig and Democratic leaders of Middle Tennessee who at first opposed secession discussed—Some one accountable for carrying Tennessee into the vortex of revolution—Chiefest among them was Governor Harris—The Whig leaders a splendid set of men—John Bell, Balie Peyton, Meredith P. Gentry, Neill S. Brown, E. H. Ewing, G. A. Henry, W. B. Campbell, John S. Brien, John Trimble, John F. House—Mr. Bell sent to Knoxville—His speech—Interview with old friends—Democratic leaders of Middle Tennessee—State might have been saved.

The Union men of Tennessee were determined, in the spring of 1861, not to yield the state to the enemies of the government without using every effort in their power to save it. They wished not only to defeat the attempt at secession, but to elect a loyal governor and legislature. Accordingly a convention was called to meet in Nashville on the second day of May for the purpose of nominating a candidate for governor. On the 1st of that month, therefore, Messrs. Maynard, Baxter, Trigg, Fleming and the author, and possibly John Williams, left home to attend the convention. Everything was encouraging at that time for the Union cause in East Tennessee. We felt hopeful, and left in high spirits. All seemed to be well until we reached Stevenson, Alabama, on the Chattanooga Railroad. There we met Colonel Peter Turney,

with his regiment of Tennessee soldiers, on their way to join the Confederate army in Virginia. His was the first Tennessee Confederate regiment. The soldiers were shouting and hurrahing with intense enthusiasm. Fortunately, as was thought by us, it was ten o'clock at night when the two trains met. They stood alongside of each other an uncomfortably long time for our party. We greatly preferred to be on our way.

When Sumter was fired upon, Colonel Turney at once went to work in the mountain counties of Middle Tennessee to raise a regiment of men for the Confederate army, and in fifteen days he was on his way to Richmond. He remained in the army four years, and won distinction by his bravery. In 1870, he was elected a member of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, and remained on the bench until 1892, when he was elected governor, which office he held for two terms.

These soldiers were in all the freshness and glow of their first day's travel toward the seat of war. That afternoon they had left their rendezvous, forty or fifty miles away, and boarded the train for Virginia. Speeches were made and a banner presented. Their friends, their wives, their parents, and their sisters and sweethearts had assembled to see them off. Mothers here and there had slipped Bibles into the pockets of their sons. Amid shouts and God speeds, blessings and tears, and the waving of banners and the kissing of hands, the train had slowly pulled out. And now handkerchiefs were waved as tokens of love, last messages were shouted back from the cars, and all eyes eagerly watched as the train turned a curve and passed out of sight. The crowd still stood in silence weeping. It was the first departing train of soldiers seen in Tennessee. These good people will yet see many more trains leaving for the war, but they will never see this proud, splendid regiment return as it was then. No wonder they weep. Some of these brave boys, now so

happy, will return, but how changed! They will come back one or two at a time, or in small squads, broken in health, maimed in battle, or perchance with still festering wounds. They will return with no stirring martial music, with no waving banners. All silent and in tatters these now exulting boys will come, the few that come at all, having had enough of war. Weep, mothers, for many of you will never see these brave sons of yours again, except in sweet dreams.

Ah, war is a hard, hard life! But for the excitements of danger and adventure, and the pleasure of merry companionship, it would be unendurable. The first day's march, or movement of troops toward the seat of war, is always the happiest. The next will be less so, and those that follow less and less so, as the long days and months and years go by, until the final discharge. By that time music and banners and jests have ceased to lighten the heart and stir the spirit, and the mind dwells only on the distant home and the loved ones there.

The soldiers in this train were shouting themselves hoarse for "Jeff Davis and the Southern Confederacy." Then, that annoyed me; now I can appreciate their spirit and their feelings. They believed they were right, and honesty condones an error, if not a crime. These exultant soldiers were going to fight, as they believed, in a righteous cause, and most valiantly they did their duty.

After considerable delay, our party again found itself under way—soon passing out of Alabama and back into Tennessee. As soon as we passed over the mountain, into Middle Tennessee, we had evidence that secession had swept over that country like a cyclone, prostrating every object before its resistless force. All who entered the train during the remainder of the way to Nashville were loud, noisy and demonstrative in its favor. They were, in fact, wild with excitement.

Our party arrived in Nashville late in the night. The next morning a preliminary meeting was held privately,

to arrange the program of the convention. To our surprise we found but a few delegates present. This was significant of the state of affairs in the other divisions of the state. At the hour appointed, the delegates repaired to a large room in the court-house. According to the arrangement agreed upon, the Hon. William H. Polk, the brother of Ex-President James K. Polk, was made chairman. On taking the chair he made no speech. Resolutions were then introduced setting forth the virtues and qualifications of Ex-Governor W. B. Campbell, for governor, and naming him for that office. Not a word was said in the resolutions in favor of the Union.

Soon after the delegates entered the hall, to their surprise, a large crowd of people began to pour into it. They at first thought these were Union men who were coming in to witness the proceedings. But they continued to come until the hall was nearly full. A glance at them showed that they were not mere friendly spectators. They looked fierce and rough, and had a dark, ominous, threatening aspect. It soon flashed on the minds of the delegates that this was probably a mob assembling to break up the convention. There they stood, scowling with desperate determination, waiting perhaps for a signal to commence their work. They spoke not a word. Deep and determined purpose was depicted on their brows.

Polk quickly saw what was impending. Not a speech was made. As soon as the resolutions were read and a motion to adopt was made, Polk put the question, and before the "ayes" were all well said, he declared them adopted. Then a motion to adjourn quickly followed. This was instantly put, and without waiting to hear the result, the chairman declared the convention adjourned, and speedily stepped down from the stand. Immediately the delegates passed out and went to their hotels. All this was done so quickly that the supposed mob stood confounded when it found the delegates gone.

No committee was appointed to notify Governor Camp-

bell of his nomination, nor was any executive committee selected to aid in the campaign. Campbell subsequently declined the nomination, and William H. Polk was, perhaps by common consent, put forward in his place as the Union candidate, and voted for by the Union men. This convention was held a little more than a month before the time when the question of separation or no separation was to be submitted to the people at the ballot box. When the result of that election became known, there no longer existed any hope, not even the slightest, of the success of a Union candidate. From the day of that election, therefore the Union party of the state began to lose its confidence and to some extent its compactness. In East Tennessee, where the Union men did not fear mobs, the organization was kept compact and solid until after the Greeneville Convention, indeed until after the disastrous battle of Bull Run. That battle was a blow of such stunning force, a disappointment so deep and crushing, that the Union people never entirely recovered from it until after General Burnside entered Knoxville with his army in September, 1863.

While I was in Nashville I called on my former friends, Ex-Governor Neill S. Brown and Ex-Judge John S. Brien. I had known them well and intimately. In 1847, Governor Brown had honored me by making me a member of his military staff. We were always intimate afterwards. I had traveled and canvassed with both of these gentlemen in 1855, in Know Nothing days, and had often spoken with them on the same stump. They had been Whig leaders of high and distinguished rank. Brown had been governor of the state, speaker of the house of representatives, and minister to St. Petersburg under Mr. Fillmore. Brien had been an able chancellor, a leading lawyer and a successful popular speaker.

While I was with them on the occasion referred to, Dr. John H. Callender, another prominent Whig, and possibly others, came in. Of course, the political outlook was the

subject of conversation. I soon found that these gentlemen were all more or less under the chilling shadow of secession. They seemed to be paralyzed. They had not yet joined the enemy, and they declared they never would; yet they were evidently under the influence of the prevailing feeling in Middle Tennessee. They were timid, cautious, hesitating.

Becoming almost vexed at the faint-hearted utterances and the want of courage in men who had been state leaders, I expressed myself strongly and warmly, somewhat in reproof of their conduct. I blamed them and the other Union men for not arresting and resisting the growth of secession in their midst, as had been done in East Tennessee. Brown arose, and putting one hand behind him, and striding back and forth across the room, he poured forth an eloquent denunciation of secession, declaring in the most earnest terms his determination to stand by the Union. Dr. Callender, with evident mental reservation, and with signs of a first love for secession, also declared his unalterable love of the Union and his purpose to abide by it. Brien was not so brave and so profuse in his words as the other two, but his love of the Union, in the end, proved to be more enduring.

A few days after my return home from Nashville, I read an account in the papers (or heard) that Governor Brown, soon after my departure, had marched through the streets of Nashville at the head of a vast crowd which was shouting frantically "for Jeff Davis." This, then, was the end of his boasted devotion to the Union. Yet Governor Brown was a good, a noble, and I venture to say a patriotic man. This act was not the act of his head or mind, as I believe, but the result of the terrorism of the hour. Let no man say until he has been proven by trial that he would have acted differently. As for Dr. Callender, the first love of secession which I had that day seen softly nestling in his bosom soon grew into a burning flame of the greatest intensity. Judge Brien quietly remained true

until the McClellan canvass, in 1864, when, holding that the "war was a failure," though nearly at an end, he was lost in the motley party then opposing its further prosecution. Politically, he was never seen or heard of afterwards. He was a brilliant man, with many good qualities.

The old Whig leaders, and the several able Democrats of Middle Tennessee who at first opposed secession, deserve more than a passing notice. Their eminent ability, their large influence, and their virtues as private citizens, all demand some notice. Somebody must bear with posterity the responsibility of carrying the State of Tennessee into the vortex of an unwise revolution, of bankrupting the people, the banks and the state; of sending tens of thousands of her noble sons to untimely graves. Who shall thus be held responsible?

The Whig leaders of Middle Tennessee of 1860–61 were splendid men. None of them, possibly excepting Mr. John Bell and Balie Peyton, had passed the meridian of their greatest power and influence. The most prominent of these were John Bell, Balie Peyton, Meredith P. Gentry, Governor N. S. Brown, Edwin H. Ewing, Gustavus A. Henry, Governor W. B. Campbell, Judge John S. Brien, Jordan Stokes, Robert Hatton, John Trimble, Charles Ready, A. S. Colyar, James E. Bailey, John F. House, and E. H. East. There were many others of less note. The most distinguished among these unquestionably was John Bell. When quite a young man, he was elected to congress several times in the Nashville district, over the influence and bitter opposition of General Jackson. These were remarkable triumphs. In congress he was elected speaker in the days of our greatest men. In 1841 he was selected as secretary of war by General Harrison. In 1847 he was elected United States senator, and served two terms in that high office. In 1860 he was nominated for the presidency of the United States by the Whig or National Union party.

Mr. Bell was always recognized as a man of great ability.

He stood in the second rank of statesmen, just below Clay, Webster and Calhoun. His mind was subtle, astute, philosophical, profound and far seeing. He was very slow and deliberate in reaching conclusions. His culture was broad and liberal and his information general. As a speaker, in his later years, he was too dignified and profound for popular assemblies. It is said he was different in his younger days. He was not in an ordinary sense a popular leader, and yet he led his party in Tennessee for thirty years. This was due to his sagacity and the force of his intellect. He did the thinking, while more brilliant speakers fought the battles. There were two great defects in his mental character. These were: slowness in forming his opinions and excessive caution. On all new questions he reached his conclusions after extreme deliberation. He would brood over them until nearly all the world was aligned on one side or the other. He did not define his position on Mr. Clay's compromise measures in 1850, until the debate was nearly over. Even then, there was a want of that direct, that bold avowal of opinions which so greatly distinguished the great man who was the author of those measures. So, at a later period, he was the only senator from the South to oppose the repeal of the Missouri Compromise line, yet it was so late before he defined his position that it had but little effect.

Mr. Bell was no leader in a great crisis. He was not only slow and indecisive, but was more or less timid at such times. Physically, he was regarded as a man of courage, but he seemed to be powerless to resist a counter current of public opinion in times of high excitement. Had one insulted or wronged him, he would have been prompt to resent or punish the outrage. But, let the public opinion of a section be turned against him, or let a howling crowd call him an Abolitionist or a traitor to the South, and it affected him as the rage of an armed enemy could not.

So, when the crowd waited on him, after the firing on

Fort Sumter, with music and shouting and hurrahs, and called him out for a speech, he knew it was a summons to surrender. No doubt, it was an hour of terrible mental agony. His mind, I venture to say, never assented to the position he assumed that night. His heart revolted at the alliance he there made with his old enemies, but a fierce, an omnipotent, an overpowering Southern sentiment was around him and he yielded. In a speech made in Knoxville, after this, on June 6, 1861, he was reported as saying:

"I have already told you that I have ever opposed secession as a heresy—I have opposed the separation of the state from the Federal Union—I have opposed the Southern Confederacy, and I see no necessity now for assuming a new position. But, by what I have said, you will see that I have placed my neck in the halter. I am a rebel."[1]

With Mr. Bell's life-long views, he could not fail to realize the incongruity of his new position. He denied the right of secession. His position was in marked contrast with that of those who thought secession was a legal and a constitutional act. These believed they had the right to secede, and, therefore, that secession was no offense under the law. Mr. Bell thought otherwise. He had no heart for the cause he had just espoused. He yielded to the terrible pressure around him. He had too long fought nullification and secession to fall in love with them in his mature old age. His prejudices were strong and inveterate, and, being a mild man, he was little inclined to change opinions. He was firm and immutable in his convictions. He had also been too long the target for the poisoned arrows of the very men he had just joined, to either love or sympathize with them in their ambitious projects. Their success would be the downfall of all his long-cherished dreams. In fact, the hour that he surrendered to the Southern Confederacy was the mournful end

[1] Possibly this was his Nashville speech.

of all his hopes, either in the North or the South. He fell, never to rise again.

Suppose Mr. Bell, instead of yielding to the clamor of a crowd of excited men and to the demands of a despotic public opinion, had remained firm and submitted to be driven out of his city and state, as a fugitive and an exile, by the power of public opinion, as Justice John Catron and Return J. Meigs did, how different his fate might have been! How grandly he would have appeared in history! He would have been the most eminent citizen of the South who had remained true to the Union. His recent prestige as the candidate of the Constitutional Union party for the presidency, would have received additional luster from his patriotic sacrifice. He would have become the most popular as well as most conspicuous statesman in the country, next after Mr. Lincoln. Honors would have fallen on him without stint. In 1864, he would almost certainly have been placed on the presidential ticket with Mr. Lincoln, and on the assassination of the latter, would have become president—the dream of his life. He had no secret secession sympathies to tempt him when he had gained the object of his ambition. Every fiber of his heart was true to the Union. Thus it might have come to pass that the great object of Mr. Bell's life, by agencies more potent than man's designing, and altogether beyond his ken or control, would have been attained. He was in many respects in full accord with the Republican party, which had just obtained control of the government. He had supported the compromise measures of 1850, had opposed the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and had opposed the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. He was conservative in sentiment and broad and national in view. The old Whig party, which constituted the larger part of the Republican party, would have supported him in preference to a Southern Democrat, who had been so recently allied with the Breckenridge Disunion party.

In the early days of June, 1861, Mr. Bell was sent to

Knoxville to gain over the Union men to the cause of secession. I say "sent," because I am morally certain that he would not have gone on such a mission, to his old and intimate friends, of his own volition. Secession was exacting in its demands. It expected the most perfect obedience. To hesitate was to be doubted. Mr. Bell had no heart for this work anywhere, but to go to Knoxville, in his new role as a secession speaker, and meet Brownlow, his most devoted, his life-long friend, and other friends—this was gall and worm-wood to his proud spirit. Yet he was bidden to go and he had to obey. An appointment was made for him to speak in the court-house on the 6th of June. His audience was small and composed almost exclusively of secessionists. The Union men would not attend. Not a single Union leader was present.[1]

After he had finished his speech, which was said to have been cold and less than half-hearted, he walked across the street to my office, about one hundred yards away. It so happened that Brownlow and two or three others, old friends of Mr. Bell, were with me. I think it was prearranged that Mr. Bell and Mr. Brownlow should meet there. Among those present, as I recollect, were Perez Dickinson, John Williams, John Fleming, possibly C. F. Trigg and Wm. Rule, then a young man, a part of the time. The meeting was embarrassing all around. I am ashamed to say that not one present had called on him. After the usual formal remarks, Mr. Bell said, in a half-sad and half-complaining tone: "I see that none of my old friends were over to hear me speak." "No," said Mr. Brownlow, "we were not present, and did not intend being. We did

[1] During this trip Mr. Bell spoke also at Athens. In his speech he deplored the division of opinion and alienation of feeling which had crept in among his old friends. Turning to the venerable John McGaughey, he said: "There is my friend, Mr. McGaughey, between whom and myself there used to be no difference in our views. I know not how he stands in reference to these new questions." "I am still," said Mr. McGaughey, in his gentle, earnest voice, "for the Union, the constitution and the enforcement of the laws."

not wish to witness the spectacle of your being surrounded by your enemies, who a few months ago were denouncing you as a traitor. We did not wish to hear these men shouting for you and see you in such a position." Mr. Brownlow then poured forth a torrent of abuse and denunciation of secession. Mr. Bell made no attempt to defend them, nor indeed to defend his own course. He listened politely, and acted as if he felt his awkward position. But no one uttered a word of censure or an unkind remark about him personally. All present had too much respect for his dignity, his exalted worth and his greatness, to wound him. He seemed sad and dejected. Both he and those present were under unusual restraint and embarrassment.

Finally, to relieve the situation, I invited them all to walk to my house, nearby, and take a glass of wine. Accordingly, we went there. Under the stimulating influence of the new surroundings, the conversation soon became free, frank and cordial. While there some one said: "Mr. Bell, if you and the other Union leaders in Middle Tennessee could have foreseen what might be done, and had stood firm and taken the stump for the Union, and boldly rallied the people, as was done in East Tennessee, the state might have been saved." He answered substantially as follows: "Yes, I see how it might possibly have been, but it is now too late." This was said with deep and pathetic sadness. Other remarks were made by him during the hour passed in my parlor indicating, but not expressing, his embarrassment in his present position. But he expressed no regret, made no apology for his course. At the end of an hour or more, we all parted in sadness, but with unabated kindness. I never saw Mr. Bell after this memorable day. He adhered to the new position he had assumed. On the evacuation of Nashville, the place of his residence, by the Confederate army, strange to say, he left with it, to follow its changing and eventful fortunes. He wandered from point to point

through the South, a disappointed, sorrowing old man, with no home, and worse than all, with no country he could call his own, uncertain, no doubt, whether the defeat or the triumph of his cause would be the greater calamity to him. When the war closed so suddenly in one general crash in the spring of 1865, he finally ventured to return to his former home, broken in health and in fortune, to find and receive at the hands of his old friend, Brownlow, who was then governor, that kind reception and consideration so soothing to him in that dark hour. It must have been to the magnanimous mind of Brownlow a source of infinite satisfaction to be in a position to assist and protect Mr. Bell in the time of his greatest need and gloom.

Mr. Bell was not, in my opinion, a willing secessionist. It was the panic of the hour that made him renounce the Union. There was not a drop of disloyal blood in his veins. Yet he must be held responsible at the bar of public opinion for his acts. The plea that he yielded to overpowering necessity will scarcely avail. Mr. Bell was the leader of the Union party, not only in this state, but throughout the whole country. His position as such demanded constancy and courage. When, therefore, he abandoned his standard, to say the least of it, he was guilty of a great error. Most gladly would I offer a justification, if I could. He was my friend. When I was quite a young man, he had rendered me a political favor of inestimable value. I never ceased to be grateful to him. From time to time, ever afterwards, as before, I rendered him such returns and services as I could. I at all times gave him a true, a sincere and a hearty allegiance. I served him with grateful fidelity. I had done my share in securing his nomination, and in carrying Tennessee for him in the presidential election the year before. At this late day, after the lapse of more than a third of a century, with sadness and sincerest affection, I recall the many virtues of that pure, great and unfortunate man.

There never was any serious question, after the death of Hugh Lawson White, in 1840, as to the preeminence of Mr. Bell over the other great Whig leaders of the state. The only one among them who was his equal in ability was Spencer Jarnagin of East Tennessee. He was, perhaps, in mere intellectual power, quite the equal, if not the superior, of Mr. Bell, or any other man ever born in the state, but in all things else, greatly his inferior. Ephraim H. Foster was eloquent and magnificent, but in breadth and profound thought he was no equal to Mr. Bell. James C. Jones, while a peerless popular speaker and leader, was not distinguished for grasp and force of intellect. As to the other Middle Tennessee leaders, still alive in 1860, excepting Mr. Gentry, there could be no doubt as to their inferiority to Mr. Bell.

Meredith P. Gentry was unquestionably a notable man. In many respects he was the superior of Mr. Bell. As a speaker he was greatly above him. Indeed, in this respect, no man in the state, since the death of Felix Grundy, equaled him, except the lamented and brilliant William T. Haskell. The latter surpassed all of his contemporaries, either in or out of the state, in dazzling brilliancy. Mr. Gentry was a strong, bold thinker, as well as a most powerful and fascinating speaker. His voice was something phenomenal. He was lofty in manner, daring in thought, sublime in bearing. Rarely had there been born a more exalted nature. Yet he lacked that steady, deep gaze, that broad comprehensive and philosophical insight which Mr. Bell possessed.

Balie Peyton had been a prominent character in this state, as well as in the nation, as far back as 1835. He had been a bright, indeed rather a brilliant man. But he was now in his decadence, and was far from being the strong man he had been twenty-five years before. As he grew old, he lost that boldness and fiery energy which he once possessed.

Ex-Governor Neill S. Brown was a man of excellent

ability and a fine speaker. He had great influence, and commanded the respect and confidence of his party in a high degree. But in times of trial and danger he was wanting in the boldness necessary for a leader. He lacked that unfaltering courage which distinguished Gentry and Peyton. Altogether he was a most worthy and valuable citizen.

Edwin H. Ewing had been more distinguished of late years as a very fine lawyer and well-informed gentleman than as a politician. A number of years before he had been a member of congress. He always took a deep interest in politics, and was regarded as a very able man. As a high-toned, pure gentleman, none stood better.

Gustavus A. Henry was one of the most elegant gentlemen and delightful, graceful and eloquent orators we ever had in the state. But he was never distinguished for great power of intellect. He too, like Governor Brown, lacked that firmness and courage necessary in leaders in perilous times.

Governor W. B. Campbell, who was nominated as the Union candidate for governor, was a brave soldier, a spotless gentleman, and a true and noble patriot. His ability was very fair, but he possessed none of that contageous enthusiasm essential to great leaders in times of revolution. As a popular leader, he could not draw men to himself as if by a magnet. As a soldier, men would have followed him to the cannon's mouth. During the Mexican War he commanded a regiment of Tennessee troops, and in the battle of Monterey he won imperishable laurels by his bravery. His regiment was the first to storm and carry the strong fortress, though this honor has been claimed for Colonel Jefferson Davis' regiment also. He was a relative of Colonel William Campbell of King's Mountain fame, and a grandson of Colonel Arther Campbell, of whom I have spoken elsewhere. In courage he was the equal of his distinguished kinsmen. At one time

he filled with great acceptability the office of circuit court judge. He served with credit as a member of congress. In 1851, the Whig party nominated him for governor, to which office he was elected over that spotless soldier, Governor Trousdale, a veteran of the War of 1812 and of the Floridas under General Jackson. Governor Campbell was honorable and exalted in all the relations of life. When the war of 1861 came on, he espoused the cause of the Union, and remained till his death—after its close—its devoted friend. All men had confidence in him. President Lincoln made him a brigadier-general in the Union army early in the war. He accepted the commission and took the oath required, but failing health forced him to resign. If the people of the state had been called upon to name the citizen most eminent for virtue, honor, and all the qualities that go to make the highest specimen of noble manhood, probably a majority would have pointed to Governor W. B. Campbell.

John Trimble was as true and as spotless in integrity as any man in the state. He belonged to a class of men of which but few are seen in these latter days—honest, independent, outspoken and fearless for truth and right. He was scholarly, reflective and retiring. His intellect was bright and original. These qualities kept him from becoming an idol of the people. Indeed he was too proud spirited, too independent, too self-sustained to seek popular applause. Yet few men enjoyed so large a share of the confidence of the people. During the war he was an unflinching, outspoken Union man, and never changed, and never hesitated to avow his sentiments openly even in the midst of the war. In 1867 he served one term in congress, representing the Nashville district.

John F. House was and still is (for he and E. H. East and A. S. Colyar alone of all I have named are now living) a man of more than ordinary ability. As a thinker and reasoner, he is clear and logical, as a speaker, animated, pleasing and strong. In 1860 he was on the Bell-

Everett electoral ticket, and as such added to his already good reputation as an able man. Early after the presidential election in 1860, he began to waiver and hesitate as to his duty in the changed condition of the country. However he remained a Union man until the spring of 1861. He finally espoused the Southern cause. After the war he was elected for several successive terms to congress, where he made a national reputation as a debater and a democratic leader.

Judge John S. Brien was by nature a very strong man. He was an able lawyer and a powerful popular speaker. He, too, like Bell, Brown and Henry, was wanting in that defiant disregard of public opinion and threatened danger which must always characterize a great and a successful leader. But, after all, he adhered to the Union long after all the others I have named, except Peyton and Trimble, had gone over to the enemy.

Charles Ready was a learned lawyer and an upright citizen, commanding the esteem and sincere respect of a large circle of friends. Before the war he served several terms in congress with credit to himself, shedding honor on his intelligent constituency.

Robert Hatton at an unusually early age became sufficiently prominent to be nominated in 1857 by the Whig party for governor, against Isham G. Harris, one of the ablest and most successful men ever in the state. After the firing on Fort Sumter, Mr. Hatton espoused the cause of the South, raised a regiment of men, went with it to Virginia, where he early fell in battle while still a young man, bravely fighting for Southern independence. Had he survived the war, the chances are that his career would have been as bright as the promise of his early years led his friends to hope.

Jordan Stokes, who was descended from the best North Carolina blood, was an eminent and most successful lawyer. He was never a politician in the ordinary sense of the term, though he served once or oftener in the legisla-

ture. His intellect was bright, clear and penetrating. He was a beautiful and accomplished orator. In his private life he was indeed an ideal citizen. In person he was tall, graceful and handsome, a model of manly elegance and stately dignity. His heart was genuine and true. Like refined gold, there was no dross in it. In politics he was an old-line Whig. When the war came on, true to his Whig training and convictions, he was an ardent Union man; and though he quietly acquiesced in the act of secession, he never lost his love of the Union. Like Peyton, Polk, Campbell, Brien, Dr. Jones, Trimble, Meigs, and Justice Catron, he never gave up his first love. In his later years, after the war, for reasons easily understood and possibly justifiable under the circumstances, he co-operated generally with the Democratic party, like many others in Tennessee, yet he was never thoroughly in sympathy with that party. He still remained an old-line Whig. But few men have lived in Tennessee more worthy to be held up to young men as a model for their imitation than Jordan Stokes.

A. S. Colyar was also a lawyer and an old-line Whig. In the early development of the secession movement he was earnest in his opposition to it, and active in his exertions to defeat it. In the spring of 1861 he abandoned the Union cause, and gave the weight of his excellent talents and his influence to the cause of the South. After the secession of Tennessee he was elected and served for one term as a member of the Confederate congress. Since the war Mr. Colyar, while always independent and often liberal and broad-minded in his views, has co-operated with the Democratic party. As a citizen he has constantly been progressive and public-spirited, at all times striving to promote the welfare of the state. In these respects no man deserves higher recognition. He is a man of decided versatility of talents; an able lawyer, an earnest politician, a vigorous writer and editor, an advanced thinker, and the advocate of intellectual progress and moral

and material development. Though an old man, his mental activity is still unabated.

Another prominent Whig was James E. Bailey. He was a man of more than ordinary worth and talents. In 1861, he adhered to the Union until the state seceded. During the war, he rose to the rank of colonel in the Confederate army. After the war, he won high rank at the bar as a learned and able lawyer. In 1877, he succeeded to the seat of Andrew Johnson, by regular election, in the United States senate, and served in that body with ability and dignity, winning considerable reputation.

E. H. East was a young man in 1861, but then gave promise of the distinction he has since won as an eminent lawyer, a jurist, an upright citizen. The state has no more worthy son, and but few of superior powers. He was a warm Union man during the war, and while very conservative and non-partisan in feeling and action, he still entertains his old national sentiments.

The men I have named constituted an unusually strong and powerful body of leaders. Besides these, there were five Democrats of great influence who were true to the Union, namely, Cave Johnson, W. H. Polk, Andrew Ewing, Ex-Senator Henry S. Foote, and Hon. George W. Jones. Both Foote and Jones finally joined the secession party, and both served in the lower house of the Confederate congress. Together these Whig and Democratic statesmen possessed, as an aggregate, every essential element of successful leadership: the public confidence, the mind to think and direct, the eloquence to arouse and persuade, the logic to convince, the courage to dare and execute. On the side of secession, there was no such array of ability in Middle Tennessee nor in the state. Governor Harris and A. O. P. Nicholson were the only men of equal ability. If these Union men had stood together from the first active development of secession in South Carolina, in December, 1860, and had from that time onward boldly kept the stump; had spoken, written, worked for the

Union, and waved the old flag; if they had denounced and defied secession, as was done in East Tennessee, Middle Tennessee in all probability might have been held firm to the Union. This is a bold assertion; but look at the facts.

In February, Davidson county, in which Nashville is situated, gave a majority of 2,548 for the Union. In June, the same county gave 5,635 votes for separation and 402 against it, or 5,233 majority in favor of that measure. The vote of Shelby county (Memphis) is even more astonishing. In February, that county gave 5,689 for the Union and 197 for secession. In June, the majority for secession was 7,132, only five men voting the Union ticket. These were the two largest counties in the state, and are taken as fairly representative of the change in many of the counties in Middle and West Tennessee.

Again, in February, the state went for the Union in round numbers by sixty-four thousand majority. In June, the majority had changed to the other side, and was fifty-seven thousand for separation. Thus there was a change of over sixty-four thousand votes. Now, take Knox, the third largest county in the state: in February, the Union majority, as indicated by the election of delegates to the convention, was 3,055; and in June it was 1,975, or a falling off of only 1,080 in the majority, or a change of only about 540 votes. The differing results are easily accounted for. In Knox, indeed in all East Tennessee, the Union leaders took the stump in January and kept it until the close of the second canvass in June. They raised the old flag and called on the people to rally around it. They did not sit timorously waiting until secession had overborne all resistance and stifled all free speech; but they took the start, kept the start, and held secession in check, so that it never gained any ascendency. The same thing might have been done in the other divisions of the state, it is believed, but not with such marked success, if there had been bold leaders there. A large majority of the people

were loyal, as the February election unquestionably demonstrated. But when the people found themselves deserted by those they were accustomed to follow, they naturally lost heart and courage, and in the mad excitement and terror of the hour, they followed their panic-stricken leaders over into the camp of secession.

CHAPTER XIII.

ABOLITIONISM.

Preparations for war in 1861—The Abolition party—The Free-soil party—Difference between the two—The two merged into the Republican party—Abolitionists narrow and bitter—Made war on the constitution—Objects and motives of "Garrisonian Abolitionists" described by Henry Wilson—Only a limited number of these—Abolitionists and Secessionists working toward the same end, the destruction of the government—Attempt to rescue Anthony Burns in Boston—Violence and bloodshed—Public meetings in Boston advocating violence—Addressed by Wendell Phillips and others—"The Boston Anti-Man Hunting Society"—Anti-slavery sentiment in the South in early days—Jefferson Randolph proposes emancipation in legislature of Virginia—Abolition agitation causes a revulsion of feeling in slave states—Garrison's "Liberator"—New England Anti-slavery Society—National Society declares for a dissolution of the Union—George Tickner Curtis on emancipation—Independence and luxurious life of slaveholders—Slow to abandon slavery—Capital invested in it—Profits of—Difficulties in the way of emancipation—Mutual reproaches—Senator Hammond—Failure to execute the Fugitive Slave law by certain states—The "Higher Law" doctrine considered—John Brown a violator of law—Effect of his death—Mr. Webster on the non-execution of Fugitive slave law—Declares forcible resistance to it "treasonable"—Wendell Phillips and Theodore Parker proclaim a "higher law"—Alexander Stephens to Mr. Lincoln—Persecution of Mr. Webster—Whittier on Mr. Webster—Crime of the Abolitionists—This no justification of secession—A portion of the people of both sections blamable for the Civil War—Honesty of Garrison and associates not questioned.

We have brought our narrative down to June, 1861. Fort Sumter had now been fired on and reduced. The noise of the first fatal shot had sounded all over the land. Suddenly a nation of warriors sprang to its feet. From Maine to Mexico the sound of fife and drum and bugle was heard calling the people to arms. Men were everywhere rushing to the tented field. In the din and tumult of preparation business was suspended. The plow was left standing in its furrow, the fire still blazing in the shop and

furnace. Mad passions had seized the minds of men. Dark columns of angry, determined men were seen moving into position. Squadrons of horsemen with flying banners were pressing to the front. All over the land, both North and South, there were hurry and bustle, martial music and mustering hosts, and preparations for coming battle and blood. And these were brethren thus going to war! What meant all this? What meant that martial music, those dark columns, those hurrying horsemen, those hostile armies, those flaunting banners bearing different devices? What caused this mighty uprising of the nation?

In this chapter and in the succeeding two, I shall attempt to point out some of the causes which culminated in the alarming condition of affairs that existed in June, 1861. In doing this perhaps it may appear that neither side was wholly to blame and neither wholly blameless. I shall begin with the movement known as Abolitionism.

The anti-slavery men of the North were divided into two classes: The first was composed of out and out Abolitionists, such as William Lloyd Garrison, who demanded the immediate and unconditional emancipation of slaves everywhere. This party was always small, but it became much larger after the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. After that action by congress, it was merged and lost in the larger organization known as the Free-soil party, which finally assumed the name of the Republican party. The Republican party did not demand emancipation, but insisted that slavery should be restricted, and everywhere and forever excluded from the territories of the United States and from all new states.

The Abolition party was narrow, bitter and extreme in its opinions and demands. It conceived a morbid, a sickly sympathy for an abstract slave, and to liberate him from bondage became its life-long object. If it were necessary, the Abolitionist would tear up and destroy the very foundations of the government in order to accomplish this object. He at once saw that the constitution stood in his

way, and therefore he denounced it "as a covenant with hell." He saw that the national government, through and by its constitution, was sacredly pledged to the protection of slavery, wherever it existed in the states, and therefore he demanded and worked for the destruction and the overthrow of that constitution. The object and the motives of the "Garrisonian Abolitionists" are thus described by Henry Wilson, late Vice-President of the United States :[1]

"Having adopted the doctrine of 'no union with slaveholders' as the fundamental idea, the corner-stone of their policy and plans, the Garrisonians of that period directed their teachings, their arguments and appeals to the establishment of the necessity and the inculcation of the duty of disunion. Believing, in the language of Edmund Quincy, the Union to be a 'confederacy of crime,' that the 'experiment of a great nation with popular institutions had signally failed,' that the Republic was 'not a model, but a warning to the nations,' that 'the hopes of the yearning ages had been mournfully defeated' through 'the disturbing elements of slavery;' believing, too, that such had become the ascendency of the system that it compelled 'the entire people to be slaveholders or slaves;' believing, also, that the 'only exodus for the slave from his bondage, the only redemption of ourselves from our guilty participation in it, lies over the ruin of the American state and the American church'—they proclaimed it to be their unalterable purpose and determination to live and labor for a dissolution of the present Union by all lawful and just, though bloodless and pacific means, and for the formation of a new Republic that shall be such not only in name, but in full, living reality and truth."

The Abolitionists, then, aimed at four things: 1st, to overthrow the Union and the constitution; 2d, to destroy the "American church;" 3d, to abolish slavery; 4th, to

[1] "Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America," by Henry Wilson, Vol. II, p. 107.

establish a new Republic. If we were not solemnly assured of these facts, in an elaborate history of those times, by an accredited leader of the anti-slavery party, who became eminent by holding high trusts in the council of the nation, it would be hard to believe that a respectable number of men could have been found capable of such supreme folly and of such boundless wickedness. Consider this matter a moment. The Southern states proposed, in 1861, simply to secede from the Union, leaving the constitution and the old government just as they were. They made no war upon "the American church." But here all were to be pulled down, "through bloodless and pacific means," they say. How absurd! The scheme meant, or involved in its results, revolution, if it meant anything. It meant bloodshed and anarchy. It meant an intestine and internecine war, horrible to think of.

It should be a source of extreme gratification to the people of this generation to know that the number of persons who entertained these revolutionary sentiments and purposes was very small, confined exclusively to the Abolitionists, and perhaps not embracing many of them.

But it can not escape observation how the two antagonistic sectional elements, the "Higher Law," party and the "Secession party," constituting at that time a great minority of the people in each section, were working toward the same end—the destruction of the government—the one because slavery was protected by the constitution and the legislation under it, and the other in part because slavery was not sufficiently protected. With widely different motives, they moved along converging lines toward the accomplishment of the same great purpose—the perpetration of the greatest folly of the ages.

The teachings of the Abolitionists naturally and logically led to a disregard of the constitution. Therefore, we are not surprised that in May, 1854, there was an open attempt made in Boston to rescue a fugitive slave named Anthony Burns from the hands of the United States

marshal. Violence was used by an Abolition mob by breaking down the doors of the court-house where the slave was guarded, and one man, a deputy marshal, was killed and others injured. Resistance to the execution of the fugitive slave law and the rescue of the slave were defiantly advocated in two public meetings by Wendell Phillips, Theodore Parker, T. W. Higginson, Dr. S. G. Howe and many other prominent men.[1] But the frantic effort of these men to overthrow the law and trample upon the constitution utterly failed.

Here was the case of a fugitive slave who had been arrested by a United States marshal, under a warrant issued by a United States commissioner, appointed under an act of congress, which act was passed to carry into execution a provision of the constitution. This constitution had been approved, accepted and ratified by the people of Massachusetts. And here was presented the spectacle of two public meetings, in the enlightened city of Boston, avowedly for the purpose of defeating this law, by the rescue of a fugitive, and the open attempt to execute this purpose by an assault on Charles Devens, the marshal, and his deputies.[2] And to give full significance to these extraordinary proceedings, it must be kept in mind that these things were not done by the "toughs" from the slums of the city, but by its foremost citizens in culture, character and social position—lawyers, preachers, merchants and physicians, and among them, we are told, a "thoughtful student of Plato" from Concord. And quite as noticeable, there was not a protest in either of the meetings against these violent proceedings, not a voice raised in favor of the observance of the law and the preservation of the constitution—not one. And Mr. Henry Wilson,

[1] Wilson's "Rise and Fall," etc., Vol. II, pp. 436–441.

[2] It may be of interest to know that Charles Devens was afterwards the able attorney-general of President Hayes. When the Civil War broke out, he entered the army, lost a leg in the battles of the Army of the Potomac, and by merit and gallantry rose to the rank of general.

from whom the foregoing account is taken, who was for many years a senator in congress from Massachusetts, and for two years vice-president of the United States, narrates these things with the utmost coolness, without one word of dissent or disapproval and apparently with pride.

And thus Massachusetts was manufacturing the ammunition for future use in secession guns which were finally aimed at the Union. And when seven years later, in the city of Charleston, Edmund Ruffin fired the first gun in the nation's terrible drama of blood, charged with this ammunition, Massachusetts helped to aim that gun and to fire that dreadful shot.

Soon after these reprehensible meetings, there was organized in Boston a secret society, called the "Boston Anti-man-hunting League," with its grips and passwords, the purpose of which was "to protect and rescue fugitive slaves." It consisted, says Mr. Henry Wilson, of more than a hundred men, composed of lawyers, physicians, clergymen, literary men, merchants, men of ability, character, social position and influence.

When the legislatures of certain Northern States passed laws designed to obstruct the free execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, they were defeating a law of congress and defying the constitution. Perhaps they did not say in words, as South Carolina had done in 1832, in the case of nullification, the law is "null, void and no law, not binding upon this state, its officers and citizens," but they did just what South Carolina attempted to do; they nullified the law, and did all they could to defeat its operation. This was nullification pure and simple. Every member of the legislatures of those states, and every judge, and every state officer, had sworn to support the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, which were (with the treaties) declared to be "the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstand-

ing." This is too explicit for any doubt or misunderstanding.

In colonial days, and in the earlier years of the Republic, there was no serious difference in opinion between the people of the North and those of the South as to the institution of slavery. Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, had all protested against the introduction of so many slaves into their dominions. It is well known that the leading statesmen of Virginia, such as Washington, Jefferson, Mason, Pendleton and Wythe, and some eminent men in North Carolina, wished to get rid of slavery. In the convention that framed the federal constitution, Virginia and the Middle States opposed the clause extending the time to 1808 when the slave trade should cease, while most of the New England States united with the Carolinas and Georgia in adopting it. For forty years after the adoption of the constitution there was a stronger anti-slavery sentiment in Virginia, Tennessee and Kentucky, than there was in the free states. Even the immense stimulus given to the culture and production of cotton by Eli Whitney's great invention, the cotton-gin, did not arrest the emancipation movement in these states until after 1834. Slavery was regarded in the early days of the Republic as both a moral and an economic evil, which ought to be removed as speedily as possible. In Tennessee, as is elsewhere more fully shown, there were many emancipation societies as early as 1815 and 1816. There were similar societies in Kentucky, Virginia and North Carolina. In the winter of 1831–'32, Jefferson Randolph, a grandson of Thomas Jefferson, introduced a proposition into the legislature of Virginia, to inquire into the expediency of gradual emancipation in that state. This proposition was never pressed to a vote. The fact that it was dropped, is ascribed by George Ticknor Curtis to the Abolitionists.[1] Mr. Curtis says:

[1] Quoted by Charles M. Harvey in a letter to the St. Louis "Globe Democrat."

"In the midst of this state of things, and before the next meeting of the legislature, intelligence came from the North of the formation of anti-slavery societies, their aim, spirit and temper. The aspect in which their proceedings presented themselves to the people of the South was most alarming. Strangers coming together in the free states to assail all slaveholders as sinners, and to demand instant abolition, aroused fears of the most dangerous consequences to the safety of Southern homes, and an intense indignation against such external interference with the domestic condition of the Southern States. A sudden revulsion of public sentiment in Virginia was followed by a similar revulsion everywhere in the South, where an amelioration of the condition of the colored race was in consideration. This change of feeling led Southern statesmen to seek new devices for strengthening the political power of their section in the Union."[1]

The insurrection of Nat Turner in that state, soon after this time, no doubt helped greatly to increase this revulsion, and to add to the general alarm.

This sudden outburst of Abolition feeling and excitement was perhaps largely due to the appearance in Boston of the "Liberator," on January 1, 1831, edited by William Lloyd Garrison. In the first number, he said: "I shall strenuously contend for the *immediate enfranchisement* of our slave population. I will be as harsh as truth, as uncompromising as justice. . . . I am in earnest! I will not equivocate! I will not excuse! I will not retreat a single inch, and I will be heard." Soon afterwards, he said, in his paper: "I take it for granted that slavery is a crime, a damning crime; therefore, my efforts shall be directed to the exposure of those who practice it."

Garrison, however, it is but just to say, did not advocate the insurrection of the slaves, though his teachings naturally tended to this result. His labors, with other

[1] Curtis' "Constitutional History of the United States," Vol. II., p. 254.

causes, resulted in the formation, in 1831, of the New England Anti-Slavery Society, and the New York and the American Anti-Slavery societies in 1833. During the next few years, local auxiliary societies sprang up in most of the Northern States.

At a meeting of the National Society, held in New York in 1844, a resolution was adopted, declaring that, as the constitution sanctioned the rendition of the fugitive slave to his master, therefore, fidelity to freedom's cause required the dissolution of the Union, and Abolitionists were forbidden to hold office under the constitution. What superlative madness and folly! It is no wonder that the good men in the South who had been laboring to bring about gradual emancipation, ceased their work when they saw the bitterness and the purpose of the Abolitionists. Nor is it surprising that a revulsion not only in feeling, but in opinion, in reference to the morality of the institution of slavery, rapidly followed. Not to have resented this attempt to interfere with a domestic institution would have been more than human. By a natural law, a similar bitterness was engendered in the South. And thus, for twenty years, the extremists of each section multiplied and grew and strengthened, each by the nourishment afforded by the other. If either could have been kept silent for four years, the other would have died of inanition. Mr. Benton once said that "the Abolitionists and the Southern extremists were as necessary to each other as were the two blades of a scissors the one to the other."

The extreme utterances of the Abolitionists were circulated in the South, while those of extreme men in the South were circulated in the North—all to inflame the minds of the people.

George Ticknor Curtis, a great lawyer and an acute thinker, expressed the opinion, in his "Constitutional History of the United States," that there were causes at work when the agitation of slavery commenced, which, in all probability, would have brought African slavery to an end,

without any political or social convulsion, if it had been left to the operation of these causes, which tended to its peaceful removal. He thinks it could not have lasted unchanged so long as 1865, even if there had been no civil war, and no forcible emancipation.

With one who has lived all his life in the midst of slavery, who knew something of Southern thought and feeling, and who was himself a slave owner, it is difficult to concur in this opinion. It is easy to believe that, under the influence of the moral causes that were at work in the South, especially in Virginia, Tennessee and Kentucky, during the first thirty years of this century, and if there had been no irritating anti-slavery movement in the free states, the gradual emancipation of slaves might have gone on from generation to generation, until slavery would have finally disappeared. But it is visionary to suppose that this could have occurred by the year 1865. It might have taken one hundred years, but, most probably, a much longer period. For a moment, consider the facts. Slaves were a luxury, or were supposed to be, to those who owned them, with which they were slow to part. Their ownership constituted a badge of honor and was a passport to society. The man or the woman who owned a hundred slaves was everywhere an honored person. The owners of great plantations, stocked with slaves, were the most influential men in the state. They everywhere received homage. They were untitled nobility. The merchant might be as wealthy, but he ranked below the "great planter." The former must toil for his money, the planter "toiled not." Others toiled for him. From the shade of his cool, broad veranda, he could look out upon perhaps a hundred slaves and a hundred mules, toiling in his extended fields in the hot summer sun. And, when the time for the in-gathering and the disposition of the crop came, each hand and mule yielded a large and certain sum in cash, leaving a heavy profit after paying all expenses. And, as the lordly planter gazed on his baronial posses-

sions, his heart kindled with pride. A call, or a whistle, from him, and a troop of servants appeared quick to do his will. Horses and carriages, and guns and hounds awaited his command. What! give up this ease, luxury, affluence and social position in deference to the moral sentiment of the North? The human heart said no. Philanthropists may rail against the sinfulness and the horrors of slavery as they will, but, barring the cruelties and injustice of the institution, life, as a whole, on these great plantations where there was refinement, was an ideal one that sinful man delighted in. Men were most slow to give up an institution that ministered so largely and constantly to their comfort and their pleasure, and which at the same time gave them position and importance. No occupation in all the land so certainly led to wealth as that of planting with slave labor. But this was not all. Fully half of the capital of the South, perhaps a much larger part, was invested in slaves. At the opening of the late Civil War, this property was estimated at two thousand millions of dollars. Emancipation would have wiped that vast sum out of existence. In this way the source of nearly half the taxes of the states would have been taken away. Both the states and the slave owners would have been impoverished.

"With the labor of the slaves," says Mr. Blaine, "they could produce three hundred millions a year in excess of the food required for the population. Three hundred million a year represented a rumunerative interest on a capital of five thousand millions of dollars." [1]

"To abandon the institution was to sacrifice four thousand millions of property, specially protected by law. It was for the existing generations of the governing class in the South to vote themselves into bankruptcy and penury. Far beyond this, it was in their judgment to blight their

[1] "Twenty Years of Congress," Vol. I, p. 174.

land with ignorance and indolence, to be followed by crime and anarchy."[1]

With such serious results following emancipation, especially universal and immediate, slaveholders would have been very slow to yield their assent to it. Universal emancipation would not have taken place, indeed could not have taken place, without wide-spread ruin. In 1834, in the Constitutional Convention of Tennessee, the moral argument against slavery, urged so earnestly by good men of the state even at that late day, was pressed with great force in favor of gradual emancipation, to be completed in the year 1865. But the slaveholders, frankly admitting, in an explanation and an apology for their course, written with great ability, that slavery was a deplorable evil to be gotten rid of as soon as possible, were unable to see their way to emancipation at that time, and therefore it was postponed. But the proposition notwithstanding this received twenty votes out of thirty-eight. In truth, it could scarcely be expected that the people of a state would reduce themselves, by an act of noble sacrifice, from a condition of independence and affluence, to one of absolute poverty, at the same time making the state bankrupt.

There was still another difficulty in the way of emancipation. In some of the slave states the slaves were more numerous than the whites, and in all of them, excepting Delaware, they formed a large element in the population. What was to be done with these slaves when emancipated? Were they to be turned loose among the white population, ignorant, property-less and thriftless? To do this, it was believed, would expose society to the danger of the greatest social evils. No community would willingly incur such a dangerous risk. To send the slaves to Liberia was beyond the ability of the state and that of their late owners. Many of the free states while clamor-

[1] "Twenty Years of Congress," Vol. I, p. 121.

ing for emancipation and the equality of men before the law had closed their doors against the entrance of free negroes. Everywhere, both in the free and in the slave states, at that day, as in this, there was a deep-seated prejudice against them. Slave owners regarded them with suspicion. They were supposed to tamper with and corrupt the slaves. They were at all times an evil example, leading lives of idleness and generally of dishonesty. Finally many of the states forbade the emancipation of slaves, except upon the condition that their masters should provide the means of sending them to Liberia, or beyond the limits of the state where they were emancipated. Here was an almost insuperable obstacle in the way of emancipation.

These were some of the difficulties in the way of the consummation of an object very near the heart of many slave owners at an early day, when they were left free, without any outside interference, to consider this question as one alone rightfully concerning themselves. But at a later day when the Abolitionists began to denounce slavery as a "damning crime," and slaveholders as sinners above all men, when they began to preach a crusade of immediate emancipation, an absolute revulsion of feeling took place. After that time no man dared to hazard his reputation, or his life, by the advocacy of a measure which a few years previously had received the approval of the best men in the South. The door to discussion even was closed. To be suspected of abolition views fastened a mark of infamy on a man, as indelible as the famous "Scarlet Letter." Tens of thousands of persons who had favored emancipation at an early day, became extreme pro-slavery advocates.[1]

[1] Frederick A. Ross, doctor of divinity, of Kingsport, East Tennessee, was a striking illustration of the truth of this statement. He was a Presbyterian minister of great brilliancy and learning. He owned a good many slaves, and back about 1830, under the then prevailing feeling in East Ten-

So, in view of all these facts, it is impossible to see how the peaceful end of slavery could have come, in 1865 or at any early period, even if the Abolitionists had not by their violence turned backward the current in its favor. This is especially true as to what are termed the Cotton States; but not so clearly so as to the border slave states. It is reasonably clear to my mind that but for the amazing madness and folly of secession, nothing but some great convulsion, such as that of the late civil war, could have put an end to it short of one or two hundred years.

But what man seemed unable to do was quickly done by Providence, through the agency of the folly and the blindness of violent men, both North and South. But for the marvelous and unexpected manner in which slavery was finally destroyed, I see no reason why it might not have existed in the South for hundreds of years. All will agree that immediate voluntary emancipation was impossible. Such a thing had nowhere taken place in any of our states. It is believed that gradual emancipation had always resulted in the shifting in advance of many, perhaps of most, of the slaves to other states, where no such movement was in contemplation, and that only a comparatively few slaves acquired their freedom in that way. With a vast expanse of new slave territory, like Mexico, into which large numbers of slaves might have been drawn, the border slave states might ultimately have emptied their slaves, under the operation and the expectation of gradual emancipation.

The bitter condemnation of slavery in the North produced its natural effect in the South. When the Southern people found themselves pilloried before the world for the crime of slavery, they naturally began to defend that insti-

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nessee, especially among the Covenanter Presbyterians, in favor of emancipation, he set these all free. Time wore on, the abolition crusade was commenced, and he changed his views. He became a secessionist, and in his later days wrote a book maintaining that slavery was of divine origin.

tution. That which they once regarded as a moral evil, inherited from their ancestors, and from which they saw no means of escape without wide-spread ruin and bankruptcy, soon appeared to them as a scriptural institution, sanctioned by the practice of all ages, and notably so in Apostolic times. Thus assailed, they turned upon the Abolitionists and retorted: "What right have you to lecture us for the sin of slavery? Did not your fathers follow this practice for one hundred and fifty years, and give it up only when it became plainly manifest that it was not profitable? Did they not reduce to slavery and sell into bondage even the poor Indians?[1] Were not some of the fortunes of yourselves, and many more of your ancestors', made in the slave trade, or by the manufacture of rum to be used in that trade? And when you determined to emancipate your slaves, did you not sell many of them to the South, and thus continue in bondage the poor beings who were promised freedom?"

These and similar accusations were constantly hurled back at the North. Congress became the high arena for the utterance of bitter reproaches and denunciations, and for the manufacture of sectional strife and animosity. The two sections became as a seething, boiling, overflowing caldron. In a speech delivered in the senate, March 4, 1858, Senator James H. Hammond, of South Carolina, thus reproached the North:

"In all social systems there must be a class to do the menial duties, to perform the drudgery of life. . . . It constitutes the very mudsill of society and of political government, and you might as well attempt to build a house in the air as to build either the one or the other except on this mudsill. Fortunately for the South, she found a race adapted to that purpose to her hand. . . . We use them for our purpose and call them slaves. . . .

[1] Some one has said that when the Puritans landed in Massachusetts, "they first fell on their knees, then they fell on the aborigines."

"The Senator from New York said yesterday that the whole world had abolished slavery. Aye, the *name*, but not the *thing;* all the powers of the earth can not abolish that. God only can do it when he repeals the fiat, 'the poor ye always have with you;' for the man who lives by daily labor, and scarcely lives at that, and who has to put out his labor in the market and take the best he can get for it—in short, your whole class of manual laborers and 'operatives,' as you call them, are essentially slaves. The difference between us is, that our slaves are hired for life and well compensated; there is no starvation, no begging, no want of employment among our people, and not too much employment, either. Yours are hired by the day, not cared for, and scantily compensated. . . ."

Mr. Calhoun, in one of his published letters, uttered opinions somewhat similar to those expressed by Senator Hammond.

It must be candidly confessed that the people of the South, while far from being free from blame themselves, had great causes of complaint against a part of the people of the North prior to 1861. The fugitive slave law was not executed in the free states with that fidelity which should have marked the course of the people of sister states. Ten states, namely, Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maine, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin and Kansas, had passed laws obstructing the operation of that law and designed to nullify it. A portion of the Northern people, perhaps only a small portion, were at all times ready, by force and violence, to resist its execution. How far they were excusable in a court of conscience, if at all, for failing or refusing their aid in enforcing the law when demanded, on account of tender scruples, is left for hair-splitting casuists to determine. But when a sovereignty speaks through its constitution and law-making power, declaring "thus saith the law," it addresses and commands the obedience of every human being within its dominions. In governmental affairs, the

doctrine of a law higher than the constitution is simply treasonable. Those who resisted the execution of the fugitive slave law on the plea of a "higher law" were guilty of the highest crime known to our laws. That law was framed under an express provision of the constitution, and was binding on every citizen of the Republic. When men, therefore, as individuals, or as legislators, or in mobs, resisted its enforcement, they resisted the government. The acts of the legislature, in so far as they resisted or impeded the execution of that law, were acts of nullification. Every attempt on the part of Northern men, by incendiary speeches or publications, to excite the slaves of the South to run away, or to insurrection, was an act, however intended, in defiance of the constitution. The right of free speech in the discussion of slavery, the right of earnest opposition to it, even the right to demand that it be peacefully extinguished, is not denied. Argument and reason are vital forces in a free government. But the matters to which I refer went far beyond the use of reason and argument.

John Brown, when he attacked Harper's Ferry, became a daring violator of law, and deserved the fate he invoked on himself. Perhaps his execution was a mistake. If he had been incarcerated for life as a demented fanatic, or confined as a lunatic, the sympathy of the world would not have been awakened in his behalf as it was. He would have become no martyr, but would have been considered simply as an infatuated, foolish man. As it was, his death contributed in a marvelous manner, and in a way he dreamed not of, to accomplish the result his morbid mind had been brooding over for many years. His death was worth to his cause thousands of lives like his own. When his bold and startling deed was first announced to the world, the news sent a shudder of horror through the minds of a majority of the people of the North. They saw in it the fearful foreboding of coming evil. But his undaunted courage, his splendid heroism during his trial,

his fortitude under his sufferings, his transcendent air of consciousness that he was right, his scornful refusal to plead mental aberration or supplicate for mercy, coupled with the wide-spread excitement in the public mind, made his tragic death thrillingly sublime. The whole land quivered with gravest apprehension. The indignation excited at first by his act of daring lawlessness, that had prompted him to give his life for a race not his own, was turned into sympathy. His name was at once enrolled (by those who believed as he did) among the canonized martyrs. It became the theme of patriotic songs and the inspiration of armies going into battle. His deeds were chanted by millions of tongues. Thus, though dead, "his soul went marching on." His conduct was not an erratic display of chivalry, not wild romance, not vain ambition to win the world's applause. It was an impelling sense, an earnest, though misguided, conviction of duty—the true martyr-spirit.

But no man had either the moral or the legal right to take from another his slaves, any more than his horses or his mules, much less stir them up to insurrection. Both acts were violations of law. By the supreme law of the land, slaves were property, and it was a crime to deprive the owner of this property. Abolitionists had no greater right to take slaves from a Southern owner, than the latter had to seize the arms, and forts and ships of the government. Neither the government, by the exercise of legislative authority, nor the executive thereof, nor the people as individuals, or in communities, or societies, nor any power on earth, had the right, in time of peace, to interfere with or take away the slaves of the South against the consent of the owners. The ancestors of the Northern people had in many cases sold their slaves in the South. By a solemn compact in the constitution, they had guaranteed peaceable possession and ownership of them. Any attempt, therefore, in time of peace, to interfere with this property where it rightfully existed, except by the lawful

use of argument and persuasion, was a crime against the law of the land, and an attempt to overthrow the constitution, deserving of prompt punishment.

Errors and falsehoods are often employed in the cause of humanity, as well as in defense of evil and oppression. Many a man has served the cause of the evil one when he thought he was serving God. Good motives will not sanctify crime. Doubtless John Brown had an approving conscience when he carried fire and sword into the state of Virginia. If the people of France or England had at any time forcibly and violently attempted to interfere with or to destroy the institution of slavery in Virginia, there was scarcely an Abolitionist in the North who would not have resented the interference, and been ready to take up arms in resistance. And yet these were foreigners, and were under no obligation to abstain from such an act, except comity and the law of nations. No such solemn obligation of obedience to law and the constitution rested on them as bound the people of the free states. Every citizen of the United States was under an implied oath to support the constitution of the country, and the laws made in pursuance thereof. The constitution recognized the legality of slavery in certain states of the Union, and every citizen was under the same oath to do likewise. It was therefore a much higher crime in one of our own citizens forcibly and illegally to attempt to destroy slavery than it would have been for the citizens of England or France. Every citizen undeniably had the right to argue against that institution, to condemn it as a wrong, to protest against its extension, and to insist that it should cease. But the moment he went beyond argument and an appeal to conscience and reason, and advocated or resorted to force for its extinction, he committed a crime against the constitution and the laws of the land, no matter what his motive may have been. No moral considerations could absolve him from his solemn obligations to the constitution. If it was his duty to aid in returning slaves to their owners, certainly

he had no right to aid in nullifying the law and defeating its execution. This is the law, as well as the ethics of this whole question. To satisfy the consciences of men, casuists could gloss over their conduct by specious arguments; and by denouncing "the constitution as a league with hell and an agreement with death," they might appease them; but this very line of argument only proved those who used it to be incendiaries and entirely outside of the law.

Surely there was the same moral, as well as legal obligation binding alike on the Abolitionist, the nullifier and the secessionist, to obey the constitution and the law. If not, then indeed, was our government a rope of sand. In illustration of this point, I quote from an opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States. The opinion was in reference to the duties of citizens toward foreign nations, but certainly no one will contend that they are under less solemn obligations to their fellow-citizens of the other states, to observe the laws made for the protection of their property. This is especially true as to their supreme obligation to obey and defend the constitution of the United States:

"He is bound to be at war," says the court, "with the nation against which the war-making power has declared war, and equally bound to commit no act of hostility against a nation with which the government is in amity and friendship.

"The principle is universally acknowledged by the laws of nations. It lies at the foundation of all governments, as else there could be no social order or peaceful relations between the citizens of the United States. For, as the sovereignty resides in the people, every citizen is a portion of it, and is, himself, personally bound by the laws which the representatives of the sovereignty may pass, or the treaties into which they may enter within the scope of their delegated authority. And, when that authority has plighted its faith to another nation, that there shall be

peace and friendship between the citizens of the two countries, every citizen of the United States is equally and personally pledged. The compact is made by the department of the government upon which he, himself, has agreed to confer the power. It is his own personal compact as a portion of the sovereignty in whose behalf it is made."

In further elucidation of these points, I quote somewhat at length from one of the speeches of Mr. Webster, bearing directly on them. After he had voted as senator for the Fugitive Slave Law and for the other compromise measures of 1850, he was abused with a fury and hounded with a ferocity by the Abolitionists of the North, and especially by those of his own Massachusetts, such as seldom falls to the lot of a public man. In a speech delivered in Albany, New York, May 28, 1851, he discussed the Fugitive Slave Law in full, without any reference to himself. Among other things, he said:

"There had been an ancient practice" (among the colonies), "a practice a century old, for aught I know, according to which fugitives from service, whether apprentices of the North or slaves of the South, should be restored. Massachusetts had restored fugitive slaves to Virginia long before the adoption of the constitution, and it is well known that in other states in which slavery did or did not exist they were restored, also, on proper application. And it was held that any man could pursue his slave and take him wherever he could find him. Under this state of things, it was expressly stipulated, in the plainest language, and there it stands—sophistry can not gloss it, it can not be erased from the page of the constitution, there it stands—that persons held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall not, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from service and labor, but shall be delivered up upon claim of the party to whom such service or labor shall be due. This was adopted without dissent; it was nowhere objected to, North or South, but considered as a

matter of absolute right and justice to the Southern States, and concurred in everywhere by every state that adopted the constitution; and we look in vain for any opposition to it from Massachusetts to Georgia.

"Such a law" (a fugitive slave law in accordance with the constitution) "was prepared and passed in General Washington's time; . . . was passed without a division in the senate, and with but seven votes against it in the house. It went into operation, and for a time it satisfied the just rights and expectations of everybody. That law provided that its enactments should be carried into effect mainly by state magistrates, justices of the peace, judges of state courts, sheriffs and other organs of state authority. So things went on without any loud complaint from any quarter, until some fifteen years ago, when some of the states, the free states, thought it proper to pass laws prohibiting their own magistrates and officers from executing this law of congress, under heavy penalties, and refusing to the United States authorities the use of their prisons for the detention of persons arrested as fugitive slaves. That is to say, these states passed acts defeating the law of congress, as far as it was in their power to defeat it. Those of them to which I refer, not all, nullified the law of 1793 entirely. They said, in effect: 'We will not execute it. No runaway slave shall be restored.' Thus the law became a dead letter, an entire dead letter. But here was the constitutional compact, nevertheless, still binding; here was the stipulation, as solemn as words could form it, and which every member of congress, every officer of the general government, every officer of the state governments, from governor down to constables, is sworn to support. Well, under this state of things, in 1850, I was of the opinion that common justice and good faith called upon us to make a law—fair, reasonable, equitable and just—that should be calculated to carry this constitutional provision into effect, and give the Southern States what they were entitled to, and what was

intended originally they should receive; that is, fair, right and reasonable means to recover their fugitives from service, from the states into which they fled. . . .

"Now, let me say that this law" (that of 1850) "has been discussed, considered and adjudged in a great many of the tribunals of the country. It has been the subject of discussion before the judges of the Supreme Court of the United Statec; the subject of discussion before courts the most respectable in the states. Everywhere, on all occasions, and by all judges, it has been held to be, and pronounced to be, a constitutional law. . . . All judicial opinions are in favor of the law. . . . You cannot find a man in the profession, in New York, whose income reaches thirty pounds a year, who will stake his professional reputation in an opinion against it. If he does, his reputation is not worth the thirty pounds. And yet this law is opposed, violently opposed, not by bringing this question into court; those lovers of human liberty, these friends of the slave, the fugitive slave, do not put their hands in their pockets and draw funds to conduct lawsuits and try the question; they are not much in that habit. That is not the way they show their devotion to liberty of any kind; they resolve that the law is oppressive, unjust and should not be executed at any rate or under any circumstances. It has been said in the states of New York, Massachusetts and Ohio, over and over again, that the law shall not be executed. That was the language of conventions in Worcester, Massachusetts; in Syracuse, New York, and elsewhere. And for this they pledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor. Now, gentlemen, these proceedings, I say it upon my professional reputation, are distinctly treasonable. Resolutions passed in Ohio, certain resolutions in New York and in conventions held in Boston, are distinctly treasonable. And the act of taking away Shadrack from the public authorities in Boston, and sending him off, was an act of clear treason. I speak this in the hearing of men who are law-

yers; I speak it out to the country; I say it everywhere on my professional reputation. It was treason and nothing less; that is to say, if men get together and combine, and resolve that they will oppose a law of the government, not in any one case, but in all cases; if they resolve to resist the law, whoever may be attempted to be made the subject of it, and carry that purpose into effect, by resisting the application of the law in any one case, either by force of arms, or force of numbers, that, sir, is treason."

Mr. Webster then went on to compare the Abolitionists of his day to the "race of saints," who called themselves "Fifth Monarchy Men" in Cromwell's time, of whom he said: "A happy, self-pleased, glorious people they were, for they had practiced so many virtues, they were so enlightened, so perfect, that they got to be in the language of that day 'above ordinances.' That is the 'higher law' of this day exactly. They were above ordinances, walked about prim and spruce, self-satisfied, thankful to God that they were not as other men, but had attained so far to salvation as to be above all necessity of restraint and control, civil or religious."[1]

Grim old Cromwell said these men deserved the attention of the magistrates.

In another speech (one at Buffalo), Mr. Webster, referring to resolutions of Abolition conventions, said, with terrible sarcasm: "Their sacred honor! They pledge their sacred honor to violate the constitution! They pledge their sacred honor to commit treason against the laws of the country!"

Thus spoke this Northern man; this great, this wonderful man, this Massachusetts man, of the fanatical Abolitionists of his day.

I give two extracts from speeches of leading Abolitionists boldly proclaiming the doctrine of a law higher than

[1] "Works of Daniel Webster," Vol. II, p. 574.

the constitution. Wendell Phillips, said, in 1846, in a speech in Boston:

"Law or no law, constitution or no constitution, humanity shall be paramount. I would send out a voice from Faneuil Hall that shall reach each hovel in South Carolina, and say to the slaves: Come here, and find an asylum of freedom here, where no talon of the national eagle shall ever snatch you away." [1]

Theodore Parker said: "When the laws of Massachusetts, or the laws of the Union, conflict with the laws of God, I would keep God's law in preference, though the heavens should fall."

Now, it was the constant agitation of the slavery question by a part of the Northern people—the unceasing denunciation of an institution exclusively belonging to sister states, and in no sense their own—and the proclamation of the "Higher Law," much more than the nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law, that aroused such intense bitterness in the South. Mr. Stephens, who was perhaps one of the greatest and at the same time the most erratic of recent Southern statesmen, in his letter to Mr. Lincoln of December 30, 1860, based his complaint against the North almost entirely on this point. He said:

"I will also add that in my judgment the people of the South do not entertain any fears that a Republican administration, or at least the one about to be inaugurated, would attempt to interfere directly or immediately with slavery in the states. Their apprehension and disquietude do not spring from that source. They do not rise from the known anti-slavery sentiments of the president-elect. Washington, Jefferson and other presidents are generally admitted to have been anti-slavery in sentiment. But in those days anti-slavery did not enter as an element into party organizations. But now the subject which is confessedly on all sides outside of the constitutional action of

[1] Wilson's "Rise," etc., Vol. II, p. 56.

the government, so far as the states are concerned, is made the central idea in the platform of principles announced by the triumphant party. The leading object seems to be simply, and wantonly, if you please, to put the institutions of nearly half the states under the ban of public opinion and national condemnation. This, upon general principles is quite enough of itself to arouse a spirit not only of general indignation, but of revolt on the part of the proscribed. We, of the South, do think that African slavery as it exists with us, is both morally and politically right. This opinion is founded on the inferiority of the black race: you, however, and perhaps a majority of the North, think it wrong. Admit the difference of opinion. The same difference of opinion existed to a more general extent amongst those who formed the constitution when it was made and adopted. The changes were mainly on our side. As parties were not formed on this difference of opinion, then, why should they be now? . . , When parties or combinations of men, therefore, so form themselves, must it not be assumed, to arise not from reason or any sense of justice, but from fanaticism? The motive can spring from no other source, and when men come under the influence of fanaticism, there is no telling where their impulses and passions may drive them. That is what creates our discontent and apprehension. . . ."

The true danger of the slaveholding states was perhaps never so truly and clearly stated as in these few sentences. Slavery was being undermined by the "ban of public opinion and national condemnation," and not by unfriendly legislation. That was what threatened its extinction, and so exasperated the slaveholders and justly too. Slavery was protected by the constitution in certain states. Neither Congress, nor any other power, except the people of those states, had the right, and the wildest fanatic did not claim such right, to interfere with it where it existed. And yet these Abolitionists went on, year after year, by the most violent utterances, inflaming the public mind against an

institution of sister states, and preaching a wild crusade of abolition. They could only have expected and designed to incite a general insurrection among the slaves, or an armed uprising of the people of the free states for its destruction, or to so weaken it as to render it useless. In any case their conduct was highly culpable and often criminal.

The spirit of the Abolitionists was strikingly manifested by their treatment of the venerable Daniel Webster in his old age. In order to save the Union and avert civil war, in 1850, as we have just seen, he patriotically voted for the Fugitive Slave Law and all the other compromise measures of that period. For these he was persecuted to his grave. Neither his great services, nor his marvelous ability, nor the splendid luster he had shed on Massachusetts, were sufficient to shield him from the storm of obloquy heaped upon him by these "insane men," as he styled them in one of his speeches. Even the gentle Quaker poet, Whittier, made him the subject of a malignant satire.[1]

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[1] The poem is entitled "Ichabod." I quote some stanzas to show its spirit:

So fallen! So lost! the light withdrawn
Which once he wore!
The glory from his gray hairs gone
Forevermore!

Scorn! would the angels laugh to mark
A bright soul driven,
Fiend-goaded, down the endless dark,
From hope and heaven?

Let not the land, once proud of him,
Insult him now;
Nor brand with deeper shame his dim,
Dishonored brow.

All else is gone; from those great eyes
The soul has fled,
When faith is lost, when honor dies,
The man is dead!

What must have been the spirit of these Abolitionists, when it could fill the heart of so kind, so loving a man as Whittier with such rancor?

Those men in the North who denounced the constitution were guilty of a crime, no matter what their motives may have been. In so doing, they were severing the bonds of the Union and undermining its very foundations. They were helping to destroy all reverence for the sacred instrument on which the compact of union depended. When the active agitation for the abolition of slavery was commenced, there was comparative peace in all sections of the country. At that very time good men, both North and South, but especially in the slave states, were engaged in a combined movement to get rid of slavery in a constitutional way. This peaceful movement was arrested by the Abolition agitation.

As the agitation went on and increased, the excitement in both sections rose higher and higher and became more and more intemperate. It continued to grow in intensity until the whole country felt it in every fiber.

But I protest that this agitation of slavery, criminal as it was in many of its phases, constituted no justification, though it was in part the cause of secession. This was no remedy, as some of us insisted at the time, and as the result proved, for the wrongs complained of by the South. This was especially true in view of the fact that the security of slavery where it then existed was in no danger in 1861. The triumphant party which had succeeded to the control of the government was proposing, in the most sol-

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Then pay the reverence of old days
To his dead fame;
Walk backward, with averted gaze,
And hide the shame!

Elizabeth Stuart Phelps is authority for the statement that Whittier, during the last years of his life, "lamented, if he did not repent, that poem." "I am afraid, I was too severe," he would say (to her); "Do thee think I was?"—"McClure's Magazine" for July, 1896, p. 118.

emn form, at the time secession was taking place, to guarantee by a new article in the constitution its perpetual existence. But the dominating ambition of a few men in the seceding states for a separate government, resting on slavery, and their intense dislike of the people of the North, would, in their haughty confidence of success, listen to no terms and to no reason.

So, in considering the causes that led up to the war, a portion of the people of both sections, according to my view, were to blame. But small as the Abolition party was, its utterances were so violent and so exasperating that they kept the South in a constant ferment of excitement, and finally furnished the excuse and the rallying cry for the fatal movement for a separate government.

Is it not time that the people of the North, as well as the people of the South, were learning to look calmly and dispassionately at some of the old war questions? We are getting far enough away from the excitement caused by those great events to begin to be honest in their consideration. We cannot deceive posterity, nor the keen eyes of impartial history. Almost certainly, posterity, on a calm review of these questions, may be as much amazed at the narrow prejudice and blind fury of the Abolitionists proper, in reference to the destruction of an institution which did not directly affect their own consciences, however much their ancestors may have been involved in fastening it upon the country, as they may be at the madness and stupendous folly of Southern men in trying to destroy the old government and establish a new one, the "corner-stone of which was to be slavery." The North may apotheosize those who fell in this cause as martyrs, and the South may consecrate the memory of its heroes in poetry and song, but perchance posterity, with cold and stern impartiality, may reverse the judgment of this generation as to both.

I most cheerfully bear testimony to the worth and purity of life of such leaders as William Lloyd Garrison, John G. Whittier, Gerrit Smith, John Rankin and Benjamin Lundy,

and other Abolitionists. They were potent agents in the work of destroying slavery in the South. Indeed, but for them, it would probably have continued on indefinitely longer. But they just as certainly helped to bring on the great Civil War of 1861. How far they are, in part, guilty of the blood of the more than a half-million of men who fell in that great conflict, or whether entirely guiltless, can be known only by the Almighty. As time separates us further and further from the excitements and bitter passions of that eventful period, and when calmness and a just equipoise of mind shall once more be restored (if they are not now), I believe that these Abolitionists will rightly be held responsible for helping to produce a state of bitter antagonism between the two sections, which finally plunged the country into civil war.

The result—the end sought and gained—must not be allowed to blind our judgment. Neither side saw, nor could see that, even if it could justify the means. Men are to be judged by the motives and events present to them, and not by the course of subsequent history. Only in this way can credit or censure be given to those who shaped our history in critical times.

CHAPTER XIV.

SECESSION.

The right of revolution admitted—The right of secession by the states denied by a majority of best statesmen—Robert E. Lee's opinion—Nullification in resolutions of 1798—Mr. Jefferson the author—Nullification in South Carolina—Was the parent of secession—Attributes of sovereignty enumerated—Controversy between the two sections as to slavery reviewed at length—Abolition petitions—Annexation of Texas—Acquisition of territory by the Mexican War—Compromise measures of 1850—Repeal of Missouri Compromise—It arouses the North—Object and hope of Southern statesmen—Extension of slavery into Kansas, New Mexico, Nevada, Colorado, Arizona—Fight in Kansas—Slavery defeated—Secession follows—Was there a sufficient justification of secession considered in full—Legislation of government all favorable to slavery—No more inviting slave territory—Controversy finally became one of opinions—Non-execution of fugitive slave law—Alone not a sufficient justification of secession—New pledges and guaranties offered in 1861—Amendment to constitution proposed protecting slavery—Reflux in opinion in the North—Unpopularity of Abolitionists—Despair of Union men—Haughty bearing of Southern senators and representatives—No concessions would satisfy the South—Summary of facts—Slavery would exist to-day but for the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.

The right of revolution on the part of the people when oppressed by intolerable wrongs is not denied by any one at this day. This right was exercised by our ancestors in the days of the American Revolution, as it had been previously by their ancestors both in England and in Scotland. At a later day, our kinsmen in Texas threw off the yoke of Mexican tyranny, and by arms achieved their independence. In Tennessee, the wise men who framed the constitution of 1796, with the recollection of the long trials of their ancestors still fresh in their minds, asserted this principle as one of the inalienable rights of freemen, too sacred to be touched or impaired by the legislature, in the following words:

"That government being instituted for the common benefit, the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind."

In popular revolutions, each individual must judge for himself whether or not he will throw off his allegiance to the existing government. Certainly this is true as long as that government affords him protection. The theory of secession was, that when a state, by its people, went through the regular forms of withdrawing from the Union, this was the exercise of an act of sovereignty on the part of the people, which carried with it the allegiance of every individual in the state. If it is conceded that secession is a constitutional right on the part of the states, there can be no denial of the truth of this proposition.

But the right of the states to secede from the Union, either peaceably or by force, has at all times been denied by a majority of the greatest statesmen and the best intellects of the land. Of those holding this opinion, I need only mention the names of Hamilton, Marshall, Henry, Lee, the father of Robert E. Lee, Clay, Webster, Calhoun, Jackson, Lincoln and Douglas. Mr. Calhoun, though he believed in the doctrine of nullification on the part of a state, and induced the people of South Carolina to undertake to exercise this right, denied the right of a state to secede from the Union. He held that secession was revolution.[1] In General Long's "Life of General Robert E. Lee," there is a letter from the latter to his son, written from Texas, dated January, 1861, in which he said:

"Secession is nothing but revolution. The framers of our constitution never exhausted so much labor, wisdom and forbearance in its formation, and surrounded it with so many guards and securities, if it was intended to be broken up by every member of the Confederacy at will. It is intended for 'perpetual Union,' so expressed in the

[1] Greeley's "Civil Conflict," Vol. I, p. 357.

preamble, and for the establishment of a government, not a compact, which can only be dissolved by revolution, or the consent of all the people in convention assembled. It is idle to talk of secession."

And yet it is easy to see that General Lee, while holding these views, might go into secession on the ground that his state had done so, believing, according to the theory of strict states' rights, that his first allegiance and duty were due to his state. Such was, I believe, his own justification of his course in 1861.

It is manifest from the preamble of the constitution of the United States that its framers contemplated a perpetual union, since they declared one of their objects to be "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Nullification had its origin in American politics in certain resolutions introduced in the legislature of Kentucky, in 1798, known as the "Resolutions of '98," written by Mr. Jefferson. One of these declared that when the general government assumed powers not delegated by the states, "a nullification of the act was the rightful remedy."[1] They declared, however, that the act nullified must be "so palpably against the constitution as to manifest an undisguised declaration; that the compact between the states was no longer to be regarded." The separate states were to be the judges whether such a condition had arisen as justified nullification, each state judging for itself.

It is difficult to conceive that the great intellect of one of the founders of the government, and a sincere lover of the Union, could have become so clouded by party spirit as to induce him thus to set aside the supreme court, the tribunal especially created by the constitution for the determination of such questions, and to substitute for it mere political bodies—the legislatures of the states. Thus

[1] Parton's "Life of Jackson," Vol. III, p. 433.

were sown the seeds of dissolution only nine years after the constitution went into effect.

Mr. Calhoun, when he induced the legislature of South Carolina, in 1832, to nullify an act of congress, was only carrying into practical effect the doctrine of Mr. Jefferson. The first clause of the South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification declared:

"That the tariff law of 1828, and the amendment to the same of 1832, were null, void and no law, nor binding upon this state, its officers or citizens."

To cut off any attempt to have the constitutionality of the nullifying act tested in the Supreme Court of the United States, it was provided that no appeal should be granted in any case involving its validity, that no copy of the proceedings in such case should be allowed, and any attempt to appeal should be dealt with as a contempt of court. This was done on the ground that the state was the sole judge of the grievance complained of.

Finally, it was provided, that if the government of the United States should attempt to enforce its tariff laws in that state, then South Carolina would no longer consider herself a member of the Federal Union, and would forthwith proceed to organize a separate government.

President Jackson at once took steps to enforce the tariff laws in South Carolina, by sending General Winfield Scott, with an army and navy, to the harbor of Charleston, and soon nullification was at an end.

Nullification was the parent of secession. The theory on which the right of secession was founded was that the constitution was a mere compact between the states, and that they still remained sovereignties, with the right to withdraw from that compact at their will. It may be well to inquire what are the essential attributes of a sovereign state? Among these are the right to make war, conclude treatise of peace, form alliances, grant letters of marque and reprisal, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, lay and collect duties, imposts, excises and

export duties, regulate commerce and trade with foreign nations, define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses against the laws of nations, coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures, emit bills of credit, establish post offices and post roads, and provide for copyrights. There are other attributes belonging to a sovereignty, but these are the leading ones, without which no state can be called sovereign, except in a qualified sense.

Now, by the very terms of the constitution, every one of these rights was conferred on the national government by the states and denied to themselves. Thus:

No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque or reprisal, coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts, pass any bill of attainder, *ex post facto* law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility. No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws. No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep armies or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will admit of no delay.

Finally it was provided that the constitution, and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, and such treaties as might be made, should be "the supreme law of the land, and the judges of every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution and laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." In the management of their own local affairs the states still remained sovereign.

It is often argued that the government of the United States is only the agent of the states, with certain limited

powers, and certain prescribed duties to be performed by them. And yet here is the declaration in the constitution itself that it is the supreme law of the land, and that the judges of the states shall be bound by it notwithstanding the state laws may conflict with it. Where there is a conflict this constitution overrides all state laws and constitutions.

In considering the question whether the South was justified in 1861 in its attempt to overthrow the Union, by the great revolution then inaugurated, it is necessary to review the controversy between the two sections in reference to slavery. From the beginning there was more or less antagonism between them on this subject. But after the year 1834, important events rapidly followed each other, revealing and developing the deep-seated diversity of opinion and interest existing between the two great sections of the country.

The refusal to receive and consider Abolition petitions by the house of representatives, in 1838, gave a real potentiality to the Abolition and the Anti-slavery party. In 1844, the scheme for annexing Texas to the United States was presented to the country by the Democratic party, with an almost open avowal that it was with the purpose of strengthening slavery. A portion of the Northern people now, for the first time, took alarm at the designs of the slave party. The annexation of Texas was consummated in 1845. This, however, did not satisfy the South. Still more slave territory was wanted. In May, 1846, the country was startled by the announcement that "war existed" between the United States and Mexico. Mexico was overrun by the armies of the United States, and its capitol captured. A treaty followed resulting in the acquisition of vast additional territory. The South hoped to profit by this acquisition, by securing California as a slave state. The contest over the admission of that state, over the organization of the new territories, and the passage of a new fugitive slave law, was long and bitter.

Certain of the Southern States, notably South Carolina and Mississippi, were warmly in favor of seceding from the Union at that time. But the patriotism and good sense of the people overrode the ambition and the hot-headedness of the politicians. Mr. Clay's compromise measures of 1850 all passed, not as a whole, but separately. For the time being these gave peace to the country. The clouds of secession were for a time blown away.

As was most natural, these several acts on the part of slaveholders, and particularly their intemperate language and haughty demeanor, in 1850, with their open threat of dissolving the Union, produced a counter current of excitement and ill-will in the North. The Abolition and Free-soil parties were by these means greatly augmented. If all parties had acted in good faith in maintaining these compromises, it is probable, indeed, almost certain, that the calamities of 1861–5 might have been averted, or, at least, indefinitely postponed. In the party conventions of 1852, both of the political parties, the Whigs and the Democrats, solemnly pledged themselves to abide by those measures as a final settlement of the questions embraced in them, and to resist all attempts to renew the agitation of the slavery question in or out of congress. Every question relating to the future status of slavery in the territories, as well as in Texas, had been settled by the Missouri Compromise of 1820 or by that of 1850.

President Pierce, in his inaugural address, in 1853, pledged himself to uphold these compromises. In his message to congress he said those measures had "given renewed vigor to our institutions and restored a sense of repose and security to the public mind." All parties were pledged to the support of the adjustment of 1850, except the Abolitionists and the Free-soil party. In the presidential election of 1852, the Free-soil party only cast in all the North, for John P. Hale, its candidate for president, 155,825 votes. Agitation of the slavery question had nearly ceased everywhere. Occasionally, but only rarely,

were complaints heard in the North about the execution of the new fugitive slave law, but even this was becoming less and less. As remarked by Mr. Blaine, the "era of good feeling of Mr. Monroe's time seemed to have returned."

But, beneath all this calm and smoothness on the surface, there was a hidden and a deep discontent on the part of the strong pro-slavery leaders of the South. California, which they had hoped to see a slave state, was already lost. That destroyed the former equilibrium of the two sections in the senate. But there was still to be settled and formed into states a vast territory west of the Missouri River. The people who were flocking into that region were already asking for the organization of a territorial government under the name of Nebraska. It was soon learned that the soil of that region produced the same products that were raised in Missouri, where slave labor was supposed to be profitable. But the Missouri Compromise line prohibited slavery there. Then, why not repeal the law of 1820? The opportunity was a favorable one. The President was known to be under the influence of Southern men. A majority of both houses of congress was believed to be under the same influence.

In one month after Mr. Pierce had said that the repose of the country "should suffer no shock during his administration," that repose was rudely broken by Mr. Archibald Dixon, of Kentucky, the successor of Mr. Clay, in the senate, arising in his place and giving notice of his intention to move "that the Missouri Compromise be repealed, and that the citizens of the several states shall" (should) "be at liberty to take and hold their slaves within any of the territories." Soon after this, Mr. Douglas reported a bill in the senate to organize the territories of Kansas and Nebraska, in which it was declared that the Missouri Compromise was inoperative and void, because "inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by congress with slavery in the states and territories as recognized by the

compromise measures of 1850." Four months after this time, this bill had received the approval of both houses of congress and of the President, and the time-honored Missouri Compromise, which had received the homage of the people of both sections for thirty years, was no more.

Mr. Blaine says that if Mr. Douglas had "proposed to abolish the constitution itself, the surprise could scarcely have been greater." Forty Democratic representatives from the North refused to follow Mr. Douglas and his allies. But the measure received the support of every Whig senator from the South, except that of John Bell, of Tennessee, and of every Democratic member of the house from the South, except Thomas H. Benton, of Missouri, and John Millson, of Virginia. Sam Houston was the only Democratic senator from the South who voted against the measure. Of the Whigs in the house from the South only seven could be induced to withstand the pro-slavery pressure. Of these, honorable mention may be made of Emerson Ethridge and William Cullom, of Tennessee, and of Theodore G. Hunt, of Louisiana. Such tried Whigs in the senate as John M. Clayton, George E. Badger, James A. Pierce and James C. Jones, all united in destroying the greatest monument erected by the genius and the patriotism of Mr. Clay.

Never before in the history of the country, and never but once since, has there been aroused such universal and wide-spread excitement as this measure created in the North. The angry winds of popular indignation swept over the country with the violence of a tornado. The clamor of the Abolitionists, which had died to a whisper under the quieting effect of the peaceful measures of 1850, once more burst forth with terrific madness. Rage and fury took the place of moderation. Conservative Democrats and conservative Whigs, Free-soilers and Abolitionists, and Anti-slavery men of every shade of opinion, coalesced and came together with one mind and a common purpose, under the new name of Republicans. The old

Whig party, which after so many years of honorable achievement in statesmanship, and which constituted a large and the better part of the Northern people, was swept almost solidly into the new organization. In the presidential election of 1856, the 155,825 votes cast for Mr. Hale in 1852 were swollen to 1,341,264 for Mr. Fremont, a gain of nearly twelve hundred thousand votes.

The repeal of the Missouri Compromise line was regarded by a majority of the people of the North, and by many of the South, as a gross violation of good faith and the wanton destruction of a sacred national compact. If this could be destroyed for party or sectional purposes, there was nothing so sacred, so consecrated by time, as to be safe and beyond the ruthless hand of sectional ambition and sectional necessity. It was well known that the object was to open the territory north of 36° 30′ for the entrance of slavery, which, under the compact of 1820, had been forever dedicated to freedom by Southern as well as Northern votes. This wrong naturally created a frenzy of rage in the North, and resulted in the election of Mr. Lincoln in 1860. Other causes legitimately growing out of this repeal subsequently contributed to this result. But all can be traced to the bad faith of 1854 in repealing the Missouri Compromise, which had divided our territory fairly, it was thought, between freedom and slavery.

At first view, it seems that the repeal of this line was an act of supreme folly on the part of the slaveholders. Perhaps it was not so from their point of view. They were led by able, sagacious, far-seeing statesmen. They needed and desired more slave territory and more slave states, whether the South should remain in the Union or go out of it. In the former case, the equilibrium in the senate, lost on the admission of California as a free state, must be restored at all hazards, or slavery would always be at the mercy of the North. On the other hand, if the South should separate from the North, it was imperative for its safety and power that its territory should be as ex-

tended, and its resources as varied and as great as possible. It was still possible in 1854, it was thought, to capture Kansas (then including nearly all of Colorado) and Utah (including all of Nevada) and New Mexico (then including Arizona), all stretching along substantially the same latitude as that of Missouri, except New Mexico, which is south of it. All of these lay north of the Missouri Compromise line, and slavery was therefore prohibited in them. Thus, in order to enter that region with slaves, it was necessary to remove that inhibition. If, by boldness and daring enterprise, Kansas could be won as a slave state, it would probably control the destiny of Utah and New Mexico, as Missouri was expected to control the status of Kansas.

The conception of seizing and occupying this large territory in the interest of slavery was a daring and magnificent one. If successful, slavery would be secure for several generations longer, and the slaveholding influence would continue to dominate the councils of the nation. On the other hand, if the Southern States should secede from the Union, the territory thus secured would, with the existing slave states, form a splendid Confederacy, able to compete successfully with its Northern neighbor. The scheme was a hazardous one, but the results magnificent, if it should be successful. No time was to be lost. The free states were year by year becoming stronger, while the slave states were growing relatively weaker. Shortly before the death of Mr. Calhoun, in 1850, he wrote to a friend in Alabama that it was the duty of the South to force upon the North the issue of the preservation of slavery in the Union. "We are now stronger," said he, "than we shall hereafter be politically and morally. Unless we bring on the issue, delay to us will be dangerous indeed." If he had lived, the issue might have been forced in 1850.

As soon as the Kansas-Nebraska bill, repealing the Missouri Compromise line was passed, thus opening all the territory of the United States to the entrance of slavery, a

rush was made by the South for Kansas, to secure that territory. The North was equally alert, and poured in its thousands to take part in the last peaceful contest over slavery in the territories. After a long, exciting and bitter contest, sometimes resulting in bloodshed, and narrowly escaping civil war, Kansas came into the Union as a free state. All hope of an equilibrium in the senate on the part of the South, was now forever hopelessly gone. Then followed the memorable presidential election of 1860, with all its wild excitements and striking dramatic historical incidents, resulting in the election of a sectional candidate for president. Every one knew, as the result became known, that great and stirring events were now impending. In the contingency which had just happened, it was well known that South Carolina stood ready to withdraw from the Union. Scarcely had the exultant echoes of the election died away on the air, before that state, through its legislature, took measures in that direction—the first step in the mighty drama which was speedily to follow. A month later, and South Carolina no longer belonged to the the splendid sisterhood of states in the Union. One bright star had disappeared. Others soon followed, shooting madly from their spheres. In three months a Southern Confederacy was organized, with its president, its department chiefs, and with an army in the field. The sound of the preparation for war was heard in every seceding state. While the North looked on in petrified stupor, war, open and flagrant, was commenced by the seizure, by organized armed men, of every assailable fort and arsenal belonging to the government, within the seceding states. Finally, on the ever memorable 12th of April, 1861, while the president of the Republic and a majority of the people of the North, stood still with outstretched arms, pleading for peace, pleading with their erring sisters to return, a number of batteries erected for the purpose, simultaneously opened fire on the national flag which still floated over Fort Sumter. The great conflict which was to preserve or

to destroy the Union of our fathers, which was to establish the supremacy of slavery, or to destroy it, had commenced.

In the light of history, was there a sufficient justification of the South in thus rushing into war? Let Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, late vice-president of the Southern Confederacy, answer: "The government of the United States," said Mr. Stephens, before the Georgia legislature in 1860, "is the best and freest government; the most equal in its measures, the most just in its decisions, and the most inspiring in its principles to elevate the race of men, that the sun of Heaven ever shone upon. Now, for you to attempt to overthrow such a government as this, under which we have lived for more than three-quarters of a century, in which we have gained our wealth, our standing as a nation, our domestic safety, while the elements of peril are around, with peace and tranquillity accompanied with unbounded prosperity and rights unassailed—is the height of madness, folly and wickedness, to which I can neither lend my sanction, nor my vote."

Every act of the government from its foundation so far as we can recall, had been favorable to the slaveholders. There was not, in its entire history, a single act of hostile legislation. Even the Ordinance of 1787, for the government of the territory north-west of the Ohio River, in excluding after its passage the introduction of slaves into that territory, was not regarded at the time as hostile. It was passed unanimously, excepting one vote from New York. The Southern members all supported it.[1]

In the ordinance prepared by Mr. Jefferson in the Congress of the Confederation in 1784, he proposed to "exclude slavery after the year 1800, from all our territory already ceded or to be ceded," north of the parallel of 31 degrees. This would have excluded slavery from Kentucky, Ten-

[1] Roosevelt's "Winning of the West," Vol. III, p. 257.

nessee, Alabama and Mississippi, as well as from the North-west Territory.

The fugitive slave law of 1793, which was passed under our constitution, was enacted in the interest of slavery. Mr. Webster, in at least two of his speeches, one at Buffalo and one at Albany, in 1851, declared that the law of 1793 was more unfavorable to the slave than that of 1850, and therefore more favorable to the slave owner.[1]

In framing the Federal Constitution, the slaveholding states obtained, as it seems at this day, two important and remarkable concessions and advantages, aside from the clause providing for the return of fugitives bound to service. Considering the strong anti-slavery feeling then existing in the states, both North and South, the provision sanctioning the African slave trade until the year 1808 is extraordinary. But perhaps quite as noticeable is the provision for the apportionment of representatives and direct taxes among the states, which were to be determined by adding to the number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, three-fifths of the slaves; that is, the number of representatives in congress and in the election of president and vice-president was to be increased in the slave states three-fifths by reason of the slaves. At the same time, when direct taxes were to be laid by the government, a slave, though property, was counted, not at his full value, but at three-fifths thereof. Both these provisions were in the interest and for the benefit of slavery. The convention had come to a stand-still on the question of the further importation of slaves, the ratio of representation, the right to regulate commerce, and other questions, and there was danger that it would break up without forming a constitution. North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia claimed the right to import slaves, and threatened not to enter into the Union unless the right was conceded. Finally, the New

[1] " Webster's Works, Vol. II.

England States, in the interest of their own commerce, and of Northern ship-owners, united with those states, and adopted the clause allowing the slave trade to continue until the year 1808. The constitution was, as to these questions, a compromise without which it never could have been formed.

In the acquisition of the Territory of Louisiana, in 1803, the slaveholding interest of the states was greatly benefited, though this was not the object of Mr. Jefferson in making the purchase. By reason of it, Louisiana came into the Union a few years later as a slave state. Afterwards, Arkansas and Missouri, which formed a part of the Louisiana purchase, were admitted also as slave states. Again, in the purchase of Florida, in 1819, slavery was strengthened and its area extended, that territory coming into the Union as a slave state. In the controversy over the admission of Missouri, in 1820, as we have seen, the South accepted and secured the compromise line of the parallel of 36 degrees, 30 minutes, south of which slavery might be introduced, and north of which it was forever prohibited. In this the South got all it asked.

When we come down to a later period, to the annexation of Texas, in 1845, the South gained another slave state, seven times as large as Tennessee, with an agreement forming a part of the fundamental contract, that four states might be formed out of the territory, all of which would, of course, have been slave states. Then followed the Mexican War, inaugurated, as was charged and believed, by President Polk and other Southern men, for the purpose of strengthening and extending slavery. The war resulted, as was anticipated, in the acquisition of a large addition to our territory. Out of this the South hoped to gain more slave states. New Mexico and the southern part of California lay south of the line of 36 degrees, 30 minutes, and it was supposed that slavery could go there. The North, seeing the ambitious designs of the slavehold-

ers, had become greatly aroused, and many of its statesmen determined that not a foot more of the common territory of the United States should be "stained" with the crime of slavery. The excitement became intense. Many of the pro-slavery leaders in the South advocated as a remedy the secession of the slave states from the Union. The attempt would have been made in 1850, instead of 1861, but it was found that the people were not yet ready for that hazardous and startling movement. While the storm of excitement was still raging in congress, and in the country, the people of California, in their sovereign capacity, formed a constitution excluding slavery from that state. The slavery propagandists were indignant at the loss of California, but what could they do? The people had decided the question for themselves.

In the compromise of 1850, California was admitted as a free state; New Mexico and Utah were organized as territorial governments, leaving the question of slavery open to be settled by the citizens thereof; the slave trade was abolished in the District of Columbia; the Texas boundary line was settled, and a more stringent fugitive slave law passed. The law, for the more effectual rendition of fugitive slaves to their owners, was framed to suit the views of the slaveholders, and was mainly the work of a Southern senator, Mr. James M. Mason, of Virginia. While this law did not fully meet the approval of the extreme men of the South, for a time at least, they accepted it in good faith. On the other hand, a cry of indignant rage on the part of the Abolitionists was at once heard all over the North.

The excitement over the new fugitive slave law, however, had gradually died out in 1854, when the Kansas-Nebraska bill was thrown as a fire-brand into the magazine of passion and prejudice, only slumbering in the North. It then burst into a devouring flame that never afterwards subsided. The South expected to profit by this measure, and supposed it was gaining large advantages.

But we have seen that these benefits were as illusory as the fabled apples of the East, beautiful to look upon, but turning to bitter ashes on the lips. The contest was transferred from the arena of congress to the plains of Kansas. Under the first trial of the South's new doctrine of "non-intervention and popular sovereignty," Kansas was lost, and thus the gateway to New Mexico and Utah was closed and barred forever.

Then came a change of front on the part of the South. The doctrine of non-intervention by congress as to slavery in the territories, proclaimed in 1854, was abandoned, and "intervention" for its protection was demanded. As applied to the remaining territories, this claim, if it had been granted, was a mere airy abstraction, a mere theory of no practical value whatever to slavery. It was an easy matter to get slavery into the territories. The difficulty was to keep it there. By the Kansas-Nebraska bill, as well as by the Dred Scott decision, all territory belonging to the United States was already open to the introduction of slavery. The slave owner was at perfect liberty to take his slaves to Utah or New Mexico if he was willing to take the hazard of losing them afterwards. Both regions were high and mountainous, and supposed to be unfavorable to slavery. In these natural conditions, Mr. Webster said in 1850, in his celebrated 7th of March speech, he found a stronger prohibition of slavery than in any possible ordinance or enactment of congress. He would not, he said, "re-enact the law of God." Under the favorite doctrine of the South, adopted in 1854, leaving the people of the territories "free to regulate their domestic institutions in their own way," slavery could not exist long in any territory with a majority of the people thereof hostile to it.

In the great debates between Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Douglas, in Illinois, in 1858, in reply to a searching question by Mr. Lincoln, the latter said, with great shrewdness, avoiding the force of the Dred Scott decision, "the people of a territory have the lawful means to introduce or ex-

clude slavery as they choose, for the reason that slavery cannot exist unless supported by local police regulations. . . . If the people are opposed to slavery, they will, by unfriendly legislation, effectually prevent its introduction." It was the final realization of this fact that made the slaveholders in 1860 and 1861 demand that "slave property should be securely protected (in the territories) until the period for the formation of a state government should arrive."

After the admission of Kansas, the controversy became one of opinions merely. There was nothing substantial in it, except the complaint of the non-execution of the fugitive slave law. The demand for the protection of slavery in the territories was a delusive cry to hide defeat. There was not a territory in the land where slavery would have gone if all the nation's army had been present to protect it. The South demanded protection, but there was nothing to protect. The North demanded inhibition, but there was nothing to inhibit. The South should have accepted its defeat, invited by its own extreme aggressiveness. The North should have been satisfied with its triumph, won largely for it by its adversaries, and against its own will and efforts.

The charge that the Southern States were deprived of their true equality in the Union was without foundation. In what respect? No man could point out wherein the alleged inequality consisted.

The charge so often and so constantly made, that the Southern States were deprived of their equal rights in the territories, is believed to be unfounded. The foregoing review conclusively shows the error of the charge. In fact, the very last legislation by congress on the subject of slavery in the territories was dictated by the friends of slavery and supported by the South. From the beginning of the government all the way down its history to 1854, whatever the South demanded in the territories which could be the subject of congressional action, was granted.

The most serious charge was the non-execution in good faith in the North of the fugitive slave law. Unfortunately for the people of this country, this was true in some of the free states. Certain states, in their blindness and madness, forgetting their duty to the constitution and their duty to their sister states, passed laws designed to hinder and obstruct the execution of that law. There was, and there can be, no justification of the people of any state, whether on the plea of material interests or conscientious scruples, for nullifying, evading, or defeating a plain constitutional law. The obstruction of the fugitive slave law ought to have been dealt with in the United States courts as treason or insurrection. Law, when upheld by strong men, is more potent than armies. The misfortune was that weak men then ruled in the national administration.

Conceding the fact that this law was not executed with the faithfulness with which it should have been, this alone constituted no sufficient justification for dissolving the Union. Many of the free states did not aid in any way in obstructing or defeating the execution of the law. The loss of slaves, and especially the loss by reason of the non-execution of this law, except possibly in Virginia, was too small to justify the dissolution of a great government. South Carolina, the earliest and the loudest in complaints, and the first to secede, probably did not lose twenty-five fugitive slaves a year. All of the states that seceded, except Virginia and Texas, were protected on their exposed border by slave states. It was the border states that did not secede on which fell nearly all the loss of runaway slaves, and this loss was comparatively insignificant in the aggregate.

Now, when it is remembered that secession from the Union destroyed the constitutional obligation to return fugitives to their owners, and rendered null the law itself, it can at once be seen how unjustifiable, in the forum of reason and common sense, was secession for this cause. It

was blindly throwing away one of the safeguards and securities the slave owner had for this kind of property, without getting anything in return. It cannot be easily believed that the people of the seceded states attached much practical importance to this grievance in determining their action in 1861, except as a matter of sacred principle. In this regard, it is confessed, they had ground for serious alarm and complaint, as they also had by reason of the ceaseless agitation of the slavery question.

Nor did the election to the presidency of a sectional candidate constitute any justifiable ground for secession.

I do not by any means overlook or underestimate the great principle involved by the nullification by a part of the Northern states of the fugitive slave law, and the constant efforts of Abolitionists to destroy slavery. I condemn these things as earnestly as the most extreme secessionist. If persisted in, after solemn remonstrance and negotiation, the first might have constituted a sufficient cause of war, or at least of retaliation; but, according to the opinion of Mr. A. H. Stephens, as we shall see in the next chapter, not until the last means of diplomacy were exhausted.

Certainly the pretense that Mr. Lincoln was a sectional candidate came with an exceedingly ill grace from the men who nominated and supported Mr. Breckenridge. He was nominated on sectional issues, and had no considerable following, and received no electoral votes, except in one section. Mr. Breckenridge and Mr. Lincoln were both sectional candidates, and each received only sectional support. Mr. Bell was the only national candidate. His election would have prevented secession. If the North had been as anxious in 1860 to save the Union as it became in 1861, it would have voted for Mr. Bell, and thus saved itself from its deep humiliation in trying to conciliate the South afterwards.

If, however, Mr. Lincoln had been elected on a platform which avowed the purpose of attacking and overthrowing

the institution of slavery, and if he had approved that purpose, then the Southern people would have been unworthy of freedom and the respect of mankind, if they had not prepared for resistance, and summoned every son of theirs to the battle-field. But the very opposite was the case. The Chicago Convention of 1860, which nominated Mr. Lincoln, declared in its platform as follows:

"That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the states and especially the right of each state, to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment, exclusively, is essential to that balance of powers on which the perpetuation and endurance of our political fabric depends, and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any state or territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes."

This declaration was in strict accordance with the views of Mr. Lincoln, avowed by him in the most explicit manner in innumerable ways, from the time he first entered public life down to the day he was inaugurated as president. No man could have been more explicit on this question. He not only declared the want of authority on his part as president to interfere with slavery, in the states where it then existed, but he also in the most solemn manner declared to the world that he had no desire, nor intention of doing so. Nor had congress any such power. No intelligent man could have been found who would have risked his reputation for common sense, by asserting such power in that body. As far back as 1780, the first congress under the constitution defined its position and its power on this subject, in the following lucid words, from which it never departed:

"Resolved, That congress have no authority to interfere in the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them in any of the states, it remaining with the the several states alone to provide rules and regulations therein, which humanity and good policy require."

Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, in his great Union speech before the legislature of Georgia, November 14, 1860, declared that to secede in consequence of the election of Mr. Lincoln would be to break the constitution. "We went into the election with this people," he said, "the result was different from what we wished, but the election was constitutionally held."[1] And in his letter to Mr. Lincoln, already quoted, he said that "the people of the South do not entertain any fears that a Republican administration, or at least the one about to be inaugurated, would attempt to interfere directly and immediately with slavery in the states."

But granting that there was just grounds for apprehension on the part of the people of the South, as to the future security of slavery, the events that transpired subsequently to the election of Mr. Lincoln, and before the firing on Fort Sumter, were amply sufficient to remove every such fear, and to afford the most convincing assurance of its future safety; indeed, that the slave states would thereafter enjoy their constitutional rights in the Union, with higher and more solemn guaranties than they did in the earlier days of the government. New pledges of good faith were offered in the most generous terms, and in the most fraternal spirit. Six weeks after the election of Mr. Lincoln, the country was aroused, as if from a dream, by the announcement that South Carolina claimed to be no longer a member of the Union. A half dozen other slave states were preparing to follow her fatal lead. The North was startled, surprised and alarmed. The threats of secession made before that time had been regarded by the North as mere bluster and bravado. Now it was seen that they were the expression of a mature and long-settled determination.

Congress was in session, and a committee of thirteen members was appointed by the senate, and one of thirty-one in the house, to consider matters of compromise and

[1] Nicolay & Hay's "Life of Lincoln," Vol. III, p. 267.

conciliation. The senate committee failed to agree on anything. The house committee, of which Thomas Corwin was chairman, reported almost unanimously, only three members voting against the recommendations, in favor of the abolition of all the personal liberty laws of the Northern States; for the admission of New Mexico, which then included Arizona, as a slave state; for an amendment of the fugitive slave law providing that the question of the right to freedom of a fugitive should be tried in the state from which he fled; and for an amendment to the constitution providing that no subsequent amendment, having for its object any interference with slavery shall originate with any state that does not recognize that relation within its own limits, or shall be valid without the assent of every one of the states composing the Union. The last proposition came from Charles Francis Adams, a distinguished anti-slavery man from Massachusetts, who had been the candidate of the Free-soil party for the vice-presidency in 1848.

While the propositions were under consideration in the house, Mr. Corwin, also a distinguished member of the Free-soil party, offered the following as a substitute, to become the thirteenth amendment to the constitution: "No amendment shall be made to the constitution which will authorize or give to congress the power to abolish or interfere within any state with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held for labor or service by the laws of said state." This proposed amendment passed the house by a vote of 133 to 65, and the senate by a vote of 24 to 12. In the house it received the votes of the following distinguished members of the Republican party: Mr. Sherman, Mr. Colfax, Mr. Charles F. Adams, Mr. Howard, Mr. Windom, and Messrs. Moorehead and McPherson. In the senate, of the Southern senators who voted for it were Mr. Hunter, Mr. Nicholson, Mr. Sebastian and Mr. Gwin. The following Republican senators voted for it: Anthony, Baker, Dixon, Foster, Grimes, Harlan,

Morrill and Ten Eyck. Mr. Seward, Mr. Fessenden and Mr. Collamer did not vote, and as pairs were not announced, Mr. Blaine says, "it may be presumed that they consented to the passage of the amendment."

This proposed amendment tied the hands of congress forever. No amendment looking to the abolition of slavery could ever be passed by congress. So far as the national government was concerned, it made slavery perpetual, and firmly entrenched it in the constitution. Two states, Ohio and Maryland, soon ratified the amendment. The New England States rejected it. In many of the states, by reason of the rapidity of passing events, and the rage caused by the firing on Sumter, the amendment was never considered. Had not the hope of peace been rudely destroyed by the haste of the secession leaders, perhaps in part to prevent this very thing, there is strong reason to believe that it would have secured the approval of enough states to have made it a part of the constitution, provided the Southern States had promptly ratified it, instead of madly precipitating the country into war.

Security for slavery in the Union was not what the extreme Southern leaders wanted. It was independence—a new government, outside of the Union. Their acts tend to the conclusion that no compromise, no concession, no constitutional guaranties would have satisfied them.

In the senate, the committee of thirteen reported in favor of immediately admitting New Mexico, including Arizona, into the Union, with the slave code already existing there, thus making it a slave state. Another strange anomaly followed. For twelve years the Free-soil party had been earnestly insisting on the application of the "Wilmot proviso" (prohibiting slavery) to every territory that was about to be organized. It had been successfully demanded in reference to Oregon, lying away north of any slave state. It had been demanded also at a later day as to Kansas. Indeed, the cardinal article in the creed of the Republican party was opposition to the

extension of slavery into the new territories. On this creed the victory of 1860 had been won. On this issue, nominally at least, the North and South had joined battle in that canvass. And yet, so great was the alarm in the North, in the winter of 1860–1, that acts were passed, reported by a Democratic senator, Mr. Greene of Missouri, organizing the territories of Colorado, Dakota and Nevada, all north of the parallel of 36 degrees 30 minntes, without any slavery restriction, and the Republicans quietly allowed these things to be done without a word of protest. Mr. Sumner, Mr. Seward, Mr. Wade and Mr. Chandler, and other stalwart Republicans, and Mr. Stevens, Mr. Lovejoy, and others in the house sat still while the corner-stone of their party edifice was thus openly taken away. These men and their associates had, in 1850, denounced Mr. Webster as recreant and a traitor for doing, in the case of New Mexico, what they were now doing themselves. However much their conduct in this and in other cases, during the winter of 1860–1, may expose them to the impeachment of insincerity in their previous professions—of being guided by a regard for personal and party success rather than by a solemn regard for principle—the charge would only be partially true in this case. No doubt there was some truth in it, for they were ambitious politicians and political agitators. They had gone on agitating the slavery question, sometimes in defense of the rights of the North, and in the interest of good faith and solemn compacts, as in 1854, and sometimes aggressively, if not wantonly, assailing the rights of their brethren in the South, until they had helped to set in motion currents of angry passion that were now roaring around them mountain high, before which they sat appalled and speechless, In common with their co-agitators in the South, they had raised a storm that threatened the destruction of the very foundations of the government. The high tide of popular excitement which had lifted the Republican party into power was now rapidly ebbing and flowing outward.

In view of the terrible dangers that were only too visible in the South, threatening the integrity of the Union, a reflux in feeling had set in in the North. Public meetings were held all over the free states, imploring conciliation, compromise, concession. A petition of the mayor and aldermen with twenty-two thousand signatures came even from Boston, praying for the adoption of the Crittenden Compromise—a measure similar to the Corwin amendment. Wendell Phillips, after one of his eloquent and bitter harangues in Boston, had to be escorted home by the police to save him from violence; George William Curtis had to cancel one of his engagements to lecture in the peaceful and staid city of Philadelphia, to avoid mob violence. Horace Greeley would let the "wayward sisters go in peace" rather than have bloodshed. Thus the Abolitionists and the Anti-slavery men, when brought face to face with the terrible reality of secession, were paralized with the appalling danger. They were now willing to make the most humiliating concessions for the sake of saving the Union. It was the knowledge of these facts, with a sincere desire to save the Union, that largely influenced their course in Washington, in 1861.

What a change since 1860 in the tone of the defiant Abolitionists. Then slavery must be abolished; now they were willing that it should be extended and protected. Then the constitution was a league with hell, because it recognized slavery; now it should be amended so as to lock and bar the door forever against its extinction. And now for the first time, perhaps, they felt in their hearts the warm glow of a love of country, instead of a love of a mere section. Such revolutions in feeling and sentiment as took place in the Northern mind in the winter of 1861, are no uncommon things in the history of nations. Like the waves of the sea, nothing is more unstable than the mind of the people.

During the months of December, January and February, great events followed one another with the rapidity of

JOSEPH ANDERSON.

Territorial Judge and Eighteen Years U. S. Senator.

shadows passing over the fields. Seven states had already seceded. Others were preparing to follow. The South had become a great military camp. The Southern people were rushing to arms like the Crusaders under the preaching of Peter the Hermit. Nearly all the Southern senators and representatives had gradually gone home. The scene in Washington during the months of January and February would have been supremely ludicrous, if it had not been supremely perilous—so full was it of the dark shadows of coming events. While Northern senators and representatives, and the Peace Congress, and all the great functionaries of government, and the press of the North, were using every possible means of conciliation—were, in fact, actually imploring their Southern brethren not to leave—the latter were quietly and deliberately packing up their effects ready to depart when it should suit them. The deliberation with which they made ready to leave for their homes was in the highest degree impressive. From time to time as their several states seceded, in a highly picturesque manner, they formally delivered their farewell speeches. Their last words, in some cases kind and regretful at parting, were in others full of bitter reproaches for the men who had, in some cases, bowed themselves to the very dust to placate them. When from time to time they returned to their homes, they did so in triumph.

Consternation and dark despair clouded every loyal face. No one knew what to do. Indecision filled the high places of the government. The president was irresolute in the presence of the enemies of the Union. Some of the members of his cabinet were plotting revolution. The only persons with erect heads and unclouded brows were the bold and daring Southern leaders, who with confident bearing, bore themselves as if already conquerors. Almost Stygian darkness seemed to be gathering over the capitol. The croaking raven, with sable wings, uttered its dismal cry, ominous of coming disaster. Only one true man in

all the North was calm, unmoved, undismayed by the raging storm. That man was Abraham Lincoln. He uttered no reproaches and no threats, but in the spirit of exalted patriotism invoked the blessings of peace upon his distracted country. In the Southern States, even then, mad ambition had its feet in the stirrups and grasped the reins, and waited only for the bugle call sounding the charge. Such was the condition of the country when Abraham Lincoln became president, March 4, 1861.

None of the proposed concessions—indeed, no possible concessions, it is believed—would have satisfied these Southern leaders. Attempted conciliation only served to make them more confident and daring. It strengthened their belief that secession would be accomplished peacefully—even without firing a gun. The conduct of the North was taken as evidence of fear of the South. They totally misunderstood, as they found out a few weeks later, the motive and spirit of the North.

Senator Alfred Iverson, of Georgia, in withdrawing from the Senate, said: "For myself, unless my opinions greatly change, I shall never consent to the reconstruction of the Federal Union. The Rubicon is passed, and with my consent shall never be recrossed."

On the 10th day of April, 1861, in response to a serenade in Charleston, Roger A. Pryor, lately a member of congress from Virginia, said, among other things:

"Gentlemen, I thank you, especially that you have at last annihilated this cursed Union, reeking with corruption, and insolent with excess of tyranny. Thank God, it is at last blasted and riven by the lightning wrath of an outraged and indignant people. Not only is it gone, but gone forever. In the expressive language of Scripture, it is water spilt on the ground and can not be gathered up. Like Lucifer, son of the morning, it has fallen, never to rise again. For my part, gentlemen, if Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin, to-morrow, were to abdicate their office, and were to give me a blank sheet of paper to write

the conditions of re-annexation to the defunct Union, I would scornfully spurn the overture. . . . I do invoke you, in your demonstrations of popular opinion, in your exhibitions of official interest, to give no countenance to the idea of reconstruction."

It thus appears that, from the adoption of the federal constitution down to 1861, there had not been a single act of national legislation, nor a single act on the part of the national governmant designed to be hostile to slavery. Some of these may, in their operation, have proved injurious to the interests of slavery, notably the repeal of the Missouri Compromise line; but they were passed to help that interest and not to injure it. It is, therefore, evident that there existed, in 1861, no substantial justification for secession, or revolution under the name of secession. It was absolutely without any justifiable cause, when viewed in the light of facts and history, except as to the questions, easy of adjustment, hereafter to be pointed out.

And when we recall the conduct of the Northern statesmen and the Northern people, in 1861; when we remember that congress proposed to amend the organic law of the land, in reference to slavery, engrafting that institution upon the constitution as never before, in language so strong as to defy evasion, and hedging slavery about with guards and buttresses which practically made it national as well as perpetual; when we recall how the people of the North almost abased themselves in manifestations of good will toward their Southern brethren, it becomes plainly manifest, in view of these facts, that this great and destructive revolution should have been avoided; that it was without sufficient justification, judged in the light of all moral laws relating to war.

In view of this long array of facts, showing that the influence of the slavery interest had been dominant in the national councils from 1787 down to 1860, does it not seem that the states that had seceded, in the spring of 1861, should have waited until it could be known certainly whether the

proposed amendment to the constitution would be ratified by a sufficient number of states, including the slave states, to become operative, and whether the Northern States would repeal their personal liberty acts? Suppose the Southern States, through their conventions or legislatures, had solemnly, kindly and firmly said to their brethren of the North, as Mr. Stephens suggested: "Our remaining in the Union, or returning to it, depends solely upon your giving us the new guaranty for the security of our slaves, and upon your repealing such laws as obstruct the complete execution of the fugitive slave laws."

No one can say positively what the Northern people would have done in response to such a proposition, but in view of the earnest, indeed almost universal desire at that time in the North for the preservation of peace, and in favor of concession and conciliation, the chances are very great that the terms demanded would have been granted. Public opinion, it is believed, would have been so strongly in favor of such peace measures that it would have overwhelmed the Abolitionists everywhere except in New England. The differences between the North and the South should have been adjusted by generous concessions. The people of the two sections were brethren, and should have dwelt together in peace as they do now. Surely conciliation and compromise were better than a long and desolating war. The South was right as to the non-execution of the fugitive slave law, but in error in rushing into war without exhausting the last means of diplomacy.

After the repeal immediately followed the last battle between freedom and slavery on the plains of Kansas, resulting in the defeat of the South. Henceforth there could be no more new slave states, unless Texas were divided as it was provided that it might be. But for the outburst of indignation caused by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise line, Kansas, under the decision in the Dred Scott case, might have become a slave state. But for

that repeal New Mexico and Arizona might ultimately have been added to the slave states, if slaveholders had been bold enough to go there. But for that repeal, as I firmly believe, there would have been no civil war in 1861. It awoke and set aflame passions, prejudices and hatreds that could be cooled only by blood. But for it, slavery would almost certainly exist to-day in the Southern States as it did in 1861, with Abolitionists and Abolition societies still agitating. The South destroyed slavery when no other power on earth could have done so. The North opposed the great repeal, with an uprising against it like the gathering of a nation for war, and yet under its operation it saw the South checked and driven back in its own chosen field of trial. The South demanded the repeal, and yet in a little while it saw, as the bitter fruit of that unwise act, slavery perish and disappear forever from the land.

CHAPTER XV.

THE CAUSES OF SECESSION.

The real causes of secession—Antagonistic opinions between the North and the South—Diverse interests—Difference in ways, thoughts, social tendencies, politics, religions, philosophy—The South conservative, the North progressive—The South finally came to hate the North—Mutual reproaches—Condition of the South described—Planters' contempt for Northern people—Two adverse systems of civilization—Mr. Iverson's speech—Loss of political power by the South—Incompatibility between the two peoples assigned as a cause for separation—Secession long meditated—The desire for a new government founded on Southern ideas the most powerful motive—Slavery to be the corner-stone—More slaves necessary—Slavery in no danger in 1861—Mr. Sherman's resolution—Mr. Lincoln's solemn assurances in his inaugural address—Independence out of the Union the object of Southern leaders—The border states hesitate—Something must be done—The blow is struck—Virginia and Tennessee wheel into line—Wisdom of Mr. Lincoln—Places the Confederacy in the wrong—Does not muster a man—Confederacy probably would have succeeded but for the firing on Sumter—Feeling in the North at that time—Democratic party of the North in part responsible for the war—Abolition party responsible for a part of the blood shed—Certain free states violated the constitution in reference to the fugitive slave law—Passed nullifying laws—Mr. Stephens denies that these were sufficient alone to justify secession and war—People of the North ready for any concession—The controversy could and ought to have been settled—A single issue by the South—Too many issues—Exaggerations—The politician's war—Slaveholders at first generally opposed to it—A few men started secession—Character of Southern men—brave and honest—Tribute to Southern women.

In the preceding chapter, I attempted to show that there was no justifiable ground for the attempted secession of the eleven Southern States in 1861, founded on any legislation or action of the national government in reference to the institution of slavery. It will be my purpose in this chapter to point out what were the real causes that induced a majority of the Southern people to embark in the scheme of setting up a new empire in the South.

For many years prior to 1861, the people of the North and of the South had been drifting further and further apart. This divergence related to nearly every question of the age—political, social, economic, and religious. Massachusetts was typical of the North and South Carolina of the South. Both were extreme. The South, in the course of time, came to dislike the Northern people—their ways, their thoughts, their social tendencies, their political opinions, their religions, their philosophy—with intense hatred. It had seen Massachusetts pass from the austere and gloomy faith of Jonathan Edwards, and sometimes, at an early date, from the most cruel practices in the name of religion, into the regions of speculation, sometimes bordering on the very confines of unbelief. A part of its people had in two centuries passed from the most austere Calvinism to tenets of doubtful orthodoxy, from extreme narrowness to unrestrained liberality, from the simple philosophy of the fathers to a mystical transcendentalism. Many of its people, the descendants of slaveholders, had become the most bitter and fanatical of Abolitionists. They had abandoned many of the old land-marks which had made the Puritan fathers famous throughout the world, and set up new sign-posts. All this they called progress. The South Carolina of 1861, on the other hand, with the exception of an evolution in political opinion, was the same it had been at the time of the formation of the government. In religion, the Presbyterianism of 1861 was the same the Covenanter fathers had taught in the days of colonial existence. The Methodists, the Baptists, and the Episcopalians were just the same in faith and practice that their fathers had been. This was called conservatism. Wild theories in these respects had gained no foothold there. The simple faith, practices and opinions of former days still prevailed in reference to religious, social and moral duties.

Massachusetts had imported and owned, and had bought and sold slaves, and made great gain therein; now slavery

was accursed of heaven, and every vestige of it must be removed from the land. South Carolina had remonstrated against the introduction of so many slaves into the state while it was a colony; now her statesmen demanded a larger number.

The people of Massachusetts were a commercial and a manufacturing people. The inhabitants of the South were, on the contrary, for the most part, planters. In their estimation manual labor was more or less degrading. Operatives in New England factories were, as they alleged, the degraded serfs of the rich manufacturers—the mere "mud-sills of society"—wanting in manhood and sunk below the depth of Southern slaves. The upper class, the wealthy and the refined, were low in courage, mean in spirit, and altogether devoid of the high principle of a noble manhood. On the other hand, Massachusetts, with unctious satisfaction, looked upon the people of South Carolina as being outside of the pale of her elegant civilization and high advancement. And thus these two extremes looked at one another, each with supreme self satisfaction, mingled with more or less pity for the other. Bitter reproaches and stinging epithets were constantly hurled at each other. And thus it came to pass, in the course of time, that in the fierce struggles for personal and political power and sectional ascendency, these extremes began to hate each other as alien enemies. This feeling of bitterness was year by year augmented in the South as it saw the political power of the country slipping away from its grasp and passing securely into the hands of the North. The South, with marvelous natural advantages, was constantly falling further and further behind in wealth and population. Mr. Calhoun saw this in 1850, when he said the "issue of slavery should be forced on the North soon or it would be too late."

But, while the North was capturing and organizing new states in the North-west, and extending its empire of thought to the Pacific, the South was slowly moving on

as it had done fifty years before. The negro and the mule were the two great factors in its growth, and they leisurely moved on in the old way. They tilled the fields and raised the cotton, the sugar, the rice and the tobacco on which all prosperity depended. Kentucky, Tennessee and the West furnished the mule, the corn, the hay and the bacon. Southern harbors were filled, for the most part, only with coasting vessels. The harbors and the great natural highways to a large extent remained unimproved, because of the supersensitive scruples of Southern statesmen on constitutional questions.

Free, universal education was unknown. The great body of the people were poorly educated, many not at all. The result was, that they were generally thriftless, nerveless and non-progressive. As a rule, only the sons of wealthy men were thoroughly educated. The most promising sons of the rich planters were sent to the University of Virginia, or to Princeton, or Yale, or West Point, to be educated for the bar or the army, with the hope of their ultimately going to congress or becoming governors or great generals, while some were educated for the ministry or for the profession of medicine. The army or a political life was thought to be the highway to honor. Many of the young men on the great plantations grew up with no definite aim, no high purpose. They frolicked, and played cards, and followed the yelping hounds; they "sat down to eat and drink, and rose up to play."

Manufacturing received but little encouragement. It served to develop a spirit of independent thought among the operatives, inconsistent with the safety of slavery. Skilled laborers, especially of the higher grade, would read and think and talk. Slavery was naturally repugnant to them, because it degraded them and their own labor. It tended to lower all laborers to the level of slaves. Trading was only tolerated as a necessity. Mining was almost unknown. The mechanic arts were only practiced in a small way. Planting and war were the only honor-

able callings aside from the learned professions. Even the learned professions were considered inferior in dignity to the other two. The little land owners who cultivated their fields with their own hands did not rise into the honorable dignity of planters. They were farmers, laborers, "poor whites." Only the man with his broad acres, his drove of negroes, and his overseer was styled a planter. Without the appendage of an overseer—the most cruel and despicable of men—the position of no planter was high. The great planter was a man of power. He was courted and honored. The doors of society opened wide at his approach. No wonder he became arrogant and haughty. Yet he possessed many noble qualities. He was brave, generous, magnanimous, sincere and honorable. Certainly in his day he had his good things—"was clothed in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day."

From the serene heights of his fancied exaltation, the great planter looked down with cold contempt on the large body of Northern men. He regarded them as little tillers of the soil, petty traders, low shop-keepers, enslaved mechanics, howling fanatics and lovers of money. They were mean in spirit, cowardly, narrow, selfish and abased. Mammon was their God. If they gave to objects of charity, it was on a cold calculation that they would get back in some way two dollars for every one given. The operatives in factories were the slaves of the lordly manufacturers, with fewer comforts than the bondsmen of the South.

In thought, taste, feelings and habits there was a wide antagonism between the people of North and those of the cotton belt. This antagonism naturally grew out of two adverse systems of labor, two adverse systems of education, two adverse systems of civilization. There was, in fact, as Mr. Seward said, an "irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces."

In the foregoing facts is found one of the potent causes which induced the Southern States to raise the standard of

secession. The leaders hated the Abolitionists and the anti-slavery men with a feeling of the deepest intensity. They hated Northern ways, habits, opinions and institutions. From them they had long since wished to be divorced. And little less in intensity was the feeling of the Abolitionists toward Southern slaveholders. Mr. Iverson, of Georgia, on leaving the senate in 1861, said:

"Besides, he claimed that there was an enmity between the Northern and Southern people, that was deep and enduring, and which could not be eradicated. We have not lived in peace, we are not now living in peace. It is not expected or hoped that we shall ever live in peace."

At the end of six decades, it became manifest to the sagacious statesmen of the South that they could no longer exercise a controlling influence in the councils of the nation. They became desperate at the thought. The exercise of power had been their birthright. A government which they could not control became hateful to them. They, therefore, sought for pretexts for its destruction. In the presidential election of 1860, by dividing the party, and thus securing the election of Mr. Lincoln, they made and used the pretext they most desired.

The loss of political power on the part of the South was one of the main impelling causes of secession. For three quarters of the time since the organization of the government, its control had been virtually in the hands of Southern men. Now, this control had fallen into other hands and the chances were that it would never return. The political ascendency of the South—that great, supreme power which had dominated at will presidents, cabinets and legislatures—had passed away forever. To become subordinate in authority to men they despised as their inferiors, was more than these proud-spirited men could endure. Some of them had long seen the end of their power approaching. They had been preparing for secession. Mr. Calhoun had advised it, Mr. Davis had urged it. Mr. Yancey had suggested the organization of "committees of

safety all over the cotton states," and in that way, said he, "we shall fire the Southern heart, instruct the Southern mind, give courage to each other, and at the proper moment, by one organized, concerted action, we can precipitate the cotton states into a revolution."[1] This was in June, 1858, more than two years before the election of Mr. Lincoln.

In a tract, No. 3, published at Charleston, in 1860, addressed to "the people of the South," intended to aid the cause of secession, the writer says:

"It is a great mistake to assign the *election of Lincoln* as the CAUSE for a disruption of the Federal government. It is but the *occasion*. The *cause* existed, perhaps at the formation of the Confederacy. The cause consists in the *incompatibility* growing out of the two systems of labor, crystallizing about them two forms of civilization—from which has sprung, if not conflicting interests, antipathies at least, instead of sympathies. In one sense the 'irrepressible conflict' is real. From time to time the pre-existing cause has presented *occasions of strife*.

"Since that time (the race of Fremont in 1856) the Black Republicans have obtained possession of the house of representatives, elected its speaker and appointed its committees. And now, in 1860, they elect, as President of the United States, a man who is at open war with the institutions of the South, and the chosen representative of the principles, the doctrines and the feelings of the (New York) 'Tribune!' These are all *occasions* forced on us by the underlying cause of INCOMPATIBILIY."

Again, this same tract No. 3, dwelling on this same idea of incompatibility, says:

"The colonial condition is, at best, one of pupilage, dependence and inferiority, and is degrading to such a people as that described by Senator Hammond. But when the people who govern are hostile; when the bond of

[1] Letter to Jas. S. Slaughter.

union of the dominant party, of the governing people, is enmity and active antagonism to the mode of labor and social organization of the people governed, then, foreign rule assumes its most dangerous form. If, however, political hostility has been intensified into religious hate, and to enmity and antagonism are added scorn and contempt; if the dominant people have been taught to despise, to deride and scoff the weakness of the governed, then their cup of abjectness is full to the brim."

In the Convention of South Carolina, which passed the Ordinance of Secession, Mr. Rhett said: "It (secession) is nothing produced by Mr. Lincoln's election, or the non-execution of the fugitive slave law. It is a matter that has been gathering for thirty years."

Mr. Packer, of the same body, said: "It is no spasmodic effort that has come suddenly on us, but it has been gradually culminating for a long series of years."

Mr. Ingles said: "Most of us have had this subject under consideration for twenty years."

Mr. Keitt said: "I have been engaged in this movement ever since I entered public life."

Senator Iverson, in withdrawing, as we have seen, said: "For myself, unless my opinions greatly change, I shall never consent to the reconstruction of the Federal Union. . . . We are about to sunder our relations with that section (the North), and I trust forever."

One of the motives that influenced the leaders in the great Southern revolution in 1861 was the desire to establish in the South a magnificent confederacy of slaveholding states, constructed on their own views as to its powers and duties, with a homogeneous people, that is to say, with one class to rule and a subject class to labor. This was a scheme of vaulting ambition, magnificent in conception and dazzling in promise. It was to be an aristocratic government. We have seen that Mr. Stephens claimed that slavery was the corner-stone of our institutions. Governor McDuffie declared on this point:

"Domestic slavery, instead of being an evil, is the corner-stone of our republican edifice, because it supersedes the necessity of an order of nobility, and all the other appendages of a hereditary system of government."[1]

Senator Hammond, of South Carolina, said in the senate in 1858, as before shown:

"In all social systems, there must be a class to do the menial duties, to perform the drudgery of life; that is, a class requiring a low order of intellect and but little skill. Its requisites are vigor, docility, and fidelity. Such a class you must have, or you would not have that other class which leads to progress, civilization and refinement."

Further on in his speech Senator Hammond said that the "South found a race adapted to that purpose to her hand—the African slaves."

In a speech made in Charleston, November 12, 1860, Mr. R. Barnwell Rhett said:

"The Southern Confederacy ought to be a slaveholding Confederacy. It is no experiment that free governments should exist in slaveholding countries. The republics of Rome and Greece—still the light and glory of ancient times—were built on domestic slavery. But it is an experiment to maintain free government with universal suffrage, and the whole population to control the government. Population increases faster than capital, and no prosperity can long stave off the dire conflict which must arise between want and affluence, capital and population. When the great majority of the population have no property, which is the case in Europe, what shall protect property under the control of this majority from partition or confiscation? Our Confederacy must be a slaveholding Confederacy. We have had enough of a Confederacy with dissimilar institutions."

Mr. Rhett was the great prophet of hope for the new Confederacy. Gazing into the future, his fancy kindled

[1] Bryant's "Pop. Hist. U. S.," Vol. IV, p. 323.

and glowed with exultant pride as he beheld it expanding and extending its conquests southward. In his fervor he declared:

"With guarantees such as these, what shall prevent the people of the South from being a great and free people? We will expand, as our growth and civilization shall demand, over Mexico, over the isles of the sea, over the far-off Southern tropics, until we shall establish a great confederation of republics—the greatest, the freest, and most powerful the world has ever seen."

Mr. Alexander Stephens, the calmest of all Southern statesmen, spoke as follows on this subject, in a speech in Savannah, in March, 1861, a few weeks after the inauguration of the Southern Confederacy:

"Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea (*i. e.*, to that held by Mr. Jefferson and most of the leading statesmen of his day, that slavery was wrong in principle); its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition. This stone, which was rejected by the first builders, is become the chief of the corner, the real corner-stone in our new edifice."[1]

Along with the idea of a Southern Confederacy ran the idea of repealing all laws prohibiting the African slave trade. If a government was to be established, resting on domestic slavery, then, manifestly, the more slaves, at

[1] Of this address, Prof. W. P. Trent says:

"Mr. Stephens forgot to mention the trifling circumstance that the Barbary States had long existed on the basis of a physical, philosophical and moral truth, strikingly similar to the one enunciated by himself, and it would have been perhaps a service to his auditors had he utilized, for the purpose of clinching his proposition, the well-known lines of the poet about—

> . . . 'The good old plan,
> That they should take who have the power,
> And they should keep who can.'"

—"Southern Statesmen," p. 287.

least for a time, the better. Mr. Stephens did not openly advocate a repeal of those laws, but he intimated such an idea by saying that the South could not keep up the race with the North in the occupation of new territory "unless they could get more Africans."[1] Mr. John Forsythe, of Alabama, openly advocated the abrogation of the prohibition. Mr. W. L. Yancey demanded the repeal of these laws. Governor Adams, of South Carolina, denounced them as a fraud on slaveholders. In the Southern Commercial Convention, at Knoxville, in 1857, Mr. L. W. Spratt, of South Carolina, editor of the "Charleston Courier" (I believe) said, in a carefully prepared address on a proposition to reopen the African slave trade:

"Society in its movements has vindicated the truth that more than equality is necessary to human progress. There was the patrician and plebeian of old Rome, the peasant and the peer of France, and the contact and the collision between them made those countries great. England has been made great from the same cause. And though among equals, inequality is wrong; though for the reason that the peer was no better than the peasant, the peer has fallen and the peasant has risen; still society also teaches the great truth that inequality is necessary to human progress. That is a greater truth than was declared in the Declaration of Independence. That instrument was founded upon a misconception, and we now proclaim this truth in opposition to pre-conception."[2]

Mr. Womack, of Alabama, said he thought the "proposition a very reasonable one." He believed there was "nothing more right in the economy of man" than slavery. Mr. Goggerty (perhaps Goggin), of Virginia, said, "the opening of the African slave trade is required by the whole world." Mr. Lochrane, of Georgia, said: "I believe the re-opening of the African slave trade is proper, just, expedient and constitutional."

[1] Blaine's "Twenty Years of Congress," Vol. I, p. 175.

[2] Official Report, pp. 90, 9

The foregoing utterances of Southern men disclose in the most convincing manner the leading motives which influenced the Southern leaders in undertaking the establishment of a Southern Confederacy. Of these, the most powerful, as it always has been, in revolutionary movements, was personal ambition. There was something peculiarly fascinating to bold, ambitious men in the thought of forming a great slaveholding confederacy, embracing fifteen states over which they would bear sway; with an aristocratic class to support their authority; with cotton, the greatest wealth-producing staple the world has ever known, as the basis of unparalleled prosperity, and with an obedient, servile race to perform all labor, and minister to the comfort and the wants of this superior class as long as governments should last. Of course this motive was concealed—was masked behind the most earnest protestations and profuse professions of patriotism. Every conceivable excuse was given to justify this scheme of vaulting ambition, every one of which was more or less baseless, except one.

We have seen that secession was not the offspring of any fear of the abolition of slavery by the national government, nor from any apprehension of Mr. Lincoln, nor on account of the non-execution of the fugitive slave law, nor because of the personal liberty acts, nor because of the alleged exclusion of slavery from the territories, nor because of any want of the equality of the Southern States in the Union, nor indeed from any well-grounded apprehension of danger to the institution of slavery from any quarter or from any source.

There was no danger of the abolition of slavery in 1860–1, and all intelligent men knew that fact.

On the 11th of February, 1861, on motion of Mr. John Sherman, the leading Republican in the house, the following resolution was unanimously adopted by that body—yeas, 161; nays, none:

"Resolved, that neither congress, nor the people, nor the

governments of the non-slaveholding states, have any constitutional right to interfere with slavery in any of the slaveholding states of the Union."

The doctrine contained in this resolution was in perfect accord with the opinions of Mr. Lincoln, as they had been declared by him on many occasions. In 1858, in his debate with Mr. Douglas in reply to a question by the latter, he declared that if the people of a territory were to do such an amazing thing as to form a constitution favorable to slavery, if elected senator, he would vote for the admission of such state into the Union.

In addition to all these facts showing that secession was not the result of any honest fear as to the security of slavery, in the states where it then existed, the solemn declaration of Mr. Lincoln in his inaugural address may be quoted. He said, in reference to the proposed thirteenth amendment to the constitution prohibiting congress from interfering with slavery in the states, that holding such proposition to be now implied in the constitution, he had no objection to its being made express and irrevocable. He recognized, as he had always done, the constitutional obligation for the return of fugitive slaves. His whole address was an earnest plea for the maintenance of the constitution.

He said further, in his inaugural address: "I declare that I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." And, after quoting from the Chicago platform words of a similar import, he said: "I only press on the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible—that the property, peace and security of no section are to be in any wise endangered by the incoming administration."

"In your hands," said he, imploringly, "my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you;

you can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors."

In beautiful words and in kind affection, scarcely ever surpassed, with one hand on the Bible and the other uplifted to heaven, he appealed for peace. "We are not enemies," said he, "but friends. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle field and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

If further proof were needed to show that a sense of the insecurity of slavery in the states where it then existed could not have been paramount in the minds of the secession leaders, in 1860–61, the fact may be mentioned that, in the speeches of senators and representatives withdrawing from congress, none of them based their action distinctly on this ground. In all their boldness in the use of high-sounding rhetoric at that time, none of them pretended that the existence of slavery was seriously threatened or endangered. Some complaint was made about the personal liberty bills passed in the Northern States. Some complaint was also made that slavery was excluded from the territories by the people thereof, but this was well known to the leaders and to every one else to be in accordance with the doctrine they had formerly advocated in reference to the people of Kansas while that state was in a territorial condition. It was the fruit of Mr. Douglas' "Popular Sovereignty," which nearly every one of these secession leaders had either voted for or advocated.

But the solemn assurances and tender appeals of the president to his "dissatisfied fellow countrymen" had no effect. Independence out of the Union was the object of Southern ambition. A new Confederacy was the predetermined fact; was then in existence, in reality, with South

Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas as its members. But this was not enough. It fell far short of the wide extended dominion originally contemplated. Virginia still held back, North Carolina still hesitated, Tennessee rejected the alliance by an immense majority, Kentucky still clung to the Union, and Missouri remained steadfast in its loyalty. Something had to be done to move the people of these states into line with their Southern sisters. Major Anderson with a small garrison still held Fort Sumter. Along the shores, on every available spot, batteries had been erected, and bristling guns bore on the fort. An army was assembled in Charleston under the command of General P. G. T. Beauregard.

Early in April, Roger A. Pryor, a member of congress from Virginia, and Edmund Ruffin, of the same state, visited Charleston to aid in pushing forward the great work of secession. On the evening of the 10th of April, Pryor was serenaded, and made one of his fiery speeches, much of which has been quoted already. He said:

"Do not distrust Virginia. As sure as to-morrow's sun will rise upon us, just so sure will Virginia be a member of the Southern Confederacy. And I will tell you, gentlemen," said the speaker, with great vehemence, "what will put her in the Southern Confederacy in less than an hour by Shrewsbury's clock—*strike a blow!* The very moment that blow is struck, Old Virginia will make common cause with her sisters of the South. It is impossible she should do otherwise."

Says Lossing, from whom the above is taken: "The cry of Pryor for blood was sent to Montgomery by telegraph the next morning, and Mr. Gilchrist, a member of the Alabama legislature, said to Davis and a portion of his "cabinet" (Walker, Benjamin and Menninger): "Gentlemen, unless you sprinkle blood in the face of the people of

Alabama, they will be back in the old Union in less than ten days."[1]

It is evident from the correspondence in existence that Beauregard was ordered, from Montgomery, to demand the immediate evacuation of Fort Sumter, for, on the 11th day of April, he was telegraphed to, to send the reply of Major Anderson. On the same day, Beauregard answered, sending the reply to the demand, as follows:

"To L. P. WALKER:

"Major Anderson replies: 'I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication demanding the evacuation of this fort, and to say in reply thereto that it is a demand with which I regret that my sense of honor and of my obligation to my government prevents my compliance.' He adds verbally: 'I will await the first shot, and if you do not batter us to pieces we will be starved out in a few days.' Answer.

(Signed,) P. G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The garrison in Fort Sumter was then living on salt pork and water. There was no concealment of the fact anywhere that the garrison must surrender or evacuate soon, unless supplies arrived. But the impatient public—the impatient authorities of Montgomery—would not wait for the slow work of starvation. "A blow" must be struck—"blood" must be "sprinkled in the face of the people." Accordingly, on the twelfth of April, a venerable old man, Edmund Ruffin from Virginia, who had requested the privilege, pulled the lanyard of the first gun fired in the greatest civil war recorded in history, the mournful sound of which went echoing over the sea and over the land, breaking the peace of the world.

And thus were verified the kind words of Abraham Lincoln, spoken with the oath of office still warm upon his lips: "The government will not assail you. You can

[1] "Civil War in America," by Benson J. Lossing, Vol. I, p. 316.

have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors." And he had kept his faith. Not a soldier had he mustered during these more than five weeks of busy preparations for war in the South. Not one drop of fraternal blood should be shed by him, except in defense—in the defense of the government. And not one drop of the rivers of blood that were shed in the great civil war which followed stained the garments of the great president.

On the 8th of April the governor of South Carolina received a notification from Mr. Lincoln that an attempt would be made to provision Fort Sumter, and on the 9th the "Harriet Lane" sailed from New York for this purpose.[1] In his message to congress Mr. Lincoln thus comments on the attack on Sumter:

"The assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit aggression upon them. They knew—they were expressly notified—that the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all which would on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more. They knew that this government desired to keep the garrison in the fort not to assail them, but merely to maintain visible possession and thus to preserve the Union from actual and immediate dissolution—trusting, as hereinbefore stated, to time, discussion and the ballot-box for final adjustment, and they assailed and reduced the fort for precisely the reverse object—to drive out the visible authority of the Federal Union and thus drive it to immediate dissolution." . . .

[1] Some time previously to this, Mr. Seward, assuming that he was the head of the government, had said to the commissioners of South Carolina, through an agent, that Sumter would be evacuated. There is no proof that this partial promise was ever communicated to Mr. Lincoln.—Ida M. Tarbell's "Life of Lincoln" in "McClure's Magazine," January 1899, page 267.

With this avowed purpose on the part of Mr. Lincoln, which he carefully pursued, it may afford a curious theme for speculation as to what would have been the fate of the Southern Confederacy if Sumter had not been assaulted, or if some similar act of open war had not been resorted to. Would it have gone on exercising the powers of government over the states which had seceded until its authority had become securely cemented and established? Would Virginia, Tennessee and North Carolina have joined the seceded states? Sooner or later this is most probable. Would the people of the North have acquiesced in this dismemberment of the government? Yes, at that time, in preference to civil war. In this very contingency such men as Greeley, Seward, Thurlow Weed and Crittenden, and thousands of others, if they did not all say, as Mr. Greeley did, let the cotton states "go in peace," they did all insist in spirit that there should be no coercion to restrain them from going. Previous to this time, Ex-president Pierce had written to Jefferson Davis, assuring him that if there was to be fighting "it will not be along Mason's and Dixon's line merely. It will be within our own borders, in our own streets, between the two classes of citizens to whom I have referred." "The Albany Argus," a Democratic paper said: "The first gun fired in the way of forcing a seceding state back into the Union would probably prove the knell of its final dismemberment."

All over the North there was alarm and apprehension after six states had seceded, Bitter indignation was aroused against the anti-slavery agitators. The sentiment against coercion and in favor of conciliation seemed to be almost universal. Governor Horatio Seymour said: "Shall we have compromise after war, or compromise without war? Let us also see if successful coercion by the North is less revolutionary than successful revolution by the South." James S. Thayer said amid cheers, in a public meeting in Albany, that "the enforcement of the law in six states

(the number that had then seceded), is war with fifteen. Let one arrow, winged by the Federal bow, strike the heart of an American citizen, and who can number the avenging darts that will darken the heavens in the conflict that will ensue." Fernando Wood, mayor of the City of New York, suggested in a message to the common council, that the municipality should be made a "free city." "It was a proposition openly entertained and freely talked about," says Mr. Henry Wilson, "should a separation take place and a new confederation be formed, that not only the city, but the State of New York, the other Middle States, indeed all the Northern States, except New England and some in the extreme North-west, would forsake the old and go to the new." A Washington dispatch, published in the New York papers, in December, said: "The opinion seems to set strongly in favor of a reconstruction of the Union, without the New England States."[1]

Ex-Governor Price, of New Jersey, in a published letter, urged that his state should "go with the South from every wise, prudential and patriotic reason." So strong was the feeling in the North in the winter of 1860–1861, in favor of the South, and against any attempt at coercion, so bitter were the people against the Abolitionists, that Mr. Wilson does not hesitate to say that the North as well as the South is responsible for secession; and that if the latter "had not found auxiliaries out of the North ready to lend their aid, they would never have ventured in the rash experiment."[2]

So high was the tide of public opinion running, at the time of the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, against the party that had elevated him to power, especially against the Abolition part of it, that it is almost certain that any attempt at coercion against the people of the seceding states, would have been followed in the North by mobs, riots and civil war. Mr. Lincoln saw and knew the hazardous condition of affairs around him. He knew that a blow prematurely

[1] Wilson's "Rise and Fall," etc., Vol. III, p. 67. [2] Id. p. 70.

struck at secession was more likely to produce a revolution in the North than to end the existing one. In addition to his earnest desire to avoid the shedding of blood, there was necessary on his part the most cautious statesmanship. A single false step would prove fatal to the Union. He must so act as to put the South clearly in the wrong before the world in the event of a conflict of arms. There must be no divided North. He delayed, apparently hesitated, and seemingly negotiated with the enemy. He refused to reenforce Sumter, and only attempted to send provisions to the starving garrison. No troops were mustered for the national defense, not one; no force was used; no threats were made. Never did Mr. Lincoln exhibit a more masterly wisdom, or profounder sagacity than in this crisis. By his discretion, secession came to a standstill. The North was petrified with fear. A majority had turned with rage against the triumphant party. In the South there was danger, as Mr. Gilchrist said, that some of the states would return to the old Union.

And now came the stupendous folly of firing on Sumter. That single act, in "one hour by Shrewsbury's clock" united the divided North. Without that, or some equally foolish deed, the North could never have been brought to the point of resisting the South, and secession would have triumphed. But when the nation's honor was assailed, and the national flag brought low, sympathy was in a moment turned to wrath, and men everywhere rushed to arms. That first shot, as it went sounding round the world, announcing the commencement of the conflict, was also sounding the death knell of the Southern Confederacy, But for that shot, it might be in existence to-day as a government. But it accomplished its purpose in the direction intended. By it, Tennessee, Virginia and North Carolina were induced, most unwisely but most naturally, to rush to the help, not of the aggrieved party, but of the aggressor. But it did more than this—something not anticipated. It lost to the South, Delaware, Maryland, West

Virginia, East Tennessee, Kentucky and Missouri. And still more; by this needless act, the North was brought together in one hour as one man in the determination to avenge the nation's insult, and to lift up and restore the fallen and dishonored flag. Thus Mr. Davis by that shot did what no other power on earth could have done—united the divided North.

But Mr. Wilson is unquestionably correct when he said that in "the day when inquisition for blood shall be made," the North as well as the South will be found to have had its share in the bringing on of the war of 1861. The assurances given by such men as Pierce, Price, Wood and Seymour, that there was a "Spartan band in every Northern state," who would stand as a wall of fire for the defense of the South against the madness of Northern Abolitionism, and that there were a million of Democrats there who would aid the South in such a fight, had great influence in finally emboldening the leaders to go to war. Mr. Wilson refers, of course, to the Democratic party of the North. He is clearly correct. Up to a certain point, they were as much responsible for the civil war as the Democratic party of the South. Perhaps they were more so, for they had in their favor no palliating circumstances, such as the South had. But there was, as previously stated, another party that must be held responsible before the tribunal of history for a share of the blood shed in the great civil war. That was the Abolition party. For years they had denounced the slaveholders with an acrimony seldom equaled. They made war on the peculiar institution of the South, and avowed a determination to overthrow and destroy it. They nullified a law passed for its protection, and appealed to a "higher law" for their justification. In their insane opposition to slavery, they placed themselves outside of the law, and were, as Mr. Webster said, guilty of "treasonable conduct." By their acts and their words, they goaded to madness the Southern people, and drove them in the direction of secession. Finally, a part

of the Southern people came to hate their assailants in the North with such a depth of intensity, and there came to be such an antagonism in interests, opinions, institutions and habits, that separation seemed to them the only remedy left. In their madness and blindness, they rushed into secession and into war. I draw a broad line of distinction between the Abolitionists, who wished to destroy slavery in the South, and the Free-soilers, who wished merely to restrict it to the states where it then existed. But this distinction was not always, nor, indeed, generally, drawn in the South. The extreme Abolitionists were taken as the types of Northern sentiment, and the most conservative Free-soilers were classed with them.

It really appears as if Providence intended that the Southern people should be the instruments of the destruction of their own favorite institution. At a period when there was, for the first time in twenty years, peace between the two sections, they broke that peace by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and thus turned loose the angry winds of sectionalism. This in the end, through successive steps, led to secession. And when war came, the conviction gradually grew on the minds of men that that was the opportunity offered by Heaven for destroying slavery. It had caused one war, said they; it should not cause another. Let it perish—by the war. And thus the folly of men was made to do the will of God.

I have said that secession and the civil war were without justifiable cause, when viewed in the light of facts and history, except in a qualified degree as to one or two questions. It is undeniably true—and it is time that history should be candid on the subject—that previous to 1861 a number of the free states had failed to perform their constitutional obligations to the slave states in reference to the return of fugitive slaves. Indeed, it is hard, if not impossible, to escape the conclusion that they had openly and defiantly violated in this regard both the letter and the spirit of the constitution. The rescue of the slave Shadrack by

a mob in Boston was an open violation of the constitution, and Mr. Webster declared it to be an act of "clear treason." The attempt, in the same city, to rescue Anthony Burns, and the attack made on the United States marshal by an armed mob in the attempt, were clearly of the same character. If it should be said or thought that these were the hasty acts of excited mobs, then what can be said in defense of the legislature of Vermont—a deliberative body—when it passed the following act:

"Every person who may have been held as a slave, who shall come or may be brought into this state, with the consent of his master or mistress, or who *shall come* or be brought, or *shall be* in this state, *shall be free.*

"Every person who shall hold, or *attempt to hold*, in this state, in slavery, as a slave, any free person, in any form, or for any time, however short, under the *pretense* that such person *is* or *has been* a slave, shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of not less than five years, nor more than twenty, and be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars."

What became, under this law, of the constitution of the United States, and of the laws made in pursuance thereof, requiring the rendition to their owners of slaves escaping into other states? Unquestionably, they were nullified and openly defied. Laws similar to this, as we have seen in Chapter XII, were passed by a number of the Northern States.

Now, were these laws, flagrant and unconstitutional as they certainly were, sufficient to justify, without more, the slave states in inaugurating war against the United States? I shall let Alexander H. Stephens, the ablest defender of the Southern Confederacy, answer this question. In his masterly Union speech before the legislature of Georgia, on the 14th of November, 1861, speaking on this very point, he said:[1]

[1] "War Between the States." pp. 294–298.

"Now, upon another point, and that the most difficult, and deserving your most serious consideration, I will speak. That is the course which this state should pursue toward these Northern States which, by their legislative acts, have attempted to nullify the Fugitive Slave Law.

"Northern States, on entering into the federal compact, pledged themselves to surrender such fugitives; and it is in disregard of their constitutional obligations that they have passed laws which even tend to hinder or inhibit the fulfillment of that obligation. They have violated their plighted faith. What ought we to do in view of this? That is the question. What is to be done? By the law of nations, you would have the right to demand the carrying out of this article of agreement, and I do not see that it should be otherwise in respect to the states of the Union; and in case it be not done, we would, by these principles, have the right to commit acts of reprisal on these faithless governments, and seize upon their property, or that of their citizens, wherever found. The states of this Union stand upon the same footing with foreign nations in this respect.

"Suppose it were Great Britain that had violated some compact of agreement with the general government—what would be first done? In that case, our ministers would be directed, in the first instance, to bring the matter to the attention of that government, or a commissioner be sent to that country to open negotiations with her, ask for redress, and it would be only after argument and reason had been exhausted in vain, that we would take the last resort of nations. That would be the course toward a foreign government; and toward a member of this Confederacy, I would recommend the same course. Let us not, therefore, act hastily or ill-temperedly in this matter. Let your committee on the state of the republic make out a bill of grievances; let it be sent by the governor to these faithless states; and, if reason and argument shall be tried in vain—if all shall fail to induce them to return to their constitu-

tional obligations, I would be for retaliatory measures, such as the governor has suggested to you. This mode of resistance in the Union is in our power. . . .

"As to the other matter, I think we have a right to pass retaliatory measures, provided they be in accordance with the constitution of the United States, and I think they can be made so. But, whether it would be wise for this legislature to do so now, is a question. To the convention, in my judgment, this matter ought to be referred. Before making reprisals, we should exhaust every means of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the controversy. Thus did General Jackson in the case of the French. . . .

"I do think, therefore, that it would be best, before going to extreme measures with the Confederate States, to make the presentation of our demands, to appeal to their reason and judgment, to give us our rights. Then, if reason should not triumph, it will be time enough to make reprisals, and we should be justified in the eyes of a civilized world. At least, let these offending and derelict states know what your grievances are, and if they refuse, as I said, to give us our rights under the constitution, I should be willing, as a last resort, to sever the ties of our Union with them."

Mr. Stephens went on to say that his own opinion was that if the course indicated by him were pursued, and the North were informed of the consequence of refusal on their part to do justice to the South, those states would recede, would repeal their nullifying acts.[1]

So strong were the prejudices of men in the South in in 1861, on both sides; so blinding were the passions aroused by the great controversy, that but few men were able to calmly and dispassionately consider both sides of the questions involved. In the whirl and violence of political opinions, men jumped to certain conclusions, and never departed from them, however erroneous. Thus, for

[1] "War Between the States," Vol. II, pp. 294 *et seq.*

illustration, the Union leaders were amazed at the many errors which prevailed among Southern people, overlooking the fact that they were themselves blind to certain aspects of the questions then dividing the country. It is certain that neither Mr. Johnson, nor Mr. Nelson, who were in many respects the two most conspicuous Union orators in the South, nor any other leader, ever dealt entirely frankly with the two just grievances of slaveholders—that in reference to the nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law by certain Northern States, and that of the forcible rescue of slaves by combinations of anti-slavery men.

After a calm review of the whole controversy, and with the moderating influence of thirty-eight years upon my mind, candor compels me to say that the slaveholding states had at least these two strong points in their favor in 1861, which if they had been earnestly presented to the North by solemn remonstrance, as Mr. Stephens recommended, if their remonstrance had been rejected, would have constituted a just ground for reprisals, if not for war. Without an honest effort, however, to obtain a redress of grievances, through a distinguished embassy—without an effort in the direction of compromise and conciliation—I insist, as I have done throughout this book, that there was no sufficient justification of the South in commencing hostilities, especially against the Federal government, which had not inflicted these wrongs.

The constitution of the United States provides no specific remedy against states thus failing and refusing to perform their solemn obligations to the citizens of other states, unless it is the right on the part of the government to enforce obedience to law by the power of arms. That perhaps would be the exercise of a doubtful power, and certainly a dangerous one. It would be a hazardous remedy and might result in the greatest of evils, which at all times ought to be avoided, if possible, in a free country—civil war. The Supreme Court had in more than one instance performed its duty by declaring the Fugitive Slave Law

constitutional, but it had no power to enforce its decision. Diplomacy and negotiation, however, to say nothing of conciliation, were still open to the Southern States when war was inaugurated by them. At this very time, as is shown in detail elsewhere, the people of the North were ready to concede to the slave states nearly everything they might demand, if they would forego their determination to leave the Union. They could have had whatever they demanded. But no concessions, no guaranties, it is believed, would have satisfied the ambitious leaders. They asked for none; they would have accepted none, They wanted independence and that only.

The controversy—at least the essential part of it—could have been adjusted. It ought to have been. A terrible responsibility lies at the door of one section or the other in that it was not settled. There was no necessity for war. It could and should have been avoided.[1] If the North had stood out defiantly in the winter of 1860–1861—if Mr. Lincoln and congress had obstinately refused any concessions, or had manifested no spirit of conciliation, no return of brotherly love—they would have stood forever before the world as haughty and implacable in their overwhelming strength. But they exhibited, in this hour, no implacable hatred, no haughty confidence born of conscious superiority of power.

If the Southern States had made the violation of the constitution by certain states, in reference to the return of fugitive slaves to their owners, their single issue, in 1861, and had presented it in a spirit of moderation and firmness, with that force and clearness which its justice war-

[1] "Put it in your book," said to the author, an intelligent and most worthy gentleman from Alabama, an ex-Confederate surgeon, who served in the army during the whole war, part of the time under Forrest—"put it in your book, that there should have been no war, that the differences should have been adjusted; that the people of the North and of the South were of substantially the same blood and did not hate each other, and that the war was the work of ambitious politicians and bad men on each side. The great body of the people on both sides were opposed to the war."

ranted, and if their demand for a redress of their wrongs had been denied, every impartial mind would have been forced to acknowledge the justice of their complaint. They would have had the moral support of the world, in their struggle to preserve the constitution. The issue would have been so plain that all men could have seen it; and all except those fanatically blind would have conceded its justice. Then, if war had to come, it would have been a war in defense of rights as clearly declared by the constitution, as the right to personal liberty itself. They would have had a quarrel that appealed to the sense of justice and commanded the approving conscience of the civilized world.

But instead of this sharp, impregnable issue, the Southern leaders chose to make an issue out of nearly every act of national legislation for the last forty years in reference to slavery, nearly every one of which had been dictated by the South, or decided by Southern votes in the interest or the supposed interest of slavery, or according to principles established for its benefit. Many of these issues, as presented, were fallacious and deceptive, some imaginary, and some unfounded. Unquestionably, by presenting unfounded, or untenable, or gravely disputed issues, those wherein they were right were overshadowed and lost sight of in the high conflict of words which followed. In this way the South lost its great moral vantage ground, where it might have securely intrenched itself behind a plain and undisputed provision of the constitution.

South Carolina did make such a declaration, but its effect on the public mind of the North was neutralized by accompanying it with an act withdrawing from the Union, and making preparations for war.

It would be surprising, if we could exactly ascertain, how small the number of men in the South is who are actually responsible for the inauguration of the war. Up to the close of the presidential election in 1860, it is doubtful whether as many as a thousand in all the Southern

States were working for the distinct object of separation. Previous to the time of firing on Sumter, it is doubtful whether in a single state, aside from South Carolina and Mississippi, a majority of the people were in their hearts honestly for a separation from the Union. They professed to be, it is true. But every one familiar with the fearful despotism of public opinion, in the cotton states, on the subject of slavery, will readily realize how impossible it was to resist this public sentiment in the winter and spring of 1861. In most of the states but few men were found brave enough to do so, and in some of the states secession swept over them with the suddenness and fury of a tropical tornado.

The War of Secession is generally regarded as the "Slaveholders' War." It would be more correct to call it the "Politicians' War." In the beginning it was the work alone of ambitious politicians. Gradually the circle widened and other classes were drawn into it. Finally whole sections were seized with the idea. Thus, from a beginning started by a few men, the movement spread over eight states. It is doubtful whether a majority of the slaveholders of these states were in favor of secession when it was first proposed. They were always conservative in habits and thought. They had vast interests involved in the issue. Nearly all they had was in slaves. They were doing well, making large gains, and were happy and contented. They wished to let well enough alone. Besides this, outside of South Carolina, a majority perhaps of the planters were Whigs. The Whig party was everywhere, North as well as South, opposed to secession. In the seceding states they never yielded to this fatal delusion, until they saw that further resistance to the storm of madness would be in vain and would result in their own ruin. At last, against their judgment, they were swept like driftwood into the angry current rushing by them, and carried along helplessly by the resistless stream.

On this point I give two or three extracts, written, says the editor, by "one of the ablest of Virginians," and published in 1883, in the "American Register." The writer says:

"I state a fact which every intelligent Southerner will confess to be a fact, that the great body of Southern slaveholders were the Whigs and Unionists of the South in 1860–61. The Whigs were commonly denominated the 'Broad-cloth party' of the South. Every intelligent slaveholder knew that his security as a slaveholder was based upon the stability of the Union. He hated alike the 'higher law' of Wendell Phillips and the lower one of revolution. . . . The illiterate and passionate largely outnumbered the 'broad cloth' or Whig party.

"Slaveholders were the educated, intelligent class of the South, multitudes of them graduates of eastern universities. Their wealth made them most conservative; their intelligence begat adhesion to the existing order of things. Security for an institution which the world reviled they knew consisted in the maintenance of the supremacy of the Union. . . .

"Slaveholders were not idiots, and were only rebels when driven to a choice between war with the Union and an internecine war."

Slavery was the remote, but not the immediate, cause of the war. This institution was as secure in 1861 as it was in 1820, and if the South had waited and willed it, it could have been so hedged around by constitutional guaranties and safeguards as to place it forever beyond the power of government to molest. Slavery was made the excuse, the pretext for the war. It was the rallying cry of the daring leaders when they would inflame the minds of the Southern people with madness.

The Southern people were sadly mistaken. They expected a divided North. Such would have been the case if the leaders had waited in patience for the fruit to ripen. There can scarcely exist a doubt that a large majority of

the Northern people would have voted, in the spring of 1861, to let the seceding states go in preference to the alternative of Civil War. So shocking, so dreadful was the idea of such a war that men were ready to give up everything rather than have such an affliction. But when the nation's honor was insulted, the feeling of brotherhood was turned into rage, that of peace into determined relentless war.

To the last the South was mistaken. They believed the Northern people would not fight. They expected easy victories. Washington, as they boasted, would soon be their capitol. One enthusiastic orator—a senator in the Confederate congress—boasted that they would soon quaff wine from golden goblets in the palaces of New York. Another gentlemen boasted that he would call the roll of his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill Monument. The boast was universal, and perhaps the belief also, that one Southern man could whip five Yankees. An Alabama gentleman reached the climax when he declared in a public speech that they could whip the North with pop-guns made out of elder stalks.[1]

The doctrine of secession as a theory and its evils as a fact should be abandoned by every lover of peace.

No government can stand long without sufficient power in its head to restrain its members into obedience to its laws. No government is worth preserving that is not strong enough to do this. It should be strong to protect and preserve, with no power to oppress. Every citizen should be free and secure in all his rights, but subject to law. He should be protected by law, made by himself, and yet forced to obey the law This is all there is of a well-regulated free government. It is all any man can ask. Every man has a right to be heard in choosing rulers and

[1] When twitted with this boast after the war while making a public speech, this gentleman admitted that he had made the boast, and that what he said was true, but that the blasted Yankees would not fight with pop-guns.

in making laws, but when once heard, the voice of the majority must prevail. The minority must yield. This is self government. It is law and order. It is freedom.

The great Washington, with his usual clearness and wisdom, expressed the true idea of nationality in his letter to Jay of August 1, 1786, when he said:

"I do not conceive we can exist long as a nation without having lodged somewhere a power which will pervade the whole Union in as energetic a manner as the authority of the state government extends over the several states."

The Southern leaders, as a class, were honorable, truthful men. If they believed all they said in their speeches and writings, and they evidently did, they had great cause for bitterness. Many misconceptions, however, as to the purposes of the North, prevailed. On one point—the aim of the Abolitionists—there was no misconception, and this was sufficient to inflame the whole South. In this way alone can we account for the deadly and intense spirit of hate with which they regarded the people of the North. They felt as if each individual had a great wrong to redress. The leaders were not worse than a similar class of men in the North, and in many respects they were better. Possibly they had a more vaulting ambition. In all the transactions of life, they were the equals of any men on earth. They had brooded and talked over their defeats and their real or imaginary wrongs until they were seized with a delusion. They thought honestly, I believe, that they had lost their rights in the government. Their utterances were violent and extreme. Yet they seemed perfectly sincere and were so. The great body of the Southern people who went into secession were undoubtedly honest in their action. It is impossible to conceive of a whole people rushing headlong into war—of such enthusiasm, such courage, such amazing endurance, and such heroic sacrifices—on any other hypothesis. They were a brave, manly, noble people, with as much regard for truth as is possessed by any other people. Indeed, their courage, independence and

frankness tended to make them conspicuous for truthfulness.

I draw a broad line of distinction between the leaders, the originators of the secession movement, and the soldiers and the great body of the people. When the war came on, the latter naturally sympathized with their section, with their state, their friends, their kindred. Many of them, perhaps a majority, thought that their first and highest allegiance was due to their state, and that this was paramount to that they owed to the United States. Their states having seceded, they felt that they were absolved from all obligations to the general government. Most of them, too, by reason of exaggerations universally circulated, believed that they were about to lose their liberties.

And what shall be said of the women of the South? It must be recorded to their honor that never did women exhibit a higher or more determined spirit. It was earnest and enthusiastic. They infused their own lofty feelings into the minds of brothers, husbands, lovers, and finally into the soldiers in the field. With them, the cause of secession was above every earthly thing. The nearer they were touched by death in battle or hospital, the higher rose their spirit and determination. Extreme as their spirit may seem at this day, it was, under the dark shadow of war, something terrible and sublime. They were capable, in their devotion to their cause, of the lofty patriotism of the Grecian mother, who, when informed by a messenger that her five sons had been killed in battle, scornfully said: "I did not ask you as to my sons; but tell me, how fared my country?" There was no sacrifice these noble, refined women were not willing to make for the Confederate cause. Jewelry, dress, food, home, luxury, ease, comfort—every material treasure, indeed—they were ready to sacrifice for success. Soft, delicate hands, unused to toil, labored with enthusiasm, as the mothers of the Revolution did, to provide clothing for the naked soldiers away in the army.

They were bitter; yes, surpassingly so. And they never yielded; were never conquered. When a town or city was captured by the Federals, secession flags were waved by female hands or hung from their windows. Yet these were not fierce viragoes, nor coarse, vulgar creatures from the slums of cities. They were generally the cultured, refined, beautiful daughters of the South, the very elite and flower of the best families, unsurpassed in loveliness and nobleness by the daughters of any age or clime. Bitter as they were, I yet bow in admiration before their matchless spirit and their unconquerable devotion to their cause. Never did legend or the pages of romance paint loftier or more heroic women. They were well worthy to be the mothers, wives, daughters, sisters and sweethearts of the brave chevaliers who for four years performed such prodigies of valor on the battle-field. Their devotion to their cause was heroic, sublime, worthy to be celebrated through all time in story, legend and song.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE KNOXVILLE–GREENEVILLE CONVENTION OF 1861.

Call for a convention of Union men—Meets in Knoxville—Speeches of Johnson, Nelson and Arnold—Adjourns to meet again on the call of the president—A call to meet in Greenville, June 17th. A large delegation assembles—Fierce determination of delegates—Unwilling to submit to Confederacy—Speeches and resolutions consume two days—Mr. Nelson's "Declaration of Grievances" and resolutions referred to business committee—Character of this document—Great excitement among delegates—A majority favors extreme measures—Published history of convention not full—Original minutes—Embarrassing position of convention—Mr. Nelson's resolutions quoted—Reported by committee to convention for adoption—A substitute offered—Debate—Both referred back to committee—Substitute reported for favorable action—Adopted—Their purport—Debate—Position of speakers—Conservative members—Commissioners named to memoralize the legislature—Convention closes in harmony—Mr. Netherland's speech—Narrowly escaped civil war—Mr. Nelson—Design and effect of "Substitute"—Little hope of a new state—Memorial to legislature—Mr. Maynard its author—Prayer of denied—Notice of the splendid men composing the convention—Eulogy on Mr. Nelson—Secret executive committee appointed—Remarkable nature of this convention—Appropriateness of Greenville as its place of meeting.

In May, 1861, a few gentlemen were sitting in my office on South Gay street, Knoxville, Tennessee, discussing the political situation in East Tennessee, when it was suggested by some one, in view of the prospect of the state voting at the approaching election for "separation," that a call be issued for a convention of Union men to meet at Knoxville at an early day for consultation. John Williams, F. S. Heiskell, S. R. Rodgers, C. F. Trigg and Dr. Wm. Rodgers were present, and possibly others whose names appear appended to the call. Some one, probably C. F. Trigg, sat down at a desk and wrote the call, which was then signed by all present, other signatures being obtained afterward. Little did the originators of this meeting, when they signed

the call for the assembling, imagine that it was to become an important historic event. The call was then published in Brownlow's "Whig." It was in the following words:

"East Tennessee Convention.

"The undersigned, a portion of the people of East Tennessee, disapproving the hasty and inconsiderate action of our general assembly, and sincerely desirous to do, in the midst of the troubles which surround us, what will be the best for our country, and for all classes of our citizens, respectfully appoint a convention to be held in Knoxville on Thursday the 30th of May inst.; and we urge every county in East Tennessee to send delegates to this convention, that the conservative element of our whole section may be represented, and that wise, prudent and judicious counsels may prevail looking to peace and harmony among ourselves.

F. S. Heiskell,
C. F. Baker,
S. R. Rodgers,
Dr. W. Rodgers,
John Baxter,
C. F. Trigg,
David Burnett,
John Williams,
John J. Craig,
W. H. Rodgers,
O. P. Temple,
John Tunnell,
W. G. Brownlow,
and others."

On the day appointed for the meeting of the convention, the town was full of excited delegates. The people had responded to the call with a sympathy scarcely anticipated. The leading Union men from all parts of East Tennessee were present, full of enthusiasm and determination. All this showed that the depths of the hearts of the people had been stirred by the great events then transpiring. The venerable General Thomas D. Arnold, who had represented the Knoxville district in congress thirty-five years before this time, was present, as full of courage and fire as when opposing and boldly denouncing General Jackson in his races for the presidency.

The meeting assembled in a beautiful grove, in East Knoxville, near the old Temperance Hall, now occupied by comfortable residences. The Hon. Thomas A. R. Nelson was made permanent president and John M. Fleming, secretary. A committee on business or resolutions was appointed, of which C. F. Trigg was chairman.

The three great events of the convention, which lasted two days, were the speeches made by Mr. Nelson, General Arnold and Senator Johnson. Before taking the chair Mr. Nelson spoke for more than one hour, with his usual earnestness and power. It was an able, fervid and splendid effort. After him followed General Arnold in a speech of nearly two hours duration. For nearly thirty years I had often heard him at the bar and on the stump, and this was by far the finest effort of his life. It was bold, earnest, witty, pointed, and at times exceedingly eloquent. He seemed to be inspired with the liveliest sense of the danger which threatened the country. He was lifted up above his common level. On the second day, Senator Johnson spoke for three hours, with perhaps more than his usual power. He was never in the habit of making failures on the stump, but was always equal to the demands of the occasion. On this day he seemed superior to himself. His speech was a masterly arraignment and a withering denunciation of the secession party, and an eloquent appeal to the people to stand by the Union.

Strong and emphatic Union resolutions were submitted by the committee, which on a motion to amend, says the published report, "provoked a running debate, participated in by Messrs. Baxter, Temple, Trigg, Fleming, Spears and Wm. Heiskell." After amendment, the resolutions were adopted. Finally the convention adjourned to meet again on the call of the president, the time and place being left to him to determine. The proposal to meet again was in view of the fact that the people of the state were to vote on the question of separation on the 8th of June. It was deemed wise to adjourn over in order to meet the new

exigencies which might soon arise by reason of that election. In accordance, therefore, with the authority vested in the president, as soon as he ascertained the result of the election, he issued a call for the reassembling of the convention in Greenville, on the 17th of June.

The Greeneville Convention.

This convention met under far different circumstances from those existing at its first meeting in Knoxville. At that time there was still a possibility that the people of the state might vote down the proposition for the secession of the state. Now, so far as the will of the majority could give authority to what was believed to be an illegal and unconstitutional measure, the act of secession was accomplished. No one doubted that Governor Harris and the Confederate government would be quick to put the state in line with the other seceding states, and attempt to force its people into immediate submission to the new authority. It was impossible for the great body of the people of East Tennessee to realize their new condition—that they were no longer under the protection of the government of their fathers and of their choice, but subject to one hateful to them and alien to their love.

But there were among the delegates at Greenville those who saw the full force of the recent act of the people of the state. They saw that the Union men were no longer free, as they recently were, to choose the government they would serve, but were in fact, or soon would be, subject to military authority. They knew that the very weakest revolutionary government could not afford to have its authority defied by a weak minority within the limits of its assumed jurisdiction. Much less would such strong men as Mr. Davis and Governor Harris submit to a local rebellion, or any independence of their authority. These men also realized that what had been tolerated a few days before would not be permitted thereafter; that acts which

were overlooked before "separation," would be treated as treason or insurrection in the future. They felt, therefore, that there was a grave and perplexing question to be considered by the convention. Indeed, all the delegates felt that a great crisis in the history of the loyal people of East Tennessee had arrived. But a large majority were bold and defiant, and determined not to submit to a government they hated.

On the reassembling of the convention, the officers and committees chosen at Knoxville were continued in office. The most important of the committees was that on business, to which all resolutions were referred without debate. This consisted of the following persons:

C. F. Trigg, of Knox; A. T. Smith, of Johnson; W. B. Carter, of Carter; J. W. Deadrick, of Washington; Jas. P. McDowell, of Greene; R. L. Stanford, of Sullivan; John Netherland, of Hawkins; Jas. P. Swann, of Jefferson; Samuel Pickens, of Sevier; Charles L. Barton, of Hancock; W. T. Dowell, of Blount; Wm. Heiskell, of Monroe; W. B. Staley, of Roane; D. C. Trewhitt, of Hamilton; R. M. Edwards, of Bradley; J. Stonecipher, of Morgan; L. C. Houk, of Anderson; W. G. Brownlow, of Marion (alternate); J. A. Cooper, of Campbell; G. W. Bridges, of McMinn; T. J. Mathews, of Meigs; R. K. Byrd, of Cumberland (alternate); Wm. M. Biggs, of Polk; J. G. Spears, of Bledsoe; E. E. Jones, of Claibourne; Isaac Bayless, of Union; H. G. Lea, of Grainger; P. Easterly, of Cocke; S. C. Honeycutt, of Scott (alternate) and E. S. Langley, of Fentress (alternate).

Soon after the election on the 8th of June, Senator Johnson had left his home in Greenville, accompanied by J. P. T. Carter, J. P. Holtsinger and W. D. McClelland, and started north in a buggy, by way of Cumberland Gap, since become so celebrated. He was therefore not present at the Greeneville Convention.

The first two days were consumed largely in offering resolutions and in making speeches. The resolutions em-

braced a great variety of projects, dependent on the views of the persons offering them. Many of them were wild and visionary, and nearly all revolutionary. No two delegates agreed as to the policy to be adopted. The only point of general concurrence was a determination on the part of a large majority not to submit to the action of the people of the state in the late election. But how to manifest that determination, what action should be taken to accomplish this end, was a problem no one had solved.

On the first day of the convention, the Hon. T. A. R. Nelson submitted a long paper, appropriately entitled a "Declaration of Grievances," followed by a number of violent resolutions pointing out the policy to be pursued. This paper was at once referred to the business committee for consideration. The Declaration of Grievances was an exceedingly able, bitter and daring arraignment of the secession party in Tennessee. This paper, somewhat modified and softened down in tone by two committees through whose hands it passed, was finally adopted without opposition, and appears in the published account of the proceedings. It is a document of great ability, and will forever lend honor to its distinguished author. This is perhaps the first time that it has been made public that this paper was the work of Mr. Nelson. This fact, though well known to the members of the convention, does not appear in the published proceedings. Whatever was reported for adoption by the business committee, and approved by the convention, appears as the work of the committee.

It was fortunate that Mr. Nelson's resolutions were referred, for if they had been acted on at once, they would have been adopted by an overwhelming majority. The committee did not get ready to report on the mass of matter submitted to it until the afternoon of the third day. By that time, much of the heat and excitement at first existing among the delegates had spent its force in speeches and resolutions. Their minds had somewhat sobered down and reason had resumed its rightful supremacy.

The pamphlet purporting to give an account of the proceedings of the convention, published by its order, does not contain all that was done, much less all that was proposed. A stranger. on reading the published account at this day, would gain a very imperfect idea of what really took place, and no knowledge whatever of the two antagonistic policies which divided the convention until near its close. It gives no insight into the history of the convention. It contains no account of what was proposed and failed. This was so for the most obvious reasons. It was not safe, nor prudent at that time to publish all that was proposed. Nor would it have been right or just to expose to punishment or persecution the members who in their excitement had proposed violent measures, not adopted by the convention.

Those who have read the book entitled "The Loyal Mountaineers of East Tennessee," by Rev. Thomas W. Humes, D.D., have gained from its perusal not only an imperfect, but a very inaccurate idea of what took place. This is not surprising, however, for its author was not a member of that body, nor was he present. In preparing his book, he did not have access to the original minutes, kept by Mr. John M. Fleming, the secretary, nor to the original papers submitted to the convention; nor did he, as it would seem, consult those who knew the facts. These minutes and original papers are now in my possession, and have been since 1861, except for a few months, when they were in the hands of Mr. Fleming. The minutes are unbroken in their account, from day to day, except as to the first part of the first day, which is unimportant. They are just as they were kept by the secretary as the business transpired, and all in his well-known handwriting. Besides, I was a member of the convention, and it having fallen to my lot to have a large agency in shaping the policy finally adopted, I have, consequently, a vivid recollection of the most important proceedings.

It is believed that this account of this celebrated con-

vention will prove of interest to those who may come hereafter. It is the only correct account ever published. No account of it would give the slightest idea of the real facts, without reference to the minutes or notes of the proceedings kept by the secretary. The published proceedings only contain such facts as it was safe to print at that time.

The members of the Greeneville Convention, on assembling, found themselves in an embarrassing dilemma, not realized by many of them at the time. When the Knoxville Convention adjourned, there was still some hope that the state might be saved at the approaching election. That hope was now gone. What was the convention to do in the new circumstances which surrounded it? Adjourn without doing anything? That would have been humiliating. No one thought of that. It was impossible for the delegates to realize the change which had taken place. In May, there was a strong Union sentiment, though suppressed, in the other two divisions of the state; now, in June, East Tennessee stood alone. Were her people able to resist all the rest of the state? Would they alone take up arms?

Mr. Nelson's resolutions voiced the feeling of an overwhelming majority of the convention, as well as that of a large majority of the Union people. The delegates, like the people, were absolutely defiant in tone. They breathed the spirit of a free people whose independence was already won rather than lost. The material resolutions of Mr. Nelson are now in my possession, in his own handwriting.

The *first* declared that "we will not abide by the new "Declaration of Independence" (adopted by the legislature) "or attach ourselves to the Confederate States."

The *second* declared that "the counties of East Tennessee and such of the adjacent counties in Middle Tennessee as choose to act with them will still legally and constitutionally continue in the Union as the State of Tennessee,

subject to its constitution and laws, as far as the same may be applicable to our distracted and divided condition."

The *third* declared in substance that if no effort should be made by the secessionists of Tennessee to coerce the people of East Tennessee into submission, "we desire to maintain a position of neutrality between them and the federal government in the existing war," promising "not to interfere with them if they do not interfere with us," and "not to disturb the formation of disunion volunteer companies, or interfere with the railroad or the transportation of troops," provided "we are not molested by either actual violence or insult," or "an attempt (be made) to enforce among us oppressive or unconstitutional laws, or to collect unlawful taxes."

The *fourth* was that "if any attempt should be made to station or quarter troops among us from either of the other divisions of the state, or from the Confederate States, we will instantly call upon tho government of the United States for aid, and will use every means in our own power for our common defense."

The *fifth* resolution was: "Resolved, that if any member of this convention, or any other citizen of East Tennessee, shall be killed in consequence of his Union sentiments, or shall be arrested under any pretended law of treason, then we earnestly advise and recommend the most prompt and decided acts of retaliation by our people, leaving it to them to judge, in the circumstances by which they may be surrounded, of the nature and extent of such acts of retaliation."

The *sixth* resolution recommended "the formation of military companies with proper officers in every county and civil district" in East Tennessee, and "that such companies shall hold themselves in readiness at a moment's warning."

There were several other resolutions, but these are the material ones. Most of the others were stricken out by the business committee. The ones I have quoted were re-

ported by the committee to the convention for adoption. This was on the afternoon of the third day. The report of the committee at once came up for consideration. The published account of the proceedings reads thus:

"Mr. Temple, of Knox, presented a series of resolutions, and gave notice that he would offer them as a substitute for part of the committee's report.

"After considerable debate, participated in by Messrs. Baxter, Havis, Clift, Brown, Myers, Swann, Thornburgh, Arnold, Carter, Temple and others,

"On motion, the substitute and the *first* resolution of the committee were referred back to the committee for a further report to-morrow morning."

It is a mistake when the report speaks of the "*first* resolution of the committee." It was the first six resolutions of the committee (being the first six of Mr. Nelson), with the substitute that were referred back. This will appear clearly by quoting from the minutes or notes of the secretary, which say:

"Temple offered a substitute for all after the *seventh* Res." This should be all "before" the *seventh*. It was the first six that were objectionable. It will be observed that the first six resolutions of Mr. Nelson, already quoted, erroneously called "the first resolution," and the series of resolutions offered as a substitute, were the only matters referred back to the committee for further consideration.

On the next morning, the fourth day of the convention, the committee again reported its decision to the convention. The printed report says: "Mr. Trigg, from the business committee, again submitted their report. After much discussion, the declaration of grievances and resolutions were finally adopted as follows, without division:"

The original minutes are fuller than the printed report. They say: "Mr. Trigg, from the committee, reported as follows:

"Recommending to strike out *first* resolution" (Mr. Nelson's six resolutions which had been recommended for

adoption by the committee the day before), "and substitute as follows." This should read, as explained above, "all before the *seventh* resolution," that is, to strike out the first six resolutions of Mr. Nelson and adopt the substitute.

The resolutions substituted were those offered the previous day by me. They were the ones finally adopted and published.

In the debate which followed, the position taken by the several speakers is indicated by the notes of the secretary, as follows:

"Mr. Baxter opposed original resolutions, *i. e.*, Mr. Nelson's.
Mr. Havis favored " " " "
Clift, of Hamilton, favored " " "
Brown, of Washington, opposed " "
Myers, of Claibourne, favored " "
Swann, of Jefferson, " " "
Thornburgh, of Jefferson, moved Temple's as a substitute.
Arnold, of Greene, favored the original resolutions.
W. B. Carter, of Carter, favored " "
Temple, of Knox, favored substitute.
Temple's referred back with original."

The resolutions offered as a substitute, which were submitted by the committee in lieu of Mr. Nelson's, and finally adopted, were, in substance, as follows:

1st. A declaration of an earnest desire that East Tennessee should not become involved in civil war.

2d. That the action of the legislature in passing the so-called "Declaration of Independence," in "forming the Military League" with the Confederate States, and in adopting other acts "looking to a separation of Tennessee from the government of the United States, is unconstitutional and illegal, and therefore not binding upon us as loyal citizens."

3d. "That in order to avert a conflict with our brethren of other parts of the state, and desiring that every constitutional means shall be resorted to for the preservation of the peace, we do, therefore, constitute and appoint

. . . . . commissioners, whose duty it shall be to prepare a memorial, and cause the same to be presented to the general assembly of Tennessee, now in session, asking its consent that the counties composing East Tennessee, and such counties in Middle Tennessee as desire to co-operate with them, may form and erect a separate state."

4th. "But, claiming the right to determine our" (their) "own destiny," the people were requested to hold an election in all the counties of East Tennessee, and in such counties in Middle Tennessee, adjacent thereto, as may desire to co-operate with them, for the choice of delegates to represent them in a general convention to be held in the town of Kingston, at such time as the president of this convention, etc., might designate, etc.

The 5th and 6th resolutions provided the mode of holding the election, and fixed the ratio of representation in the convention.

Immediately after the committee made its report in the afternoon of the third day, and after the substitute for Mr. Nelson's resolutions had been presented, a hot debate sprang up in the convention, as indicated above, over the two sets of resolutions. Mr. John Baxter, Mr. Montgomery Thornburgh, Mr. A. J. Brown and myself, supported the substitute, and opposed the more violent resolutions submitted by the committee. Messrs. S. T. Havis, Wm. Clift, V. Myers, J. P. Swann, Thos. D. Arnold and W. B. Carter warmly advocated the adoption of the committee's first report. It was intimated by some of them that those entertaining opposite views were actuated by fear. General Arnold poured a perfect broadside of ridicule and sarcasm, in his inimitable way, on the heads of the conservative speakers. A great deal of fine talking took place about the effective work which could be done with squirrel rifles and shot guns in the hands of our mountain men, in the event of a conflict with the Confederacy. These debates, sometimes almost personal, and at all times excited, lasted

all the afternoon. This was the first time the members began to think seriously about the great questions under consideration. It had become apparent, by the debate, that there was a wide divergence of opinion in the convention. Hence, after the discussion, at a late hour, the resolutions were recommitted with directions for another report the next morning.

Mr. Nelson's resolutions, as at first reported for adoption by the committee, reflected the views of those who favored resistance to the authorities of the state. These constituted, at first, a very large majority. This majority was decidedly in the ascendency, until the debate of that afternoon, when for the first time, an opposite and a more pacific policy was presented. There had been, however, from the first, a number of thoughtful delegates, who saw the perils of the situation, and were opposed to any extreme action, and who wished to wait until relief should come from the Federal government. They saw that the situation was a very grave one, demanding the utmost prudence and discretion. These stood ready to oppose any extreme or revolutionary measures. Among these were Maynard, Baxter, Deadrick, Wm. Heiskell, Thornburgh, Brown, Butler, McDowell, Fleming and myself. On the other side, were the great influence and name of Mr. Nelson, the president, and Mr. Trigg, the chairman of the business committee, and thirty members of his committee, with General Arnold, W. B. Carter, Colonel Clift, and very many more influential men.

On the next morning, when the committee recommended striking out the first six resolutions of Mr. Nelson, and the adoption of the substitute, the fight commenced anew. Mr. Robert Johnson, a son of Andrew Johnson, moved at once to reinstate Mr. Nelson's resolutions, but finally withdrew his motion. Then Mr. Nelson, leaving the chair, renewed the motion. But on a parliamentary point, raised by Mr. R. R. Butler, his motion was also withdrawn. A

debate on the general merits followed. Neither the minutes nor the printed account show who took part in this debate, except that the former show that "Baxter opposed inaugurating revolution," and "McGaughey, of Greene, favored committee's first resolution," (Mr. Nelson's). At some time either during that day, or on the previous afternoon, Mr. Maynard made a very temperate speech in favor of moderation and caution. This fact does not appear in either of the accounts, but I remember it distinctly. The published account says that "after much discussion, the declaration of grievances, and resolutions" (the substitute) "were finally adopted without a division." The minutes say they were all adopted "*seriatim una voce.*"

The blank in the resolutions was filled by the convention or by the committee, by inserting the names of Oliver P. Temple, John Netherland and James P. McDowell as commissioners to memorialize the legislature in reference to a new state.

After the adoption of the "Declaration of Grievances," the minutes show that that document was referred to Mr. Nelson, Mr. Maynard and myself, for final revision. Mr. Nelson declined or failed to act, and Mr. Maynard and I spent several hours in toning it down, and in eliminating from it words and sentences which it was not deemed prudent to publish at that time. Still, this splendid document, as it now appears, though slightly modified from the original, was the work of Mr. Nelson, and he alone is entitled to the credit of its authorship. We did not improve it, nor hope to do so. We simply omitted such expressions as it would have been dangerous to publish at that time.

Thus this memorable convention, which opened in a storm of excitement and passion, closed in perfect harmony. The dark clouds, portending civil war, which hung over East Tennessee for the previous three days, were blown away by prudent counsels and the adoption of pacific measures. The only exception to the harmony which prevailed was on the part of Mr. John Blevins and Mr. W. C.

Kyle, of Hawkins county. Near the close of the convention, they presented a paper protesting "against the action of the convention," but in what respect, they did not say. Why this protest was presented, has never been manifest. To have done less and said less than was done and said by the convention would have been cowardly, and degrading to the high honor and courage of the Union men of East Tennessee. Doubtless there were many delegates, perhaps a majority, who were not quite satisfied with the action taken. These evidently, however, saw no other safe course open to them, for none of them voted against the resolutions which were adopted, and all voted for them.

The convention acted with great deliberation. As will be seen it lasted four days. A speech made by John Netherland on the first day of its meeting, no doubt helped to prevent hasty action. This was the only speech preserved, even in brief, by the secretary, and it deserves reproduction. He said:

"Our deliberations and acts will become historic. We should act calmly. We are in a revolution and a fearful one. As a Union man, I say for myself that we have acted right in East Tennessee. But we must look at things practically. In February, we triumphed in the state by 60,000 majority; that majority has melted away and now the majority against us is 50,000. East Tennessee has stood firm. Now, before taking steps, let us feel the ground firm under us. Do not hurry through the convention."

Whatever difference of opinion might have existed in June, 1861, as to the policy which was finally adopted by the Greeneville convention, it is submitted that at this day none can exist as to its wisdom; or, to reverse the proposition, no difference of opinion can exist as to the extreme inexpediency of passing Mr. Nelson's resolutions, which were at first indorsed and recommended by the business committee. Yet, no reflection is intended to be cast, either upon their distinguished author, nor upon the committee. The committee was composed of thirty gentlemen, one from each county,

and they were supposed to be, and were in fact, among the ablest and wisest men in the convention. Some of them were extremely conservative in their views, and opposed to any violent measures. This was especially the case with Netherland, McDowell, Deadrick and Wm. Heiskell. And yet it is worthy of remark that, when the violent resolutions of Mr. Nelson were first reported for adoption, there was no adverse report, and the action of the committee seemed to be unanimous. This fact shows the intense excitement of a majority of the delegates during the first three days, which carried even the coolest minds beyond the bounds of prudence. Besides, until the afternoon of the third day, there had not yet been presented a single alternative proposition, suitable to the grave emergency then existing.

If Mr. Nelson's resolutions had been adopted, it would have brought on the people of East Tennessee at once all the horrors of civil war. These resolutions constituted a bold defiance of the state and of the Confederate authorities, such as no government could have tolerated. No doubt it seemed entirely practicable, at that day, to those who were carried away by their zeal and excitement, to maintain an independent state, to keep up an army, to resist arrests and the payment of taxes, and to inflict at will retaliatory measures, and, if necessary, to fight battles; but those who thus thought knew nothing of actual war, and were apparently ignorant of the power and spirit of the great revolution then surrounding them. A prevalent idea in the convention was that the Federal Government would protect the loyal people of East Tennessee. And yet, at that time, there was not a federal soldier south of the River Ohio, a distance of nearly three hundred miles. It was more than two years after this time before a relieving army reached Knoxville. At the very time the convention was in session even the capitol of the nation was in serious peril. However strongly Union men may have hoped and believed that relief would soon come from that quar-

ter, we know now that federal aid was at that time utterly hopeless and impossible. Mr. Lincoln, with his big heart, constantly urged, entreated and commanded his generals to relieve these people, and yet it took two years to accomplish this cherished object.

If a strong federal column had even penetrated to Knoxville in 1861 or 1862, previous to the fall of Nashville and Memphis, it would have likely perished or have been driven back in disaster. General Grant was right when, in 1864, he ordered all the armies to move forward at one time. The hazard, the folly, indeed, of throwing one army, except the main one, into the heart of the enemy's country, far ahead of other supporting columns, was too evident to such strategists as General McClellan, General Buell and General Sherman for them to attempt such a thing. For this reason East Tennessee had to wait until the whole line was pushed forward.

Suppose Mr. Nelson's resolutions had been adopted. They constituted a bold declaration of independence. They set East Tennessee in distinct array against the will of a majority of the people of the state and its constituted authorities. They placed us in hostility to the Confederate Government. We became by that act in a state of rebellion. We would therefore have been treated as rebels. Every prominent member of the convention probably would have been arrested for treason. Then would have commenced the work of retaliation, recommended by the *fifth* resolution of Mr. Nelson. If it required, as it did, all the restraining influence of the Union leaders to keep our indignant people from commencing the extermination of the Confederates before that time, what would have been the result of the advice deliberately given by the assembled leaders? The work of slaughter would have been commenced at once by them. Thereupon Confederate soldiers would have been sent into every county to suppress the uprising. Many of these would have been shot by Union men in ambush. Wholesale arrests and shooting of Union

men would have followed. Soon these would have been driven from their homes into the woods or mountains. Guerilla warfare would have succeeded. Union men would have perished in this unequal contest by the thousands. The leaders would have been hung under sentence of drum-head court-martials, or sent South to die in prisons. The scenes of La Vendée during the French Revolution would have been re-enacted in East Tennessee. Blood would have flowed like water. There could have been but one result to such a mad and unequal contest—the utter destruction and overthrow of the Union people. They had no arms, no ammunition, no military organization. In vain they would have looked to the Federal Government for help and protection. At that time it was as powerless to help them as they would have been to protect themselves.

There were at that time not a half-dozen even partial military companies in all East Tennessee. These were without drill, and, worse still, without arms or ammunition. The Confederate Government could have thrown five or ten thousand soldiers among us in two or three days. Indeed, at that very time, there was a considerable Confederate force at Knoxville and at other points. Nearly every train that passed carried a regiment of soldiers from the states South and West on their way to Virginia. While the convention was in session, more than one regiment of Confederate troops passed every day within sight of the place where the meetings were held. Indeed, it has always been a source of surprise that the delegates were not arrested while in session or the meeting broken up. Its sessions were not secret, but open to all who chose to witness them. There were spies present, and that was well known to the members. The only way that this immunity from arrest or molestation can be accounted for is on the well-known fact that the secessionists of East Tennessee were at that time in greater fear of the Union men than the latter were of them. While the convention was in session, the "Louisiana Tigers" stopped in

Greeneville, entered the town, cut down the national flag, made threats, committed some minor outrages, and, after a few hours, departed to Virginia. The delegates were on the streets during all this time, acting discreetly, but defiantly. They carefully avoided provoking a collision, but stood ready to defend themselves as best they could should they be assailed. They everywhere spoke their minds freely and boldly. A few months later, when arrests commenced being made, they were forced into discreet silence. They had learned that, with all their courage, they were powerless to resist.

It must be kept in mind, in order to realize the situation at that time, that our people were absolutely without any of the means of warfare, with no military leaders of experience, and that they were surrounded on every side but one by a hostile territory, and eagerly watched by a hostile army in their very midst. The idea of attempting resistance to the whole Southern Confederacy would seem almost ludicrous at this day, were it not for the gravity and the sincerity of the men who proposed it, and the supreme imminence of the danger which was so narrowly escaped. Even after the lapse of thirty-seven years, I tremble at the thought of the countless horrors and calamities which came so nigh befalling the Union people of East Tennessee at that time. For a time, they seemed willing to face this fate, inspired by their undying love of the Union, and their unflinching determination never to submit to the Southern Confederacy.

No one was hopeful that the legislature would consent to the formation of East Tennessee into a new state. But it was seen that this scheme presented a plausible plan, and the only one, for turning the excited minds of a majority of the members away from the adoption of violent and revolutionary measures to those of a pacific character.

When the substitute was offered, there was nothing before the convention except Mr. Nelson's resolutions, which in effect proposed to encourage the Union men to

take up arms, burn bridges and engage in a wholesale retaliation for any wrongs suffered by them. There was no provision made for their protection in the future. There was no future programme laid out. The substitute had a double object. The first was, and this was the chief one, to avert civil war, which was inevitable should Mr. Nelson's resolutions be adopted. The second object was to provide for any future contingency which might arise, by the election of delegates to a convention to meet on the call of the president, thus keeping up an organization with competent authority to act. It was barely possible, though hardly hoped for by the most sanguine, that the legislature might give its assent to the formation of a new state. But it might be well for delegates to a convention to be elected, and to meet some time in the future for other purposes. The substitute provided for such a contingency.

If the substitute resolutions did not accomplish all that was hoped, they did secure the first and greatest object—the preservation of peace. They prevented the greatest of all calamities—a fraternal civil war, with all its attendant horrors.

If a new state had been formed, it would, of course, have asked congress for admission into the Union. It was with that end in view, in part at least, that the consent of the legislature was asked, in conformity with the constitution of the United States. In West Virginia, at a little later date, this end was secured by calling together the members of the legislature of the parent state who resided within the limits of the proposed new state. This body, assuming to be the legislature of the whole state, although notoriously representing not more than one-third of it, gave its formal assent to the formation of a new state. But both congress and the President yielded to the view that this body was competent to give the assent required only after long delay and hesitation. It must be observed, however, that Mr. Bates, Mr. Wells and Mr. Blair, members of the cabinet,

gave the President written opinions against the legality of the proceedings, while Mr. Seward, Mr. Chase and Mr. Stanton took the opposite view. In the vote ratifying the new constitution of West Virginia, less than twenty thousand votes were cast. This legislature had, however, in 1861, elected senators to congress who had been admitted to their seats in the senate. This recognition of this body as the legislature of the state no doubt had something to do with the creation and admission of the new state.

Although the analogy between East Tennessee and West Virginia, in the early stages of the war, is very striking in many respects, yet that analogy soon ceased. Had East Tennessee been on the border of the free states from which large armies could easily move, and into which they could be quickly thrown, for the protection of conventions, legislatures and the loyal people, as West Virginia was, East Tennessee would to-day no doubt be one of the states of the Union. The loyal people of West Virginia were protected from the opening of the war by large Union armies, which gave freedom of thought and of action to the people.

Soon after the adjournment of the Greeneville Convention, the commissioners appointed for this purpose drew up a memorial and forwarded it to the legislature, asking its consent to the formation of a new state. This memorial was afterwards respectfully considered by that body, and, as was expected, its prayer denied. This document, as will be seen by reading it, was couched in terms of moderation, but was frank and outspoken in the expression of a desire on the part of the Union people of East Tennessee to adhere to the government of their fathers. It is chaste in style, courteous in tone, and exceedingly skillful in expression. Indeed, it is a masterpiece of diplomatic composition in asserting our rights with plausible ingenuity, and yet not offensive. For the first time, it is publicly stated that it was the work of the Hon. Horace

Maynard written after conferring with me. Still it was the work of that scholarly man, written at my request.

More than a mere passing notice is due to the memory of the men who composed this historic convention. The best men in the Union party of East Tennessee were present. It was truly representative in character. In worth and standing, they were nearly equal to any body of men ever assembled in the state. In ability, it contained men of the first order. As lawyers, Nelson, Maynard, Baxter and Trigg stood in the front rank, not only in East Tennessee, but throughout the state. As popular orators, Netherland, Nelson, Maynard, Arnold and Trigg had but few equals in the state, and none in East Tennessee, except Andrew Johnson. In intellectual power, Johnson and Baxter had no equals in the state, excepting John Bell. In courage and boldness, no men could anywhere be found superior to Brownlow, Johnson, Trigg, Baxter, Nelson and Arnold. In honor and lofty integrity, there were men in this body who would have adorned the age of chivalry. In bold and terrible energy in writing, Brownlow had no peer in the state. As a graceful, elegant and brilliant editor, Fleming, though but a young man, had but few equals.

The number of men present who were then or afterwards became prominent and even distinguished is noteworthy. Counting the Knoxville and Greeneville Convention as the same, as they really were, one member became president of the United States. Three, Johnson, Patterson and Brownlow, filled seats in the United States senate. One, Mr. Maynard, served fourteen years in congress, and then became minister to Turkey, and afterwards postmaster-general. Baxter became a United States circuit judge, while Trigg became a United States district judge. Two, Brownlow and Senter, became governors of the state. Nelson and Maynard were then members of congress. Afterwards Houk, Crutchfield, Bridges and Butler also became members of Congress, the first having been elected

for seven terms. Arnold had twice been a member of congress. Nelson and Deadrick became judges of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, and the latter its chief justice. Trewhitt, Staley, H. C. Smith, John M. Smith and the author became chancellors of the state. D. T. Patterson, Butler, Brown, J. P. Swann, Bridges, Houk, Young, Logan and N. A. Patterson had been or became circuit judges. Joseph A. Cooper became a major-general and J. G. Spears a brigadier-general in the Federal army, and twenty-five of the delegates became colonels. Besides, twenty-nine delegates or more, either had been, were then, or afterward became senators or representatives in the legisture. W. B. Carter, another delegate, never held office, except in the constitutional convention of 1870, but in scholarship, in astuteness of intellect, and in logical analysis he had but few equals in the day of his full mental power. He it was who originated and alone directed the execution of burning simultaneously all the railroad bridges on the great line of transportation of Confederate troops between Bridgeport, Alabama, and Bristol, Tennessee, in November, 1861. Mr. Netherland was also a man of marked ability. He was a peerless advocate and a noted popular speaker. In 1859, he was the Whig candidate for governor against Isham G. Harris.

Before closing this chapter, a few words as to the Hon. T. A. R. Nelson are necessary. A more honest man never lived. Perfectly fearless himself, he had no sense of danger. More prudent men, possibly as brave as he, saw peril where he saw only duty and honor. Hurried along by his own knightly spirit and dauntless courage, without stopping to count the odds, but looking alone to the right, he would have had the brave people of East Tennessee imitate the heroic example of the Swiss under Tell, or the Scots under Bruce. Fortunately for the Union people of East Tennessee, as was then thought by a few more prudent men, and as all can now see, his daring policy, after

a full discussion of its merits, finally proved unacceptable to a large majority of the convention.

It is not correct, as is stated in the book entitled "The Loyal Mountaineers of East Tennessee," that it was through the influence and exertions of Mr. Baxter, aided by Mr. Deadrick and Mr. Maxwell, that the convention became harmonious, and the peace of East Tennessee was preserved. Mr. Baxter, it is true, was opposed to the adoption of violent measures, and made two strong speeches in favor of the pacific measures contained in the substitute, and in opposition to Mr. Nelson's plan. He did his full share in preserving the peace, but others did the same. He submitted no resolutions, was on no committee, and made no motions. Neither is it correct that Mr. Deadrick and Mr. Maxwell were specially influential in opposing Mr. Nelson's resolutions. Neither the published nor the unpublished records show that these gentlemen opened their lips in either of the debates, nor can I recall that they did. I, however, know that Mr. Deadrick was very conservative in his views.

Before the convention adjourned, the president was authorized to appoint five persons as an executive committee, with power to act until the next meeting in all matters of emergency for the best interest of the Union party of East Tennessee. This committee had large discretionary powers. No record was made of this action. It was intended that this should be a secret executive committee. But few persons, even among the members of the convention, knew that there was such a committee. It was composed of C. F. Trigg, John Williams, Abner G. Jackson, John M. Fleming and myself—all of Knoxville. The committee held two or three, or, possibly, more meetings, always in secret. One of these was held in the country at the residence of Mr. Abner G. Jackson. If it had been known that we belonged to such a committee and that we were holding secret meetings, it certainly would have lead to our arrest. All that the committee ever did, or attempted,

was to meet and consult together, and exert their influence with Union men for the preservation of peace and order.

The Greeneville Convention was one of the most notable meetings ever held in the United States. Indeed, it is without an analogy. The state had then, by a vote of sixty-four thousand majority, assumed its place as a member of the Southern Confederacy. War then existed between the parent government and its seceding members. The Confederacy had armies in the field, able to enforce obedience and submission to its laws everywhere within its dominions. And yet, in the face of these facts, and in the very presence of the armies of the revolutionary government, this convention assembled, and both the extremists and the conservatives proceeded solemnly to declare that "the action of the state legislature in passing the so-called 'Declaration of Independence;' in forming a 'Military League' with the Confederate States, and in adopting other acts looking to the separation of the State of Tennessee from the government of the United States, is (was) *unconstitutional and illegal*, and, therefore, *not binding* on us (them) as loyal citizens."

The members of the convention then proceeded one step further, and boldly claimed the right to determine their own "destiny," in choosing the government to which they would give their services and their allegiance. Accordingly, they proceeded to take steps for the organization, upon obtaining the consent of the legislature, of a new state in the heart of the South, which state was to be in harmony with that of the United States. That irresistible force prevented the accomplishment of this daring purpose, does not in the least lessen its surpassing boldness. The spirit of these declarations was faithfully kept by these brave, patriotic people. When it was found that a loyal state could not be formed, true to the claim made by them of "the right to determine their own destiny," more than thirty thousand of them left their homes (as refu-

gees) and joined the federal army. Thus they kept the pledge they made to their country.

Nearly three years after the adjournment of the Greeneville Convention, it was again called together in Knoxville, in the spring of 1864. Of the proceedings of this convention I have given an account elsewhere. It is sufficient to say that it was a divided body, and after a four days' session, without doing anything, a motion to adjourn *sine die* was carried.[1]

There was something exceedingly appropriate in the selection of Greeneville as the second place of meeting of the patriots of East Tennessee. This was one of the oldest towns of the state. The cradle of the state was in that region. From that region had gone forth, in 1780, the heroes of King's Mountain. Here had been, at one time, the capitol of the once famous State of Franklin. Here John Sevier, its governor, had tried to bring into form and vigorous life the discordant elements of his revolutionary state. In this region had settled that splendid Covenanter race, whose virtues still adorn its population even after the lapse of more than a hundred years. In this place the glorious memories of the past crowded thick and fast upon the mind. It was full of the inspiration of patriotism. Everywhere could be seen the descendants of revolutionary heroes. And only a few miles away to the southward the Great Smoky Mountains rose up and stretched away in matchless grandeur and sublimity, immovable and unchangeable, typical of the stedfastness of the brave Covenanter people who dwelt in the valleys spreading out from their base.

[1] The "Declaration of Grievances" and the resolutions finally adopted by the Greeneville Convention, together with the "Memorial" sent to the legislature, and a list of the delegates present will be found in Appendix A to this volume.

CHAPTER XVII.

BURNING THE BRIDGES.

Unpleasant condition of Union people of East Tennessee after the secession of state—Commenced going North for safety—W. B. Carter proposes to the President and General McClellan to burn all railroad bridges in East Tennessee—Approved by them—Relief of Union people promised—General Robert Anderson appointed to command an expedition for this purpose—Succeeded by General Sherman—Expedition under General Thomas starts for East Tennessee—Is recalled—Carter authorized to burn bridges—Starts to Tennessee—Selects his assistants—Night of 8th of November the time—Carter ignorant that Thomas had been recalled—Plan executed in part—Chickamauga bridges, Hiwassee bridge, Lick Creek bridge, Watauga bridge all burned—Names in part of persons engaged—Failure as to four bridges—Resistance and fight at Strawberry Plains bridge—Gathering of citizens with arms at Watauga—Gathering in Sevier county—Folly of burning these bridges.

On the adjournment of the Greeneville Convention there was a short lull in the stormy excitement among the Union people of East Tennessee. The action of that body in refusing to advise the organization and equipment of the Union men for war had a soothing effect. They at once began to resume their usual and peaceful avocations. With one mind they were determined not to join the Confederate army, and this resolution was faithfully kept. It is a remarkable attestation of their firmness and loyalty that perhaps not five per cent of these men ever wavered in their course or joined the Confederacy after the secession of the state in June, 1861. Many of them, on the other hand, were reluctant to take up arms against their neighbors and kinsmen in the Southern army. But there was one point on which they all agreed, and that was in a firm and immutable resolution never under any circumstances to fire a hostile shot at the flag of their country. Many of them were willing, if permitted to do so, to remain

at home in peace, quiet spectators of the great conflict in which they could not follow their patriotic instincts. But even this poor privilege was soon denied them.

The triumph of the secessionists in the June election, and the presence of Southern troops at many important points in East Tennessee, gave high confidence to their adherents. These served to encourage many of them to extreme arrogance in their demeanor toward the Union men. This feeling was greatly intensified by the first victory at Bull Run. This seemed not only to move their joy, but to stir up within them all the ill-feeling which the war had engendered. In country districts they became especially insulting to the Union men. Now and then the best and the most honorable Confederates did not consider it degrading to inform on their Union neighbors. Sometimes the most sacred ties of friendship and even of kinship were disregarded. Men hitherto of mildest disposition not unfrequently seemed to become anxious for blood. This is one of the phenomena of the war which I could never understand. And only those who witnessed it, can ever realize the intensity of this feeling.

Gradually the fact became apparent to the Union men that they were under the dominion of a power hostile to their opinions. They were denounced as "tories," as "Lincolnites" and as cowards. Their situation was becoming unbearable. So, they began at last to cast their eyes in the direction of Kentucky, as an asylum of safety. Senator Johnson had left in June. Mr. Nelson made an attempt to reach the North early in August, but had been intercepted and arrested in South West Virginia, and sent to Richmond. Mr. Maynard had managed to be in Scott county, bordering on Kentucky, on the day of the state election for members of congress, on the first Thursday of August. In the afternoon he quietly took his horse, and the next morning was safely beyond the state border. Mr. George W. Bridges was elected a member of congress from the 3d district. He too started North after the elec-

tion by nearly the same route taken by Mr. Maynard, but he was enticed back to see a dying wife, as was pretended, and was arrested. Andrew J. Clements was elected from the 4th district and managed to get North. He took his seat in the next congress.

All these had started North as members of congress, and expected soon to return to their families. Mr. James P. Carter had accompanied Mr. Johnson in his flight in June. In the latter part of June, or early in July, Rev. William B. Carter also went North to try and procure some kind of relief for the people of East Tennessee.

On the first Thursday of August, 1861, the real flight of Union men from East Tennessee commenced. On that day Felix A. Reeve, then a young man, started North, by way of Nashville and Louisville, with the fixed purpose of never returning if the Southern Confederacy should be successful. A little more than two years after this, however, he did return at the head of the Eighth Regiment of Tennessee Infantry.

The first refugee unquestionably was Fred. Heiskell, of Knox county. The very day the firing on Sumter took place he commenced preparing to go North. On the 18th of April he was in Louisville. On the 20th or 21st he enlisted in Colonel W. W. Woodruff's First Kentucky Regiment. He served throughout the war, and was a brave and faithful soldier. He is a brother of Hon. J. B. Heiskell, of Memphis.

Very soon after the flight of Mr. Reeve, Robert K. Byrd, and others from Roane county, also left their homes as exiles. Gradually the disposition to leave spread through all the counties of East Tennessee. So, there came to be a constant stream of refugees silently working their way by night, through the wide expanse of mountains separating East Tennessee from the thickly settled parts of Kentucky. Many of these left without any settled purpose as to what they were to do when they reached their destination. They fled from what they regarded as a present and terrible

danger. Anything that could befall them was better than their condition at home. In Kentucky there would be at least freedom of opinion. At home, even the pure and exhilarating air wafted from the very mountain tops, now seemed tainted, and became hot and stifling to these sturdy sons of freedom. Soon there were thousands of these wanderers in Kentucky. Before autumn had passed away the First Tennessee Infantry, with Robert K. Byrd as Colonel, was organized and equipped. And then followed in rapid succession, the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Regiments, and still others from time to time till the close of the war.

The condition of the Union men remaining in East Tennessee was day by day becoming more disagreeable. Arrests and imprisonments had commenced. Dr. John W. Thornburgh and H. C. Jarvis, for no crime, except being Union men, were arrested and carried to Nashville for trial and imprisonment on a charge of treason, though that place was outside of and quite remote from the judicial district in which their alleged offenses were committed. Both were afterwards members of the Tennessee legislature.

It was now becoming evident that a reign of terror if not one of persecution had been inaugurated, and there was no safety for loyal men living in the country, except in flight. There were many good men in the secession party who did all they could to prevent this state of things. Unfortunately in civil revolutions the voice of justice and mercy is low and feeble, while the cry for vengeance is uttered in thunder tones. Those who would have protected the Union men, and they were many, were powerless. Violent men were in the ascendant. The wise and humane soon lost all influence.

At an early day steps were taken to prevent the escape of Union men. Every pass in the mountains, on the Kentucky border, was occupied and guarded. Confederate

soldiers constantly patrolled the foot of the mountains from the base of the Blue Ridge, in Virginia, to the western slope of the Cumberland, in Middle Tennessee. But men fleeing for freedom were alert and lynx-eyed. Darkness would creep over the mountains, and while the Confederate soldiers slept, or dozed at their posts, cunning guides, wide awake and soft of tread as panthers, were leading the refugees in silence along some unexpected way, or scaling beetling steeps, impassable except to men whose lives depend on present strength, coolness and daring. Thus Camp Dick Robinson, the place of rendezvous, in Kentucky, was constantly recruited by East Tennessee exiles during the autumn of 1861.

But still more stirring events were in waiting. As before stated, William B. Carter, who had been an active and an able Union leader, left East Tennessee about the first of July, 1861, for the purpose of going North, to see what could be done for the relief of East Tennessee.

Whatever may have been the scheme hidden away in his own bosom at that time, if there was any such, it is certain that before the months of autumn passed a daring one was agitating his restless mind. In September he went to Washington and was admitted to an interview with Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Seward and General McClellan, in reference to the relief of East Tennessee. He suggested to them a plan by which this relief could come. This was by the simultaneous destruction of all the bridges on the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad, and on the East Tennessee and Virginia road, between Bridgeport and Bristol, a distance of 270 miles, and also a long bridge over the Tennessee at Bridgeport, Alabama, on the Memphis and Charleston road. This was the main line connecting Memphis and Nashville with Richmond, by which the Confederate army in Virginia secured its supplies and re-enforcements. This road, or the several roads forming one main line, was deemed vital to the Southern cause. Simultaneously with the destruction of the bridges

on this important line, there was to be a military expedition sent into East Tennessee. An army was to be concentrated on the border of Tennessee, and was to move on Knoxville as soon as the bridges were destroyed, or rather, the two things were to be in process of execution at the same time, the object being to seize the road and control it.

Mr. Lincoln at once entered warmly into the scheme. Mr. Seward and General McClellan also approved it. The secretary of state furnished Mr. Carter $2,500 with which to secure the destruction of the bridges—certainly a very small sum for such an enterprise. General McClellan promised to aid in the movement by sending an army into East Tennessee as soon as possible. He said he would keep the Confederate army in Virginia so busy that it could not send troops to East Tennessee to aid in defending its lines of communication.[1] He also said that the Federal army in Louisville would do the same in reference to the Confederate army in Middle Tennessee.

An expedition into East Tennessee had early been a favorite idea with Mr. Lincoln. He seemed to possess intuitive military genius. Soon after the battle of Bull Run he made his celebrated "memorandum" as to military affairs, in which he suggested a military expedition from Cincinnati into East Tennessee.

In the latter part of September, Mr. Lincoln went to the War Department, and left another memorandum, which was a *quasi* order, in which he said among other things:

"On or about the 5th of October (the exact date to be determined hereafter) I wish a movement made to seize and hold a point on the railroad connecting Virginia and Tennessee, near the mountain pass called 'Cumberland Gap.'"[2]

[1] The above facts were communicated to me orally by Mr. Carter, September 8, 1891, and very soon afterwards reduced to writing by me.

[2] Cumberland Gap is distant at the nearest point, about forty miles from the railroad which was to be seized, and sixty miles from Knoxville.

In every possible way, Mr. Lincoln manifested his deep sympathy with the loyal people of East Tennessee. As early as August he selected General Robert Anderson, as we have seen, of Fort Sumter fame, to take charge of this enterprise. General Anderson was not only a brave and an able soldier, but he had the advantage of being a native of Kentucky, which seemed to give him peculiar fitness for command in a state where great tact, discretion and popularity were required at that time. Very soon also Samuel P. Carter, a lieutenant in the navy, was made a brigadier-general and sent to Kentucky. General Carter was a brother of William B. Carter. The fact that he was a native of East Tennessee no doubt had much to do with his selection to aid in the contemplated expedition, for he knew much of the people as well as the country. His subsequent history during the war shows the wisdom of his selection.[1]

General Anderson retained his command only a short time. The strain on his nervous system during the bombardment of Sumter had been so great that he never recovered from it. He found himself totally unfit for a command beset with the perplexities and grave responsibilities that he met in his native state. The Confederates under General Leonidas Polk had seized Columbus; General Buckner had just occupied Bowling Green, and General F. K. Zollicoffer was in possession of Cumberland Gap, on the border of Tennessee and Kentucky. Thus they held a line in the southern part of Kentucky from the Mississippi to the Virginia border. General Anderson had no army. There were a few raw Tennessee recruits at Camp Dick Robinson, a few companies of home guards here and there; Colonel W. W. Woodruff had raised a regiment of Kentuckians, and General L. H. Rousseau had raised and organized his legion, consisting of two or

[1] He arose to the rank of major-general, and bore an honorable part throughout the entire war. At its close he returned to the navy, where he rose by successive grades to the rank of commodore.

three regiments, at Jeffersonville, in the State of Indiana. There were probably other embryo regiments. With these inadequate forces, probably in all not amounting to 20,000 men, he had to hold the country from the mouth of the Sandy to Paducah. In bad health and probably in despair at the disparity between the means at command and the magnitude of the work to be done, on the 8th of October, General Anderson relinquished his command, and turned it over to General W. T. Sherman.

On the 5th of September, General Grant having discovered by a reconnoissance that Columbus was lost, quietly organized a force, and sailed up the Ohio River to the mouth of the Tennessee, at Paducah, which place he seized and fortified. The importance of this step may be seen from the letter of General Buckner to the war department, at Richmond, a few days later, in which he says: "Our possession of Columbus is already neutralized by that of Paducah."

By this time the loyal legislature of Kentucky, which had been elected in August, indignant at the invasion of her soil by armies claiming to act under the authority of a foreign government, abandoned the delusion of neutrality, and by unmistakable acts began to take sides with the Union. It was widely circulated that, on the 20th of September, the state guards—the militia which General Buckner had been organizing—would have a "camp drill" at Lexington. It was believed that this was to be a signal for a general rising of the Kentucky secessionists, who, aided by Buckner and Zollicoffer's forces, were to seize Lexington, Frankfort and Louisville, and overthrow the legislature. The loyal members of that body, not trusting Governor Beriah Magoffin, who was known to be a secessionist, requested General Thomas, at Camp Dick Robinson, to send a regiment to Lexington, in advance of the advertised camp drill "fully prepared for a fight." Gen-

[1] Nicolay & Hay's "Life of Lincoln," Vol. V, pp. 50, 51.

eral Thomas sent Colonel Thomas E. Bramlette with his regiment, which reached the Lexington Fair Ground on the night of September 19th, the night before the proposed "drill." John C. Breckenridge, Humphrey Marshall, and other leaders, who were in Lexington to aid, no doubt, in the contemplated rising, were surprised and startled by the sudden appearance of Bramlette and his troops, and fled precipitately for safety from arrest. A few days after this affair, Breckenridge and William Preston made their appearance in Knoxville as refugees from their home in Kentucky, having come through the mountains by way of Cumberland Gap. Knoxville soon became a kind of rendezvous for the young chivalry of the Blue Grass region. Not many months after this, the noted John Morgan, with his command, also made his appearance there.

The situation in Kentucky, in October, 1861, was extremely critical for the small Union forces in that state. General Sherman says: "It was manifest that the young men were generally inclined to the cause of the South, while the older men of property wanted to be let alone—*i. e.*, to remain neutral." [1]

He further says he was "all the time expecting that Sidney Johnston—who was a real general—would unite his forces with Zollicoffer, and fall on Thomas at Dick Robinson, or McCook at Nolin. Had he done so in October, 1861, he would have walked into Louisville, and a vital part of the population would have hailed him as a deliverer. Why he did not, was to me a mystery then and is now; for I know he saw the move, and had his wagons loaded at one time for a start toward Frankfort, passing between our two camps." [2]

Such was the condition of military affairs in Kentucky, in November, 1861, when the plan of burning the bridges in Tennessee was put in execution.

The general outlines of the attempt to burn the bridges

[1] "Memoirs," Vol. I, p. 199. [2] Id., p. 200.

are briefly set forth in a report made to the house of representatives, January 30, 1891, by the committee on invalid pensions. That report says:

"Soon after General George H. Thomas took command of the United States forces in South-eastern Kentucky in September, 1861, he began preparations for a campaign, with Knoxville, Tennessee, as its objective point, hoping to be able to occupy and hold that city, thus cutting the railroad communications between Richmond and the South-west through East Tennessee. The importance of occupying this section at that stage of the war, in a military point of view, was well understood, not only by General Thomas, but also by the President and General McClellan, then commanding the army. This subject formed the basis of a conference in September, 1861, between General Thomas, General S. P. Carter, Andrew Johnson and Horace Maynard, of Tennessee, when the feasibility of the burning of the aforesaid railroad bridges was agreed upon.

"The government had placed in the hands of Andrew Johnson a considerable sum of money, to be used in the defense of East Tennessee, and General Thomas expected to obtain from the former a sufficient amount to carry out the plan agreed upon.

"But in this he was disappointed; and being unwilling to abandon his campaign, dispatched one William B. Carter, a prominent Union man of that section, to Washington, with a communication to General McClellan regarding this matter. The proposition received the favorable consideration of the latter, as well as Secretary Seward and the President, and Mr. Carter returned to General Thomas' headquarters at Camp Dick Robinson, and soon received instructions to carry out the latter's plans, the details of which were left to Carter's judgment. Mr. Carter, accompanied by two army officers detailed for that purpose, entered upon his duties after a long and perilous journey, by selecting from the known Union men

of the section through which the railroad ran six assistants, who in turn obtained a sufficient number of trusty persons to carry into execution the work before him. The night of November 8th was selected as the time when the destruction of the bridges should take place, and the programme was carried out to perfection at the appointed time."

In the conversation with Mr. W. B. Carter, previously referred to, he said that he was present at an interview between Generals Sherman, Thomas and S. B. Carter, in the fall of 1861, presumably at Camp Dick Robinson, in which the question of an expedition into East Tennessee in connection with the burning of bridges was fully discussed. General Sherman opposed the expedition and gave his reasons for his opposition. When he concluded, General Thomas presented his reasons for favoring the expedition, and answered the objections offered by General Sherman. When he finished, Sherman, with manly honesty, confessed that Thomas had converted him to his views, and he accordingly ordered him (Thomas) "to push on an expedition."

General Sherman, in a letter published in the congressional report quoted above, dated February 21, 1890, addressed probably to Mr. Carter, but the report is silent on this point, says:

". . . The movement on Knoxville in 1861 was a divergent one at first, and was by me afterwards changed to one of concentration, when Thomas was recalled, after having gone but a short distance."

Soon after this, as we shall see more fully hereafter, General Sherman changed his mind as to the expediency of this "divergent movement," as he called it. General Thomas, from the first, was greatly, indeed earnestly, in favor of it. On every suitable occasion, he urged the matter on the attention of his superiors; first on Anderson, while he was in command; then on Sherman, his successor. On October 4th, he asked General Anderson for

"four good regiments, with transportation and ammunition." He said that, if he could get such a force, and be ready to march in ten days from that time, he could seize the railroad at Knoxville.

In somewhat curious contrast to the foregoing, Governor Harris, of Tennessee, was calling at that very time on the Confederate secretary of war for "twelve or fourteen thousand men" for East Tennessee, to crush out the rebellion there, which he thought "could be done, without firing a gun, while a smaller force may involve us in scenes of blood that will take long years to heal."

In a letter of Thomas to Sherman, dated November 5th, he once more asked for four regiments, with which to invade East Tennessee. After the consultation between these two Generals in October, which resulted in Sherman directing Thomas to proceed with his expedition into East Tennessee, the latter made preparations to carry out what he so much desired.

At the time agreed upon, General Thomas was to be on the border of Tennessee, perhaps at Cumberland Gap, or south of it, with his army, and was, on the burning of the bridges, to make a hurried march to Knoxville and seize the railroads. On the 18th or 19th of October, Mr. Carter left Camp Dick Robinson for East Tennessee, to execute his part of the important movement. Thomas was to leave his camp with his army about the 22d or 23d. In the meantime General Zollicoffer made an advance with his army in the direction of Wild Cat, about forty-five miles south of Camp Dick Robinson. This advance of Zollicoffer rendered it necessary for Thomas to set out three or four days earlier than he expected.[1] He met Zollicoffer at Wild Cat, where a sharp little fight took place, in which Zollicoffer was repulsed and driven back. Thomas, with his little army of only a few regiments, then moved on to London, about fifty-five miles south of Dick Robinson, on

[1] Manuscript letter of W. B. Carter, of September 15, 1891, to author.

his way toward Knoxville. Here he was arrested in his march by command of General Sherman, and ordered to retrace his steps, which he most reluctantly did.

Thus the expedition into East Tennessee, for the relief of the loyal people, was indefinitely postponed. General Sherman, in the letter already quoted, speaks of the time "when Thomas was recalled after having gone but a short distance." Sherman was too brave and frank for any concealment about his actions or opinions. He was at first favorable to this enterprise. Then he changed his mind and revoked his order to Thomas to advance. In fact, his policy, as avowed by himself, was one of "concentration," with the view of operating in the direction of Columbus and Bowling Green. In a letter, dated February 3, 1862, addressed to the Hon. John Sherman, published in the "Century," for January, 1893, he says: "Until these places (Bowling Green and Columbus) are reduced it will not do to advance far into Tennessee, and I doubt if it will be done. East Tennessee can not exercise much influence on the final result. West Tennessee is more important, as without the navigation of the Mississippi all commercial interests will lean to the Southern cause. . . ."

When General Thomas was halted at London in his movement toward Knoxville, Mr. W. B. Carter, as we have seen, had been in East Tennessee several days. He was too far off to receive news of the change of plans. Indeed, he was at that very time engaged in making his final arrangements for the destruction of the bridges. It was too late to countermand his orders. His agents were already at or near their respective points of duty, only waiting for the appointed night to arrive. Even if a message could have reached Mr. Carter, it was too late to arrest those selected to burn the bridges. Carter was in fact profoundly ignorant of the change of plans, and knew nothing of this until his return from Tennessee to Kentucky, several days after the time fixed for their execution.

There were nine important bridges which were included

in the plan of destruction. Two of these, the one over the Tennessee at Loudon, and the other over the Tennessee at Bridgeport, Alabama, on the Nashville and Chattanooga and also on the Memphis and Charleston roads, were very long and costly structures. The others were not so valuable. Five of the nine were destroyed. These were the bridges over the Holston, at Union Depot, that over Lick Creek west of Greeneville, one over the Hiwassee River at Charleston, Tennessee, and two over Chickamauga Creek, not far from Chattanooga.

The entire execution of the plan for their destruction was left to the discretion of Mr. Carter. As we have seen, two officers of the army, namely, Captain William Cross and Captain David Fry, of Greene county, Tennessee, were detailed to aid him. He selected in the neighborhood of each of the bridges to be burned, a leader for the work to be done in that neighborhood, and these leaders selected their own assistants, generally five or six more persons. Mr. Carter himself came to Emory River at the house of a Mr. Crow, near Mr. De Armond's, two or three miles from Kingston. He was the very man for such an enterprise—cool, cunning, sagacious and brave.

But few of the persons connected with these daring enterprises were ever found out by the public. At the time, and for nearly two years afterwards, the danger of punishment by the Confederate authorities constituted a sufficient reason for the concealment of their names. But that reason long since ceased to have any force. And yet their names, with few exceptions, are unknown to the public to-day. Mr. Carter can not reveal them, being bound by honor not to do so.[1] But the others are not under the same bond of secrecy. I have succeeded in getting most of the names, with permission from those still living to publish them.

The destruction of the bridges in lower East Tennessee, from the Hiwassee River to Bridgeport, was wisely left to

[1] Manuscript letter of April 11, 1895.

the sole discretion of Mr. A. M. Cate, of Bradley county, subsequently a state senator. He was a prudent, sagacious man, and a citizen of high character and standing. His four different enterprises were managed with such admirable skill and secrecy that for thirty-five years no one ever suspected him of any agency in them. Until quite recently the matter was as great a mystery in that region as it was the next morning after it occurred.

The great bridge over the Tennessee, at Bridgeport, was to have been burned by R. B. Rogan and James D. Keener. They went to the bridge, but, finding it heavily guarded by Confederate soldiers, abandoned the attempt and returned home. Mr. Keener still lives and resides near Chattanooga. Mr. W. T. Cate, a brother of A. M. Cate, and W. H. Crowder alone burned the two bridges over Chickamauga Creek, which were very close together, one on the East Tennessee and Georgia road, and the other on the Western and Atlantic. The bridge over the Hiwassee River was burned by A. M. Cate, the general leader, by Adam Thomas, Jesse F. Cleveland and his son Eli, and by Thomas L. Cate, a brother of A. M. Cate. All these are dead, except Thomas L. Cate, who lives in Cleveland, Tennessee, but is engaged in banking in Chattanooga. He stands deservedly high every way, and belongs to one of the largest and most influential families in East Tennessee. If there were any peculiar or exciting incidents connected with the destruction of either of these bridges, I have no information on the subject. As far as I have gone, the facts given are absolutely authentic. No one of these persons has ever been suspected even by their best friends.[1] There must have been admirable sagacity and discretion in the execution of these hazardous and daring enterprises. Mr. A. M. Cate displayed in them qualities fitted for a successful general in the field.

After the most diligent inquiry, extending through two

[1] Quite recently a pamphlet has been published giving an account of the burning of these bridges.

or three years, I have not been able to obtain any reliable information in reference to the long bridge over the Tennessee at Loudon. No one in the vicinity seems to know anything about any attempt having been made to burn that structure. Mr. Carter knows, but declines to disclose any names. That bridge was the second in importance of all the nine doomed to destruction. It was included in the plan, and persons were selected to destroy it, and no doubt they made some kind of an attempt to carry out their orders. But who were these persons?

From certain information I have obtained, I think it probable that Captain William Cross, of Scott county, was detailed to burn this bridge. If so, finding it guarded, he probably made no effort to do so. He died several years ago. While alive he seems to have been reticent about it, as A. M. Cate and his associates always were. I cannot ascertain that he ever told anyone that he was connected with an attempt to destroy this bridge, though he did tell his family that he was connected with bridge burning.

The next bridge on the line was the one on the Holston, at Strawberry Plains, fifteen miles east of Knoxville. William C. Pickens, of Sevier county, was the leader selected to destroy this bridge. He was a bold, dashing, reckless, good-natured fellow, who delighted in just such adventures as this. His associates were Daniel M. Ray, James Montgomery, Abe Smith, B. F. Franklin, White Underdown, William Montgomery, Elijah Gamble, and a father and a son—the son objecting to the mention of either his father's or his own name. All these men were from Sevier county. They made no careful examination of the premises in advance, and seemed to have known but little about it. If they had known the fact that a guard was stationed at the eastern end of the bridge, doubtless the attempt would have been made at the other end.

I have conversed with two of the men engaged in this enterprise, and read the account given by a third, and they

somewhat differ as to details, but agree as to the main facts.

Having left their horses in charge of two of their number, they approached the bridge by going along the bank of the river until they reached the abutment. There two or more of the party scrambled up to the top of the bridge, when Pickens struck a light. No sooner had he done this than the sharp crack of a gun rang out on the night air, and Pickens fell wounded in the thigh. Thereupon, James Keelin, the guardsman, seized him, and a desperate struggle ensued. One of the Montgomerys, seeing this struggle, rushed to the assistance of his companion with a huge home-made knife twelve or fifteen inches long. In the darkness, the light having gone out, mistaking Pickens for Keelin, he commenced cutting him with blind fury. With one blow he nearly severed his hand from his arm, and probably inflicted other wounds. By this time others had gotten upon the bridge; Keelin was shot, or was supposed to be, and was either thrown down the embankment or rolled down it, supposed by those above to have been killed. This was a mistake, for no sooner did he touch the earth below than he sprang to his feet, and ran for safety as fast as he could, two of the party who were still below firing their guns at him as he ran.

Now the party was in possession of the bridge. But to their consternation, when they sought for matches, not one could be found. Pickens had the only matches brought by the party, and when the gun was fired, or in the subsequent struggle, the box containing them fell from his hands and dropped below. So, no fire could be applied to the bridge. It was proposed by some one to go to some of the neighboring houses and procure fire, but it was plain that this would be the means of advertising who they were. All that remained for them to do was to abandon the enterprise. This they reluctantly did at last. Though Pickens was wounded in two or more places, he was too

plucky to give up. He was mounted behind a companion and the party rode off to Dan. Keener's, several miles away, where they spent the next day, and where medical assistance was procured. Here he was placed on a sled, concealed with corn fodder, and hauled back into the mountains, where he remained with occasional changes of place of concealment, until the following January, when he and his associates were piloted across the mountains into Kentucky. Here he and others raised the Third Tennessee Cavalry, and he became its first colonel. Dr. Jas. H. Ellis, of Trundles' X Roads, a worthy gentleman and a good physician, from whom I obtained a part of my information, dressed the wounds of Pickens the next day after the attempt on the bridge, at the house of Keener, and attended him afterwards.

There has been much sensational matter published in reference to this attempt to burn the Strawberry Plains bridge. Keelin became a great hero in the South for the time being. It was represented that he alone had resisted and driven off a whole company—an indefinite number of men—and had nearly cut Pickens to pieces. There is no question as to the heroic defense of the bridge made by him, and in one sense he alone saved it. But notwithstanding his bravery, the bridge would have been destroyed in spite of him, but for the loss of the box of matches. Keelin only recently died at Bristol, Tennessee. Colonel Pickens died a few years after the close of the war.

Of the men engaged in the enterprise, two of them became colonels in the Federal army, D. M. Ray, of the Second Tennessee Cavalry, and W. C. Pickens, of the Third; W. W. Montgomery, J. A. Montgomery and one other became captains; White Underdown and Elijah Gamble became lieutenants, and another became a sergeant.

The foregoing is a substantially correct account of this affair as given by the survivors.

I copy from the statement of Colonel Ray an account

of their treatment while in the mountains by the good Union men:

"While in this mountain retreat they" (the party of bridge burners) "were joined by Parson Brownlow and Rev. James Cummings, who were compelled to flee from their homes on account of their Union sentiments. Every member of this little band of fugitives should ever remember with feelings of gratitude the loyal citizens of Weir's Cove. Every man, woman and child there was true to their country's flag, and during the dark hour of danger when they were in hiding, carried provisions and kept them supplied with everything they needed."

The next bridge marked for destruction was the one over Lick Creek, in Greene county, fifteen miles west of Greeneville. This stream is long and narrow, with broad, flat, marshy meadow lands on either bank. Its water is turbid and sluggish. It has become famous by reason of the facts that connected with its name there were five lamentable tragedies early in the Civil War which will never be forgotten.

Captain David Fry, of the Second Tennessee Infantry, was the leader of the party which burned this bridge. He was a brave, daring man, just suited for such an undertaking. It is very difficult to ascertain certainly who his assistants were, because all of them are dead, five of them having died on the gallows soon afterwards. It is, however, almost certain that Jacob Harmon and his son, Thomas Harmon, Jacob M. Hensie, Henry Fry, Hugh A. Self, A. C. Hawn and Harrison Self were with Captain Fry at the burning of the bridge. I have heard of no striking incident immediately connected with its destruction.

There were two bridges on the extreme eastern end of the railroad line that were selected for destruction. These were, the one over the Holston at Union Depot, now called Bluff City, within a few miles of the Virginia line at Bristol; the other the one over the Watauga at Carter's Depot, in Carter county. The leader selected to destroy



ISAAC SHELBY.

Colonel at King's Mountain and First Governor of Kentucky.

these bridges was Daniel Stover, the son-in-law of Andrew Johnson, afterwards Colonel of the Fourth Tennessee Infantry. I have the names of these men, but the list is long, and I do not feel that I have sufficient authority to publish them, though most of their names are already known in that region of country.

Only one of these bridges, the one over the Holston, was destroyed. The other was guarded by Captain David McClelland's company of Confederate Infantry, and the attempt at its destruction was therefore abandoned. There was a guard of two men at the Watauga bridge. These were easily overpowered and captured. Their lives were spared on the promise that they would not reveal the names of the men who burned the bridge. Yet they went away and disclosed the names of all whom they recognized.

Soon the news spread that the men engaged in this enterprise had been identified under oath, and that they were to be arrested and hung as bridge burners. These brave men, the descendants of the men who planted the banner of civilization on the Watauga—on the very spot where they then were—nearly one hundred years before, were not such base and cowardly spirits as to quietly submit to such a thing. With the high metal of the Seviers, the Tiptons, the Shelbys and the Robertsons, they determined once more to make the Watauga famous with heroic deeds. By the next night, many men were under arms. The next day, one thousand were assembled at the celebrated revolutionary rendezvous at the Sycamore Shoals. Soon nearly all the available men in Carter county were present, and a number of companies from Johnson had arrived, all animated by the same spirit which brought together on that spot their fathers on the 25th of September, 1780. A partial organization was effected by the election of L. Williams as colonel. In a day or two, however, a new organization was effected by the election of J. S. R.

Boyd as colonel, and Daniel Stover as lieutenant-colonel. While stationed at Sycamore Shoals, or Taylor's Ford, pickets were sent out toward Carter's Depot, who encountered the advance of the enemy and fired on it. The latter fled to the depot, and when they reported to Captain McClellan, he retreated also. That night the Union men were attacked by the enemy and the latter repulsed.

The next day, the Union forces, knowing that heavy Confederate reinforcements were on their way and arriving, retreated, by way of Big Spring, to Elizabethton. From this point, the Union men went to Doe River Cove, six miles south of Elizabethton, where they went into camp and remained two weeks. Finally, the Confederate forces, under General Leadbetter, broke up this camp, and the men fled to the mountains. A few were captured, but most of them hid in the mountains until they had a chance to follow their own matchless pilot and leader, Daniel Ellis, to Kentucky, where they could enter the Union army. Some waited until the Federal army came in, and they were thus set free from their mountain imprisonment.[1]

All this demonstration of a spirit of resistance on the part of the people of Carter and Johnson counties, in a military point of view, amounted to nothing. But as a manifestation of the determination of the people never to yield, nor submit to the rule of the Southern Confederacy, it amounted to a great deal. In this respect it was equal to a Union victory. It showed, too, what these brave mountain men would become when trained, drilled and led by such skillful leaders as Colonel John K. Miller, one of their own people.

Very similar to the action of the Union men of Carter and Johnson was that of the people of Sevier county.

Hearing of the burning of the bridges, and some of them believing that this was the forerunner of the entrance

[1] For the foregoing facts, I am under obligations to Mr. C. P. Toncry; also to the letters of Captain Daniel Ellis, published in the "National Tribune."

of the Federal army, they too assembled to the number of four hundred, armed as best they could, and marched toward Strawberry Plains. They proceeded as far as Underdown's Ferry, on the French Broad, where they remained thirty-four hours or longer, skirmishing and keeping at bay a Confederate force on the north bank of the stream. Finally, they fell back and scattered to their homes, some of them having been arrested in doing so. These demonstrations on the part of the Union people of these counties created the wildest alarm in Knoxville and elsewhere among the Confederate authorities, as we shall presently see.

The attempt to burn these bridges at this time, and its partial success, was, in my opinion, from every point of view, as I shall hereafter try to show, most unwise and unfortunate. It did but little injury to the enemy, while it brought untold calamities and sufferings on the Union people.

CHAPTER XVIII.

EXECUTIONS AND IMPRISONMENTS.

Alarm caused by burning the bridges—Telegraphic messages—A general uprising expected—Confederate troops sent to East Tennessee—Union men arrested—Benjamin's order—Five bridge burners hanged—Court-martial organized—Judges Brown and Humphreys interpose—Condemnation of Harrison Self—His daughter appeals to Mr. Davis—Humane conduct of latter—Union men sent to prison at Tuscaloosa—Noble conduct of Confederate officers—Bridge burning condemned—Political arrests condemned.

The news of the burning of the bridges, in East Tennessee, came upon the country on the morning of November 9, 1861, like the sound of a fire-bell at night, so sudden and unexpected was it. The Southern Confederacy was startled and stirred from end to end. Men awoke frightened as if by a horrible dream. Universal consternation prevailed in East Tennessee. Other and greater calamities were expected to follow immediately. The military authorities and railroad officials were thrown into a wild and unreasonable panic. They hastened to and fro, and stormed and issued orders, as if they had just lost a decisive battle. Confederate citizens of Knoxville, as the Rev. Colonel W. B. Wood, of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, informed General Samuel Cooper, commenced "finding places of safety for their families," and in some cases for themselves also!

John R. Branner, president of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, telegraphed to J. P. Benjamin that: "Two large bridges on my road were burned last night about 12 o'clock; also one bridge on the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad (there were, in fact, two). There is great excitement along the whole line of road, and evidence that the Union party are organizing to destroy or

take possession of the whole line from Bristol to Chattanooga." . . .

General A. S. Johnston telegraphed Governor Harris from Bowling Green: "From our information, the destruction of the railroad and the telegraphs near Chattanooga, Cleveland and Dalton can not be the work of the enemy's troops, but of the disaffected in North Alabama and East Tennessee." . . .

General Zollicoffer telegraphed to General Samuel Cooper from Jacksborough: "Colonel Wood, of Knoxville, writes that last night Hiawassee bridge and two other bridges near Chattanooga were burned." . . .

J. W. Lewis, "superintendent of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad" (that must have been the Western Atlantic road), telegraphed to Jefferson Davis from Cleveland, Tennessee: "Several bridges burned on East Tennessee road. The country in great excitement and terror." . . .

The Rev. Colonel W. B. Wood telegraphed on the 11th to Adjutant-General Cooper from Knoxville: "Three bridges burned between Bristol and Chattanooga, and two on Georgia road. Five hundred Union men now threatening Strawberry Plains; fifteen hundred assembling in Hamilton county, and a general uprising in all the counties." . . .

On the same day, Colonel Wood wrote to General Cooper: . . . "The whole country is now in a state of rebellion. A thousand men are within six miles of Strawberry Plains bridge, and an attack is contemplated to-morrow. . . . Five hundred Unionists left Hamilton to-day, we suppose, to attack Loudon bridge (eighty miles distant). An attack was made yesterday on Watauga. . . . I need not say that great alarm is felt by the few Southern men. I have had all the arms in this city seized. . . . I felt it to be my duty to place this city under martial law, as there was a large majority of the people sympathizing with

the enemy, and communicating with them by the unfrequented mountain paths." . . .

On the 12th, Governor Harris wrote to Jefferson Davis from Nashville as follows: "The burning of the railroad bridges in East Tennessee shows a deep-seated spirit of rebellion in that section. Union men are organizing. The rebellion must be crushed out instantly, the leaders arrested and summarily punished. I shall send immediately about ten thousand men to that section. If you can possibly send from Western Virginia a number of Tennessee regiments to East Tennessee, we can at once repair the bridges and crush the rebellion." . . .

General Zollicoffer, in a letter to Colonel Wood, of November 12th, from Jacksborough, said: "I will tomorrow send dispatches to the forces near Jamestown, the cavalry near Huntsville, that near Olivers, and start out the cavalry here to commence simultaneously disarming the Union inhabitants. You will please simultaneously send orders to all detachments under your command to inaugurate the same movement at the same time in their various localities. The leaders should be seized and held as prisoners. The leniency shown them has been unavailing. They have acted with base duplicity and should no longer be trusted."

J. P. Benjamin, under date of November 13th, telegraphed to John R. Branner: "Troops are now moving to East Tennessee to crush the traitors. . . ."

General Zollicoffer on the 14th, telegraphed from Jacksborough to General Cooper: "I have ordered all posts and detachments to disarm Union men and seize leaders. Have made dispositions to cut off and crush tories of Rhea, Hamilton and Sevier."

On November 25, J. P. Benjamin, secretary of war, wrote the following instructions to Colonel W. B. Wood, at Knoxville:

"Sir, your report of the 20th instant is received, and I

proceed to give you the desired instructions in relation to the prisoners taken by you amongst the traitors in East Tennessee. First, all such as can be identified as having been engaged in bridge burning are to be tried summarily by drum-head court-martial, and if found guilty, executed on the spot by hanging. It would be well to leave their bodies hanging in the vicinity of the burned bridges. Second, all such as have not been so engaged are to be treated as prisoners of war, and sent with an armed guard to Tuscaloosa, Alabama, there to be kept imprisoned at the depot selected by the government for prisoners of war. Wherever you can discover that arms are concealed by these traitors, you will send out detachments, search for and seize the arms. In no case is one of the men known to have been up in arms against the government to be released on any pledge or oath of allegiance. The time for such measures is past. They are all to be held as prisoners of war and held in jail till the end of the war. Such as come in voluntarily, take the oath of allegiance, and surrender their arms, are alone to be treated with leniency.

Your vigilant execution of these orders is earnestly urged by the government.

Your obedient servant,

J. P. Benjamin, *Secretary of War.*

P. S.—Judge (David T.) Patterson, Colonel (Samuel) Pickens, and other ringleaders of the same class must be sent at once to Tuscaloosa to jail as prisoners of war.

J. P. B."

In another book, not yet in press, I have spoken of the honorable conduct of Mr. Benjamin in his treatment of Mr. Brownlow in 1862. I regret that the spirit of this letter does not merit similar commendation.

It will be observed that all such as could be identified as having been "engaged in bridge burning" were to be

"tried summarily by drum-head court-martial, and if found guilty were to be executed on the spot by hanging. It would be well to leave their bodies hanging in the vicinity of the burned bridges." In a letter of the same date to J. C. Ramsey, Confederate States district attorney, he said he hoped "to hear they have hung every bridge burner at the end of the burned bridges."

As to the second class, Mr. Benjamin said: "All such as have not been so engaged (that is, in bridge burning) are to be treated as prisoners of war, and sent with an armed guard to Tuscaloosa, Alabama, there to be kept as prisoners of war." All such as had not been engaged in bridge burning, whether guilty of any other offense or not, by the words of this letter, were to be sent to Tuscaloosa, and that, too, without trial or examination. It was not sufficient that they had been suspected and arrested. They must be hurried off to this prison of such ill-fame. Perhaps Mr. Benjamin did not mean all he said. Perhaps he meant all such "as have been guilty of taking up arms are to be sent off as prisoners of war."

After the lapse of more than a third of a century, in the light of published history, we can to-day understand what was a mystery in 1861–62 to those of us who so frequently saw or knew of long lines of wasted Union men, many of them three score and ten years of age, and some only mere boys, being driven through our streets on their way to the cars which were to carry them to Tuscaloosa. It was in obedience to this order of Mr. Benjamin that the prisons of the South were filled with Union men. His agents, in the form of military companies, were scattered over all the counties of East Tennessee, gathering in these detested "traitors" to be sent to the prison at Tuscaloosa.

At the very time Mr. Lincoln was being denounced as a tyrant by Southern orators and papers, for proclaiming martial law, and suspending the writ of *habeas corpus* in certain places in the North, Mr. Benjamin was instructing

Colonel R. F. Looney, at Knoxville, Tennessee, November 30, 1861, as follows:

"Courts of justice have no power to take prisoners of war out of the hands of the military, nor to interfere with the disposal of such prisoners by the military. An answer to a writ of *habeas corpus* that the prisoner was captured in arms against the government, and is held as a prisoner of war is a good and complete answer to the writ. Send this dispatch to General Carroll, and let him send at once all the prisoners to jail at Tuscaloosa as prisoners of war, except those found guilty of bridge burning and murdering the guards placed at the bridges. Let not one of these treacherous murderers escape.

J. P. Benjamin, *Secretary of War.*"

"Let him send at once," says he, "all the prisoners to jail at Tuscaloosa as prisoners of war." Of course, there was, and there could be, under this order, no examination, no trial. The order was imperative. We now see why so many were sent off.

The military courts were at once opened as he directed. On the 30th of November, the following dispatch was sent to Mr. Benjamin:

"Headquarters, Greeneville,
November 30, 1861.

"Two insurgents have to day been tried for bridge burning, found guilty and hanged.

D. Leadbetter, *Colonel.*"

The men thus executed were Jacob M. Hensie and Henry Fry. How they had eluded arrest for burning Lick Creek bridge up to this time it is difficult to explain. It will be observed that the trial and the execution both took place on the same day. The truth is, after the mere form of a trial, they were at once led out for execution. They were swung from the projecting limb of a tree which stood North of the railroad and the depot in Greeneville. This

was in full sight of the railroad and of the trains as they passed. The bodies of these poor fellows were left swinging from the tree for about twenty-four hours before they were taken down. The wish of Mr. Benjamin, expressed in his letter to Mr. Ramsey, that they should be hung at "the end of the burned bridge," could not be gratified in this case, for the bridge was gone, and the place where it had stood was fifteen miles away.

Colonel Leadbetter was a native of Maine, who had been educated at West Point at the expense of the United States, and had taken an oath to support the constitution. It is said that he fell in love with a refined lady of the South and married her. As he was a Northern man it was necessary for him, in order to escape suspicion, to manifest extra zeal in behalf of his newly-espoused cause.

On the 10th of December, a court-martial at Knoxville, convicted A. C. Haun of bridge burning, and ordered him to be hung. The sentence was approved by Wm. H. Carroll, "Brigadier-General Commanding," and the time of execution fixed for 12 o'clock the same day. Again Mr. Benjamin, on the same day, directs the commander to "execute the sentence of your court-martial on the bridge burners." Haun was accordingly executed at Knoxville at the time fixed.

In the meantime there was a little friction in the movements of the Confederate machinery, between the civil and the military departments. George Brown, a state circuit court judge of the Knoxville circuit, an able jurist, and an ardent Southern man, having old fashioned notions of law, would occasionally issue a writ of *habeas corpus* in favor of Union men held in custody. Judge West H. Humphreys also, of the Confederate States district court, out of the goodness of his heart, sometimes went so far as to hear these cases, and turn these men loose, on their executing bond and taking an oath of good behavior.

This obstructive policy was very annoying to Generals Carroll and Leadbetter. General Carroll, then in com-

mand of East Tennessee, said in a letter to Mr. Benjamin, dated December 11, 1861:

. . . "I have been greatly annoyed by the interference of the civil authorities with what I conceive the proper and faithful discharge of the duties incumbent upon me in my capacity of military commander of this portion of East Tennessee." . . . He said several attempts had been made to take offenders out of his hands, by judicial process, etc. To avoid these little annoyances, he informed Mr. Benjamin that he had placed the city under martial law. In his order he said the time had come for the adoption of the "sternest measures of military policy," and therefore he suspends "for a time the functions of the civil tribunals." In his letter to Mr. Benjamin, he informs that officer that, in addition to the cases already disposed of, he had still in confinement, awaiting trial by military tribunals, about one hundred and fifty more prisoners. He said that if after these are tried "any should remain whose offenses come legitimately under the jurisdiction of the civil courts he will turn them over to the proper officers."

J. C. Ramsey, the Confederate States district attorney, all alive to share in any good work for the Confederate cause, seeing that he was deprived of any hand in the disposal of prisoners, telegraphed to Mr. Benjamin, almost in a wail of dispair, asking: "What shall I do?" With Carroll and Leadbetter and their courts-martial and summary proceedings, what could he do?

All these things were, however, very disgusting to the zealous Leadbetter, who assumed command when General Carroll moved with the army to the front to take part in the battle of Fishing Creek. Carroll had organized a regular court-martial, which had already condemned forty-nine persons to imprisonment during the war, besides those condemned to death. But this did not satisfy the impatient Leadbetter. He informs General S. Cooper, January 7, 1862, that there were then confined in Knoxville 130 po-

litical prisoners. The number had "lately been increasing," and others it was expected would be "captured soon." He could not see "how the court-martial was to keep pace with the exigencies of the occasion." Acting under this conviction he said: "I shall dissolve the court-martial convened by General Carroll on its determination of the few purely military cases yet to be tried, and shall proceed with the political offenders as I have heretofore done at Greeneville."

It will be remembered how speedily he had disposed of Hensie and Fry at Greeneville. Court-martials were too slow for him. They did not "keep pace with the exigencies of the occasion."

But it seems that Judges Brown and Humphreys, with their stubborn old-fashioned ways, still continued to issue writs in favor of Union men. In view of these obstructions to his summary proceedings, Leadbetter appealed to Mr. Benjamin for instructions and guidance in his new embarrassments, but it does not seem that he received any.

A milder policy was expected of General Carroll. He had a noble name behind him. His father was a soldier of renown. In all of General Jackson's campaigns he was the right arm of the iron general. He had been for six years the honored chief magistrate of Tennessee. His career was full of honor and glory, and only mild conduct was expected of his son in the treatment of the sons of the old friends of his father. However bitter Southern officers might be, they were at all times expected to bear themselves, especially toward the weak and unfortunate, as gentlemen. And this they generally did.[1]

In order to preserve the advantage of a continuous nar-

[1] It is only just to the memory of General Carroll to add, and I most cheerfully do so, that it somewhere appears in the voluminous correspondence of that time, that he could not manifest, in his treatment of Union men his real feelings of kindness and mercy, because of positive instructions from Richmond. This was probably so.

rative of the events connected with the administrations of General Carroll and General Leadbetter, I have run ahead of the order of some of the facts, to which I now return.

Harrison Self was the next man tried and convicted of the Lick Creek bridge burning. The sentence was approved by General Carroll, and the time of his execution fixed for the 26th of December, 1861, at 4 P. M. Much interest was awakened on his account. Colonel James W. Gillespie, Colonel R. F. Looney and Lieutenant-Colonel Reuben Arnold, all of Tennessee Confederate regiments, and twenty-five other officers and citizens, sent petitions to Richmond for his pardon. All proved unavailing. Mr. Self had a charming, beautiful daughter, whose steadfastness to her crushed father in his misfortunes was sublime and heroic. She was notified on the morning of the day of the execution that he was to be hanged at 4 o'clock P. M. I will let Mr. Brownlow, who was at that time confined in the Knoxville jail, describe what followed:

. . . "His daughter, a noble girl, modest and neatly attired, came in this morning to see him (her father). Heart-broken and bowed down under a fearful weight of sorrow, she entered his iron cage, and they embraced each other affectionately. My God, what a sight! What an affecting scene! May these eyes of mine, bathed in tears, never look upon the like again. . . .

"But her short limit to remain with her father expired, and she came out weeping bitterly, and shedding burning tears. Requesting me to write a dispatch for her, and sign her name to it, I took out my pencil and a slip of paper, and wrote the following:

"'KNOXVILLE, Dec. 26, 1861.

"'HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS:

"'My father, Harrison Self, is sentenced to hang at four o'clock this evening on a charge of bridge burning. As

he remains my earthly all, and all my hopes of happiness center on him, I implore you to pardon him.

"'ELIZABETH SELF.'

"With this dispatch the poor girl hurried off to the telegraph office, some two or three hundred yards from the jail; and about two o'clock in the afternoon an answer came to General Carroll, telling him not to allow Self to be hung. Self was turned out of the cage into the jail with the rest of us, and looks as if he had gone through a long spell of sickness. But what a thrill of joy ran through the heart of that noble girl! Self is to be confined, as I understand, during the war."[1]

Was there ever a more touching scene?

It affords me sincere pleasure to record this act of clemency and goodness of heart on the part of President Davis, so much at variance with what is usually regarded as his character, for he was considered by the world an austere man. This, however, is not the first instance in which he appears to have been more generous in his sentiments towards the Union people of East Tennessee than those who surrounded him at Richmond, and more so than many even of our own leading citizens. No doubt Mr. Benjamin had been appealed to earnestly in behalf of this unfortunate man, but without effect. It is seen, however, that the moment the appeal of the daughter reached Mr. Davis, his heart was touched, and he at once granted the petition of the despairing girl. After knowing this beautiful act of mercy, no word of bitterness against Mr. Davis shall ever escape my lips. This was the third time in which he had manifested a disposition to be just and generous towards the suffering Union men of East Tennessee. So far as we can see, he desired to treat them and rule them with impartial justice.

Confined in the jail at Knoxville at the same time with

[1] "Parson Brownlow's Book," page 326.

Mr. Brownlow and Harrison Self were Jacob Harmon and his son, Thomas Harmon. They were also accused, and I presume correctly, of having taken part in burning the Lick Creek bridge. They were therefore tried by a court-martial, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged. Although an earnest and determined effort was made by their counsel, Mr. John Baxter, both here and in Richmond, to save them, all his efforts were in vain. On the 17th day of December, 1861, they were executed on a gallows erected a short distance north of the railway track in North Knoxville. This gallows remained standing, a conspicuous object, until after the Federal army entered the city, when it was destroyed by the soldiers with a fury similar to that which characterized the destruction of the Old Bastile by the populace of Paris. It was stated at the time, and no doubt correctly, that the young man Harmon was first executed, while the father, an aged man, was compelled to sit and look on at the shocking sight.[1]

Two other persons, Daniel Smith and Jacob Myers, were tried and found guilty of having had some connection with the burning of the Lick Creek bridge. They were both sent to Tuscaloosa. Captain Fry, the leader in that unfortunate affair, was arrested in trying to make his escape into Kentucky. He was tried for bridge burning, convicted and sentenced to be hanged. No doubt he would have been executed, but for the remonstrance of General S. P. Carter, of the Federal army in Kentucky. On the 16th of April, 1862, General Carter appears to have addressed a letter, in reference to Captain Fry, to General E. Kirby Smith, then in command in East Tennessee. The correspondence in full can not be found. Enough, however, appears to show that the Federal commander in Kentucky remonstrated against the execution of Fry, on the ground that in burning bridges he was acting under orders from the Federal military authorities.

[1] "Parson Brownlow's Book," page 319.

In June, 1862, when General Mitchell was advancing on Chattanooga, and General George W. Morgan was reported to be advancing on Knoxville with a Federal force from Cumberland Gap, a number of prisoners then confined in jail at Knoxville were hurriedly sent to Atlanta. Among them was Captain David Fry. At the same time, there were in the Atlanta prison, as there had previously been in the Knoxville prison, a number of Federal soldiers who were tried and convicted of the offense of being spies. These were a portion of the men who had seized and attempted to carry off a locomotive on the Western Atlantic Railroad, intending to run it back to the Federal army in Middle Tennessee, burning all the bridges as they went.[1] Fry and these men were to be hanged at the same time. On the night before the day of their intended execution, they seized and overpowered the guard in the Atlanta prison, and, after a desperate struggle, succeeded in making their escape. Fry and a part of these men, after enduring almost incredible hardships, succeeded in escaping through North Carolina into Eastern Tennessee, and finally, after an absence of more than a year, Fry made his way back to the Federal army near Murfreesboro, where he again assumed command of his old company. The adventures and hair-breadth escapes of this daring man, if written out, would form a history of thrilling interest. After the close of the war. he was killed by a railway train, in Greeneville, his native home.

Although I am satisfied that not three hundred people in East Tennessee, outside of those actually engaged in the

[1] About fifteen of these "train stealers," as they were called, were brought to Knoxville for trial by a court-martial. Eight were successively tried on the charge of being spies and found guilty. These, with their leader, J. J. Andrews, were subsequently executed in Atlanta. In the midst of the trials, news of the approach of a Federal army, under General George W. Morgan, broke up the court, and the prisoners were all hurried off to Atlanta. A portion of these were the men who, with Captain Fry, overpowered the guard and made their escape. The late Judge John Baxter and the author defended those who were tried in Knoxville.

work. knew of the purpose to destroy the bridges, yet the belief generally existed in the minds of the Confederate authorities that nearly all the Union men knew in advance of this contemplated movement. The fact that hundreds of men in Carter, Johnson and Sevier counties, immediately flew to arms with such weapons as they could command, and that hundreds more assembled who had no arms, furnished apparently strong corroborative evidence of their complicity in the burning of the bridges. And yet such was not the fact, except as to a limited number. If it had been generally known that such a thing was to happen, I ought to have known it. And yet I had not the slightest intimation or suspicion of such a thing. The mustering of these men was very unwise, and productive of the most disastrous consequences, not only to themselves and their families, but likewise to the whole Union population. Their rising was not prearranged. It was the sudden uprising of a few of the people who thought the Federal army was coming, many of them attracted merely by idle curiosity.

Looking back to 1861, with a full knowledge of the facts as they are known to us now, the excitement among the Confederates at that time seems to have been the result of little more than a ludicrous scare. There were at that time from five to ten thousand Confederate troops in East Tennessee and on the border of Kentucky. Governor Harris, as we have seen, wrote to Mr. Davis, November 12th: "I shall send immediately about 10,000 men to that section" (East Tennessee), and he urged Mr. Davis "to send from Western Virginia a number of Tennessee regiments." On the 13th Mr. Benjamin telegraphed to J. R. Branner that "troops were moving to East Tennessee to crush the traitors." In all there were probably gathered here, within the next ten days, not less than twenty thousand, and possibly twenty-five thousand soldiers. The singular part of this strange farce was that the excitement and the scare continued nearly two months. And yet

during all this time there was not a Federal soldier within the borders of East Tennessee, except Captains Fry and Cross, who had come to aid in the burning of the bridges, and they were hiding and trying to get back to Kentucky. And none were threatening to come.

At the very time the Confederates were in the wildest state of excitement—on the very tip-toe of apprehension—the outline of the little army of Federals under General Thomas might have been seen receding beyond the hills of Wild Cat, in the direction of Camp Dick Robinson, wholly unconscious of the great commotion it had created, while the Union men, after a few days, like partridges when the hawk is abroad, were hiding, or seeking safety in the hills and mountains, or secretly fleeing to Kentucky. The reported uprising was greatly exaggerated, and in some cases imaginary, and altogether contemptible, as against organized troops. There were not one hundred men in all East Tennessee, well armed, nor two thousand even half armed, nor ammunition for a half hour's fight.

It might be easily suspected that the incident of the bridge burning was used as a pretext for arresting, disarming and imprisoning Union men. This was certainly not the motive. It was a sincere, honest fright, laughable by reason of its extent, its intensity, and the length of its duration. In this view, it was comical and farcical. But to the Union people, it was full of terror, suffering and woe. Violent wrath and apprehension seized the Confederate army. Confederate citizens were thrown into a panic. The storm of anger naturally burst on the heads of Union men, and all were suspected. Arrests were made until the prisons overflowed. The poor, frightened Union men fled terror-stricken to such places of safety as they could find.

But one great and important fact was developed by these stirring events. It was made manifest that the Southern Confederacy rested, in East Tennessee, on a live and an ever-burning volcano, which needed only the slightest vent to

cause it to burst forth at any moment in a terrific explosion. The solid Union ranks of June had been thinned by no desertions. And now, sufferings had welded them into a solid mass, which would make them terrible in the day of battle. Strange that those in authority did not see, could not see, that it was better to let these determined, these lion-hearted people alone in their quiet pursuits and secluded homes than to force them into active hostility.

If there were those, at the time the bridges were burned, who thought that their destruction was a good thing for the loyal people of East Tennessee, surely they must have been convinced of its folly during the long, sad, dismal months that followed. With the wild excitement and the blind panic which everywhere filled the minds of the Confederate people, there soon came to the Union people an overwhelming sense of insecurity. For the first time, they began to realize fully that they were among enemies, who counted the success of the new government above all things else—above kinship, above old friendship, above the most sacred ties hitherto uniting them. This sense of personal insecurity and of alienship extended to every Union fireside in East Tennessee. There was not a man so high, nor one so noble, but felt that he was liable to be accused, seized and thrust into prison at any moment.

On the 20th of November, 1861, Rev. Colonel Wm. B. Wood, commanding the post at Knoxville, wrote to Mr. Benjamin as follows:

"The rebellion in East Tennessee has been put down in some of the counties. . . . Their camps in Sevier and Hamilton counties have been broken up, and a large number of them made prisoners; some are confined in jail at this place, and others sent to Nashville. . . .

"We have now in custody some of their leaders—Judge (David T.) Patterson, the son-in-law of Andrew Johnson, Colonel (Samuel) Pickens, the senator in the legislature from Sevier and other counties, and several members of the legislature, besides others of influence and some dis-

tinction in their counties. . . . They really deserve the *gallows*, and if consistent with the laws ought speedily to receive their deserts. . . . I have to request at least that the prisoners I have taken be held, if not as traitors, as prisoners of war. . . . To release them is ruinous." . . .

Colonel Leadbetter, November 28th, says in a letter to General S. Cooper:

"Twenty-two persons have been sent to Nashville from Carter county, and we have now in confinement some five or six known to have been in arms, and who will be sent to Tuscaloosa."

On the 11th of December, 1861, General W. H. Carroll, in a letter from Knoxville, to Mr. Benjamin, said:

"In addition to those suspected of burning the bridges, I have now in confinement about 150 prisoners charged with taking up arms, giving aid and assistance to the enemy, inciting rebellion, etc. . . . I have already sent there (Tuscaloosa) forty-eight to be held as prisoners of war."

Thus the work of arresting Union men went on through November and December, 1861, and in the early months of 1862. Among the prominent men thus arrested was, as we have just seen, Samuel Pickens, an old and respectable citizen of Sevier county, then a senator in the legislature. His crime was being a Union man and the father of W. C. Pickens, the leader in the attempt to burn Strawberry Plains bridge. Without even the form of a trial, unless by the secret and *ex parte* action of Leadbetter's or Carroll's court, he was sent to Tuscaloosa, where he died. There was no evidence against him, and he was guilty of no offense. He was a quiet, peaceable and an excellent citizen.

Dr. R. H. Hodsden, also of Sevier county, and John M. Fleming of Knox, both members of the legislature, were also soon afterward arrested. They were released by the Confederate States judge, West H. Humphreys, on being

brought before him, who, though a noisy and ardent secessionist, was a kind hearted and just man.

Edmond Hodges and Wm. E. Hodges, of Sevier county, were also arrested, and sent to Tuscaloosa without trial, where they were confined for many months. Both of these men were good citizens and had been guilty of no offense, except an earnest and active support of the Union cause. Edmond Hodges was a superb specimen of nature's nobility.

A little later on, Mr. Montgomery Thornburgh, of Jefferson county, was arrested, and without trial sent to Madison, Georgia, for confinement. Alas! he never returned. He was a strong, powerful man physically, and in good health, but the privations of prison life proved too much for even his robust constitution. Mr. Thornburgh had served two or three terms as senator in the state legislature, and had acted with ability one or two terms as prosecuting state's attorney in the judicial circuit in which he resided. He was the father of Jacob M. Thornburgh, who was afterwards a colonel in the Federal army, and represented the Knoxville district for three terms in congress after the close of the war. He was also the father of Thomas Tipton Thornburgh, a major in the United States army, who was killed in Colorado, in 1879, gallantly fighting at the head of his command in a desperate battle with the Ute Indians. The offense of Mr. Thornburgh was that he had been a prominent Union speaker and leader. I happened to know that during the troubles that followed the burning of the bridges all his influence was exerted in trying to preserve the peace of the country and in keeping the Union men quiet.

At the same time that Mr. Thornburgh was arrested, Mr. James Monroe Meek and Samuel P. Johnson, of the same county and town, were arrested and hurried off to prison in Macon, Georgia. The former was a worthy citizen, had been a member of the legislature and was a

lawyer in fair practice. He still lives, commanding the respect and esteem of his fellow-citizens.

The only tangible evidence, or rather charge, against both Mr. Meek and Mr. Thornburgh was that a large body of Union men from their town and vicinity had attempted to escape into Kentucky, and they were held responsible for this attempt.

Levi Trewhitt, of Bradley county, near seventy years of age, was also arrested and sent to Tuscaloosa, without trial, where he died some months afterward. His offense was being a Union man. Mr. Trewhitt was an able lawyer, had been prominent at the bar for a great many years, and was a peaceable and an upright citizen. He was the father of Daniel C. Trewhitt, a colonel in the Federal army, and for many years after the war an able chancellor and circuit judge in the Chattanooga chancery division and circuit.

Dr. William Hunt, the brother-in-law of William G. Brownlow, was also arrested at the same time with Mr. Trewhitt, and sent to Tuscaloosa. He had no trial, was guilty of no offense, and accused of none except that of being an outspoken Union man. Dr. Hunt was noted as a peaceable, amiable man, and was one of our purest and best citizens. He never returned to his home, but died from prison life. Many other citizens were sent to prisons in the South. I only name the more prominent ones.

In reference to Mr. Trewhitt, I quote the following statement of Colonel James W. Gillespie, a Confederate colonel:

"KNOXVILLE, TENN., *January* 20, 1862.

"On the 19th day of November last, I arrested and brought to this place Levi Trewhitt, Esq., of Cleveland, Tennessee. This arrest was made under an order from Colonel W. B. Wood, commanding the Sixteenth Alabama regiment, who at that time was the commander of this post. The arrest was ordered because Mr. Trewhitt was suspected of a knowledge of the burning of the railroad

bridges and the plans by which it was done. He was retained here for some weeks and then sent to Tuscaloosa by order of General W. H. Carroll, who succeeded Colonel Wood in command. There was no trial or investigation of the charges so far as I know or have understood.

JAS. W. GILLESPIE,
Col. Forty-third Reg. Tenn. (Confederate) Volunteers."

I insert also the petition of divers neighbors of Mr. Trewhitt for his release from prison, as follows:

". . . HIS EXCELLENCY JEFFERSON DAVIS,
"*President of the Confederate States of America:*

"Your petitioners, the undersigned citizens of Bradley county, humbly represent and show unto your excellency that Levi Trewhitt, who is now as they understand confined in Mobile as a prisoner of war, is one of the old, influential citizens of Bradley county, Tennessee; that he is about sixty-five years of age, and has been for the past few years afflicted with paralysis, and as they now understand is sick and in the hospital at Mobile. They further state that said Trewhitt was a very useful man at home. We therefore pray that said Levi Trewhitt be released from said confinement upon his becoming a loyal citizen, and taking an oath to support the constitution of the Confederate States of America, and as in duty bound, will ever pray, etc., William Grant, T. L. Hoyl, Jno. B. Hoyl (and 31 others).

"We, the undersigned officers in the Confederate service, fully concur with the above petitioners.

D. M. KEY, *Lieut.-Colonel*,
(JAMES W.) GILLESPIE,
Col. Reg. Tenn. Vols.,
(and 16 others)."

While Mr. Trewhitt was in confinement, the affidavits of John Blackburn, E. Ramsey, Benjamin Hambright, G. R.

Hambright, Welcome Beard and A. A. Clingan, all Confederate sympathizers, were forwarded to headquarters, showing that he had been not only guilty of no offense, but that he had been active in using his influence among the Union men in trying to preserve the peace. Notwithstanding the mass of testimony in the possession of the authorities, at Knoxville, this feeble old man, who had been afflicted with paralysis for years, was kept in prison until he died in 1862.

In view of the failure of the army in Kentucky to advance into East Tennessee and cover and protect those who were engaged in bridge burning, as well as the loyal people generally, this attempt to destroy the bridges was one of the most unfortunate and doubtless one of the most unwise military schemes of the war. The destruction of the five bridges, as it turned out, did but little harm to the Confederacy, and no good whatever to the Union cause. On the contrary, it resulted in incalculable injury to the Union people of East Tennessee. In addition to the fact that several persons were hung for their participation in burning the bridges, this was the cause of the arrests of hundreds, not to say thousands, of Union men, and the long incarceration of many of them in prisons in Tuscaloosa, Mobile, Madison and Macon. It created in the minds of the Confederates wide-spread alarm and the most intense bitterness. The next few months were the most fearful and terrible to the Union men of any during the whole war. It was the "*noche triste*" in their history. Then followed those several repressive acts on the part of the military authorities which have made the sufferings of the people of East Tennessee known throughout the land. While it would be presumptuous in me to question the military plans or opinions of such a great general as Thomas, yet I may venture the opinion that Sherman was right, and that the proposed expedition into East Tennessee, in November, 1861, with the forces then contemplated, was premature, and would have been a failure, except as

a mere raid. The general plans of the army were not ripe for such an expedition. The force intended for this expedition was not sufficient. It was too early for such a movement. The other armies were not in co-operation with it. Knoxville, if it had been taken at that time by General Thomas, in all probability, could not have been held, and untold calamities to Union men would have followed. As it was, the proposed movement sent five men to the gallows, fifteen hundred or two thousand to long confinements in prisons, where many died, and drove from five to ten thousand men from their homes into exile. It filled the minds of all loyal people with fear and anxiety, and put them in constant and extreme peril for nearly two years.

I have not insisted in the foregoing criticisms of the conduct of the Confederate authorities, and do not insist that they had not the rightful authority to punish men, not engaged as soldiers in actual war, for destroying their bridges. I waive the consideration of the limitations of that right entirely, and confine myself to a point which cannot be disputed, namely, the unseemly haste of their conduct. Concede this right in the most ample form, and I do concede it, and that furnishes no justification for the hasty hanging of Henzie and Fry, and but little less for that of old man Harmon. Nor is there any possible justification for sending Pickens, Thornburgh, Hodges, Trewhitt, Hunt, Meek and others to southern prisons, without any kind of trial. They had been guilty of no offense against the laws of the Southern Confederacy; they were all peaceable citizens, and, according to the laws of all civilized nations, they were entitled to a trial before condemnation and punishment. The treatment of these men, as well as others not named, was unjustifiable and indefensible. At the same time, it brings out in bright relief the noble and the humane conduct of President Davis, Colonel James W. Gillespie, Colonel Robert F. Looney, Col-

onel D. M. Key, Lieutenant-Colonel Reuben Arnold and other honorable Confederate officers.

It is not overlooked that, when the Federal army occupied East Tennessee, many arrests of citizens sympathizing with secession were made, and that many were cast into prison, and some sent North for confinement. Many of these arrests, perhaps most of them, were made because the parties arrested were accused of having persecuted Union men in some form or another during the ascendency of the Confederacy. In many cases these charges were true. In divers other cases men were arrested solely because they had been active and prominent secessionists. Often the arrests were instigated by a spirit of retaliation and hate. Possibly the larger number was of this class. In a large majority of cases, the prisoners, after being held under guard or in jail awhile, were released on bond for good behavior, and on an oath of allegiance, as often happened with Union men under the Confederate rule. In nearly all cases there was some kind of an examination, generally an *ex parte* one, by the provost-marshal, of the charges against the prisoners.

There was undoubtedly a disposition on the part of General S. P. Carter, the provost-marshal-general, to be just and humane, for such was his nature; but it was difficult for the most humane man, under the circumstances, to hold the scales of justice level. Beyond question, there was in some cases, possibly in a number, unnecessary severity. In this category falls the confinement in a northern prison of Rev. R. M. Stevens, W. W. Wallace and Chancellor T. N. Van Dyke. These men were sent, so far as I understood their history, simply because they were outspoken, prominent secessionists, who were unwilling to give up the cause of the Confederacy after the Federals obtained control of East Tennessee. As I have condemned the imprisonment of peaceable citizens because of political opinions in the case of Union men, so likewise I condemn it in these cases. But it is to be observed that the latter

class of cases did not amount to a third of the former in point of number, nor the severity of treatment, and that they occurred after the unjust and unnecessary persecutions of Union men by the Confederate authorities.

It is hoped that if, unfortunately, there should ever be another civil war in this country, there may be greater toleration of opinion. In a revolution, especially one involving a disruption of the government, all men cannot be expected to see alike. The minority may be quite as honest as the majority. Why should this minority be molested or coerced in their opinions? When, however, a new government is established, this minority is bound to yield obedience to the new authority. If they disregard its laws, they are subject to punishment. It follows, therefore, that the Union men of East Tennessee had no right to defy the laws of the Confederacy as long as those laws were over them, and that private citizens who engaged in burning bridges took upon themselves the hazard of their lives.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE FLIGHT.

Bitterness in 1861 against Union men—Mr. Davis' desire to be just—Feeling of Confederate officers—Names given—Extracts from letters—Unionists arrested for political opinions—Protests of distinguished Confederate citizens—Arrests instigated by local leaders—Seizing arms of Union men—Enforcing conscript law—Flight of Union men—Universal alarm—Capture of 400 refugees—Notice of pilots—Noble women—Condition of Union men—Full of danger and anxiety.

The feeling of a majority of the Confederate citizens of East Tennessee, at this time against the Union people, was that of intense bitterness. Nearly every prominent citizen among them felt and acted in this spirit. There could be no line of policy adopted, however severe, that did not meet their approval. Their policy of pacification meant banishment, or imprisonment. The crime of being, or having been, a Union man was one that could not be condoned. The bitter and earnest outcry against any toleration of these "traitors and tories," as they were esteemed and called, helped to increase the already swollen stream of bitterness, until it burst all bounds, and for a season nearly submerged all sense of justice and mercy. At all times, and perhaps that was natural under the circumstances, our worst and most implacable enemies were the old political leaders, and a few of the officers from our own section.

It was unfortunate that the three representatives in the Confederate congress, from East Tennessee, were intense in their condemnation of the course of the Union people. They were naturally looked to by the authorities at Richmond for information and advice as to the condition of things in their districts. Two of them, Joseph B. Heiskell and William G. Swan, were men of decided ability. The

first named, though still a young man, had become eminent as a lawyer, which reputation he fully sustained for more than twenty years after the close of the war. He was honorable in all things, but from some cause he had become extreme in his views and feelings. Mr. Swan, though not quite so able a lawyer as Mr. Heiskell, was quite his equal, in shrewdness, sagacity and natural ability. He too, was exceedingly ultra, except as to his own personal friends. These he was willing to shield and protect. Personal friendship counted for much with him even amid the bitter strife of civil war. The third of these representatives, William H. Tibbs, was perhaps more extreme than either of the others, but of far less capacity.

Whatever the truth may be, it was universally charged and believed at that time, that the policy pursued in East Tennessee was largely the result of the advice of these three men. It is certain that they did not arrest the wrong, nor so far as was known to the public, protest against it. It was also charged at the time, that they earnestly insisted on the enforcement of the Confederate conscription law in East Tennessee. This may have been the case. How far they were supported in these measures by the two Confederate senators from this state does not clearly appear.

There are a number of facts that tend to show that Mr. Davis was animated by a sincere desire to deal kindly, and even magnanimously, toward the Union people of East Tennessee. I believe that such was the fact. He was an honorable gentleman, and though somewhat bitter, he was possessed of a clear sense of justice.

Fortunately for the Union people there were many persons, both privates and officers, from other sections of the state, and from other states, who never ceased to be Southern gentlemen, and who turned the shield of their protection in front of these people, as far as they dared, and in this way helped to mitigate their hard condition. I should be unjust to both the living and the dead if I were to fail

to mention in this connection the names of Colonel H. Casey Young, of Memphis, since the war a prominent member of congress for several terms; James W. Gillespie, Colonel of the Forty-third regiment Tennessee Volunteers; Colonel D. M. Key, since distinguished by holding seats in the cabinet, in the senate, and on the federal bench, and Colonel Robert B. Vance, of North Carolina. The Hon. Samuel A. Smith, a prominent Democratic member of congress, from the Chattanooga district for a number of terms before the war, and Mr. John C. Burch, since the war a distinguished Nashville editor, also comptroller of the state, both seem to have been, at this time, animated by the most generous sentiments, as will appear from extracts from their letters to persons in Richmond. I also mention the names of Colonel A. M. Perry, ex-governor of Florida; Lieutenant Joseph H. Speed, of Alabama; Colonel George H. Monsarat, of Memphis; Colonel Edward Golliday, of Lebanon, Tennessee, and Major T. S. Webb and Colonel Louis A. J. Dupre, of Memphis. I also mention the noble Colonel D. H. Cummings, of our own section. Colonel Young, while serving as the Adjutant-General of General W. H. Carroll, when the latter was in command in East Tennessee, showed by many acts that he was both a just and a humane man. The people of East Tennessee owe to him a debt of gratitude for his justice that they can never repay.

In this connection, I would do injustice to a noble gentleman and a gallant Confederate officer, should I fail to mention, in fitting terms of praise, Colonel Robert F. Looney, of Memphis.

I quote extracts from the letters of Mr. S. A. Smith and Frank W. Lea, to show that at this time men were being sent to Southern prisons solely because of their *political opinions*.

Mr. Smith wrote as follows:

"Cleveland, Tenn., *January* 8, 1862.

"Colonel Charles M. McGhee.

"*Dear Sir:*—James S. Bradford, of this county, was arrested some time since and sent to Tuscaloosa. Mr. Bradford was originally a Union man, but I know of no other charge that has been brought against him. Since the separation of the state from the Federal Government, he has recommended submission to the will of the majority of the people of the state. . . . Now that everything is calm and quiet, it is believed by the original secessionists, of whom I am one, that Bradford ought to be released. You know that I would be the last one who would screen anyone who had any connection with toryism in East Tennessee. I am satisfied, however, that Bradford had nothing to do with it, and was arrested simply because he had been a Union man. . . . You have only inquired of me as to Bradford. I might, perhaps, give you the names of others who have been subjected to equally as great outrages by the petty personal prejudices of some of our recent converts who are now in brief authority.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"Sam'l A. Smith."

Mr. Lea also wrote as follows:

"Cleveland, Tenn., *January* 8, 1862.

"Colonel Charles M. McGhee.

"*Dear Sir:*—I have received your request to write you the facts about the arrest of James S. Bradford by Captain W. L. Brown's command, and he was a few days after sent to Tuscaloosa. I feel confident that his arrest and transportation from here must have been done under a misconception of his position as regards the rebellious feeling that has disturbed East Tennessee, and, had an investigation been allowed, he would have been discharged without spot or blemish. It is true he was originally a Union man, . . . but, before the period at which our state linked her future with the Southern Confederacy, he became a loyal South-

ern man, and from that day exerted all his influence and power for peace and submission. I know that it told to such a degree that their numbers were greatly lessened amongst us. FRANCK W. LEA."

Nothing that I can say will so clearly reveal the true condition of the Union people of East Tennessee, at this time, as the letters of Hon. Robertson Topp, Colonel H. C. Young, and Mr. John C. Burch, herein inserted. It must be kept in mind that all these gentlemen were Confederates in high standing with the authorities, one of them being on the staff of General Carroll, and that these letters were the enforced protests of these honorable gentlemen against the wrongs which were at that time inflicted on these suffering people, largely by the instigation of our own public men of East Tennessee.

The Hon. Robertson Topp, a distinguished citizen of Memphis, under date of October 26, 1861, in a letter to Robert Josselyn, intended for President Davis (this was before the bridges were burned), says:

"More than one hundred persons have been arrested in East Tennessee, without warrants in some cases, marched great distances, and carried into court on no other charge than that they were Union men. In one case, an old man named Duggan, a Methodist preacher, was arrested, carried fifty miles on foot (he being a large, fleshy man), refused the privilege of riding his own horse, and all they had against him was that, in February last, he had prayed for the Union. . . .

"Just as the people were quieting down, getting reconciled, raising volunteers, etc., they commenced these arrests, which have gone far to poison the minds of the people against the government, and, if tolerated and persisted in, the people of that end of the state, at a critical moment, will rise up enemies, instead of friends. You ask me who makes these arrests. As far as I can learn,

they are instigated by a few malicious, troublesome men in and around Knoxville."

(*Indorsement.*)

"Referred to the secretary of war, that such inquiry may be made and action taken as will prevent, as far as we may, such proceedings as are herein described.

"J. D."

The Hon. H. C. Young says:

"Headquarters Carroll's Brigade,
Knoxville, Tenn., *December* 19, 1861.

"Hon. D. M. Currin, Richmond, Va.

"*Dear Sir:*—. . . In September, Major-General Polk sent General W. H. Carroll here for the purpose of endeavoring to bring the people over to the support of the Confederate government, and to enlist one or more regiments for the army. General Carroll succeeded beyond his expectations, raising and organizing in a very short time a full regiment. . . . By these (bad men) and these alone were the bridges burned, and other depredations committed, while the mass of the people were entirely ignorant of their designs and utterly opposed to any such wickedness and folly. The numbers engaged in these outrages have, I know, been greatly overestimated, as facts have developed in the investigations that have been made by the court-martial now in session at this place, which satisfy me beyond doubt that there was not at the time the bridges were burned 500 men in all East Tennessee who knew anything of it or who contemplated any organized opposition to the government. . . . Scouting parties were sent out in every direction, who arrested hundreds suspected of disloyalty and incarcerated them in prison until almost every jail in the eastern end of the state was filled with poor, ignorant and for the most part harmless men who had been guilty of no crime save that of lending

a too credulous ear to the corrupt demagogues whose counsels have led them astray. Among those thus captured were a number of bridge burners. These latter were tried and promptly executed. . . . About 400 of the poor victims of designing leaders have been sent to Tuscaloosa as prisoners of war, leaving in many instances their families in a helpless and destitute condition. The greatest distress prevails throughout the entire country in consequence of the various arrests that have been made, together with the facts that the horses and the other property of the parties that have been arrested have been seized by the soldiers and in many cases appropriated to personal uses or wantonly destroyed.

"Old political animosities and private grudges have been revived, and bad men among our friends are availing themselves of the opportunity afforded them by bringing Southern men to hunt down with the ferocity of bloodhounds all those against whom they entertain any feeling of dislike. . . . The wretched condition of these unfortunate people appeals to the sympathy and commiseration of every humane man. When in Richmond a short time since, I was present at an interview with the President, and feel assured that he has no disposition to exercise any unnecessary severity toward the deluded dupes. Those best acquainted with affairs here are fully impressed with the belief that if the proper course were pursued, all East Tennessee could be united in support of the Confederate government.

"Respectfully your friend,

"H. C. Young."

Let it be remembered that the foregoing was written by an officer on the staff of General Carroll.

The following is the letter of Mr. John C. Burch:

"Richmond, Va., *January* 26, 1862.

"His Excellency the President of the Confederate States—

"*Sir:*—In passing through East Tennessee, I have been informed by a gentleman of integrity, and whose loyalty to the Confederacy has never been questioned, that some forty-five or fifty of the citizens of that section of country (Bradley county) have been arrested by persons having or assuming to have military authority under this government, that after arrest the most of them have been told they must volunteer or be sent to the government prison at Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and that those who refused to volunteer under such compulsion have been sent to and imprisoned at Tuscaloosa where they now remain.

"The names of the persons thus dealt with, as far as my information extends, are as follows: Dr. John G. Brown, Charles B. Champion, James S. Bradford, Allen Marlow, Sidney Wise, John F. Kinchelow, Samuel Hunt, — Potts, W. R. Davis, — Gamble, Thomas L. Cate, John Bean, Sr., and John Boon. These men were arrested by a captain of Tennessee Cavalry, and as I learn without any specification of charges and without the examination of a single witness, they were hurried off to imprisonment. Levi Trewhitt, William Hunt, Stephen Beard, John McPherson, George Munsey, — Thompson were taken to Knoxville, but had no investigation before any tribunal. The first two were sent from thence to Tuscaloosa. The remaining four were released either on parole or unconditionally, but after returning to their homes, they were arrested by the captain of cavalry before alluded to and also sent to Tuscaloosa. As I am informed, none of the persons whose names I have given were taken in arms or suspicioned of having been in arms against the government. . . .

"It is insisted and I presume correctly that the terror en-

gendered by these arrests was an efficient cause in changing public sentiment in East Tennessee.

"Respectfully,

"JOHN C. BURCH."

(Indorsement, presumably by Mr. Davis.)

"SECRETARY OF WAR, FOR ATTENTION:

"Those who acted for the government can inform you whether political arrests were made and prisoners sent to Tuscaloosa as herein affirmed."

Thus it is incontestably established by the testimony of five honorable Confederate citizens that hundreds of Union men were arrested and imprisoned solely because of their Union sentiments.

The condition of the Union men of East Tennessee was at that time rendered still more helpless and hopeless by orders issued to agents to search for and seize their arms. All houses were to be searched and all arms seized. This was in violation of the bill of rights in the constitution of the state in three particulars, namely, "that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures; that no man's property shall be taken or applied to public use . . . without just compensation being made therefor," and "that the free white men of this state have the right to keep and bear arms for their common defense."

The last declaration is but the embodiment of a sentiment springing up in the heart of every freeman. The highest indignity that can be put on a spirited man is to strip him of his arms. With a mountain people their arms are the true mark and insignia of liberty. Without them half of their manhood is gone. Rulers, when they would enslave a people, first take away their arms. But for the fact of the utter hopelessness of resistance, not a gun would have been surrendered without bloodshed. Most of these brave people were disarmed one by one. Some, however, to avoid humiliation such as had never

befallen them, nor their ancestors before them, sought the recesses of the hills or mountains, and there, with their trusty guns, awaited the coming of a better day.

One more cause of discontent awaited these brave-spirited Union people. This quickly followed the disarming. These men, who had thus far resisted every seductive appeal and every intimidation, and had grown more defiant with each new wrong put upon them, must now yield their manhood and fight for a government they disliked, and against the one they loved with more than a mother's love. Squads of soldiers were sent out over the country to gather up the men liable to military service under the Confederate conscript law. These were to be put into a camp for instruction, at Knoxville, and from time to time sent off to fill up depleted Southern companies and regiments.

And now followed a general exodus of Union men. Great as were the dangers and hardships of seeking security in Kentucky, by a journey through the wild mountains, these were infinitely preferable in their estimation to service against the government of their choice. Immediately the minds of almost the entire male population, of age for military duty, were turned toward Kentucky. As fast as they could procure guides and companions, they silently slipped away on their perilous journey. Many had already gone and were enrolled in regiments which helped to swell the army of deliverance, waiting over the border for the time for their return.

In the whole history of the war nothing can be found so blind, so infatuated, so absolutely devoid of wisdom and statesmanship, as the conduct of those who dictated the policy of the Confederate authorities toward the Union people of East Tennessee. It was the policy of coercion. The mistake was in thinking that a high-spirited, proud people could be forced, contrary to all their traditions and glorious history, as they believed, into the support of a government they hated. As I have shown in another chapter, after the June election in 1861, when the people of the

state decided to cast their fortunes with their brethren of the South, especially after the action of the Greeneville convention, a majority of the Union people were willing to abide the result, so far as to remain quietly at home until the national government should be able to come to their relief and restore its authority. Most of the men who finally fled to Kentucky and entered the army did not at first contemplate such a thing. They were willing to pursue their usual avocations, on their farms, raising stock and grain for sale, and for the support of their families. By conciliation and toleration, such as were exhibited toward the Union people in Southwest Virginia and Western North Carolina, thousands who crossed the mountains as exiles and entered the Federal army might have been kept at home as producers and peaceable citizens. But madness ruled the hour. Folly held its high carnival. Personal and political animosity were in the saddle. The feeling among their enemies at home was that these men should be coerced to fight for the South, or driven out of the country. Under this policy nearly three-fourths of the male population became exposed to arrest or imprisonment, or to be forced to fight for a cause they disliked. Desperation at last drove them into the hills, or into exile. They were told by their own people that they were "tories," and that neither they nor their families should remain on the soil of Tennessee; and yet, when goaded to desperation they made an attempt to escape from this terrible condition, they were arrested in their flight and sent to Southern prisons. And all this was done under the advice of home leaders. It was not the work of Mr. Davis, nor the Confederate authorities.

But this was civil war. If the conditions had been reversed, the Union men would doubtless have been just as bitter as were the Secessionists. In fact, it is not surprising that Southern men were bitter against the Union people of East Tennessee. They believed that the latter should have joined them in their great struggle for inde-

pendence. From their point of view, the Union men were false to their brethren of the South in the hour of their supreme need. On the other hand, the Union men believed the Secessionists, from selfish and ambitious motives, were attempting to destroy a great and beneficent government. Neither side had any charity or toleration for the other; so hate and bitter passion ran riot on both sides. Perhaps in the end it might have been better for the Union men of East Tennessee to have submitted to the will of the majority of the state after the June election, as a majority of them would have done if they had been treated with clemency and toleration. But, unfortunately, they were not thus treated. Thousands, if not tens of thousands, of these men, who would have remained at home as peaceable citizens if a policy of moderation and conciliation had been adopted, were driven into exile and the army solely from a sense of insecurity. In violent revolutions, resulting in civil war, it is always an overwhelming calamity for a people to be divided in opinion and action. Perhaps in such a case it would be better for the minority to yield.

It must be kept in mind that the Union people were perfectly quiet and peaceable until after the bridges were burned. Let it be kept in mind, also, that the system of arrests and imprisonments had been commenced before that event. We have just seen that the Hon. Robertson Topp, in his letter, intended for Mr. Davis, of October 26th—twelve days before the bridge burning—said: "More than one hundred persons have been arrested in East Tennessee on no other charge than that they were 'Union men.'" Here is the evidence of a distinguished Confederate gentleman, written at the time to a friend, after having spent some days in Knoxville. And after the bridges were burned, and it was found that no Federal army was coming, the Union men again became perfectly quiet, and remained so for twenty-two months following. During all these long, gloomy months, arrests and imprisonments

numbering thousands were made, so that at last most of the male population were driven into exile.

By the spring and early summer of 1862, when it became evident that the conscript act would be enforced, nearly every male inhabitant, liable to military duty, who was able to endure the hardships of the journey and could leave his family, had determined to seek safety in flight. The hardships of a journey in winter, and the hope that the storm would pass by, that a milder policy might prevail, had kept thousands at home until that time. This pleasant hope was now dispelled. Sometimes whole communities were seized with the determination to leave. In April, 1862, between four and five hundred young men and boys from New Market and its vicinity, Jefferson county, started as refugees to Kentucky. Some of them were armed, and they seem to have expected that their number and arms would secure them safety. In this they were mistaken. In crossing Powell's Valley, when in sight of the Cumberland Mountains, where there was safety, nearly forty miles from home, after a feeble effort at resistance, they were intercepted and captured, except a few who were in the rear, by a regiment of East Tennessee Confederate cavalry.

As soon as these unfortunate men were captured, though already exhausted by their journey, they were placed in line for an immediate march to Knoxville, distant more than forty miles. They were hurried forward as rapidly as they could be forced to go. It was a hot, sultry afternoon when they arrived at Knoxville. They were driven to the already crowded jail or small jail-yard, into which they were huddled. making their condition almost intolerable. Soon afterwards, they were marched under a strong guard to the railroad and sent off to Tuscaloosa, or some other prison, to be held during the war as political prisoners.

And who were these young men who were thus sent off to Southern prisons? They were the tender and gentle

sons of the intelligent and independent farmers around New Market and of the beautiful and rich valley of the same name, celebrated all over the state and beyond it as one of the fairest and wealthiest regions in all the land. Many of these young men were the descendants of the pioneer Covenanters who had helped to win King's Mountain, who had planted civilization in the valley of the Holston, and who had defended and held the state against the terrible Indian tribes of the great wilderness west and south of them. A better population nowhere existed.

And what was the crime of these innocent, ingenuous young men? They still loved the government of their fathers, and were trying to escape from one they did not love. This was the "very head and front of their offending."

The imprisonment of these young men was done under the order of General E. Kirby Smith, who had recently taken command of this department. General Smith was of Connecticut parentage. He had the reputation, both before and since the war, of being a fair and a just, indeed a good man, and that was true of him in his normal condition. But he had caught the spirit then prevailing in East Tennessee and was no longer himself.

Soon after the accession of General Smith, the celebrated orders directing Mrs. Andrew Johnson, Mrs. W. G. Brownlow, Mrs. Horace Maynard and Mrs. William B. Carter, with their families, to leave the state and go north, were issued at his command, as stated on their face. These families were ordered to leave in thirty-six hours. Not a word of comment is necessary as to the time allowed. The time, however, was afterwards extended. Nor will I dwell a single moment on the policy and justice of thus sending from their homes harmless, innocent ladies, who were especially noted for their mildness and peaceable disposition, all of whom were verging on old age, and two of them well advanced in life.

It is no justification of such a policy to say that General

S. P. Carter afterwards sent out of Knoxville women and children, nor that Andrew Johnson did the same at Nashville and General Sherman at Atlanta. It is enough to say that the practice, except in cases of actual danger to the general cause, is one to be discountenanced rather than encouraged.

The necessities of the situation in East Tennessee naturally called forth a class of men known as guides or pilots, who engaged in the hazardous business of conducting Union refugees through the woods and mountains to places of safety, generally the Federal army in Kentucky. These men became exceedingly skillful in this business. They did not expect to fight their way through, but by traveling at night and pursuing unfrequented and pathless ways—cautiously, silently and stealthily creeping past their enemies, who were always patrolling the roads and mountain passes—thus to make their escape from danger. There were a number of guides who became celebrated in this business. Perhaps the most noted of these was Captain Daniel Ellis, of Carter county, who has published a book of his adventures, full of thrilling interest. He was a man of great coolness, daring and shrewdness, always able to extricate himself from perils that at the time seemed to be absolutely hopeless. In him the future writers of historical romances will find a second Horseshoe Robinson. Captain Ellis still lives in his native county, enjoying the esteem and confidence of his fellow-citizens. I believe that he claims to have piloted to the Federal army, in Kentucky and Tennessee, ten thousand men.

Spencer Deaton, of Knox county, was another celebrated pilot. He conducted many parties through the mountains. At last, probably in 1864, he was captured and carried to Richmond, where he was tried, condemned and hanged as a spy in Castle Thunder.

Isaac Bolinger, of Campbell county, Seth Lea and Frank Hodge, of Knox, Washington Vann and William B. Rey-

nolds, of Anderson, and James Lane, of Greene, were all successful pilots and conducted many parties to Kentucky. Doubtless there were others, whose names I have not learned.

Captain W. B. Reynolds, of Anderson county, became quite noted as a guide, a spy, a recruiting officer and a fighter. He acted in all these capacities as occasion demanded. No danger kept him from undertaking the most perilous trips. He would slip into Knoxville, bringing messages and news, showing himself to such persons as he wished to see, then, ascertaining all that was important about the Confederate army, would slip out and return to Kentucky, leading back a small number of recruits or refugees. His daring often amounted to brazen effrontery. Captain Reynolds was a veteran of the Mexican War.

There were thousands of noble women in East Tennessee who were always ready to help these refugees by every means in their power. Perhaps none of these was so widely and so favorably known as Mrs. Jeannette Laurimer Mabry, of Knox county, the wife of Colonel George W. Mabry, a wealthy farmer. Her husband and all his family early espoused the cause of the Confederacy, but she remained unflinchingly true to the Union. She was at all times outspoken in its favor. Being a woman of prominence, by reason of her social position and wealth, and possessing a large degree of intelligence, her open stand for the Union became widely known. Her influence among her neighbors and acquaintances in the country in holding them true and stedfast to the government was remarkable. Besides she had the reputation, and deservedly too, of being the most universally charitable woman in the country. She never turned the needy away empty-handed, nor the hungry unfed. No wonder such a woman had influence. When, therefore, the dark days of 1861 and 1862 came, and the males of almost whole communities were fleeing for safety, these men naturally turned to this noble woman for advice and

assistance. The poor, starving, needy refugee, always found in her a generous friend; the timid and the fearful loyalist took new hope from her unshaken faith and courage. She always knew the latest news from the front. If a guide came in from the Federal lines his mission was not considered complete without communicating in some way with her. And thus she lived through the war, aiding in her humble way the cause of her country. And around the camp-fires in Kentucky, and in other distant fields where duty called them, no name left behind was uttered more frequently by the exiles, nor with a tenderer or more sincere invocation of a blessing on it, than that of Jeannette Laurimer Mabry.

It is impossible to give even an approximate estimate of the number of men who were secretly conducted to the Federal lines. Possibly it amounted to fifteen or twenty thousand, Estimating that thirty-five thousand men from East Tennessee entered the Federal army during the war, including those who became connected with the organizations of other states, and were therefore not counted as Tennessee troops, the estimate I have made seems reasonable. Besides a considerable number of persons fled from East Tennessee who did not enter the army.

The condition of the Union men of East Tennessee during the latter part of the year 1861 and during the year 1862, and until September of the year 1863, was gloomy beyond description. No pen can picture the mental anxiety they endured. Many, it must be remembered, could not get away. Some were physically unable to endure the hardships of such a perilous journey on foot through the mountains. Some found their families in such a helpless condition that they could not leave. Some hoped until the last that the terrors and hardships which encompassed them would be mitigated, and that their condition would become more tolerable. It was hard, very hard to leave home and family as an exile, not knowing when, nor whether at all, they should ever return. It was

a sad, hard lot which thus forced men to such a step. Dark indeed must things have seemed. But whether men stayed or went, there was peril before them.

Many persons who could not go, did not dare to remain at home. So, they hid themselves in the hills or the mountains, coming in when no danger seemed to be near.

An overwhelming sense of danger at all times filled the minds of the Union men. The feet of the enemy, often strangers, pressed the soil, and roamed in triumph over the valleys and hills once their own. These hills and valleys, lately so lovely to the Union men, had now become almost hateful to them. Even the great mountains which they loved so fondly, seemed almost to mock them in their despair. The chill of evening had settled on their minds.

Overwhelming and terrible was their condition. While the excitement of the canvasses of 1861 lasted, it gave courage and buoyancy to their minds. But when it was no longer safe to speak except in a whisper, when a new, a hostile government was manifesting its spirit, as well as its power by arrests and by imprisonments in distant states, then indeed they awoke to a sad realization of the change. As time wore on, and the policy of the authorities in East Tennessee became more and more rigorous, often despair, darker than midnight, overcast their minds. Dangers were on every hand—danger of arrest, of conscription, of imprisonment, of transportation—these were a few of the things that rendered the condition of loyal men so desperate from the day the state seceded until September, 1863. Add to this the fact that they had no reliable news from the North. Then consider the fact, that scarcely a ray of hope cheered them until Grant, the coming general of the war, won Donelson in the winter of 1862, and that after the spring of that year there was no real progress made until the triumphs of Vicksburg and of Gettysburg suddenly burst upon an impatient and almost despairing people in 1863.

Hard as was the lot of the refugees, the condition of those who remained at home, in mental anxiety and fear, was even harder, especially if they were men of prominence. During the year 1861 and a part of 1862, the Union seemed to them to be dissolving and melting away. There were feebleness and indecision in the North; unparalleled energy and determination in the South. The cry of war rang from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. In only one small section in all this vast region were the people still loyal to the old flag, and their voice was now silenced amid the din of war.

During the long, long months of waiting, hoping and despairing, following June 8, 1861, how the hearts of the Union men grew sick and faint! The darkness of despondency overcast them. At all times the odium of being traitors to the South rested on them. If the South triumphed, for all future time they were to be regarded—were then in fact regarded—as the Tories of the Revolution are regarded by this generation. Social ostracism and outlawry were to be their fate and that of their children. Like Cain, their punishment was almost greater than they could bear.

The intense anxiety of these people can never be estimated. Cut off from communication with the North, filled with doubt and perplexity, with the noise of the storm of war constantly in their ears, with no light breaking from any quarter, surrounded by dangers and threatened with personal violence, what situation could have been more gloomy? It looked as if all was lost. They could not forecast the brightness of the future. And yet, amid all this gloom, they remained true and firm. The darker the hour, the more intensely glowed their love for the Union.

The very dangers which surrounded them, increased their dislike of the new government, and heightened their love of the old. Never did a people love the Union so lavishly as did these heart-sick people. Little wonder they wept and laughed and shouted like children, when in 1863, they once more beheld the old flag.[1]

[1] The author deems it only just to say that personally he never had any

cause of complaint against the Confederate authorities. He was always treated kindly by them, and enjoyed as many privileges as were consistent with a state of civil war. He received courtesies from numerous Confederate officers. Scores of them visited his house. All knew he had been a Union leader, and yet their treatment was kind and cordial.

CHAPTER XX.

WAITING OVER THE BORDER.

Mr. Lincoln determines to relieve East Tennessee—Appoints General Robert Anderson to lead an army for this purpose—He retires—Then General Sherman—He declines—General Buell succeeds Sherman—Views of Sherman—Sherman and Buell both at first in favor of an advance into East Tennessee—Both change their minds—Mr. Lincoln and General McClellan urge Buell to advance—Correspondence—Buell opposed to an independent expedition—General Thomas—General Zollicoffer—Battle of Fishing Creek—Way open to East Tennessee—General Grant asks permission to take Fort Henry—Capture of that place—Invests Fort Donelson—Surrender of that place—Battle of Shiloh—Confederate lines forced southward—Way again open to East Tennessee—Buell's objections to an advance considered—Importance to the Confederacy of holding East Tennessee and its line of railroads—War should not have lasted so long—No reflection on the military capacity of General George H. Thomas.

When Mr. Lincoln heard, in 1861, the romantic and thrilling story of the loyalty of the people of East Tennessee, of their sublime struggle for the Union, and of their continued faithfulness amid general desertion in the South, his sympathy was deeply touched in behalf of these unyielding and unconquerable people. He at once determined to rescue them from their perils by sending an army to their support. The first suggestion of the kind, so far as we can see, sprang up in the kind heart and emanated from the brain of this extraordinary man. In the summer of 1861, as we have seen, he appointed General Robert Anderson to command an army to be concentrated in Kentucky. Anderson was selected with special reference to this specific object. He did not attempt to conceal the fact that he was appointed to lead an army designed for the relief of the people of East Tennessee. We have also seen that General Anderson, sick and broken down in health, was soon overwhelmed with the hopelessness of

his situation. Therefore, in October, he asked to be relieved of his command, which was accordingly done. General W. T. Sherman was his successor, who, likewise in a few weeks, despairing of accomplishing anything in Kentucky, asked to be relieved. About the middle of November, General Don Carlos Buell was appointed to succeed him. While Sherman was in command in Kentucky in the Department of the Cumberland, General Ormsby M. Mitchel was stationed at Cincinnati in command of the Department of the Ohio. He was engaged in organizing Ohio troops and sending them forward to Camp Dick Robinson, in Kentucky, for the use of General Sherman. General George H. Thomas was in command at Dick Robinson under Sherman. On the 20th of October, the secretary of war, Mr. Cameron, and L. Thomas, adjutant-general of the army, were in Cincinnati, and while there issued to General Mitchel an order to repair at once to Camp Dick Robinson, and there "prepare troops for a forward movement, the object being to take possession of Cumberland Ford and Cumberland Gap and ultimately to seize the railroad," in East Tennessee, at Knoxville.

General Mitchel entered upon the discharge of the duties of his new command with all his usual energy. He immediately commenced throwing forward from Cincinnati all the troops he could prepare for the field, to concentrate at once at Dick Robinson, ten or twelve regiments, for the purpose of this expedition. As the field of his operations was within the territory embraced by the Department of General Sherman, and as General George H. Thomas had been placed in command of the troops at Camp Dick Robinson, soon there came to be serious friction between General Mitchel and these several commanders. Mitchel, though assigned by the secretary of war to a special duty, and apparently an independent command, was to report to Sherman. The latter was finally opposed, as we shall see more fully, to the movement

toward East Tennessee. He believed it unwise. On the other hand, Mitchel regarded it as a military movement of the first importance. He also believed it entirely feasible with ten or twelve regiments and with sufficient artillery. If any one could have succeeded in reaching the railroad, in East Tennessee, and destroying the bridges at that time, it was General Mitchel. He subsequently developed a tireless energy and a brilliant dash, as well as military sagacity, similar to those displayed by Sheridan and Stonewall Jackson. If he had lived, it can scarcely be doubted that he would have become one of the great generals of the war. He was a graduate of West Point, and in 1862, won the rank of brevet major-general by his operations in Alabama.

Sherman had constantly insisted on having more troops, if the government expected to retain Kentucky. He believed that it would be impossible to hold Louisville and Frankfort without a larger army, against a combined attack of Johnston, Buckner and Zollicoffer, much less make offensive movements. He became exceedingly annoyed at the perplexities and difficulties which encompassed the cause of the Union in that state.

About the middle of October, Mr. Simon Cameron, secretary of war, and Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas, with a full staff of newspaper correspondents, stopped at Louisville, on their return from St. Louis, to confer with General Sherman. The latter pointed out in their conference very fully the danger which threatened the national cause in that state, and after explaining that he had a line three hundred miles long to defend, extending from the mouth of the Big Sandy to Paducah, he insisted that he needed 60,000 men for defense, and that for offensive operations—that is, to conquer and hold the country to the Gulf of Mexico and the sea—he needed 200,000 men. Mr. Cameron, at this statement, threw up his hands and exclaimed: "Great God, where are they to come from?" General Sherman asserted "that

there were plenty of men in the North ready and willing to come if he—the secretary of war—would only accept their services; . . . for it was a notorious fact that regiments had been formed in all the North-western States whose services had been refused by the war department, on the ground that they would not be needed."[1]

Mr. James Guthrie, who was present, was called on for his opinion as to the condition of affairs in Kentucky, and he corroborated all General Sherman had said, and added, what General Sherman says he had often heard him say, "that no man who owned a slave or a mule in Kentucky could be trusted." On the return of Mr. Cameron to Washington, by some means a newspaper man got hold of the fact and published it that General Sherman had demanded two hundred thousand men. Immediately the report was current, both in the East and the West, that he was "insane." Wherever he went this charge followed him. It was not until after the battle of Shiloh, the next April, that he was relieved from the injury of this cruel and widely circulated slander.

It might possibly afford a curious mathematical problem to determine how many less men than 200,000 it finally took, during the next three years, to clear out the country to the Gulf of Mexico, as contemplated by General Sherman when he named that number. Then again, military men ought to be able to say whether or not, with a sufficient force, the Confederacy could have been cut in two in 1861–62, as it was by this same general in 1864. The truth is, General Sherman was greatly in advance in his ideas of the men around him, excepting General Mitchel, as well as in advance of the authorities in Washington.

Sherman, like General Buell, when first placed in com-

[1] "Sherman's Memoirs," Vol. I, pp. 200, 203.

The quota of Indiana, under the 75,000 call, was less than 5,000 men. The governor offered 10,000. The governor of Ohio telegraphed: "We will furnish the largest number you will receive." The governor of Michigan offered to furnish 50,000 men.—"Life of Lincoln," by Ida M. Tarbell; "McClure's Magazine," February, 1899.

mand of the Department of Ohio, appeared to think favorably of the project of an expedition into East Tennessee. No doubt he was encouraged in that direction by the instructions he had from General McClellan. General Buell at first seemed to heartily approve of the project also. Mr. W. B. Carter in his letter of September 15, 1861, before quoted, says, that on his return to London, Kentucky, from Tennessee, where he had been directing the bridge burning, he found a message from Buell for him to repair at once to Louisville to meet that general. He says:

"One of Buell's objects in sending for me was to ask me this question: 'You have just been over the road; can I, at this season of the year, march an army into East Tennessee?' I replied: 'Much as I desire you to do so, I feel obliged to say you can not do it.'" This was about the 1st of December. Mr. Carter says Buell had "his heart set on relieving East Tennessee."

All through the late fall of 1861 and the winter of 1862, General McClellan was urging Buell to advance into East Tennessee. On the 25th of November, he said: "I am still convinced that political and strategical considerations render a prompt movement in force on Eastern Tennessee imperative. The object to be gained is to cut communication between the Mississippi Valley and Eastern Virginia; to protect our Union friends in Tennessee, and to re-establish the government of the Union in the eastern portion of that state. I think we owe it to our Union friends in Eastern Tennessee to protect them at all hazards. First secure that, then, if you possess the means, carry Nashville."

The matter of the relief of the Union men of East Tennessee was still weighing heavily on Mr. Lincoln. In his message to congress in December, he recommended "that the loyal regions of East Tennessee and Western North Carolina should be connected with Kentucky and other faithful parts of the Union by railroad. I therefore recommend," said he, "as a military measure that congress

provide for the construction of such a road as speedily as possible." Nothing ever resulted from this suggestion.

I have given General Buell the credit of being, at first, like General Sherman, sincerely in sympathy with the proposed expedition into East Tennessee. But, in a short time, if such were the case, his mind underwent a decided change. General McClellan continued to send him reenforcements, and to urge the imperative necessity of relieving East Tennessee. In a dispatch of November, 1861, he said: "What is the reason of concentration of troops at Louisville? I urge movement at once on Eastern Tennessee, unless it is impossible."

Again, November 29th, he said: "Keep up the hearts of the Tennesseans. Make them feel that, far from any intention of deserting them, all will be done to sustain them. . . . I believe in attacks by concentrated masses, but it seems to me, with the little local knowledge I possess, that you might attempt two movements—one on Eastern Tennessee, say with 15,000 men, and a strong attack on Nashville, as you propose, with, say 50,000 men."

Again, December 3, 1861, General McClellan wrote to Buell, saying: " . . . Please send there, with the least possible delay, troops enough to protect these men. I still feel sure that the best strategical move in this case will be that dictated by the simplest feeling of humanity. We must preserve these noble fellows from harm; everything urges us to do that—faith, interest and loyalty. For the sake of these Eastern Tennesseans who have taken part with us, I would gladly sacrifice mere military advantages; they deserve our protection, and, at all hazards, they must have it." . . .

These are noble words, and show that General McClellan had a heart of genuine sympathy, whatever his faults as a commander may have been.

Again, December 5th, General McClellan wrote to General Buell: " . . . Let me again urge the necessity of sending something into East Tennessee as promptly as

possible; our friends there have thrown their all into the scale, and we must not desert them."

In the meantime, the East Tennesseans who were in the North, and in Kentucky, were importunate in demanding that something should be done for their suffering fellow-countrymen at home. General Samuel P. Carter, on the 21st of November, wrote to the Hon. Horace Maynard: " . . . Our men are most anxious to return to Eastern Tennessee, not so much to see their families as to drive the rebels from the country. . . . Two or three batteries, and 10,000 men, provided even with powder and lead for the people, could save Eastern Tennessee at this time. Will help never come?" . . .

On the 25th of November, General Carter wrote again to the same gentleman:

" . . . I know not what will be the next move, but hope most sincerely it may be toward Eastern Tennessee. If something is not done, and that speedily, our people will be cut up and ruined. . . . If we had a battery, I believe we could go into Tennessee, and then we could carry arms, or even powder and lead to furnish to our people, I believe we could stay there. Will help ever come? . . .

"If it be possible, have it so arranged that the Eastern Tennesseans shall not again, except in case of urgent and pressing necessity, be ordered back to Central Kentucky. Many would sooner perish in battle than turn their backs toward the Tennessee lines again." . . .

On the 7th of December, 1861, the following dispatch was sent from Washington to General Buell:

"General D. C. Buell:

"We have just had interviews with the President and General McClellan, and find they concur fully with us in respect to the East Tennessee expedition. Our people are oppressed and pursued as beasts of the forest. The gov-

ernment must come to their relief. We are looking to you with anxious solicitude to move in that direction.

"ANDREW JOHNSON,
"HORACE MAYNARD."

To which General Buell sent the following reply, on the 8th:

"I have received your dispatch. I assure you I recognize no more imperative duty and crave no higher honor than that of rescuing our loyal friends in Tennessee, whose sufferings and heroism I think I can appreciate. I have seen Colonel Carter, and hope he is satisfied of this."

On the same day (October 8th), Mr. Maynard wrote the following caustic letter to General George H. Thomas:

" . . . You are still further from East Tennessee than when I left you nearly six weeks ago. There is shameful wrong somewhere; I have not yet satisfied myself where. That movement so far has been disgraceful to the country and to all concerned. I feel a sense of personal degradation from my connection with it greater than from any part of my public actions. My heart bleeds for these Tennessee troops. I learn they have not yet been paid, and are left without either cavalry or artillery at London.

"With Nelson, and the measles, and blue grass, and nakedness, and hunger and poverty, and home-sickness, the poor fellows have had a bitter experience since they left their homes to serve a government which as yet has hardly given them a word of kindly recognition. The soldiers of all the other states have a home government to look after them. These have not, and but for Carter (General Samuel P.), who has been like a father to them, they would have suffered still more severely. That they at times get discouraged and out of heart, I do not wonder. My assurances to them have failed so often that I should be ashamed to look them in the face. . . .

"HORACE MAYNARD."

Mr. Maynard seems to have had a poor opinion of General Nelson and Kentucky blue grass, as he ranked them with measles and other horrible things.

On the 20th of December, the war department telegraphed to General Buell: "Do you need more regiments than are now under your orders; if so, how many?" The next day Buell answered, saying: "I am not willing to say that I need more regiments. I can use more with decided advantage, if they can be sent." Two days later, he stated that "he had a force of 70,000 men; about 57,000 for duty."

He then for the first time disclosed his plan; that is, it was "one of defense on the East" (in Kentucky toward East Tennessee) "and of invasion on the South," that is toward Nashville.

But General McClellan and Mr. Lincoln still pressed the matter of relieving East Tennessee upon his consideration. On December 29th, the former telegraphed him:

"Johnson, Maynard, etc, are again becoming frantic, and have President Lincoln's sympathy excited. Political considerations would make it advisable to get the arms and troops into Eastern Tennessee at a very early day; you are, however, the best judge. Can you tell me about when and in what force you will be in Eastern Tennessee? . . . Better get the Eastern Tennessee arms and clothing into position for distribution as soon as possible. . . ."

On the same day, General Buell answered as follows: "I intend a column of 12,000, with three batteries for East Tennessee, but as I have telegraphed you, it is impossible to fix a time for it to be there, so much depends on the circumstances which may arise in the meantime. . . . In any event I must tell you, what I have been unwilling to do all along, you will require more troops in Kentucky. . . ."

It was now becoming painfully evident to those who had the inside view of General Buell's movements, that he was

unwilling to do what he had been so earnestly and so often urged to do, both by the President and the commander-in-chief. The President doubtless saw, or suspected this fact, when, on the 4th of January, 1862, he sent this searching dispatch to him:

"Have arms gone forward for East Tennessee? Please tell me the progress and condition of the movement in that direction. Answer."

The time had at last come when General Buell must deal with this question with explicitness. The President would be put off no longer; he must know the intentions of his subordinate. Accordingly he wrote as follows to the President, January 5, 1862:

"To the President:

"Arms can only go forward for East Tennessee under the protection of an army. My organization of the troops has had in view two columns with reference to that movement: a division to move from Lebanon, and a brigade to operate offensively or defensively according to circumstances on the Cumberland Gap route. . . .

"While my preparations have had this movement constantly in view, I will confess to your excellency that I have been bound to it more by my sympathy for the people of East Tennessee, and the anxiety with which you and the general-in-chief have desired it, than by my opinion of its wisdom as an unconditional measure. As earnestly as I wish to accomplish it, my judgment has from the first been decidedly against it, if it should render at all doubtful the success of a movement against the great power of the rebellion in the West, which is mainly arrayed on the line from Columbus to Bowling Green, and can speedily be concentrated at any point of that line which is attacked singly.

D. C. Buell."

To this dispatch the President, with a sorrowful heart, sent the following reply, January 6th:

"Brigadier-General Buell:

"Your dispatch of yesterday has been received and it disappoints and distresses me. . . . My distress is that our friends in East Tennessee are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now I fear are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. In this we lose the most valuable state we have in the South. My dispatch to which yours is an answer was sent with the knowledge of Senator Johnson and Representative Maynard, of East Tennessee, and they will be upon me to know the answer which I can not safely show them. They would despair; possibly resign to go and save their families somehow, or die with them.

"I do not intend this to be an order in any sense, but merely as intimated before to show you the grounds of my anxiety. Yours, very truly,

"A. Lincoln."

On the same day, General McClellan sent the following dispatch to General Buell, marked "confidential:"

"My Dear General: . . . There are few things I have more at heart than the prompt movement of a strong column into Eastern Tennessee. The political consequences of the delay of this movement will be much more severe than you seem to anticipate. If relief is not soon afforded these people we shall lose them entirely, and with them the power of inflicting the most severe blow upon the secession cause.

"I was extremely sorry to learn from your telegram to the President that you had from the beginning attached little or no importance to a movement in East Tennessee. I had not so understood your views, and it develops a radical difference between your views and my own, which I deeply regret. . . . Interesting as Nashville may be to the Louisville interests, it strikes me that its possession is of very secondary importance in comparison with the

immense results that would arise from the adherence to our cause of the masses in East Tennessee, West North Carolina, South Carolina, North Georgia and Alabama—results that I feel assured would ere long flow from the movement I allude to. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,

"*Major-General, Commanding.*"

This brought out from General Buell an explanatory dispatch to General McClellan, dated January 13, 1862, as follows:

"MY DEAR FRIEND: I did not intend to be understood in my dispatch to the President as attaching little importance to the movement on East Tennessee; on the contrary, it is evidently of the highest importance, if thoroughly carried out. But I believe that if the other object were attained, the same result would be accomplished quite as promptly and effectually. I have taken no step thus far that has not had that in view also. . . . The Tennessee arms are being unpacked and put in order and forwarded to Lebanon. Truly yours, D. C. BUELL."

In this same letter he admitted that his command had risen to 90,000 men, and promised to carry out General McClellan's instructions.

On February 1st, General Buell again addressed General McClellan, in a long letter, on the subject of their previous correspondence, giving his reasons for thinking an expedition into East Tennessee not only unwise, but impracticable. It was as follows:

"MY DEAR GENERAL: . . . It is 200 miles or thereabouts from our depots (at the terminus of the railroad) to Knoxville, or the nearest point on the Tennessee Railroad. At the best, supplies are meager along the whole route, and if they suffice for a trip or two, must by that time be entirely exhausted for any distance that we can reach on both sides of the road.

From Somerset to Jacksborough we will scarcely find any

at all. East Tennessee is almost entirely stripped of wheat by the enemy. In the productive region there is still a small surplus of corn and wheat. We must supply two-thirds of the rations from our depots here, and we must of course depend on them also for our ordnance and other stores. It will take 1,000 wagons constantly going to supply 10,000 men. , . . If the numbor of troops, and consequently the amount of hauling is increased, the difficulty is increased in a greater proportion. The limited amount of forage on the route will be speedily exhausted, as besides provisions for our men, we must have forage for our animals—a thing that is not to be lightly thought of.

"In my previous letter I set down three divisions (say 30,000 effective men) as the force that would be required for East Tennessee—two to penetrate the country and one to keep open communications. I believe that is the least force that will suffice, and it ought to be able to establish itself promptly before it can be anticipated by a force of the enemy sufficient to make the result doubtful. With railroads converging from the east, west and south, it ought not to be difficult for them to get a pretty formidable force in that country in ten days. . . .

"For the reasons I have stated, I have been forced reluctantly to the conviction that an advance into East Tennessee is impracticable at this time on any such scale which will be sufficient. I have ordered General Carter's brigade to move on the Gap, but I fear very much that even that will be compelled to fall back for supplies, such is the condition of the roads over which they have to be hauled. . . . Truly yours, D. C. Buell."

I have given the correspondence of the authorities at Washington with General Buell, in reference to the occupation of East Tennessee, as well as his letters and explanations in reference thereto, almost in full. This I have done not only because of the great importance of this matter, but also as an act of justice to General Buell, who has been

held responsible for the long delay in giving relief to the loyal people of East Tennessee. That he persistently disregarded the oft and constantly-repeated suggestions of his superiors in this respect, is only too manifest from the foregoing correspondence.

The point I am making is not affected in the slightest by the consideration that General Buell was probably right, as I think he was, in the opinion he held that an expedition into East Tennessee, at that time, was both unwise and impracticable. It must be admitted that there was great force in the reasons he gave for his conduct.

During all this time, General George H. Thomas had been posted on the south-eastern border of Kentucky, watching the movements of General Zollicoffer, who, having received re-enforcements, established himself on the north bank of the Cumberland River. From this point Zollicoffer could defend Cumberland Gap, and at the same time encourage the disloyal element in Kentucky. Late in December, Thomas was sent with orders to dislodge him.

Thomas was posted at Somerset, about ten miles from Fishing Creek or Mill Springs; Crittenden and Zollicoffer occupied a fortified camp on the Cumberland. They had built cabins for the soldiers and had gone into winter quarters. Thomas was anxious for a fight, but he did not wish to attack a fortified position. He therefore resorted to strategy, as we have reason to believe, though he does not say so, to draw the enemy out of his strong position. On the 17th of January, he sent two regiments of soldiers in the direction of the enemy with orders to cross Fishing Creek, that is, to get on the same side occupied by Zollicoffer. Two other regiments were within supporting distance. In the meantime, he put the remainder of his force in motion, but as quietly as possible, and on the night of the 17th, he got them in position for the expected fight on the other side of Fishing Creek.

The prospect of capturing and destroying a considerable

force of Thomas' army, which had, as was doubtless supposed, incautiously ventured so near, could not be resisted by an enterprising general like Zollicoffer, who was as ready to fight as Thomas. Accordingly, on the night of the 18th of January, the army of Zollicoffer moved out of its intrenchments, and started in the direction of the two regiments which had come so near. The night was cold and rainy, the roads muddy and almost impassable. Upon no other theory, except the one given above, can we account for the action of prudent generals in leaving their fortified position, on such a night, and marching nine miles over horrible roads, where they were to encounter an enemy with nearly as large a force as they had. The result of all this was that Thomas' men were rested on the morning of the battle, while Zollicoffer's arrived on the field only a little while before the commencement of the action in a worn out and exhausted condition.

The morning was wet and chilly, the atmosphere dark and murky. About seven o'clock, or soon after, the fight was commenced with spirit and determination on both sides. It raged without ceasing, or any intermission in courage and effort, until some time after eleven o'clock, when an event happened which soon put an end to the fighting, as such things often did with inexperienced troops in the early stages of the war. This was the death of General Zollicoffer. This officer, mistaking a Union regiment for one of his own, rode forward and told its commander, Colonel Speed S. Fry, that he was firing on friends. Fry, not recognizing Zollicoffer as an enemy, turned away to order his men to cease firing. At this moment, one of Zollicoffer's aides-de-camp rode up, and, seeing the true state of facts, commenced firing on Fry, wounding his horse. Fry, wheeling in turn, drew his navy revolver and returned the fire, shooting Zollicoffer through the heart.[1]

[1] The above account of the death of General Zollicoffer I have taken almost literally from Vol. 5, p. 116, of Nicholay & Hay's "Life of Lin-

The fall of the brave Confederate leader soon put an end to the fight. As soon as his death was known, the Confederate forces gave way. They retreated in disorder to their fortified camp at Mill Springs. Thomas made immediate pursuit, and invested their camp that night, intending to assault the intrenchments the next morning. But when morning came, it was found that the enemy had crossed the Cumberland River during the night, and had fled in the wildest disorder and precipitation, abandoning their wounded, their supplies, twelve pieces of artillery and many small arms.

The forces engaged in this battle were as follows, namely: on the Confederate side, officers, 333; privates, 6,111; on the Union side, 4,829 men. It is possible that the full number given above as the force of the Confederates was not on the battlefield. But, be that as it may, it is plain that there was no great disparity in the forces of the respective sides. It is a singular fact that Zollicoffer's entire command, except one Mississippi and one Alabama regiment, was composed of Tennessee troops, most of them being from Middle Tennessee, from the wealthy country around Nashville; while fully one-half of Thomas' men were Kentuckians and East Tennesseans—the First Tennessee (Colonel Byrd), and the Second Tennessee (Colonel J. P. T. Carter), being in the engagement.[1]

An eye-witness of this fight, as well as a participant,

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coln." They cite as authorities Henry M. Cist, Army of the Cumberland, pp. 17, 18, also "History of the Army of the Cumberland," Vol. I, p. 57, by Thomas B. Van Horne.

General Crittenden, in his official report, gives a somewhat different account of his death. He says that General Zollicoffer rode up to the Nineteenth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel D. H. Cummings, and ordered him to cease firing, under the impression that he was firing on one of his own regiments. He then rode forward toward the Federal troops, as if to give orders, when he was killed just as he discovered his mistake.

[1] Judging by General George B. Crittenden's report, the battle must have lasted an hour after the death of Zollicoffer. He says that Thomas had 12,000 men in the engagement, while he had but 4,000. A report of all the commands engaged under Thomas shows the number I have given in the text.

says that both armies fought with steadiness and courage up to the time of the death of Zollicoffer, that no decided advantage had been gained by either side up to that time, and that no one could tell how the fortunes of the day were going. In all his experience during the war, and he served four years, he says he never saw harder fighting than that between the Second Minnesota (Colonel Van Cleve), and the Fifteenth Mississippi (Colonel Walthall), in a struggle to hold an old fence-row which had grown up with underbrush, and which afforded some kind of shelter. These regiments charged each other three times successively in the effort to hold this vantage ground. Finally, the Minnesota regiment gained and held it.[1]

The victory of Thomas was complete; the disaster of the Confederates overwhelming. The importance of this victory has never received the recognition it was rightly entitled to. Soon after it was won, it was eclipsed, and therefore obscured, by other and very much greater victories, and, therefore, soon almost forgotten. And yet it was the first real decisive Union victory of the war. By it an army of from six to ten thousand Confederates was destroyed for the time being, and lost as an element in battles and in the movement of forces for sometime to come. This defeat does not in the slightest degree reflect on the courage of the Confederate soldiers, nor imply that they were less brave than the Union soldiers. It was just such a calamity as all raw armies were liable to have in the early stages of the war. If General Thomas had met the fate of Zollicoffer in that battle, the disaster which befell the Confederates might have fallen on the Union army. Very likely the Confederate soldiers trusted more in the well-known courage and coolness of Zollicoffer than they

[1] Major D. A. Carpenter, who was at that time adjutant of the Second Tennessee (Union), and afterwards major of that regiment, is my authority for the above. I am also indebted to Major Carpenter for other details of this fight. He was one of the bravest officers in either army.

did in their own courage, as inexperienced soldiers are apt to do.

There was the wildest excitement over this defeat. As it was fought just over the border of Tennessee, and within one hundred miles of Knoxville, it created the greatest alarm in that place. Every one expected the Federal army would enter in a few days. In Nashville the news was received with overwhelming consternation and grief. Zollicoffer, the pride, and, to some extent, the hope of Nashville, was dead. Young Lieutenant Balie Peyton, the son of Hon. Balie Peyton, was also dead. In many other families and homes, in that place and in the surrounding country, there were weeping and lamentations over the loss of noble sons. Never did Nashville—never did any city anywhere—send forth to battle braver young men than those who followed Zollicoffer with exultant confidence, and with manly spirit, to the fatal field of Fishing Creek.

The way to East Tennessee was now open to General Thomas. He could have marched his army, at that time, into Knoxville almost without opposition. It had been stripped bare of soldiers in strengthening the army of Zollicoffer. Now, as that was scattered, new forces had to be sent there.

Events of a still more startling character than the battle of Fishing Creek were, at this time, being quietly evolved and developed, which were soon to burst on the world with brilliant suddenness. General Grant, since his seizure and occupation of Paducah, in his quiet, ceaseless manner, had been preparing the means of aggressive operations against the enemy. Finally, he was ready, and telegraphed to General Halleck, his superior, for permission to strike a blow, saying: "With permission, I shall take Fort Henry, on the Tennessee." He received no permission. Rear-Admiral Foote repeated the request, with no better success. Again Grant, and again, for the third time, with renewed

earnestness, urged his petition on his superior in St. Louis. At length, the permission was given. There was no delay in the movements of this silent, earnest man. Receiving Halleck's instructions on February 1st, the next day the expedition, with fifteen thousand men, was under way, on board of transports, and on the 4th, Grant and Foote, with seven gun-boats, also moved up the river. On the 6th, the gun-boats attacked the fort, while Grant's forces landed with the view of an investment and an assault by land. Before this could be completely done, the fort surrendered. Grant telegraphed to Halleck: "Fort Henry is ours. . . . I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th." How positive this remarkable man was. Whatever he promised to do, he did.

The sudden fall of Henry threw the Confederate generals, A. S. Johnston, Buckner and Hardee, into the wildest excitement. At once 12,000 re-enforcements for Donelson were sent forward under Buckner, Floyd and Pillow. The army at Bowling Green soon commenced a hasty retreat on Nashville. Thus had the plans and the energy of Grant not only opened up the Tennessee, but they had also virtually cleared Kentucky of all hostile armies, while Buell still remained quiet and inactive, with an army of 90,000 men under his command. In the meantime the telegraph wires were burdened with messages passing between McClellan, at Washington, and Buell in Louisville, and Halleck at St. Louis. None of them seemed to know what to do, and therefore nothing was done. Halleck wanted Buell to unite his forces with his own, then under Grant operating on the Tennessee and the Cumberland, and thus with their joint forces, to invest and capture Donelson. Buell, after much deliberation and indecision, rather preferred following the retreating army of Johnston now on its way to Nashville. So, he declined going to Donelson. General McClellan also thought this was the best plan. The result was that with the addition of a few thousand troops sent to him by Halleck, Grant was left to capture

Donelson with his original 15,000 men, and with the aid of the gun-boats. Halleck finally had a keen sense of the importance of the capture of this fort. He telegraphed to McClellan as follows: "United to Grant" (*i. e.* Buell's forces) "we can take and hold Fort Donelson and Clarksville. . . . Unless we can take Fort Donelson very soon, we shall have the whole force of the enemy on us. Fort Donelson is the turning point of the war." . . .

While these generals were talking about concerted action in order to take Donelson, Grant was busy investing and assaulting that great stronghold. He would have taken the place on the 8th as he had promised, but extremely high water, impassable roads and terrible weather rendered it impossible. After encountering difficulties not often met with at that day, in the midst of one of the worst spells of cold and rain and snow ever experienced in that climate, Grant had made such a show of determination and bravery, by his assaults on the works, that on the morning of the 16th, just as his forces were ready for a last assault, he received a note from Buckner, proposing an armistice, so as to arrange for capitulation. Grant's reply has served very largely to give immortality to his name. He said: "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works." Buckner complained that the terms were "ungenerous and unchivalric." But he nevertheless accepted them. Four thousand men, under Floyd, Pillow and Forrest, made their escape on the night of the 15th. The number who surrendered, according to the rations issued at Cairo by the commissary of prisoners was 14,623. Many escaped who are not enumerated above. General Grant estimated the Confederate force at 21,000, and his own at 17,000, when he first invested the place, but this was increased by re-enforcements during the investment until it finally amounted to 27,000 men.

This was one of the most complete victories of the war. Here were first conspicuously manifested the peculiar

qualities which made Grant unlike any other general of the war on either side. During the fight, on the 15th, while he was away in consultation with Rear-Admiral Foote, the enemy had come out of their fortifications and attacked McClernand's command on the right, and driven it back. General Lew Wallace sent fresh troops to the exposed point, who got in between those and repulsed the enemy, and thus checked the disaster which might have proved most serious. Grant did not expect an attack while he was gone, for the Confederates were in no condition for offensive operations at that time. When he returned, he found part of his troops in wild excitement over this repulse or disaster. He was convinced that the enemy had made the attack on his lines with the view of cutting their way out and escaping, as they came with their knapsacks full of rations. He said to Colonel J. D. Webster of his staff: "Some of our men are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so. . . . the one who attacks first now will be victorious, and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me." He determined to make an assault at once on the left of his line. He directed Colonel Webster to ride with him along the lines, and to call out to the men as they passed: "Fill your cartridge boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape, and he must not be permitted to do so." This inspired his men. General C. F. Smith at once led the assault on the works of the enemy, and that night he and his command bivouacked inside of the Confederate lines. The next morning came the request for an armistice.

Thus General Grant, seizing the critical moment when both armies were demoralized, by an act of supreme daring, inspired the minds of his own soldiers with confidence, and at the same time created alarm and fear in the minds of the enemy.[1] As he tells elsewhere, he

[1] "Grant's Memoirs," Vol. I, pp. 306 and 307.

acted on this same principle, with successful effect, at a critical moment in the battle of Shiloh.

Six weeks after this time, the battle of Shiloh was fought by this same modest man, and after a disaster the first day, another victory was finally won on the second. The question of the fall of Nashville was settled by him while Buell was still quietly waiting in Louisville. Grant, a subordinate, had unostentatiously gone ahead, at the suggestion of his own fertile brain, and inaugurated movements of such stupendous importance that they created a deep rapid Southward flowing current behind it which drew the army of Halleck and the cautious Buell after it, almost without an effort on their part. It was simply what is often seen on streams—smaller objects floating and following in the current made by the movement of some greater one. Grant's enterprises drew everything Southward, within the wide region affected by their influence. At Donelson he had driven a wedge into the territory of the Southern Confederacy, which had riven it asunder as far south as the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Columbus, Bowling Green and Nashville fell as naturally as ripe fruit falls from its parent stem. And now, after the battle of Shiloh, under the guidance of his matchless genius, the Confederate lines again moved Southward.[1]

The great commander of the war—modest, quiet and sleepless—had at last appeared. Unpretending and unheralded, rising by the force of his own genius and matchless qualities, he suddenly appeared amid the smoke and noise of battles and men began to inquire: "Who is this strange man that wins victories?"

Perhaps the most favorable opportunity which had ever occurred for relieving East Tennessee had now presented

[1] Though it took three appeals from Grant and Foote to get permission from Halleck to undertake the expedition up the Tennessee and the Cumberland, Halleck asked for promotion, not for Grant, but for himself, on account of these operations.

itself. There was universal consternation throughout the South. Mr. Lincoln, ever alive with keenest sympathy for the noble people of East Tennessee, telegraphed to Kentucky to inquire if a cavalry force might not at that time be sent into that region to seize the railroad. It was not done, however, and from this time for eighteen months following, but little was done toward accomplishing this patriotic object.

Why was this? Was it because the conviction was gradually forcing itself on the minds of military men that the force originally proposed for this work was grossly inadequate?

It is probably true that a small force of men, say eight or ten thousand, might have seized Knoxville and the railroad immediately after the battle of Fishing Creek, and almost certainly after the fall of Donelson. But the vital question was: Could such a force have held it after it was seized? It seems to have been taken for granted at that time that if the road could be reached and seized it could be held.

There was much truth and force in the letter of General Buell to General McClellan, dated February 1, 1862, in which he gives some of his reasons for his opinion that such an expedition was unwise and impracticable at that time. He overestimates, however, the difficulty as to supplies. He was correct as to the scarcity of forage on the route, but the moment the army had reached Jacksborough, or descended at any point from the Cumberland Plateau into the fertile valley of East Tennessee, provisions sufficient for the support of such an army for a long time could have been found. This region was the richest grain field in the Southern Confederacy, excepting the valley of Virginia. It not only furnished wheat and corn for the armies of the South, but also hay, beef and bacon, as well as horses and mules. Hence no spot of territory in the South, of no greater area, was more vital to the support of her armies. It constantly supported out

of its surplus an army of eight or ten thousand men, from June, 1861, to September, 1863, and also shipped large quantities of provisions and forage to supply other armies. From October, 1863, until the next summer, both Longstreet's and the Federal army, the two probably aggregating fifty thousand men, lived nearly entirely on the resources of Upper and Middle East Tennessee. It must be kept in mind that there were two other armies, namely Bragg's and Sherman's, at that time in this region, which in part lived off the country. It so happened that, while the crop of 1861 was a fair one, the wheat crops of 1862 and 1863 in this region were unprecedented in quantity. They were simply enormous.

Now, the fact of the great abundance of supplies in East Tennessee, rendering it easy for an army of invasion to subsist indefinitely, constituted one of the strongest reasons why a mighty effort should have been made by the Confederates to drive such an army back. Provisions and supplies were needed by the South as badly as men. It could not afford to give up a region of such plenteous supplies. If the South could not get the men of this region for its armies, it could get its grain and its forage, its beef and bacon, and its horses and mules. In this respect, East Tennessee was as important to the South as Middle Tennessee.

Now, consider the importance of holding the line of railroads in East Tennessee. These roads, for there were two, but forming only one line, constituted the shortest and the main line of transit to Virginia, for Southern armies and their supplies, from North Alabama, North Mississippi, Arkansas, North Louisiana and Texas, from Missouri and Kentucky, and from Nashville and Memphis. If it were seized and held by hostile forces, both armies and supplies must go by the longer and the circuitous route by way of Augusta, and through the Carolinas, in order to reach Virginia. So the possession of the roads in East Tennessee was of supreme importance to the Confederacy. No sacri-

fice made in keeping possession of them was too great for the resulting benefits to arise from their control.

Judging by the light of experience, and looking at the question as seen at the time from an East Tennessee point of view, I do not hesitate to express the opinion that the proposed expedition into East Tennessee, under Thomas "with four good regiments," in November, 1863, was full of peril. It might have been successful at first. Zollicoffer would most probably have fallen back from Kentucky, and his forces, when united with those already in East Tennessee, would have given him a greater number of men than Thomas had. While Thomas was marching from Cumberland Gap to Knoxville, a distance of sixty miles, over bad roads, and across a succession of high parallel ridges, little less difficult to cross than the mountains of Kentucky, the Confederates could have drawn from Bowling Green and from other points in the South, or Virginia, ten or fifteen thousand other troops. So, Thomas would have encountered at Knoxville an army twice or three times as large as his own. The chances are that he would have been defeated and driven back before he planted his feet on the railroad. If successful at first, forces would have been drawn from other quarters, until they were sufficient to overthrow him. Better would it have been for the Confederacy to sacrifice twenty thousand men than lose the control of these railroads, and the possession of this region of inexhaustible plenty. So the authorities of the South evidently thought. The desperate effort made by General Bragg, in 1863, to hold his line at Chattanooga, and that made by General Longstreet to regain its possession at Knoxville, the same year, prove the tenacity with which they clung to it. In fact, the great battles of Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge and Knoxville were but desperate efforts on the part of the Confederates to hold this line of communication.

Mr. Lincoln and General McClellan appreciated the military advantages of seizing and holding this great artery

connecting Virginia and the South, but evidently did not comprehend the difficulties to be encountered in their accomplishment. Neither General Sherman nor General Buell attached any great importance to this movement, as a military enterprise, though they did realize in some degree the magnitude of the undertaking.

General Buell's idea of sending a column of thirty thousand men into East Tennessee, twenty thousand for offensive operations and ten thousand to guard the rear and keep open communications, probably would have proved a success for a time, provided he had moved on Nashville at the same time with a large co-operative force. If such an expedition had been an independent one, and if the lines of the enemy everywhere else had been left unbroken, and its armies unengaged, this expedition would most probably have proved a failure in the end. Two years later, when the Confederate lines were everywhere forced back South of Tennessee, except in a small territory around Chattanooga, General Burnside entered East Tennessee, with an army of fifteen or twenty thousand men (said at the time to be thirty thousand) literally without firing a gun. And yet three months later he was shut up and besieged in Knoxville by Longstreet, with a greatly superior force, and but for the assistance sent by General Grant—the army of Sherman—and the failure to completely invest the place, the chances are that starvation would have compelled a surrender. This shows with what desperate tenacity the Confederates clung to East Tennessee. But when General Buell moved forward and occupied Nashville, in the spring of 1862, and especially after the battle of Shiloh, the Confederate lines, except in East Tennessee, being everywhere forced back beyond the state line, the time had come when the relief of East Tennessee was practicable, and an expedition for that purpose wise and advisable.

It is easy to understand why Buell did not make this movement. He was opposed to it, as he was finally forced to admit to McClellan. But why the latter and Mr. Lin-

coln, who were all the time earnestly in its favor, did not insist on such an expedition, in the spring or the early summer of 1862, is not by any means as easily comprehended. Indeed, it is a source of profound astonishment. The fall before, McClellan had insisted on this movement as one in co-operation with and in aid of his own great movement against Richmond, which he was at length about to commence. If fifty thousand men, or even thirty thousand, had been thrown into Knoxville in May, 1862, how many men would it have withheld or withdrawn from the enemy in Virginia? How many would it have drawn off from the army of Bragg? With such a force in possession of the railroad at Knoxville, the expedition into Kentucky in the fall of 1862, under General E. Kirby Smith, having Knoxville as a base, would have been impossible. And if that were impossible, it being merely a co-operative movement, then the expedition of Bragg into the same state at the same time would have been impossible also. These movements of Bragg and E. Kirby Smith into Kentucky, although disastrous in their results to the forces engaged in them, threw back the operations of the Union armies in Tennessee nearly a year. A strong force sent into East Tennessee at the propitious moment, in May, 1862, would have changed the whole plans of the campaigns in the South, as well as produced momentous results on the final operations. This was an error on some one's part of vast consequences. This one single movement made at the right time ought to have shortened the war in the South one year. Men are slow to believe such things as this. They think because the war dragged its slow length along for four years, it necessarily had to last so long. This is a great mistake. With proper appreciation of the determined spirit and the resources of the South, and with the necessary preparations to overcome them, the war ought to have been closed in the fall of 1863.

The first two years of the war, on the part of the North, except the work of Grant, Sherman, Thomas and Mitchel,

was little more than holiday parades, and heart-sickening failures. The people were not in earnest. They were speculating—making fortunes. It took defeat after defeat, disaster after disaster, approaching and threatening their own homes and cities and business, to arouse them, both people and rulers, to a realization of the danger of the government, and to a proper conception of the masterly people they had to subdue.

The peculiar racial traits in the Southern people seemed to be forgotten. They were nearly entirely of Scotch-Irish (or Covenanter), Cavalier, and Huguenot blood. The Covenanter blood largely predominated. The Southern people were the nearest a pure original race of men of any in all the states. Immigration never flowed Southward. From colonial days downward there had never been much intermixture of foreign blood with that of the original races. So it was kept almost as pure as it was when the immigrants landed in the colonies. Those who supposed that the demonstrations in the South in 1861 were mere noise and bluster which would soon die out, overlooked an important element in the calculation. This persistent, stubborn, determined Covenanter race, which so largely filled the South, never gave up anything it had undertaken until human effort became futile.

In the latter part of 1863, and in the early part of 1864, there was such an outpouring of men and money for the prosecution of the war to a successful termination as should have ended it in two years, if the same means had been provided and used in 1861 by the government. To avoid being ruinous, great wars should be short and sharp. The German government in the Franco-Prussian war set the world an example that will not be forgotten. General Moltke hurled with such momentum his vast masses against the French armies that each day there was an advance, and each day a victory. In a few weeks the war was over. There will never again be as long a war as ours between civilized nations. The recently-invented means for the

destruction of human life, as well as property, are so amazing, and indeed so appalling, that either one side or the other must soon sue for peace.[1]

In the summer of 1862 General Buell had an opportunity to occupy East Tennessee such as had never occurred before. When he left Nashville in the spring to join Grant, just before the battle of Shiloh, General Mitchel was left in charge of Middle Tennessee. In a short time, by a rapid march, he suddenly appeared with four thousand men in Huntsville, Alabama, and seized the Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Decatur to Bridgeport, holding it nearly three months. After Halleck, with one hundred and twenty thousand men, allowed Beauregard with forty thousand to hold him in check for some time before Corinth, and finally to slip away, Buell marched with his army to Huntsville, where Mitchel was stationed, arriving June 29th. On his arrival a conference took place between him and Mitchel in reference to the movements of the army. Mitchel urged Buell to move upon and seize East Tennessee immediately. His plan was to occupy Chattanooga with a column of ten thousand men, with the view of seizing the railroad at Dalton or Cleveland; another similar column to march on Rome, Georgia, and another one to march across the mountains and seize the railroad about twenty miles west of Knoxville, while the army of General Morgan, then at Cumberland Gap, should seize the railroad, presumably at Knoxville. These movements, if executed with promptness and energy, could not have failed, for the force then in East Tennessee, under General E. Kirby Smith, did not amount to one-fourth of that proposed for their execution. None could have been drawn from Virginia, for at that time the fighting was going on around Richmond.

After parts of three days had been spent by General Mitchel in earnestly urging on his superior the great mili-

[1] This was written before the late Spanish-American war. Also before the war of 1914–

tary importance of at once occupying East Tennessee, General Buell still hesitated, still had not made up his mind. Thereupon Mitchel, disgusted with this indecision, sent his resignation to Washington, saying he could no longer serve under his present commander.[1] He was thereupon ordered to report to Washington. After some delay he was appointed to the command of a department at Port Royal, where in a few months he died from an attack of yellow fever. Thus the country lost one of its most promising officers almost in the beginning of his splendid career. He, like General Grant and General Lyon, believed that armies were organized to move and to fight.

The evil results flowing from this inaction of General Buell, and the delay of Halleck at Corinth after the battle of Shiloh, are thus commented upon by General Grant in his "Memoirs," in his usual mild language:

"After the capture of Corinth a movable force of eighty thousand men could have been set in motion, for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the rebellion. In addition to this, fresh troops were being raised to swell the effective force. . . . Buell with the Army of the Ohio was sent East, following the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. . . . If he had been sent directly to Chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions along the line of railroad from Nashville forward, he could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much loss of life, which was afterwards incurred on gaining Chattanooga. Bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession of Middle and East Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone River and Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought. These are the negative advantages—if the term negative is applicable—which would probably have resulted from prompt movements, after Corinth fell into possession of the na-

[1] "Life of Ormsby M. Mitchel," by F. A. Mitchel, p. 339.

tional forces. The positive results might have been: a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or to any other desired point South of Corinth, in the interior of Mississippi.'"[1]

In conclusion, I remark that it has been far from my purpose to reflect on or to question the great military ability of General George H. Thomas, in what I have said in reference to the contemplated expedition into East Tennessee in 1861. He was certainly one of the greatest generals produced by the Civil War. If that expedition was not feasible at that time, then Mr. Lincoln and Generals McClellan, Sherman, Buell, Mitchel, Anderson and Carter were all in error on that point, as well as General Thomas. For it will be remembered that General Sherman at one time approved it, and ordered General Thomas to proceed with its execution. Then he adopted the policy of "concentration," as he styled it, and not that of "divergence," and recalled Thomas. The objection urged by General Sherman was to its expediency and wisdom as a military movement, and not to its feasibility. He thought it better to move on Nashville with his whole force, and not to divide it by undertaking two expeditions. And these were the final views of General Buell also. At first he approved the movement and only changed his mind at a late hour. It was not until some months had elapsed and he found himself hard pressed by Mr. Lincoln and General McClellan, for failing to second their wishes in this regard, that he began openly to question the expediency and the feasibility of this movement. Besides all this General McClellan had promised General Thomas that he would keep the enemy, both in Virginia and in Kentucky and Tennessee, so busy that it could not interfere with his movement on East Tennessee. And this also must be considered: General Thomas was to bring arms for the Union men, and he expected, as there assuredly would have been, a general

[1] "Grant's Memoirs," p. 347.

rising of Union men on his approach. After all, this might have saved him from a disaster and a retreat! Who knows? Besides this, he relied on the destruction of the bridges on the line of railway to aid him. This might have given him immunity for a time at least.

So it is clear that there is nothing in the conduct of General Thomas, in reference to this matter, that can reflect upon or detract from his great military sagacity and reputation.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE RETURN.

The exiles in Kentucky—Bitter disappointment—Cumberland Gap occupied by Union army—East Tennessee Union soldiers there—Historic point—Time hangs heavily—General E. Kirby Smith starts to Kentucky with army—General Bragg does the same thing—Buell follows—Safety of Morgan threatened—Abandons the Gap—Long retreats through Eastern Kentucky—Suffering of army—Armies safely at Portsmouth—Battle of Perryville—Retreat of Bragg and Smith—East Tennessee soldiers sent to Rosecrans—Are in battle of Stone River—With Thomas at Chickamauga—Exiles in Kentucky—Impatience to return home—General Burnside to lead an army to East Tennessee—Preparations—Knoxville evacuated by the Confederates—Burnside in motion—Joy of Union people along the line of his march—Advance unknown in Knoxville—Almost despair of people—Suddenly Colonel Foster's brigade of cavalry dashes into the town—The gathering and joy of Union people—General Burnside's army enters—Tumultuous rejoicing—The old flag hoisted—Burnsides speaks to the people—Description of scenes by Colonel Foster—Further wanderings of the exiles—400 at Vicksburg, April 24, 1865—On board the "Sultana," with other troops for Cairo to be exchanged—Vessel blows up—1,400 men perish—332 out of the 400 East Tennesseans lost—Gloom and sorrow at home—Annual re-union of the survivors.

In October, 1861, there was not an exile in Kentucky who did not expect to be back in East Tennessee in a few days or a few weeks. Mr. Maynard, who was at that time with the soldiers, confidently declared that he expected to eat his Christmas dinner in his own home in Knoxville. But these fond hopes were doomed to bitter disappointment. The expedition to East Tennessee on which their hopes rested was suddenly abandoned, and all they could do was to wait. When the advance movement was countermanded, and the exiles, now in the Union army, were ordered to turn toward Ohio, their hearts were crushed within them. They shed bitter tears of anguish. This was not childish weakness. It was the sad condition

of their families at home that filled their minds with trouble. How the long, weary months passed with them can not be described. It would reveal many a sad, heavy heart, as the months slowly passed, and there was no forward movement.

In June, 1862, Cumberland Gap was evacuated by the Confederates, and successfully occupied by the Federal troops, under the command of General George W. Morgan. Nearly all, perhaps all, of the Tennessee troops were there with him. There they remained until September. This point was on the line of their native state. A part of the "Gap" was in Tennessee. But there was a "dead line" between these exiles and their homes which none of them dared to pass. To be caught beyond it was to incur the hazard of arrest as spies, followed by a trial and conviction and probably by a speedy execution, or by imprisonment in the South.

Sometimes scouting or skirmishing parties, in force, were sent across this line, and then these sad, brave fellows had the pleasure of once more treading their native soil.

Cumberland Gap is, on many accounts, an interesting historical point. It is a deep cut or gap in the Cumberland Mountain, with high peaks rising on either side. In this gap the line of the three states of Virginia, Tennessee and Kentucky unite at a common spot. In 1748, Dr. Thomas Walker and others, from Virginia, on an exploring expedition, discovered and passed through this remarkable depression. Walker was the first white man whose feet pressed the soil of Kentucky. He called the mountain "Cumberland" and the gap "Cumberland Gap." Beyond this gap a few miles, he came to a beautiful river, which he called the "Cumberland" also, all in honor of the Duke of Cumberland, then prime minister of England.[1] As early as 1761, possibly in 1760, Daniel Boone

[1] Ramsey, p. 65. Ramsey says that these names and that of Loudon are the only names of English origin in Tennessee.

passed through this gap on his way to Kentucky. On one of his trips, vast herds of buffalo were found grazing in the valley, at the foot of the mountain, now known as Powell's Valley. In all his trips from North Carolina to Kentucky, Boone invariably passed through this gap. The pioneers and hunters of Virginia, on their way to Kentucky, as well as those of North Carolina, beyond the mountains, all followed the well-beaten trail through Cumberland Gap.

Time hung heavily on these East Tennesseans at Cumberland Gap, as they waited there during the long summer months of 1862. Often they climbed to the highest peak of the Cumberland, called the "Pinacle," overlooking their encampment, and from its lofty crest gazed with heavy hearts upon the valley of East Tennessee, stretching away a half hundred miles eastwardly, and more than one hundred and fifty miles westwardly, lying before them so serenely in quiet beauty. Sixty or seventy miles southwardly the lofty mountains of North Carolina rose up in solemn grandeur. And between these lay the beautiful undulating valley of East Tennessee. To the longing eyes of these gazers never was there such an enchanting scene. Summer had arrayed everything in loveliest colors. To add to this beauty, fields of golden wheat dotted the valleys and the hill sides. A sea of deepest green lay before them, stretching away further and further until lost in the blue haze, or until it faded into the shadowy outlines of the distant mountains. As these men gazed on this picture of loveliness, and cast their eager eyes in the direction of their homes, in imagination they could almost hear the lowing of their own herds, or the barking of their own watch dogs. They try to trace to their own homes the blue line of curling smoke that away off in the distance rises out of a valley, and slowly and gracefully ascends higher and higher, until it is caught and carried away by a passing breeze.

At long intervals some of the faithful guides, who

piloted men through the mountains, would come into camp with a few letters from home. Often these contained sorrowful news. One poor soldier's wife had died in his absence; others had been sick for many months; this one had lost his favorite little daughter, and that one the little boy named after him. More than one complained that guerrillas had taken and carried off their last horse. "But," added the faithful wives, "Providence will take care of us and the children in some way until you come home. Be of good courage. We can get along somehow until you return. Never come back unless with honor in the army and under the flag." Noble words from noble mothers.

And now commenced the wanderings of these exiles. In September, 1861, General E. Kirby Smith, then in command of the Confederate Department of East Tennessee, started with a large force, probably fifteen thousand men, to Kentucky. Passing through Big Creek Gap, about forty miles west of Cumberland Gap, he moved in such a manner as to threaten the safety of General Morgan and his command. Smith's cavalry had already cut off Morgan's supply trains. For five days the soldiers lived on beans. At length, to avoid being captured, Morgan destroyed everything he could not carry away and hastily evacuated the "Gap." Smith was marching in the direction of Lexington and Central Kentucky. Therefore Morgan had to avoid that route. So he did the only thing he could do; he struck out into the mountains of Eastern Kentucky, through a country where there were no good roads, and in the dry season of September but little water and even less food. The country was wild, barren and rough. For two weeks Morgan's army struggled on through these mountains, sometimes suffering from thirst, living mostly on fresh corn. At length after perhaps the hardest march made by any army during the war, of over two hundred miles, harassed at every step by

John Morgan's cavalry, the command, worn out and exhausted, reached Portsmouth, on the Ohio River.

General George W. Morgan was an able and a worthy officer. He conducted this retreat with great judgment and skill, and yet, somehow, unjust as it was, it left a little cloud on his military record from which he was never entirely relieved. He was unfortunate in not meeting more favorable circumstances. Success is the standard in war by which generals are measured.

At the same time that Morgan was retreating toward the Ohio, General Bragg with a large army was pushing toward Central Kentucky, drawing the army of General Buell after him, along parallel lines. Thus there were four armies moving northward at the same time, along roads leading substantially in the same direction. At length Bragg and Smith united their forces, and Buell having overtaken them, the not very great nor decisive battle of Perryville was fought, with victory on the side of the Union army. Then Smith and Bragg hastily retreated from Kentucky, the former to his old position in Knoxville, and the latter to Murfreesborough, Tennessee.

Most of the East Tennesseans in the command of Morgan were conveyed by boats from Portsmouth to Louisville, thence to Bowling Green.

In the meantime General W. S. Rosecrans superseded Buell, and took charge of the army of the Cumberland. The East Tennesseans, consisting of Spear's brigade, who had been attached to this army, moved with it to Nashville, thence to Murfreesborough. Then on the 31st of December, 1862, and on January 1, 1863, followed the battle of Murfreesborough, or Stone River, with a victory again on the side of the Federal army. Then followed a long pause, so long that everybody from the President down to the common people wondered and began to complain. At length, in June—a delay of five months—Rosecrans' army moved forward, following Bragg in the

direction of Chattanooga. Finally the two armies met on the battlefield of Chickamauga, and struggled for supremacy on the 19th and 20th of September. Rosecrans was defeated, and with Crittenden and McCook was driven back in disorder into Chattanooga. Thomas stood his ground, and by his firmness and coolness prevented a disastrous rout, and won for himself the sobriquet of the "Rock of Chickamauga." It is a source of no little pride to add that the brigade of East Tennesseans, who had started on their long wanderings at Cumberland Gap, under Morgan a year before, was in Thomas' command that day, and shared in the glory of that desperate battle.

Rosecrans was soon relieved, and Thomas placed in command, at Chattanooga. Bragg moved forward after his victory, and occupied Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain. Soon after this, Grant was sent to take command, and Sherman and McPherson, with their splendid veterans of Vicksburg, were ordered to that point. Hooker, with Howard and Slocum, from the Army of the Potomac, was sent to Chattanooga also. On assuming command at Louisville, Grant telegraphed to Thomas "to hold Chattanooga at all hazards." The reply was, "We will hold the town till we starve." The truth was they were nearly starving at that very time. Grant says that the soldiers a little later on were in the habit of saying that they were living on "half rations of hard bread and *beef dried on the hoof.*"[1]

We now leave these two great armies confronting each other on the soil of East Tennessee, and return to Kentucky, where we left a part of the exiles more than a year ago. The attempted enforcement of the Confederate act of conscription, together with the persecutions in 1862 and the first half of 1863, had driven thousands more of the Union men of East Tennessee from their homes. These sought safety in the Federal army in Kentucky.

[1] "Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 25.

Many new regiments had been organized and put into the field. All were burning for an opportunity to return to the relief of their oppressed families and countrymen.

No human pen can describe the sufferings or the mental anguish of these exiles fleeing from their homes and their families. They went away stealthily at night, as if they were fleeing criminals. Danger beset them at every step. A mountain wilderness, full of armed enemies waiting to seize them, lay between them and safety. They knew not that they should ever return. They must travel at night. Safety lay only over the steepest mountains and through the darkest ways. Every human habitation must be avoided. Fires must not be kindled even in the coldest weather, lest they should betray their presence to the enemy. And when they at length reach the army to join it, new anxiety fills their minds. What will become of their families at home? What will their enemies do to them when it is learned that their husbands have fled to the Federal army? And how will their families support themselves?

As time rolled on impatience to return home became a torment. As they waited over the border their hearts grew sick at the long delay. Winter came and passed. Summer came, then winter again came and passed, and still no advance. And while they were away in the army, what were the anxieties, the fears, the sufferings of the brave mothers and wives at home? Will the loved ones ever come back? Will the way ever be open to them to return? Seek not to penetrate the agony and sorrow of those noble women during these months and years of separation and uncertainty. Suffice it to say, that if ever the endurance and the fortitude of women were more heroic, more patriotic, more exalted, or more sublime than those of these women of East Tennessee, from 1861 to 1863, I know not where to find the record of it. No Spartan mothers nor Roman matrons ever surpassed them.

All through the summer of 1863, and especially toward the autumn, when something decisive seemed to be im-

pending at and around Chattanooga, the hearts of the Union men were naturally turned toward Kentucky, as the quarter from which their deliverance was to come. A well-settled conviction everywhere prevailed that the Federals were certainly coming, but no one knew when. General Ambrose E. Burnside, a brave and experienced officer, who had won unfading laurels on the coast of North Carolina, had been sent to take command of the expedition. This fact was known to but few persons in East Tennessee, for all news tending to encourage hope in the minds of Union men was carefully suppressed. They had been most sadly disappointed with the delusive expectation of speedy relief more than once before. The year before a Federal army was confidently expected, by the Union men as well as by the Confederate authorities. Indeed, so certain did this seem, that preparations for abandoning Knoxville went forward for several days. But the Federals did not come and the panic passed off.

The first knowledge of the fact that a Federal army was about to enter East Tennessee came from the Confederate military authorities. This time the fact seemed to be too certain for doubt. A little after the middle of August, they commenced shipping Southward, in great haste, all their supplies of every description. Everything that could be transported to another place was moved. All was haste and confusion. The town was cleared of most of the army supplies four or five days before the Federals entered it. The army, too, had departed. Nearly all the citizens who sympathized with the South, who could get away, had most unwisely gone, too. The alarm was universal. Why they were in such haste has always seemed remarkable. There could not have been at the time of the final evacuation a Federal soldier within the state advancing toward Knoxville, and perhaps there was not for days afterward.

On this occasion, for the first time in my life, I realized the importance of government—of an ever-present power

capable of giving protection. There was, for nearly a week, absolutely no one in Knoxville with authority to give a command, or to enforce obedience to law. There was no protection for any one. To add to the uneasiness and insecurity, a straggling band of "Scott's Louisiana Tigers" remained behind, apparently, and as it was believed at the time, for the purpose of committing depredations. These were the only soldiers in Knoxville during these days of anxiety. No one went out on the streets unless forced to do so. The days were as the stillness of the sacred Sabbath. A vague and yet terrible sense of insecurity and uncertainty filled the minds of all. They knew not at what moment the men in their midst might set fire to the town, or enter their houses for pillage. So, the week wore away slowly and heavily to the anxious Union men. Not a man among them had heard a word from the advancing army.

In the meantime, important events were being matured and pushed forward in Kentucky. General Burnside was ready to put his army in motion for East Tennessee. Preparations went forward rapidly. A part of the wanderers, with happy, exultant hearts, were at last about to turn their faces and steps homeward. In the latter part of August, the joyous march was commenced. The route lay through the mountains of Kentucky and Tennessee.

As the army advanced into and through East Tennessee, the excitement and enthusiasm among the citizens became wild and tumultuous. There was scarcely a family in all the mountain region to be traversed that had not given every able-bodied man to the army. Women and children and old men alone remained at home. All these, as the advance became known, flocked to the roadside to see the army, bringing with them for distribution such food as they had on hand. Shouting and rejoicing, the waving of bonnets and handkerchiefs, weeping and sobbing, and enthusiastic praise to God for the great deliverance, everywhere greeted the army. Never did marching soldiers find such a reception. Mothers and wives came to meet

their long-absent loved ones. But short must be the happy communion. The army must move forward. Every man would be needed soon. Many sad hearts turned away in tears; for their sons were absent in other armies.

From the bottom of my heart, I am thankful that the loyal women of East Tennessee were what they were—brave, true and sublime in their unfaltering devotion to the government; that, when the Federal army came, in the fullness of their unbounded joy, and out of the very depths of their hearts, there issued from their lips, in sincerest reverence and thankfulness for their great deliverance, the thrilling shout: "Glory to God! glory to God! the army has come." No wonder these touching scenes melted a whole army into tears.

Surely, had they not cause for thankfulness and rejoicing? Had they not suffered as women seldom suffered before? Had they not yielded to their country their last stay and support? Had not many of them toiled in the fields to save the children from starving while the men were away in the army? Had they not suffered hunger, and cold, and want, and anguish for two whole years for the sake of the Union? And, when the day of deliverance came, should any human power restrain nature's outburst of exultation and thankfulness?

Before any one was aware of the proximity of the Federal force, on a beautiful, bright day, September 1, 1863, a splendid brigade of cavalry, the advance of Burnside's army, led by the gallant Colonel John W. Foster, of Indiana, with the old banner afloat, suddenly dashed into Knoxville.

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon, anxious, restless, and sick at heart at the uncertain delay on the part of the Federal army, I had walked down to the depot of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad to see the superintendent, Mr. J. B. Hoxsie, to ascertain if he knew anything of the advance of the Union army. Like myself, he had not heard one word in reference to it. While sitting there,

talking to Mr. Hoxsie, and to Mr. John R. Branner, the president, I heard the clatter of horses' feet rapidly advancing toward us. Instinctively realizing the situation, I sprang to my feet, and rushed out into the street. Just as I reached the center of it, the head of a column of cavalry was passing within five feet of me. I believed that they were Federals, but was not certain. In this conviction, I cried out: "Who are you? who are you?" Major John M. Sawyers, of Union county, whom I had known, but had not recognized in the rapid dash, shouted to me: "We are Federals." So speaking, without a moment's pause, he and his troops galloped rapidly up the street.

The entrance of the Federal army was to a Union man a moment of supreme happiness, for it was the moment of deliverance. For more than two years, the loyal people had been mentally enslaved.

If, therefore, in the first moments of relief, there was a joyous upward bound of feeling, like the flight of an eagle let loose from its cage, no one will be surprised.

When the horsemen passed, I immediately sprang forward, following on after them in the direction of the center of the town. I broke into a run, in a vain effort to keep up with them. As rapidly as I could go, I followed the horsemen along Gay street, to the Lamar House, where the cavalry had concentrated, and where I was met by a messenger, who informed me that Colonel Foster wished to see me in the parlor of the hotel. Going thither, I met the commander of the forces which had just entered the town. James C. Luttrell, the mayor of the town, was present, and possibly one or two others.

Two days later, on the 3d of September, General Burnside with his staff, rode into town at the head of a splendid army, amid the rejoicing and cheering of the people who lined the streets. Colonel Foster had held possession of the place two days before Burnside's arrival, and was, in fact, but perhaps not in a military sense, the captor of

Knoxville.[1] It was reported at the time that Burnside had entered East Tennessee with an army of 30,000 men, but in fact, it probably did not exceed 15,000.

The news, first of Foster's, then of Burnside's entrance into Knoxville, spread over the country with marvelous celerity. Each man seemed to act as a special courier to carry the news to his neighbor, and he to the next. It is said that signal lights blazed from the high hill-tops. Thus the joyous news spread from man to man, and soon it was known to every man, woman and child within a circuit of fifty miles. And now was witnessed a remarkable change and transformation. Suddenly, like the followers of Roderic Dhu at "a blast upon his bugle horn," there sprang from the recent silence and loneliness of the hills and the forests, thousands of men, who at last, felt free to come forth from their long hiding places. The first impulse of all was to hurry to Knoxville, to see the Federal army. With one accord, men, women and children hastened thither. Many of them, in their joyous zeal, traveled all night. On the first day after Colonel Foster entered, the people commenced pouring in. On the next day, the crowd had swollen to thousands, and on the third day, the day after Burnside entered, it had grown to tens of thousands. The streets were literally packed with human beings. On this day and the following one, there

[1] Colonel John W. Foster has had since that time a most distinguished career, and has proved himself to be a noteworthy man. After the close of the war, he filled with marked success the positions of minister to Mexico, Russia and Spain. On the death of Mr. Blaine, President Harrison made him secretary of state, which position he filled with high honor to the nation. When the Behring Sea Fishery controversy was referred to arbitration for settlement, Mr. Foster represented the government in preparing the case for trial. And in 1895, China selected him to aid in negotiating a treaty of peace between that power and Japan. This is perhaps the highest compliment that was ever paid by China or any other government to a foreigner. These things conclusively prove his excellent ability. All these honors came from genuine merit, for he is as modest and unpretending as he is worthy. Soon after his capture of Knoxville, he went North and I met him no more for twenty-nine years.

was witnessed on the streets of the thronged city—scenes which could have occurred nowhere else in all this land—scene never to be forgotten, and such as these aged eyes shall never see again—the meeting of mothers, fathers, wives and sisters with the long absent, but now returned exiles. The bliss of that day will never fade from the memory of thousands of persons present. Not much more rapturous was the meeting of kindred, so long separated, than was the joy of the people at once more beholding the old flag of their country floating over Knoxville. Strong men and brave women wept at its sight like children. In the wild exuberance of their rejoicing, they fell into one another's arms, and laughed and wept aloud, as if bereft of reason. All day long as the exiles met mothers, fathers, wives, children or sisters, scenes such as these—scenes of wildest rapture—could be witnessed nearly every moment on the streets. It was the frenzy of overpowering delight. Now and then, as a wife met her husband, or a mother her boy, a wild scream was heard. From morning till night, the people gave themselves up to the most unrestrained demonstrations of rejoicing. The long gloom, doubt, almost despair, which had filled their minds were all gone. The exiles had returned, with the old banner waving over them. They had come, as these noble wives and mothers had written to them they should come, "with honor, in the army, and under the old flag."

Nearly every city and village north of Tennessee had its rejoicings, and its meetings of returning soldiers with their kindred and friends. But there were none like this. There were no exiles in the North. There the boys in blue went away amid cheers and smiles, huzzas and demonstrations, encouraged by music and waving banners. They went on the high swelling current of popular sympathy and popular enthusiasm. The way to their return was at all times open. Letters and messages passed as freely as in times of peace. How different with these Union soldiers of East Tennessee!

But on this great day of joy, there were here and there mournful hearts and tearful eyes that joined not in the general rejoicing. A sad, natural curiosity had drawn them hither with their friends. But they knew that their loved son, or brother, or husband had not come, and never would come home again. He slept in another state, perhaps on some battlefield where he had fallen in honor, or in some hospital cemetery, his grave unmarked by stone or tablet. No flowers bedecked his resting-place.

General Burnside was hailed, not as a conqueror, but as a deliverer by the people. In no part of the South, outside of East Tennessee, was such a demonstration of loyalty and unbounded joy possible. All day long the people poured in a constant stream in the direction of his headquarters, in order that they might have the chance of shaking hands with him, or at least catching a sight of him. It would have seemed a strange sight in some generals to see them shaking hands by the hour with plain old men and women from the country, as General Burnside that day did; but he was a kindly man, and knew that these parties were Spartan fathers and mothers, whose sons then constituted a part of the very flower of his army, and that they had suffered as it seldom falls to the lot of men to suffer.

So universal was the desire to see General Burnside that some time on the second day, it was arranged that he should appear on the balcony of the Mansion House and address a few words to the people. Accordingly, surrounded by his staff and army officers and a few citizens, he appeared on the balcony above referred to. He was greeted with loud cheering. He then addressed a few remarks to the sea of people who filled the streets. He thanked them for the patriotic reception they had given him and his army. He referred to the wonderful loyalty and fidelity of the people of East Tennessee to the government, and told them that President Lincoln had sent him and his army to deliver them. He assured them that he

expected to remain in East Tennessee, and that secession would be suppressed. General Burnside was an awkward, stammering speaker, but he was an honest, noble man. He had a heart, and therefore spoke to the heart. He won the undying love of our people.

To show that my descriptions of the wild and unbounded joy of the Union people of East Tennessee are not overcolored, I give an extract from a letter written home by Colonel John W. Foster on the day after his arrival:

"KNOXVILLE, TENN., *September* 2, 1861.

". . . About four o'clock yesterday morning, I received orders to push on into Knoxville and occupy the town. We were in motion within an hour, and all along the road, as heretofore in our march through East Tennessee, we were received with warmest expressions and demonstrations of joy. . . . A few miles before we reached the town, we ascertained that the rebels had all left, the last of them that morning. The Eighth Tennessee Cavalry, which was in the advance, surrounded the town, and about four o'clock yesterday afternoon, I rode into the town with the staff and escort, and such an ovation as we received was never before during this war given to any army. The demonstration beggars all description. Men, women and children rushed to the streets, no camp-meeting shouting ever exceeding the rejoicing of the women. . . . The men huzzaed and yelled like mad-men, and in their profusion of greeting, I was almost pulled from my horse. Flags long concealed were brought from their hiding-places. As soon as I could get to a hotel, I was waited upon by the mayor (a true Union man) and a large number of loyal men, prominent citizens, and they received me with heartiest congratulations and welcome. All afternoon and into the night, the streets resounded with yells and cheers for the 'Union' and 'Lincoln.'

"It is stated that last night, after the occupation of the

town, the intelligence was communicated to the people throughout the country by firing of guns from place to place, and by signal fires on the mountains. And this morning the streets were crowded with people from the country, far and near, and such rejoicing I never saw before. How they shouted, and stood with uncovered heads beneath the stars and stripes. The mayor[1] of the city brought forth an immense flag which he had kept, waiting anxiously for the day when he could unfurl it. This was suspended early this morning over Main (or Gay) street, and at the sight of it the people, as they came in from the country, yelled with a perfect frenzy of delight. Early in the day a procession of ladies was formed, and, bearing two American flags, they marched down Main street and under the large flag, in order that they might fulfill a vow they had made early in the war, that they would in a body march under the first American flag raised in Knoxville." . . .

"September 3d.

"We had this morning a fresh outbreak of patriotism. The news of the Federal occupation of the town by last night spread into the adjoining counties, and the people flocked in from every direction. A large delegation of men and women of all ages formed in a long procession (from Sevier county), and, carrying the American flag, paraded through the town and out to camp, and the town again ran wild with patriotic joy. Men who had been in hiding among the rocks and caves of the mountains, and who had not seen each other for years, or since the rebellion broke out, stood grasping each other's hands beneath the folds of the old flag, while tears streamed down their cheeks. I have read of 'tears of joy,' but never saw so much of it as here.

"But General Burnside and the rest of the army will be

[1] Colonel James C. Luttrell.

in town this morning, and I must get ready to receive them, so good-by for the present.

. . . . . .

"JOHN W. FOSTER."

It was significant and most fitting on many accounts that East Tennessee troops should have been in the advance of the relieving army and the first to enter the town. Two years before they had been driven from their homes, and now they came back triumphantly in the post of honor, and their enemies fled trembling or hid themselves at the sound of their horses' feet. Major John M. Sawyers, whom I had encountered at the depot as he turned into and dashed up Gay street at the head of his troops, was in command that day of Colonel S. N. K. Patton's regiment, the Eighth Tennessee Cavalry.

Many old flags, which had been hidden for two years, were brought out and unfurled. Soon the enthusiastic Union people of Knoxville and vicinity erected a new flag-pole on Gay street, on the site of the one which had been cut down by the Confederates thirty months before. From its lofty top they hung the stars and stripes amid the sound of martial music and the shouts of thousands of joyous spectators. The national flag had come to have a meaning never dreamed of until it was displaced by one representing a foreign power. Then it became to the imprisoned Union men of East Tennessee, confined and hedged in by a wall of fire and lines of bayonets, as dear to them as their own children. Dr. Swan M. Burnett, a native of East Tennessee, but now of Washington, D. C., in an address delivered in that city in 1894, entitled "The Over-Mountain Men," and published in the American Historical Register, touchingly refers to this sentiment among these people, and especially with the wives of the exiles in Kentucky, as follows:

"It was no wonder, then, that some of these lonely women made for themselves flags emblematic of their faith,



JAMES ROBERTSON.

Father and Defender of Middle Tennessee.

which they *took secretly from their hiding places in hours of darkness and caressed, often with tears, as a devotee would the relic of a patron saint.*"

I have said that a part of the exiles came home in triumph with the army of General Burnside. Some came and stayed a few days and were then hurried to other fields of service. Some spent the winter of 1863–'4 here, but they were always on the front, fighting or skirmishing with Longstreet and his veterans. In the spring some of them commenced a new career of wandering. They marched Southward with Schofield to join Sherman in his "hundred days' fight." In every engagement in which they took part they did their duty nobly. When Atlanta was taken, they followed Thomas back toward Nashville. They were present with Schofield in the desperate battle of Franklin. A few weeks later, they participated in the dangers as well as the glories of the magnificent victory of Nashville. Here "brave old General Cooper," as General Schofield calls him, by a wonderful march and by his bravery in battle, won his second star. Other East Tennessee troops (Gillem's brigade) moved from point to point till the close of the war, fighting the battles and winning the victories of Morristown and Greeneville, thence on into South-west Virginia, breaking up the salt works at Saltville and the lead-mines near Wytheville, and then dashing across the state line into North Carolina, destroying railroads and communications, and finally winning the victory at Salisbury, and releasing the Federal prisoners who had been confined there.

There were still other East Tennessee troops far away from home. Some were with General Schofield in North Carolina, and were present at the surrender of brave Joe Johnston. Some were with General Sooey Smith when he made his raid into Mississippi where they fought Forrest nearly every day. Finally, they found themselves in Alabama, again fighting Forrest. After an obstinate all-day

fight, in September, 1864, four hundred of these men, under command of the brave Colonel J. B. Minnis, of the Third Tennessee Cavalry, and other soldiers, were forced by overwhelming numbers to surrender. Minnis shed tears and protested against surrendering, but further resistance was mere madness. Those who surrendered were sent to Cahaba, Alabama, for confinement, until they could be exchanged.

In April, 1865, the exiles and wanderers nearly all returned to their homes. Some of them had been absent two, some three and some nearly four years. They returned wiser and generally better men. War and time had to some extent mellowed their fierce spirits. Hardships and absence had chastened them. They had faithfully served their country. They were proud that they had helped to save it from disruption. Now, new duties lay before them. The soldier must sink into the citizen. They must take the places of their fathers who were passing away. The burdens and the duties of citizenship must rest on them. And right bravely did they assume their new responsibilities, and to-day we see the result in happy, prosperous homes all over East Tennessee.

The end was long delayed. At length it came. Spring had once more come. The events of the 9th of April, 1865, had made Appomattox immortal. Peace was soon to smile once more on the land. The imprisoned soldiers all over the country would be released and sent home. So it happened that there was assembled at Vicksburg, on the 24th day of April, 1865, a large number of Union soldiers on their way to Cairo, to be exchanged. They had all been in prison, some at Cahaba and some at Andersonville or Macon. They belonged to the States of Ohio, Michigan, Tennessee, Indiana, Kentucky and West Virginia. Among these were four hundred East Tennesseans, mostly belonging to the Third Tennessee Cavalry (Colonel Minnis), with a few also belonging to the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh and Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry, and also a few to the Second and Third

Tennessee Mounted Infantry. These were mostly from the counties of Knox, Blount, Sevier aad Jefferson.

On the 24th of April, 1,965 Federal soldiers and 35 officers—2,000 in all—were loaded on the packet-boat "Sultana" for Cairo. There were about 200 passengers, besides the crew of the boat, and two companies of infantry under arms, making a total of 2,300 souls.[1] Everything went well until the boat had gotten eight or nine miles above Memphis. Then, at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 27th, the loud noise of the explosion of the boiler startled every one on board. Soon this was followed by a rapidly-spreading fire. It had been raining and the night was dark. The Mississippi was swollen by the melting snow on its upper waters. The water was cold and icy. The river was at that time three miles wide at the point where the explosion took place.

No pen nor tongue can describe the confusion and the alarm that followed. Whole masses of men leaping into the river together and falling on top of one another made the destruction of life terrible. The struggling human beings striving to get rid of those who were frantically clinging to them for life created a sickening scene of horror. In many cases those who could swim, and who would have escaped, if left alone, were dragged down by others to the bottom and perished. Horrible struggles often took place in the water between drowning men. Some escaped on pieces of the wrecked boat; some seized the mane or tail of escaping horses, letting them pull them ashore; and some, by getting on the bodies of cattle which were killed by the explosion, floated with them to the bank. One Confederate soldier, on the Arkansas shore, rescued fifteen persons by means of a little dug-out. Would that I could give the name of that brave, noble fellow!

Of the 2,000 Federal soldiers (including officers) on the boat, 1,235 were lost and 765 escaped. Of the 400 East

[1] "Loss of the 'Sultana,'" by Rev. Chester D. Berry, pp. 7, 8.

Tennesseans, 332 were lost and 68 survived. The proportion of loss among these brave fellows seems to have been much greater than among the other passengers. The general loss was less than two to one, but among these East Tennesseans it was about five to one. There was something peculiarly sad in the loss of these East Tennesseans. They had been exiles, and had not been at home since they fled for safety in 1861 or 1862. When Burnside entered East Tennessee, they did not follow him, for they were on duty elsewhere. They had been captured and confined in Southern prisons. Finally approaching peace was assured by the surrender at Appomattox. Then they were released and sent forward to be exchanged. They sped forward toward their destination with exultant hope, full of reveries and dreams and plans for the future. Never did imagination kindled by joy paint brighter visions of home and kindred and the future. And the loved ones at home, too, whose hearts had long since grown sick at the long, long separation, now felt a new hope and a new joy, for they at last knew the absent ones were coming. How the noble women strove to be ready for their return; how many delicate little surprises they planned and prepared. And how their anxious, expectant hearts, running ahead of time, anticipated and daily looked for them long before they could possibly get back.

The eyes of the nation were still wet with tears shed over the sad and tragic and never-to-be-forgotten death of the great and beloved Lincoln. Followed by the hearts of millions of people, his remains had just been laid away in their last resting-place. Just as the people were recovering from the stupefaction caused by this overwhelming calamity, this other appalling accident followed. Nothing in all the war was so heartrending, so mournful, as the sinking of the Sultana. Fourteen hundred human souls swallowed up in the angry waters of the Mississippi in an hour! And nearly three hundred and fifty of these men were brave East Tennesseans. Most of them resided in

one part of the state, and for the most part in two counties. And, when the startling news of the disaster came, and quickly spread over that region, the blackness of despair seemed to brood over and settle on nearly every household. And, though thirty summers have come and gone, and time has frosted the heads and furrowed the cheeks and dimmed the eyes of the surviving mothers, wives and daughters, within their bosoms there are still concealed wounds that will never heal, never close, never cease to bleed, as the 27th of April comes around. The memory of the great loss is too sacred to be given up. And year by year the sweet flowers that were to have greeted the returning exiles, in 1865, are still planted by the walk leading up to the humble cottage. And, unconsciously, at eventide, when the air is laden with their fragrance, the aged wife or mother, sitting in her door, still looks anxiously up the road as if expecting some one.

And on the 27th of April, annually, the survivors of these men, with their friends, hold a sad re-union generally near Knoxville. This re-union took place a few months since, two miles south of the Tennessee River, on the farm of the colonel of the Third Tennessee Cavalry Regiment (Colonel Minnis), to which most of the lost belonged. Only fourteen of the survivors were present. These meetings are always sad and mournful. In a few more fleeting years, there shall be no one left to answer *ad sum* to the roll-call!

CHAPTER XXII.

THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.

General Burnside ordered to Chattanooga to the assistance of General Rosecrans—Fails to go—Receives the surrender of Cumberland Gap—Better in the end if he had gone to Chattanooga—General Longstreet sent to capture Knoxville—Burnside falls back—Skirmishes with Longstreet—Fight at Campbell Station—Siege of Knoxville—Sherman sent by Grant to relief of Burnside—Assault on Fort Sanders—Longstreet repulsed—Assault described—Mr. Lincoln proclaims a general thanksgiving for the safety of Knoxville—Longstreet retires from Knoxville as Sherman approaches—Scarcity of provisions during the siege—Dinner given by Burnside to Sherman—Loyal people of the French Broad saved Knoxville—Provisions floated down that stream—Colonel Doughty—Another dinner—Thrilling incidents connected with the assassination of Mr. Lincoln—Sad fate of Colonel Rathbone and Clara W. Harris.

When General Rosecrans became involved in peril, by Bragg's army, in McLemore's Cove in 1863, General Halleck, on the 13th of September, ordered General Burnside to "move down his infantry from Knoxville as rapidly as possibly toward Chattanooga to connect with Rosecrans." The next day he said: "There are reasons why you should re-enforce General Rosecrans with all possible dispatch. It is believed that the enemy will concentrate to give him battle. You must be there to help him." The President also repeatedly urged Burnside to go to the help of Rosecrans. Burnside promised to do so, but did not. He seems to have been at first misled by a dispatch he received from General Thomas L. Crittenden sent by Rosecrans' direction, when Chattanooga was evacuated, which indicated the flight of Bragg.[1] On the 10th Burnside had been at Cumberland Gap—sixty miles from Knoxville, whither he had marched by land—and had received the

[1] Nicolay & Hay, Vol. VIII, p. 165.

surrender of the Gap at the hands of General J. W. Frazer with two thousand troops.[1] Then returning, with a part of his army, he started by trains eastwardly toward the Virginia line, skirmishing with and scattering the Confederate forces which met him. On the 23d, three days after the battle of Chickamauga, he was at Carter's Station, one hundred and twenty miles east of Knoxville.[2]

The probabilities are that Burnside had no idea at any time of giving up East Tennessee, and abandoning his own conquests. He was greatly attached to these loyal people, and sympathized with them most sincerely. He had seen enough during his stay there to satisfy himself of the paramount importance of holding its plentiful grain fields, and above all this nursery of brave men for the army.

The result of the obstinacy of General Burnside was to bring upon himself, for the time being, the serious displeasure of the authorities in Washington. This became so grave that in the latter part of September he requested Mr. John Baxter and the author to proceed to Washington to explain to the authorities the situation of things in East Tennessee. Accordingly, equipped with the necessary letters, they proceeded to that place. But by the time they arrived (having had to travel by the overland route through Kentucky to Lexington) the situation at

[1] It was while on his march to the Gap, but near it, that General Burnside and his staff were met and halted by Hamilton, familiarly known far and wide as "Ham Scott." Scott was the son of a former celebrated judge of the state; he was a man of honor and integrity, and an ardent Union man. He was excitable, odd and eccentric beyond description or even imagination. Meeting General Burnside, in his wild tumultuous joy, he hailed him as his deliverer, and throwing himself on his knees before the general's horse, he poured out in a most dramatic and wild manner his joy and thankfulness to God and to General Burnside for his deliverance. The general was deeply affected by this incident; by this sincere exhibition of the wonderful love of these East Tennessee people for the Union.—"The Loyal Mountaineers," p. 218.

[2] Nicolay & Hay, Vol. III, p. 165.

Chattanooga had become more hopeful, and the storm which threatened to burst upon the head of Burnside died away. His subsequent splendid conduct during the siege of Knoxville restored him to the full confidence of the administration.

Perhaps in the end it might have been as well for Burnside to have gone to the support of Rosecrans. For a time, it would have exposed all of Upper East Tennessee, as well as Cumberland Gap, to seizure and re-occupation by General Jones, then in South West Virginia. But it almost certainly would have saved Rosecrans from defeat, averted the subsequent struggle around Chattanooga, and prevented the presence of Longstreet in Upper East Tennessee during the whole winter.

General Burnside was not destined to remain long in peaceable possession of Knoxville and Upper East Tennessee. Early in November General Longstreet was detached, by order of President Davis,[1] from the army of General Bragg at Chattanooga, and ordered to march on Knoxville and capture Burnside and his army. The latter fell back from Loudon, Lenoir's and Campbell Station, before the superior force of Longstreet, skirmishing as he did so. General Burnside had suggested to General Grant that he would adopt this course, and draw Longstreet further and further away from Bragg, and thus prevent him from returning to take part in the impending fight at Chattanooga. This was a noble act on the part of Burnside. Grant approved the suggestion, and ordered him to fall back slowly to Knoxville.[2] This accounts for the fact

[1] It was reported at the time that there was a serious misunderstanding between General Bragg and General Longstreet, and that Mr. Davis' visit to Chattanooga was for the purpose of reconciling them, and failing in this, he planned the campaign against Knoxville. General Longstreet, in a carefully prepared address, delivered at Knoxville at a reunion of Federal and Confederate soldiers in October, 1890, said that he was opposed to the expedition to Knoxville, and that it was ordered by Mr. Davis and General Bragg.

[2] "Grant's Memoirs," Vol. II, pp. 50, 51.

that such feeble resistance was made by Burnside at Huff's Ferry, near Loudon, to the passage of Longstreet's army over the Tennessee River.

At Campbell Station,[1] fifteen miles west of Knoxville, there was a sharp and spirited fight lasting several hours, after which Burnside continued his retreat to Knoxville. In a day or two he was shut up on three sides in the imperfect fortifications surrounding the place, with an army of 20,000 men besieging him, which was afterwards increased to 27,000. Most likely it was the plan of Longstreet to starve Burnside into a surrender, for if he had intended to carry the place by assault, that might have been done at first more easily than three weeks later, when the works had been greatly strengthened and extended by the most incessant labor, day and night, under the direction of the best engineering skill, And yet he delayed an assault for three weeks.

Here then, we have in November, 1863, four great armies on the soil of East Tennessee, two facing each other at Chattanooga, and two smaller ones at Knoxville. It may be recalled by the reader that in the letter of General Sherman to his brother John, of February 3, 1862, he said: "East Tennessee can not exercise much influence on the final result." And yet here were four armies, numbering in the aggregate nearly 200,000 men, on the point of measuring their strength in battle in an effort to retain the control of this region. East Tennessee had become the pivotal point in the South on which every movement turned. It was the gateway to Georgia and South Carolina, and hence Bragg, re-enforced by the best troops from Lee's army, stood in this gateway prepared to resist any attempt at an advance Southward. And so, too, Johnson afterward resisted the advance of Sherman through this

[1] Campbell Station, where this fight took place, was the undoubted birthplace of the great naval hero, David Glascoe Farragut. This fact is well known. But it is not so well known and yet pretty well attested that when he was a boy, he lived with his father in Knoxville.

gateway, with a skillful determination showing how much importance was attached to this region in a military point of view. And Longstreet likewise, lingered many months in Upper East Tennessee, long after his mission to this region had failed. He too, was reluctant to yield the position which was the key to the whole Southern situation.

On the 18th of November, as Longstreet's forces were approaching Knoxville, General William P. Sanders was, by order of General Burnside, sent with seven hundred dismounted cavalry, to hold them in check on the Kingston road, two miles west of town. While thus engaged, with daring intrepidity, he exposed himself to the enemy's fire and fell mortally wounded. He died the next day. A solitary cedar tree, on the top of the ridge, overlooking the river that silently washes its base, is still pointed out as the spot where one of the most gallant Federal officers fell. Romantic, beautiful spot. Let no vandal hand touch that lonely cedar tree, but let it stand as a monument to this brave Kentucky hero!

Said General Burnside: "I told Sanders not to expose himself, but he would do it." On the next night, amid the gloom of darkness, relieved only by the flickering light of a lantern, he was buried in the yard of the Episcopal Church. No martial music, no volley of musketry disturbed the solemn silence. The beautiful service of the Episcopal Church was read by the Rev. Thomas W. Humes, D.D., rector of the church, in the presence of General Burnside and a few other faithful friends. Then these hastened away to their several posts of duty, for while they linger over the grave, the sound of the enemy's cannon is heard off in the west, and armed hosts are rapidly moving into position along the ridges on the northwest of the town. The scene was most solemn and impressive, reminding those present, as was remarked at the time, of the "burial of Sir John Moore."[1]

[1] "Loyal Mountaineers," by Thomas W. Humes, D.D., pp. 256, 258.

The brilliant victory of Grant over Bragg in the battle of Chattanooga settled the fate of Knoxville. General Sherman was sent from the battlefield to the relief of Burnside. Hearing of this fact (for Grant had managed that the news should reach Longstreet as well as Burnside),[1] Longstreet made an assault on Fort Sanders with the veterans who had won undying honor at Gettysburg on the morning of November 29, 1863.

Before the assault on Fort Sanders, wire had been stretched from stump to stump in front of the fort where the attack was expected. This formed a perfect net-work twelve or fifteen inches above the ground. The forest had recently been cut away leaving high stumps. The front was also protected by abatis. The ground gradually sloped down from the top of the ridge on which the fort stood to the railroad track, a distance of about eight hundred feet. The track of the railroad was formed by a deep cut near the foot of the slope, extending for a quarter of a mile, thus affording complete shelter for an attacking column. Along this cut the forces of Longstreet intended for the assault were massed in the darkness of the latter part of the night. Some time before daylight, the batteries of Longstreet, posted on the long ridge north and north-west of the fort, as well as those south of the Tennessee, opened a simultaneous and terrific fire on the fort. It was a sublime and awe-inspiring scene, as fifty or seventy-five guns thundered forth shot and shell in the darkness of night.

The moat or ditch around the fort was nearly eight feet deep, with almost perpendicular walls. The dirt was all thrown on the inside, thus increasing the height of the inside walls. General Burnside, who was a vigilant and an active commander, knowing an assault was to be made on that part of his line, had put four thousand loaded guns

[1] Grant's "Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 94. General Longstreet captured, as he states in his official report, one of the couriers who had been sent by Grant with dispatches to Burnside, just as Grant desired.

inside of the fort, so that when one was fired another was ready for use without waiting for reloading.[1] Burnside had twelve thousand effective men all told inside of the city to defend his long line of trenches against about twenty thousand men at first, and finally twenty-seven thousand, under Longstreet.

The enemy did not know that there was a moat outside of the fort, as some of the prisoners stated afterwards. With their glasses they had seen men and dogs passing from the outside into the fort, and supposed they were walking on the natural earth. They did not see and know that they were walking on planks thrown across the moat. These planks were all removed during the night before the attack. In this way Longstreet was misled. In consequence thereof, the assaulting column brought no scaling ladders.

Just as the gray of early dawn began to appear, the heavy cannonading ceased, and suddenly there arises from their concealment the dark outline of that mass of brave men who are to make the assault. In perfect silence they pushed up the gentle slope with the dreadful rush of a tempest. Suddenly they are thrown into confusion. They have struck the network of wire, and many of them are prostrate on the ground. Other columns behind press on the entangled mass in front. At length partial order is restored. They press forward again and suddenly come upon the moat. Whether willingly or unwillingly they plunge into it, being pushed forward by the heavy mass behind. And now the fire of the fort is doing its terrible work. Grape and canister are poured upon them. Musketry flashes from every opening. Cannon charged with grape, fired from the angles, enfilade the struggling mass in the moat. Those pushed into the embrasures are blown to pieces. Fifty or more daring men, notwithstand-

[1] I am indebted to Mr. E. J. Sanford, who was in the fight, for this statement.

ing the appalling danger, clamber up the steep wall and reach the top, in nearly every case only to be instantly shot or captured. With a burning cigar, Lieutenant Benjamin is lighting grenades, and casting them over into the ditch. The scene on the outside is one of horror. Says one who was in the fort: "The dead, the dying and the living were piled on top of one another in the moat, an indiscriminate and helpless mass."[1] In the western corner the blood is literally over shoe top deep. Three times the brave men put forward to attempt this daring enterprise dash themselves against the strong earthworks and the death-dealing cannon and musketry, only to be hurled back with terrible loss of life. Both the assaults and the resistance are desperate. In a few minutes, nearly a thousand brave men fall before the murderous fire which is poured on them from the fortifications. The deep moat is finally almost literally bridged with human bodies. Longstreet at length recalls his troops. On the night of December 4th, he and his forces give up the siege and withdraw from Knoxville.

That fight on Burnside's part was made by two hundred and twenty men and eleven guns actually engaged against four brigades. General Edward Ferrero, of New York, was in command. Lieutenant Samuel N. Benjamin, in command of a light battery of the Second United States Artillery, directed the defense. The troops inside of the

[1] Mr. E. J. Sanford, of Knoxville. I am indebted to this gentleman for many of the foregoing facts in reference to this fight. When the siege of Knoxville commenced, though he did not belong to the army, he asked for a gun. He was in Fort Sanders during the fight and took part in it. Some years before the war he came to Knoxville from Connecticut, where his ancestors had been prominent at the founding of that colony. When the Civil War broke out, he espoused the side of the Union, and never for a moment faltered in his adhesion to it. He formed a conspicuous contrast to a number of New England men in East Tennessee, who espoused the cause of the South. By his industry, sagacity and honorable life, Mr. Sanford has become a man of large wealth, and a citizen of influence throughout the state.

fort were composed of part of the Nineteenth Highlanders, of New York, and a part of the Second Michigan Volunteers. Burnside reported thirteen killed and wounded in this terrible assault. For the time it lasted, this was one of the most desperate assaults of the war, while the defense was most brilliant.[1]

The Southern historian, Pollard, in his work, says: "In this terrible ditch the dead were piled eight or ten deep. . . . Never, excepting at Gettysburg, was there in the history of the war, a disaster adorned with the glory of such devout courage as Longstreet's repulse at Knoxville."

Mr. Lincoln, now regarding East Tennessee as safe, and considering its occupation by the Federal troops as a matter of great national importance, in the fullness of his joy at the accomplishment of this object, long so near his heart, on the 7th day of December issued a proclamation for general thanksgiving throughout the land on account of this glorious result, in which he said: "Esteeming this to be of high national consequence I recommend that all loyal people do, on receipt of this information, assemble at their places of worship and render special homage to Almighty God for this great advancement of the national cause."[2]

Evidently it was the purpose of Longstreet, as before stated, before he heard that Sherman was on his way to Knoxville with his army, not to assault the place, but let hunger do its work. It was probable, too, that he would have succeeded if Sherman had not come. Burnside informed Grant that he could subsist only until the 3d of December. Neither Grant nor Sherman seem to have thought that there was at any time any very serious want of provisions. The fact that Burnside fixed the 3d of December as the time when his provisions would fail, shows that he thought the situation very critical.

But there are many facts showing the serious condition

[1] Nicolay & Hay's "Life of Lincoln," Vol. VIII, p. 180. [2] Id. p. 187.

of the army during the siege, on account of the scarcity of provisions. At the reunion of General Gillem's brigade, in Knoxville, in August, 1894, Major Wilson, of the Eighth Tennessee Cavalry, stated that as commissary of that regiment he issued at one time during the siege to the men, for two days' rations, one little potato and one ear of corn.

In the "National Tribune" of October 12, 1893, there is an account of the siege published, by W. H. Brearly, of the Seventeenth Michigan, in a private letter to a friend at home, written from day to day as the siege progressed. More than once he says the soldiers were living on one-fourth rations. Under date of November 28th he says:

"Last night we drew to-day's rations of bread and two days' rations of boiled meat. It all made a scant supper for me. All we draw here now is bread and meat, and you can judge of the amount we get."

December 3d he says:

"I picked up a handful of kernels of corn from the dirt, washed them, and ate them, of course."

December 4th he writes:

"December 4th (18th day)—Yesterday I was out in the skirmish pit again, but just before starting we got our day's rations. What do you think it was? A nubbin of corn—corn on the cob which is not more than six inches long. All our regiment got the same, so I have no reason to grumble; only, if Burnside don't try to break out, or if help don't come pretty soon, we may have to go to Richmond after all. The rebs can't take these works in any other way except by starving us out.

"I have just heard that Burnside sent word to our colonel that he has quarter rations, such as they are, for only three days more."

Here are statements that are worth more than the inferences of General Sherman, drawn from one or two facts witnessed by him during his brief stay in Knoxville. The siege was raised on the night of the 4th of December.

On the 6th General Sherman rode over from Maryville to Knoxville, having been informed by General Burnside, through a staff officer, that Longstreet was gone. He says he saw a pen of cattle near the river, and that General Burnside's table was abundantly supplied with good things to eat.[1] Therefore he seemed to think lightly of the story of starvation or suffering.

Between the morning of the 5th and a fashionable dinner hour—say 5 or 6 o'clock P. M.—on the 6th, there was ample time to send to the loyal people south of the river, as was done, and say to them that General Burnside wanted provisions for his own use and also for General Sherman. Such a message would have commanded the very best that was in the country. And this was the way the ample table of General Burnside was provided, when he was expecting so distinguished a guest as General Sherman. He simply sent to the country, and the loyal women divided with their beloved general what they had hidden away. The appearance of the cattle in the pens can be accounted for in the same way. They had been sent in probably as soon as the siege was raised, or they were a few that had not been doled out to the army, but were reserved for the last bitter extremity.

A writer in the "Chattanooga Times" of December, 1894, thus speaks of General Burnside's famous dinner, gotten up in honor of General Sherman, on December 6, 1863:

"It was an occasion of rejoicing on all sides. The soldiers were elated over their victory, and doubly rejoiced at having escaped rebel prisons by so narrow a margin.

"General Burnside, always a prince of good fellows, set about to do the honors to his distinguished guest and his staff. Orders were given for a good dinner. It was to be a sort of supplemental Thanksgiving dinner. The larder of the gallant Burnside was none too full just on the heels of a fortnight's imprisonment on half rations within the

[1] "Memoirs," Vol. I, p. 381.

confines of the city; but there were willing hands to go out in all directions in search of such delicacies as could be drummed up in the town and surrounding country. There was a fairly good supply in the headquarters decanter, for it must be remembered that Burnside's staff was composed almost entirely of well-to-do officers, who always went provided with an abundance of the best of everything.

"As luck would have it, an ample supply of turkeys was found over in the hill country to the south of Knoxville. Butter and eggs were also secured by the same forage party which unearthed the turkeys—the typical Thanksgiving bird of America. Never in our history was there a more ideal offering on the altar of thanksgiving than these turkeys from the loyal South, when brought forth steaming to the festive board, at which grand and picturesque Tecumseh and his staff sat as guests of Burnside, the savior of East Tennessee, surrounded by his staff and officers who had but recently done such gallant service in the bloody trenches.

"A member of Burnside's staff, Colonel C. E. Mallam, not long since recited his recollections of this famous dinner. He said the spirit of felicity ran high, and never before or since had it been his pleasure to enjoy such a scene. Burnside mindful of the courtesies due his distinguished guest, made apology to Sherman for the almost boisterous manner in which his own staff and other guests demeaned themselves.

"'Oh! that is all right, General,' said Sherman. 'I would n't give a farthing for an officer who was afraid of either wine or women.'

"Thirty-one years ago this memorable dinner was enjoyed by those grim old warriors. Since then nearly all who participated in it have gone to the beyond. Like the old fort on the hill, they now dwell only in our memories.

"It is almost unaccountable that the loyal people of

East Tennessee should have permitted Fort Sanders to be destroyed. It is the ideal spot around which the glories of their valor cluster.

"How grand a thing it would be to restore Fort Sanders and convert it into a park to be graced by monuments to our military heroes—Sevier, Houston, Crockett, Jackson, Gaines and Farragut.

"Truly, the fires of our patriotism are low in the embers."

But whatever may have been the true condition of the commissary department inside of the besieged city at the time of its deliverance, the fact can not well be denied that the loyal people of the country east of the town saved the army from starvation and Knoxville from capture. The people had hoarded up corn, wheat and bacon for the use of the Federal army when it should come. Most of these provisions had been raised by old men and women and children. The bottom lands along the French Broad River are as generous in their yield of corn as the lands of the Nile. The year 1863 had been a season of unprecedented plentifulness in East Tennessee. Nothing like it had been known for a long time. The fields literally groaned with the teeming abundance of wheat and corn.

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[1] Appropriate to the reference to the demolition of Fort Sanders, and in marked contrast to the sentiment which permitted it, I refer to that prevailing among the descendants of the brave defenders of Londonderry, even after the lapse of nearly two hundred years, as described by Macaulay.

"The citizens of Londonderry are to the last degree jealous of the integrity of those walls. No improvement that would deface them would be proposed without raising a storm, and I do not blame them. . . .

"The wall is carefully preserved, nor would any plea of health or convenience be held by the inhabitants sufficient to justify the demolition of that sacred inclosure; which, in the evil time, gave shelter to their race and their religion. It is impossible not to respect the sentiment which indicates itself by these tokens. It is a sentiment which belongs to the higher and purer part of human nature, and which adds not a little to the strength of states. A people which takes no pride in the noble achievements of remote ancestors, will never achieve anything to be remembered with pride by remote descendants."—Treveylan's "Life and Letters of Macaulay," Vol. II, p. 196.

It is a singular fact that the people dwelling in the region watered by the French Broad and its tributaries were the most universally loyal of all the people of East Tennessee. Another singular fact or coincidence was that the only part of Knoxville not completely invested and closed was the part lying on the side of these rich cornfields and these loyal people, from which the town could be reached at all times by watercraft, floating on the waters of this large stream.

No sooner was it known that General Burnside's army was shut up in the fortifications at Knoxville, than these noble people began to fill little boats with provisions, and silently float them down the river after night to the town. Sometimes little flat-boats were filled, and then turned loose on the water, leaving them to float in the current. At Knoxville they were checked by a boom devised for this purpose. General Burnside seeing the immense importance of these supplies, ordered Colonel James A. Doughty (who recently died in this city), of the Seventeenth Tennessee Cavalry, with two or three companies, to take charge of this important work. Colonel Doughty fixed his headquarters at Bowman's Ferry, on the French Broad, ten miles above Knoxville. The loyal people of the surrounding country literally poured to this point their supplies of all kinds, such as corn, wheat, flour, bacon, pork, beeves, potatoes and hay, and even lard and chickens and turkeys. The wheat was ground into flour by the mills in the country. As fast as received these provisions and supplies were dispatched under the care of trusty men to Knoxville. Finally Colonel Doughty and his men, and the loyal citizens, became so bold as to openly navigate the river in broad daylight, landing their boats within the city, on Crozier street, at the mouth of First Creek. This point was within sight and within half a mile of the Confederate battery erected on the high bluff south of the Holston (now called the Tennessee), nearly opposite the University of Tennessee. The supplies thus

furnished were alone nearly half sufficient to support the army and the people of the city.[1] Of course these little boats were continually liable to be fired on by Confederate videttes or scouting parties, but in most places the stream was wide, and the boats low and flat, and at night could be seen only a short distance away. When force was necessary they were propelled so quietly and gently that the noise could scarcely be heard on the shore.

Thus the Union people dwelling on the waters of the French Broad, by their generous contributions of supplies, at a critical moment, saved the army of Burnside from starvation and surrender. Generals Grant and Sherman, and Charles A. Dana, assistant secretary of war, all bear testimony to the patriotic assistance thus rendered to the army by these loyal people.

Nicolay & Hay, in their "Life of Lincoln," thus speak of it:

"Loyal farmers floated down all kinds of necessary supplies in rafts on the river, which were caught by the booms of the town, and the same device was used to stop the progress of the heavy rafts sent down by the Confederates in hope of breaking up the pontoon bridges."[2]

Never in the history of war did a people labor more willingly or more enthusiastically for a cause, or give more generously than these patriots on the French Broad. Nor was such disinterested conduct confined to the people on the waters of that stream. The same spirit animated the loyal people of East Tennessee everywhere.

General O. O. Howard says in his report of his march to the relief of Burnside: "Along the entire route . . . we were cheered by the most lively demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the inhabitants." In the "National

[1] Colonel Doughty is my authority for the foregoing details. He says the next day after the siege was raised, the 5th of December, his recollection is that he sent in a drove of cattle. This accounts for the cattle General Sherman saw as he entered the town on the 6th.

[2] Nicolay & Hay, Vol. VIII, p. 175.

Tribune" of October 9, 1884, he states that many of his troops had worn out their shoes in their long march, and were tramping barefoot over the frozen ground. He saw citizens, meeting them, sit down on the ground, take off their own shoes and give them to the soldiers. General Howard recently repeated this statement in an address in Chicago. General Frank P. Blair paid a similar tribute to the patriotism of East Tennessee. Howard says that such patriotism he had never seen or read of. He is right. Such patriotism, purified, sanctified and exalted by suffering and exile did not exist, and could not exist anywhere else outside of East Tennessee, except with a people under similar circumstances.

Colonel Doughty performed the work assigned to him faithfully and efficiently. In fact, the honor of saving Knoxville and the army is as largely due to him (and these loyal farmers) as to any other man, perhaps more so than to any one else, excepting General Burnside. The latter was enthusiastic in his praise. I quote from a letter of his to the secretary of war, dated April 15, 1868:

"Hon. Edwin M. Stanton,

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

"*Dear Sir:*—I desire to present to you the claims of Colonel James A. Doughty, who was one of the most prominent Union men in East Tennessee during my service there, and whose arduous and unremitting labors were of the greatest service to our command. His knowledge of the country and its people enabled him to obtain information and supplies that would otherwise have been withheld from us, and he, without regard to the risk of capture, constantly penetrated the enemy's lines and brought to us supplies during the siege, floating them down the river under cover of night, encountering many obstacles that would have discouraged any but the most thoroughly loyal and devoted friend of our forces, thus giving us the means of subsistence without which our command must have

been reduced to actual starvation. I have no hesitation in saying that it was greatly owing to the efforts of Colonel Doughty and his command that our soldiers and animals were so well enabled to withstand the long siege of the enemy. . . . Yours respectfully,

"A. E. BURNSIDE, *Late Major-General.*"

Charles A. Dana, who accompanied General Sherman to Knoxville on the 6th of December, says, in his work now going through the press, that at the close of the siege there were twenty days' rations on hand; in fact, more than when the siege commenced. This must certainly be an error. If not, it shows the amazing amount of supplies brought in by Colonel Doughty and the people east of the city.[1]

[1] There had been a Thanksgiving and turkey eating dinner in Knoxville previously to the one given by General Burnside—one given in his honor. On Thanksgiving Day, November 26, 1863, Mrs. Temple, wife of the author, gave a dinner to him and a part of his staff. Among those were Colonel Wm. Hamilton Harris, of New York; Captain (now Colonel U. S. A.) D. H. Larned, retired; and probably Major William Cutting, of New York City, and others. I was absent at the time. Before the siege commenced, Mrs. Temple had procured a splendid large turkey for that occasion. Other supplies she always had on hand. The entertainment was sumptuous, and, considering the time, profuse. The occasion was one of anxiety, especially to General Burnside, and well calculated to cast a gloom over the company. The fate of Knoxville and the army at that very time hung wavering in the balance. But the genial sunshine of the hostess, and her inspiring animation, drove away all gloom, even from the brow of the stern old chief. All went well with him through the various courses until coffee was reached, and there he drew the line, declaring that he could not think of drinking coffee while his poor soldiers were lying in wet trenches and had none. Noble-hearted man! But, worthy as was this sentiment, I never heard that he refused to partake of the turkey because his soldiers had none! This was perhaps the only Thanksgiving dinner given in Knoxville on that day. This incident is given as an introduction and as indirectly related to the thrilling incidents which follow:

Thirty years after that time, a carriage drove up to my house in Knoxville, one Sabbath afternoon, containing a gentleman and two ladies. On being ushered into the parlor, the gentleman introduced himself by saying that he was Wm. Hamilton Harris, a son of ex-United States Senator Ira

Harris, of New York, who served in the senate during the late war. He further stated that he served on the staff of General Burnside with the rank of colonel; that he was in Knoxville during the siege; that he was one of the party who had partaken of the Thanksgiving dinner given by Mrs. Temple to General Burnside, and that we had had the honor of carving the large turkey on that occasion. He explained that he had called to pay his respects to my daughter and myself out of regard for the memory of Mrs. Temple, who was then dead, and of whom he spoke in the most tender praise. This courtesy, after the lapse of thirty years, certainly proved Colonel Harris to be a refined gentleman.

He further stated, in the course of the conversation, that he was a brother of Miss Clara W. Harris, who, in company with Brevet Colonel W. R. Rathbone, had accompanied Mr. and Mrs. Lincoln to Ford's Theater on the night of April 14, 1865, and were in the box with Mr. Lincoln when he was assassinated by J. Wilkes Booth. It will be recollected that General Grant and his wife were invited to accompany Mr. and Mrs. Lincoln, but they finally declined. They took the train that afternoon for New Jersey to visit their children. Otherwise General Grant might have been killed with Lincoln. Then Colonel D. R. Rathbone and Miss Clara W. Harris, the daughter of Senator Ira Harris, of New York, who were engaged to be married, were invited in their place.

A sad fate awaited each of the four persons who sat in the theater box that night chatting so cheerfully, whose happiness seemed at that hour as full as ever falls to the lot of mortals. Suddenly the sharp sound of a pistol rang out near the President's box. Mr. Lincoln's head fell over on his shoulder, and blood oozed from a fatal wound and ran down his cheeks. Almost at the same instant, J. Wilkes Booth—young, handsome and dramatic in every movement—rushed by, brandishing a large knife, exclaiming, "*Sic semper tyrannis.*" Colonel Rathbone seized him, but was severely wounded in the struggle. The assassin escaped with a shattered leg caused by a fall. That night the President died, and in a few days he was borne to his last resting-place, followed by the tears of millions of his countrymen. Mrs. Lincoln never recovered from the shock of that terrible night, but lingered out a mournful life, her reason darkened and sometimes gone, overwhelmed by sorrow and an ever-present melancholy.

A few months later, the two young lovers, Colonel Rathbone and Miss Clara W. Harris, who witnessed the sad tragedy at the theater, were united in the holy bonds of matrimony. But Colonel Rathbone—young and sensitive—like Mrs. Lincoln, could never shake off the dark shadow of that terrible night. The image of the dying President and the gloating frenzy of J. Wilkes Booth, as he strode across the theater, would come back. A homicidal tendency was developed in him; he lost his reason, and with wild, gleaming eyes, like those of the assassin on that fatal night, he killed his young, beautiful wife. And at last accounts, Colonel Rathbone, so full of promise and hope in April, 1865, was confined in a lunatic asylum near Hanover, Germany—a raving maniac! And thus was cut off lovely Clara Harris, who seemed to be born only for sunshine, falling in the very freshness of young womanhood, like a beautiful flower, plucked

in the early morning, just as it opened its "waxen leaves and began to drink in the sunlight."

And thus the fates demanded these sad tragedies. Such a picture of calamity—so pathetic and so horrible—as that presented by this group of persons who were together at Ford's Theater that terrible night, can not be found in all our annals. Who will not shed a tear over the mournful fate of lovely Clara Harris Rathbone? On the night of the assassination, she alone seemed to keep her self-possession, and know what ought to be done. She coolly called for water, and directed that the dying martyr should be carried across the street to the historic house where he breathed out his life.

A part of these facts I have from the lips and pen of her brother, Colonel Wm. Hamilton Harris, and a part from other authentic sources.

One other singular fact, almost a coincidence: Sergeant Boston Corbett, who was one of the squad of soldiers who accompanied Lieutenant L. C. Baker in the pursuit of Booth, and who, contrary to orders, shot and killed the assassin, some years afterward became demented, and in 1890, was confined in a lunatic asylum in Kansas.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE (CONTINUED).

Knoxville never completely invested by army of Longstreet—One side open by the river during the siege—Longstreet misled by inaccurate maps as to the mouth of the French Broad—Thought it was below Knoxville—French Broad open all the time to navigation—The reason Fort Sanders was selected for the assault—Sherman returns with most of his army to neighborhood of Chattanooga—Gordon Grainger's corps remains—Longstreet halts his army east of Knoxville—Burnside's army follows—No general engagement—Much skirmishing between the armies—Longstreet remains until spring—His army consumes all the supplies—People driven to Knoxville to avoid starvation—General Grant visits Knoxville—Extremely cold weather—His plans—Travels on horseback to Lexington—Plans of campaign for the spring of 1864—Campaign contemplated up the French Broad or the valley of East Tennessee—Plan as disclosed from Washington—All the Union armies move on the same day—Interesting incidents connected with siege of Knoxville—Mary Love and John T. Brown.

There can exist no doubt of the fact that Knoxville was never completely invested by General Longstreet. As well as can be ascertained, all the country south of the Holston and the French Broad and lying east of the Maryville road was not in the possession of General Longstreet.

Mr. Charles A. Dana is explicit in his statement to this effect. It was by reason of this fact that provisions were sent into Knoxville, by way of the French Broad and the Holston and along the Sevierville road, during the whole siege. Why the Holston above Knoxville was left open to navigation has always been a mystery to me, as it doubtless has been to all familiar with the fact.

In the course of my investigation of the incidents relating to the siege of Knoxville, I have ascertained some remarkable facts, if they are true. It turns out that it was the result of misinformation on the part of General Longstreet as to the location of the mouth of the French

Broad river, that the navigation of the river remained open. He was informed that this stream united with the Holston below or west of Knoxville. He mistook the Little River below Knoxville for the French Broad. When, therefore, he threw his forces around on the north side of the Holston, to a point on that stream a few miles above Knoxville, he supposed his command of the river at that point would cut off all navigation of its waters below. He was totally ignorant of the fact that one or two miles below the point he commanded on the Holston, the French Broad, a much larger and deeper stream, united with the stream he commanded. The French Broad in its entire length was therefore left open to navigation. It must be kept in mind that Longstreet never had the command of the south bank of the Holston above Knoxville. Indeed, his troops did not occupy permanently any of the territory south of the Holston above or east of the Maryville road. His cavalry may have ranged through that country occasionally, but they had no permanent foothold on the south bank of the river above the line indicated. One of the high hills south of the river just opposite Knoxville, and perhaps two of them, were fortified and held by the Federal command of General Shackleford and Colonel Woolford. This was perhaps one of the reasons why no Confederate troops were stationed on the south side of the river above the town. This, however, would have been wholly immaterial, if Longstreet had been correct in his information as to the location of the mouth of the French Broad. In that event he would have held, or could have held, the north bank of the Holston down to the Federal lines, and thus cut off all supplies, except such as slipped by at night. As it was, the country south or east of the Holston, from the point held by Longstreet, lying between that stream and the French Broad (called the "Forks"), was wholly unoccupied permanently by his troops, leaving both banks of the latter stream under the control of Burnside. And it was along the waters

of this stream, and by the Sevierville road, south of the French Broad, that Burnside received his supplies.

If Longstreet had contracted the upper or eastern line of his investment, and thrown it below the junction of the Holston and the French Broad, he could have cut off the supplies, for then he would have held the north bank of the Holston, by which they all had to pass.

Thus, there appears to have been a remarkable mistake on the part of Longstreet in the siege of Knoxville. The French Broad is no insignificant stream, but a broad and deep one, double the size of the Holston, and fully as large as the Cumberland at Nashville, or even larger. The fact that Little River enters the Holston on the south side, a few miles below Knoxville, might have confused a casual observer; but it is expected that a general and his engineers, before entering a strange country, with an army of invasion, would make themselves perfectly familiar with both the geography and topography of that country. Of course, in all such cases, the general must rely on his engineers, and here is, doubtless, where the fault primarily lay in this case.

When General Longstreet was ordered to march on Knoxville, as he states in his official report, he applied to the headquarters of General Bragg "for maps and information about the country he was to operate in," and "for an engineer officer who had been serving on Major-General Buckner's staff at Knoxville."

He obtained none of these, except one map of the Hiwassee and Tennessee rivers. General Buckner furnished him with "some *inaccurate* maps of the country along the Holston."

It thus appears that General Longstreet had no engineer, at first at least, who knew the country, and that he had only "inaccurate maps." He was a stranger and knew nothing of it himself.

During the siege, Richard Wilson, of Rockford, ten miles south of Knoxville, owner of the Rockford Cotton

Mills, and a most worthy gentleman, seeing that General Burnside was getting supplies by the French Broad, and knowing, or suspecting the cause, hired a Mr. James Henry to go to the headquarters of General Longstreet, taking with him a rough map of the country, to inform him of the location of the mouth of the French Broad. Mr. Henry went and saw General Longstreet, and pointed out to him the exact location of the rivers. The reply of General Longstreet was that his information was that the French Broad entered the Holston below and west of Knoxville and not above it, and that he must act on his own information.[1]

I have discovered another singular fact in this connection, which may explain the error of General Longstreet in reference to the mouth of the French Broad. This is a map published by C. O. Perrin, in Indianapolis, Indiana, in 1862, entitled a "Military Map of the Seat of War," by which it clearly appears that the French Broad enters the Holston below and not above Knoxville.[2]

This is probably one of the "inaccurate maps" obtained by General Longstreet from General Buckner, which the latter had probably obtained from Kentucky. That General Longstreet had good reasons for believing the mouth of the French Broad was below Knoxville, can admit of no serious doubt. On any other theory his conduct is inexplicable, unless the monstrous conclusion is drawn that he purposely left open the navigation of the French Broad and the Holston. Surely it would seem that the exalted character of this distinguished general should shield him from such an imputation.

It turns out to be a fact, that the eastern or upper line

[1] This is stated on the authority of the late Thomas E. Oldham.

[2] This map is now the property of Mr. Charles Dawes, of Knoxville, purchased by his father, Wm. Dawes, in 1864. It is very probable that General Longstreet had a copy of this map, and it led him into his error. If Mr. Perrin is still alive, he may have the satisfaction of knowing that his unintentional mistake helped to save Knoxville from capture and the army of Burnside from a surrender in 1863.


LONGSTREET'S FORCES
CREEK
CREEK
SEVIER
FORKS
Ferry
HOLSTON R.
TENNESSEE R.
FRENCH BROAD R.
MANSVILLE ROAD
EAST TENN. VIRGINIA AND GEORGIA RAILROAD
KINGSTON PIKE
HOLSTON
LITTLE RIVER
MAP
SHOWING THE MOUTH
OF THE
FRENCH BROAD RIVER
SCALE 1½ INCHES = 1 MILE

of investment rested on the Holston one mile or more above the mouth of the French Broad, near and just above Boyd's Ferry. This, it will be seen, by the accompanying map, left the waters of the Holston below that point to Knoxville, as well as the French Broad in its whole length, entirely open to navigation, both day and night. The pickets of General Longstreet did not extend to the eastern side of the Holston at all. The large territory lying in the fork of the two streams was not occupied by Confederate soldiers. It thus appears that there were no Confederate soldiers to interfere with navigation on either bank of the river between Bowman's Ferry and Knoxville.[1]

Additional confirmation of the facts I have stated, is furnished by the testimony of James Park, D. D., a native of Knoxville, and now residing in that place, a gentleman of the highest worth and character. He states that the evening General Longstreet invested Knoxville, the latter took supper with him in his home, nine miles below Knoxville. Dr. Park was a warm Southern sympathizer. In conversation he learned from General Longstreet, who was inquiring about the roads leading out from Knoxville, that he intended to throw the left or eastern line of investment on the Holston River, about Boyd's Ferry, as he indicated. Dr. Park told General Longstreet that unless he threw his line southward as low as the junction of the Holston and the French Broad, he would leave all the productive lands on the waters of the French Broad open to General Burn-

[1] These facts I have just obtained from Colonel James E. Carter, commanding the First Tennessee Confederate Cavalry. During the siege, his regiment with two others was stationed near Boyd's Ferry and had to protect that region. He, in conjunction with Colonel Giltner, of Kentucky, and one or two other officers, made a reconnoissance of the country, and determined the point where the line of investment should strike the river. Colonel Carter was born and reared only a few miles away, and knew the country and the rivers. Knoxville was his home, and it still is. He was a brave soldier and a reliable, honorable gentleman. He says that it was not deemed safe to throw their line below Boyd's Ferry so as to strike the river below the mouth of the French Broad. If they had had one more regiment, which they expected, they could and would have done so.

side's army. General Longstreet said: "No, because the junction of the two rivers just named was below Knoxville and not above it." Dr. Park told him that he was raised in Knoxville, and that he preached for a number of years at Lebanon Church within a few hundred feet of the junction of those streams, and that he knew positively that they united above and not below Knoxville. General Longstreet said that he had a map showing the facts as he stated them, and refused to be convinced otherwise. In addition to this, as I am informed by Dr. Park, during the siege, General Longstreet visited Boyd's Ferry. There he accidentally met Dr. J. G. M. Ramsey, the Historian of Tennessee, who resided at that time, at the mouth of the French Broad and Holston, his farm being between the two rivers. General Joseph Brooks, the owner of the farm on which the line of investment rested, was also present. In a conversation which followed between Dr. Ramsey and General Longstreet, the former pointed out that the French Broad River entered the Holston at his residence, one mile below where they stood. General Longstreet again insisted that the map in his possession showed that that could not be so.

Amazement has sometimes been expressed by his Confederate friends, that General Longstreet when he attacked the fortifications of Knoxville, selected the strongest point, instead of the weakest, for the assault. It may be that there were weak places in the line of defenses, which could have been easily carried. But whether they could have been held, if taken, under the fire of Fort Sanders and other commanding points, is a question which military men alone are capable of determining.

The point of attack, as appears by the reports of General Longstreet and Generals Alexander and Leadbetter, had been the subject of consideration for some days, and a careful examination of different points was made by them. Mabry's Hill was at first selected, but this was abandoned, as all other points were, in deference to the opinion of General

Leadbetter, chief engineer of Longstreet, because of the open ground in its front, and the long distance the assaulting party would have to march under fire. Fort Sanders was finally selected by the advice of Alexander and Leadbetter because the assaulting force would be protected until close by the fort.

General Longstreet was confessedly one of the great commanders of the war, and it would be gross injustice to him for persons who neither understand the science of war, nor have experience in the field to set themselves up in judgment and in condemnation of his plans of battle. It may be mentioned that both Grant and Sherman were familiar with the defenses of Knoxville, and both wrote about the siege, and that neither of them mentions any error committed by Longstreet.

It only remains further to say of the siege of Knoxville that General Sherman, after examining the line of fortifications, pronounced them a "wonderful production for the short time allowed in their selection of ground and construction of work." He says: "They seemed to me (him) that they were nearly impregnable."

It has already been stated that Sherman came to the relief of Burnside with a large army. He had with him the three army corps of Howard, Blair and Grainger. He proposed to Burnside to stay at Knoxville, and aid him in driving Longstreet out of East Tennessee. Burnside thought that with the aid of Grainger's ten thousand men, who were to remain, he would not need any greater force. He expected to be able to drive Longstreet out in a short time. Indeed, Burnside thought that he would voluntarily leave. In this he was seriously mistaken. Longstreet went as far as Rogersville, and then returned to Bean's Station, and there he spread his army along a line running southward from that point to the French Broad, where he remained until spring. The region occupied by his army was the most productive part of East Tennessee.

Burnside's army moved out of Knoxville about the 7th

of December, in pursuit of Longstreet. It followed to Strawberry Plains, Bean's Station and Dandridge, and never got any further. A number of partial fights and many severe skirmishes took place between the opposing armies during the following two or three months, but there was no general engagement. There was some severe fighting at Dandridge, at Bean's Station and near Morristown, and at other points, but no decisive results. At his own request Burnside was relieved of his command, and on the 10th of December he left the state. He was succeeded by General John G. Foster. Longstreet remained through the entire winter within fifty miles of Knoxville, but holding the country down to within twenty-five miles of it, and subsisting his army on its supplies.

It is admitted by both Grant and Sherman that an error was committed in not retaining Sherman's army to aid in driving Longstreet beyond the state. Burnside, with his usual frankness and nobility, took all the blame on himself. He thought, as before stated, that Grainger's corps, in addition to his own army, would be sufficient for this purpose. Sherman acquiesced perhaps too readily in this opinion, and took the rest of his army back to the region of the Hiwassee River, where they were not needed. Bragg undertook no new enterprise during the winter, and Sherman's army was scattered along the Tennessee River. Thomas lay watching Bragg until the movement on Atlanta should be commenced. In the meantime Longstreet fattened his men and his stock on the ample supplies of East Tennessee. No laurels were won by either Longstreet's or Foster's armies during the winter of 1863–'64.

It was a great error that Longstreet was not pursued vigorously until he had passed the state line. If Burnside had remained here in command there can be but little doubt that he would have made an honest, determined effort to that effect. Whatever may be thought as to his ability to manage a great army, like that of the Potomac,

one thing was admitted by all—he was always willing to fight. He was a brave, honest, energetic, pushing officer, who thought fighting to be the business of himself and his army. If, therefore, he had remained in his command he would have fought Longstreet as long as he could have moved his guns or his men. General Foster was in ill health on account of old wounds, and was therefore unable to take the field in person. When he was relieved on account of ill health, and General Schofield was sent to this department to take command, spring was near at hand, and preparations for Sherman's great campaign, in which his army was to take part, were already going on. So this able and enterprising officer had no opportunity to attempt to drive Longstreet out of the state, and he is in no sense responsible for the failure of the campaign inaugurated by Grant, Sherman and Burnside for this purpose. Early in the spring nearly all of his army moved southward, toward Dalton, to join Sherman. About this time Longstreet, having wintered his army on the loyal people of East Tennessee, and stripped it bare of provisions and stock, quietly folded his tents and moved away to Virginia, to take part in the wonderful campaigns of Grant and Lee.[1]

Longstreet's object in remaining in East Tennessee must have been to exhaust the country and cut off supplies from the army holding Knoxville. With Sherman's great army near Chattanooga, within easy reach of Knoxville by rail,

[1] When a successor to Foster was under consideration, as General Schofield recently informed the author, Mr. Lincoln suggested to him several places where he might go, among them to East Tennessee. General Schofield gladly accepted this place, and regarded himself as most fortunate in doing so. It placed him in a position to take a leading part in the great campaign against Atlanta, where he commanded with signal ability the left wing of Sherman's army. And when Thomas was sent back to Nashville to meet General Hood, Schofield went also, and in this way he happened to be in the immediate command at Franklin, and there won one of the noted victories of the war. So also in this way he was present and gained a part of the glory of the great battle of Nashville.

he could not have hoped again to strike at the latter place.

If his object were to protect the salt works and the lead mines in South-west Virginia, as it is most probable, this could have been done just as well on the state line at Bristol, or even at Abingdon, as on the line he occupied. But in that case his army would have had to subsist in part at least on his friends, while on the line he held it lived off his enemies. It at the same time crippled the Union army by cutting off its supplies.

The failure to drive Longstreet out of the country was the cause of the greatest calamity that ever befell the people of Upper East Tennessee. It brought upon them actual famine. It was his presence that caused so much suffering in all that region, which continued until the close of the war. Tens of thousands of people, on account of actual starvation, had to leave their homes and flee to Knoxville, where they were fed and clothed, in part at least, by the East Tennessee Relief Association, out of means generously contributed by the North, mostly by Boston and New England.

It is no mere figure of speech when I say that actual starvation would have followed, if the people in thousands of instances had not fled to Knoxville. They came in great crowds, by whatever means they could provide, many on foot, without shoes and almost without clothing, and threw themselves on the charity of the army and the noble people of the North, who moved by the touching appeals of the Hon. N. G. Taylor, our own splendid orator, and by the burning words of Edward Everett, poured out their treasures generously to save our patriotic suffering people from a sad fate.

When I recall the sufferings inflicted on the people of a whole section by the presence of Longstreet's army from December till April, and remember that there were enough troops in East Tennessee to have expelled him within ten days after the siege was raised, I can scarcely refrain from

bitter words of censure. Yet I know that the ever just Grant, and the kind and noble Burnside, and the impulsive, brilliant Sherman, anticipated no such sad results. Still, it seems to me that Sherman listened to the sanguine words of Burnside too readily, when he determined to return to Chattanooga with his army, excepting Grainger's corps. What would the tender-hearted Lincoln have thought if he had known the actual fact that nearly one-half of East Tennessee, which he thought freed of the enemy, was still in its possession, and that that enemy was eating out the very life support of the loyal people, leaving them as destitute as if they had dwelt on the plains of Sahara? What would the dashing, the daring Sheridan, who was present, but in a subordinate position, have done if he had been in command? He would have fought Longstreet and driven him out, or would have been driven back himself in defeat into the fortifications in Knoxville.

On the publication of the Memoirs of Grant, the reason of the inaction of the two armies in upper East Tennessee was disclosed.

General Foster advised Grant that "he thought it would be a good thing to keep Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in East Tennessee, and that if he were forced to leave, his whole, well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it would effect the most for their cause." Now, the strangest part of this winter's campaign is, that Grant thought "this advice was good," and adopted it, and "countermanded the orders for the pursuit of Longstreet."[1] Here, then, we had mimic, not real war. It must have been delightful to see the two armies dwelling together in peace, the one doing all it could in a hospitable way to induce the other not to depart, and the other, complacently glancing at the rich cornfields yet untouched, graciously agreeing to accept the proffered hospitality as long as there was anything left to eat!

[1] "Grant's Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 113.

In the latter part of December, 1863, General Grant visited Knoxville, where he remained several days. The weather was extremely cold, the mercury being down below zero for a week while he was at that place and on his way to Lexington.[1] He came from Nashville on a tour of inspection. It was especially his desire to examine the road from Knoxville to Lexington, and judge for himself as to the feasibility of still using that road for the transportation of army supplies. So important did he deem this matter that in the midst of one of the coldest spells on record, he set out to make this examination, traveling one hundred and seventy-five miles on horseback, over as execrable roads as could be found in the land, having "been cut up," as he says, "to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons." No doubt he ordered the road abandoned, as it was never used much for military purposes after that time.[2]

[1] "Grant's Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 101.

[2] It was during his trip from Knoxville to Lexington that the following incident occurred, as related in the "Louisville Courier-Journal." The "boisterous" party referred to was not Grant's, but one pretending to be:

"... Big Hill is the dividing line between the Blue Grass and the Mountains, and one Merritt Jones kept there a tavern for the accommodation of the traveling public. There were then no railroads in this part of the state nearer than Lexington. Mr. Jones and his sons were absent in the Confederate army, and his wife and younger children kept the tavern. Late in the afternoon of the day before a cavalry officer had come hurriedly up from the direction of the Gap, announced to the Jones household that General Grant was coming to spend the night; that they must prepare for him a good supper, with all the silverware, and to be particular to have a nice, warm room ready for the General about one hour from that time. In fact, the officer demanded the best of everything they had. Mrs. Jones was ill, and the dictatorial manner of the officer made her exceedingly nervous. She thought of her husband and sons in the far-away South, and feared that it would not be well with her should the Unionists discover her to be a rebel sympathizer. Much disturbed, she retired to her room and bed, and directed the children to do the best they could for the General's party.

"In a few minutes the advance guard of eight or ten men arrived, and their boisterous manner increased Mrs. Jones' alarm. The hour was short, and General Grant and staff came. There was a marked change; all was quiet and orderly among the men; supper was soon over and the guests

On the first day of January, 1864, General Grant and General John G. Foster, then commanding this department, called at my residence to pay their respects to Mrs. Temple, who was well known as a prominent Union lady. Here I first became acquainted with General Grant. He declined both wine and cigars at my house. On the same day, he called on Mrs. William G. Brownlow.

On the 2d of January, I called on him at his headquarters, in the residence then belonging to the Hon. W. H. Sneed, then a refugee in the South, this being general headquarters of the army.[1] General Grant was very quiet, having but little to say. He was as modest as a woman. However, he was exceedingly sensible in all he did say. His staff officers, General Rawlins and Colonel Comstock

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soon asleep. When General Grant arose next morning, a nice breakfast awaited him. After breakfast, General Grant asked Mrs. Jones' little daughter where her father was. 'He is in the South,' she answered. 'Where are your brothers, if you have any?' asked the General. 'They are in the Confederate army,' she replied. 'Then where is your mother?' he asked. 'She is in her room, sick,' said the little girl. 'Can I see her?' asked the General; 'I wish to bid her good-by.' The door was opened, the little girl led the way, and General Grant was in the presence of the mother of several of General John H. Morgan's most gallant Confederates.

"General Grant said to her: 'I am told that your husband and sons are in the South, and I want to say that I hope they may return in safety to you. I am sorry to find you sick, and hope you may soon be well. I have ordered that our bill for the night's lodging be promptly paid you. You will now allow me to bid you good-by.' At this he shook her hand and bowed himself out, his staff in turn shaking hands with the good lady.

"This indication of kindly feeling on the part of General Grant made many friends in Madison county for the great Union General."

[1] This house was built in 1816 or 1817 by William Park. The brick was laid by William Morgan, the man who, in 1826, published or was about to publish a book revealing the secrets of Free Masonry, and who was abducted at Batavia, in the State of New York, and carried off and drowned in Lake Ontario, as alleged by the enemies of the Masonic fraternity. He wrote his book in Knoxville, or at least he took it to the late Hiram Barry, who had a printing office, and wanted him to publish it, but the latter declined. This house was the headquarters of Federal officers for eighteen months, and gave shelter to Generals Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Schofield, Foster, Grainger, Stoneman and many others when they were in Knoxville in 1864–65.

(I believe), had much to say. They took me into another room, and asked me a great many questions as to the feasibility of sending an army up the pass through the mountains, along the French Broad River, into North Carolina. As I was born, and lived for some time after my manhood, not far from that stream, but over the mountain in Tennessee, I was able to give them pretty full information as to this remarkable pass in the mountains, made by that stream cutting the great mountains in two for a distance of nearly fifty miles. There is no other pass through the mountains for a distance of fifty miles or more on either side.

Without disclosing their plans or the plans of their chief, it was evident from the questions asked that an expedition up the French Broad into North Carolina was one of the near probabilities, if not certainties. It was evidently in contemplation by General Grant at that time to send an army up that river with the view of penetrating the interior of North Carolina, seizing the railroads, reaching the coast and cutting the Confederacy into two parts, as Sherman afterwards did in Georgia. And if this had been done in the spring of 1864, simultaneously with the march on Atlanta, by a force sufficiently strong to have made sure of its steps, Lee's surrender ought to have taken place in the fall of 1864, instead of the spring of 1865. But General Grant and his military staff have not informed the world why this daring conception was never carried into execution. Doubtless the difficulty of keeping up, or securing on the way, supplies for a large army constituted the main and a sufficient reason. That General Grant at that time contemplated military operations, in the spring of 1864, on a line east of Knoxville, either through Virginia or North Carolina, admits of no doubt. This explains the reason of his personal inspection of the road through Cumberland Gap to Lexington.

General Sherman says that on the 21st of December, 1863, he went up to Nashville "to confer with General

Grant." He says: "At that time General Grant was under the impression that the next campaign would be up the valley of East Tennessee in the direction of Virginia, and as it would be the *last and most important campaign* of the war, it became necessary to set free as many of the old troops serving along the Mississippi River as possible."[1]

It is not quite easy to reconcile all the facts and statements as to the plans for the campaign of the spring of 1864, except upon the hypothesis that in December and early in January they were not absolutely fixed, but were, to some extent, matters of speculation and subject to change. In December, as we have seen, on the authority of General Sherman, a campaign, and the most important one of the war, was contemplated "up the valley of East Tennessee" into Virginia, or, as I inferred by conversation with Grant's highest staff officers, into North Carolina. It follows logically that, at that time, the great campaign afterwards inaugurated against Atlanta had not yet been considered, or at least settled, as a part of the next movement. That seems to have been a later conception, the date of which can not be given. The whole plan, as finally executed, was probably a gradual development or evolution. At first, Atlanta and Mobile were the objective points. "The plan was," said Grant, "for Sherman to attack Johnston, and destroy his army, if possible; to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile,[2] thus cutting the Confederacy in two. Banks was to take Mobile, but failed to perform the part assigned to him. Again, he says:

"I expected to retain the command I then had, and prepared myself (this was sometime in the winter of 1864) for the campaign against Atlanta. . . . I expected,

[1] Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. I, p. 386.

[2] Grant's "Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 120.

after Atlanta fell, to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by way of the road running through Atlanta to Augusta and thence southwest. I was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to Mobile, if that city was in our possession; if not, to Savannah, and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy. But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made."

So it will be seen that Savannah was a possible objective point from the beginning with Grant. The great object, next after destroying Johnston's army and taking Atlanta, was to cut off communication between the East and the West. So far as I can see, Sherman nowhere claims that the Georgia campaign originated with him. Long before Grant was ordered to the command of the Army of the Potomac, indeed to the command of all the armies of the United States, the first steps in this great campaign were definitely settled in the mind of Grant, and all the contingencies provided for.

This great commander, from his headquarters near Washington, on the 4th of April, 1864, sent a letter to General Sherman, in which he frankly revealed all his plans for the different armies in the approaching campaigns. The very first sentence contained the promise and gave the assurance of success. He said:

"It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to *work all parts* of the army together and somewhat toward a common center."[1] For the first time, there was now unity in the armies. One great military genius guided and directed the movements of all these vast armies. On the 5th of May, at the very time appointed by Grant for the commencement of the great campaign, Sherman's three splendid armies, consisting of one hundred thousand men, com-

[1] "Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 130.

manded respectively by Schofield, Thomas and McPherson, and Grant's and Meade's still greater armies, commanded respectively by Hancock, Warren, Sedgwick and Sheridan, moved out from their positions, and advanced in line of battle in search of the enemy.[1] And soon the noise of battle was heard in the land, giving an assurance that the end of the greatest civil war recorded in history was not far off. And yet so brave, so skillful, and so determined was the resistance offered to these great armies, with all their outlying assistance, directed and guided by one master mind, that it took twelve months to overcome it. Sherman swept through the Confederacy to the sea, then, turning northward, he bisected the Atlantic States, while Grant commenced a series of the most stupendous operations with his great armies ever witnessed on this continent. As last, the day of Appomattox came, and victory was crowned with peace, *Esto perpetua.*[2]

Two interesting little incidents are connected with one of the dispatches sent by Grant from Chattanooga to Burnside during the siege of Knoxville. It will be remembered that he sent five couriers with dispatches by different routes. One of these couriers was never heard of afterwards. One dispatch only reached Burnside. The courier in charge of this one was sent from Chattanooga by way of the north side of the Tennessee River. Arriving at Kingston, a distance of about seventy or eighty miles, he was, it is presumed, unable to go any further. There still remained forty miles to Knoxville, by the direct road, and more than fifty by the circuitous route necessary to be taken. Burnside must get the dispatch. Who would carry it forward? The men present hesitated and held back. Most of the men were absent. The trip was

[1] "Sherman's Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 31.

[2] On March 7, 1865, General Grant ordered Thomas to throw a good force at Bull's Gap (East Tennessee), and fortify it so as to be prepared if it should be required to make "a campaign toward Lynchburg or into North Carolina."—"Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 615.

full of peril. Longstreet's forces held all the country between that point and Knoxville. The weather was cold, the roads execrable. At this moment, a delicate, brave young woman, Miss Mary Love, stepped forward, and said she would go. Her services were accepted. Mounted on a fleet horse, away she sped as fast as nimble feet and sinewy limbs could carry her. Now along the public highway, now along by-paths, and now through the forests, this brave woman swept on over a constant succession of hills, that she might save Burnside's army. At length she is arrested by Confederate soldiers, and conducted out of her way to a provost-martial. This proved to be Philo B. Shepard. She tells him with perfect self-composure that she is the sister of Dr. Love, a Confederate surgeon, who had been stationed at Knoxville, whom Shepard knew, and that she was riding his horse, both of which statements were true. She further said that the wife of Dr. Love was dangerously sick, at the village of Louisville, and that she was going there to wait on her. This story was told with such an air of sincerity that it gained credence and she was released.

Once more she dashes on in her perilous journey. After a long and circuitous ride she reaches the river opposite Louisville, her native town; she crosses the wide stream, and hastens to the house of her brother-in-law, Horace Foster, and tottering in, falls exhausted. Tired nature, hitherto sustained by a masterly will and a great purpose, could endure no more. She had traveled in a few hours nearly thirty-five miles, partly at night. The dispatch was so far safe.

But who would carry it on the remaining fifteen miles, after night, through a country swarming with Confederate soldiers. The men were absent in the army, or had fled at the approach of Longstreet's forces. After a hasty consultation, Mrs. Elizabeth Brown, the mother of a thirteen year old boy, John T. Brown, announced that her son could go, and that he was the only one who could get

through. He was called and was willing to go. He was a daring boy, and delighted in such adventures. Wheeler's Confederate cavalry held the little town, and pickets were stationed on all the roads. At nightfall, Mrs. Brown and her brave little boy, quietly slipped down to the bank of the river, and silently scrambled through the dense undergrowth along the stream for two miles, until they were out of the picket lines. Here the mother turned back.

The night was bitter cold; the ground frozen. The brave boy picks his way on foot through the cold, the darkness and the silent forests. At length he reaches Little River, a distance of eight or nine miles. The river is swollen and he cannot cross. Returning, he goes some distance back to the house of an old friend of his father's, Mr. Isaac Lebow, where he stays all night. Realizing that an explanation of his strange trip after night was necessary, he frankly tells Mr. Lebow that he is carrying papers to General Burnside. The generous old man, though a warm Confederate, makes no objection and no inquiries, but treats him kindly, gives him his breakfast before daylight the next morning, and starts him on his way. Again coming to the river, he succeeds in crossing. At length he comes to Federal pickets. Now he is sent forward, under the charge of a sergeant to General Burnside's headquarters, still several miles away.

The dispatch was eagerly read by the veteran hero. In a few minutes bands of music struck up with thrilling national airs all over the city, and the batteries pealed forth their thunders, the joyous announcement that deliverance was near at hand. Little Johnnie sat there in the meantime, wondering what all this meant. Suddenly soldiers gathered around the brave little hero, and with strong arms and weeping eyes, threw him upon their shoulders, and with cheers and shouts carried him up and down the streets. And now, and for the first time, he learned the import of the dispatch he had brought, and understood that he was the cause of all he saw and heard.

Miss Love years ago passed to her long home, but Mrs. Brown and her son, now forty-five years of age, still live worthy citizens of Knox county. Noble, heroic Mary Love, and brave young Johnny Brown! Forever green and sweet be their memories in the minds and the hearts of all good people who shall read these patriotic incidents! And that Spartan mother, let not her deed be forgotten as long as patriotism burns in the hearts of the American people. The history of East Tennessee, if fully written, would reveal many incidents of heroic daring on the part of its brave, noble women.

The famous ride of Paul Revere, on the night of April 8, 1775, from Boston toward Concord—distant twenty miles—though he only went something over twelve miles—to warn the patriots that the British were coming to seize the ammunition and arms stored at that place, has been celebrated in song and prose, and perpetuated in marble. That ride on that beautiful moonlight night, made Revere immortal. And yet, here was a ride, by a delicate young lady, of thirty-five miles or more, in bitter cold weather, over rough roads, and through a country of high ridges and hills, patroled in every direction by a watchful enemy, with a wide river (the Tennessee) to be crossed. Surely a lofty marble column should mark the spot for all generations where repose the remains of the dauntless Mary Love! Thirty-five years have come and gone, and Brave Johnny Brown has not received any recognition from the government for his share in saving the army of General Burnside. Let us hope, at least, that some Longfellow may arise some day, who shall in verse give immortality to this daring woman and this heroic boy.[1]

[1] A part of the foregoing facts relating to Mary Love, I had from a nephew of hers, and most of those as to John Brown and his mother, I learned from his own lips. On the 4th of July, 1866, I took dinner with Miss Love and her brother and another sister. At that time I had not heard of her famous ride, and she was too modest to mention it. She belonged to a highly respectable and refined family of Blount county.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE RETURNED UNION SOLDIERS.

A country inn—Good effects of the Civil War—Sent men away from home—A practical education—The soldiers learned obedience, subordination, faithfulness—East Tennessee soldiers returned home better men—Had learned much by travel and experience—Soon filling all the important county offices—General progress made by them—One neighborhood described—Union and Confederate soldiers become neighbors—Live together in peace—Families intermarry—Soldiers of East Tennessee described—Honesty of motives of Union men in joining Federal army—No exiles or refugees in the North.

A good many years ago, a judge and three or four lawyers, going to court, late in the afternoon of an exceedingly bitter January day, rode up and alighted at a modest little hotel, in a village in a mountain county in East Tennessee. Soon they were all seated around a bright, blazing wood fire in the sitting-room. Looking around, one of them remarked: "Look at this room; look at the neat furniture, at the chairs, at the carpet, and, above all, at those pictures on the walls. Our landlord has traveled—he has been away from home." Half seriously, he said "that he wanted the county court of the several counties annually to appropriate money to pay the expenses of five or ten wide-awake men in each county, for the purpose of traveling in other states, as a means of education." Going out to supper soon afterwards, they found everything there in such contrast with the sitting-room that one of them remarked: "But our good landlady has not traveled—she has not been away from home. We must have the women travel as well as the men."

This playful conversation contains much food for thought, and suggests one of the means of a practical education.

The late war, with all its countless evils, had many com-

pensations in it. It was productive of much good, because it sent men away from home. In every quarter of this vast republic, men were put in motion. They traveled, they saw, they learned. They went into different states, and many of them visited every section of our country. All had opportunities of seeing much that was new, much that was instructive. Take, for example, the Union soldiers of East Tennessee. Many of them had never before crossed the state line. Going abroad was the revelation to them of a new world. New objects burst on their sight every day. They saw everywhere new ways; new methods in farming, in living, in architecture, in dress, in education. At every turn, some new idea, some practical suggestion, flashed upon their minds. They talked with men from Maine, from Ohio, from Minnesota, from Kansas. By this daily contact with new men and new objects, they were enlarged and broadened. Many of them were very young; some were mere boys. They had joined the first Union army they came to. They entered it as a frolic. Soon they discovered that soldiering was a serious business. From the start they were in a severe school of training. They learned rapidly. Soon they realized that merit and courage were to be rewarded and promoted; that cowardice and worthlessness were to be punished. The army—the common soldiers—had their own unwritten code of honor. Every soldier must be brave, truthful, honorable and faithful. Everything appealed to his higher nature. To the ambitious, honor waved her garlands from above, and he struggled upward to grasp them. More than one enlisted in the ranks, and came out with stars on his shoulders. War, undertaken as a frolic, thus became, with its awful consequences, as serious as life itself. The soldiers underwent a transformation. They grew into new men of a grander mold. They aspired to become heroes. Obedience, subordination, constancy, fidelity were quickly acquired. Men grew better every way. Life had a new motive, a higher object to be attained—a grander

and a wider horizon. The army thus became a great university, in which tens of thousands of men were educated.

After two, three or four years of fighting, the survivors came home. They were older, graver, wiser, more manly. They had sown their wild oats. They had ceased to be boys. Their manly forms wore the *toga virilis*. Soon they settled down in life. Many of them had saved their money. This they invested in farms, or merchandise, or in other business. In their new callings, they made and saved money. The community respected them for their worth and good conduct. In course of time they were filling nearly all the offices of honor and profit in their respective counties. They became sheriffs, clerks of courts, registers, trustees, tax collectors, county judges, and justices of the peace. Many were elected members of the legislature, and sometimes one was elected to congress. Some became judges. And thus these soldiers have become among the first and the best citizens of the several counties of East Tennessee.

In time of peace they turned to account what they saw and learned while they were away from home. New methods of cultivation have been introduced on their farms, new machinery, new crops and better farm stock. In a word there is a revolution in the country. A new race of men is in the lead. These are the men who, with the aid of Confederate soldiers, are helping to push the state forward, and saving it from retrogression. Contrary to all expectations, the war made the soldiers of both armies better citizens.

A short time ago, in passing through a certain neighborhood near Knoxville, south of the river, which I was familiar with forty years ago, I halted at a way-side store and asked: "What has become of the log-cabins that used to be here?" The reply was: "They are all gone." It was so. I looked in vain for a solitary one, and from that point of view the only one left was the old residence of

Governor Sevier, nearly one hundred years old, and it was weatherboarded and painted white, and so seemed new. It was spared out of respect for the father of the state.[1] Forty years ago, there was scarcely a frame house in all that region. In the contest of 1861, that whole section embracing a large district of country, was nearly a solid unit for the old government. When the war suddenly burst upon the country, in little squads, or singly, the able bodied men silently slipped away from home, crossed the mountains into Kentucky, and joined the Federal Army. No section of the United States was hardly so thoroughly winnowed of all men fit for duty in the army. The women, children and old men only were left at home.

It was these brave Union soldiers who had gone out from this neighborhood in 1861 and 1862, who had now returned to their homes. On their return scenes of desolation everywhere met their eyes. War had ruthlessly swept away everything but the rough log cabins. Scarcely a relic of peaceful days remained.

Behold the change wrought by thirty years of peace. Standing by the side of the little wayside store, just referred to, on the macadam road leading to Martin's Mill, and looking over the country, comfortable frame houses, containing from four to six rooms, were seen thickly dotting the little farms. In every direction the houses were new and fresh. They were all painted on the outside mostly white, and papered or plastered in the inside. On the front of nearly every house, there is a neat porch or veranda. There are generally carpets on the floors, and

[1] It is not generally known in Knoxville that Governor Sevier built and once lived in a house one mile from the south side of the river, opposite the city, on the left side of the Maryville road. The house was built of hewn logs, with a foundation of marble. It is now weatherboarded on the outside and ceiled in the inside. It once belonged to Mr. John Wrinkle and now to Mr. William Owens. The fact that Governor Sevier built this house, and once lived in it, is as well established by tradition and by the testimony of old people, as any fact can be.

plain, comfortable, new furniture in the rooms. In many of these homes, there is either a piano or an organ.

In the rear of these houses stand the barn, the cow-house, and sometimes a little carriage-house. All are enclosed. Up the side of the porch, or on the walls of the house, clambers the sweet wild honeysuckle or the running rose. Potted plants often fill the windows or adorn the steps. In many a little lawn can be seen carnations, chrysanthemums, roses and flowering shrubs. In some cases a nice brick or gravel walk leads from the gate to the house. Newspapers, a few books, magazines, and plain household ornaments are found in most of these homes. While I stand talking to the storekeeper, a number of neighbors call to see if the daily mail has arrived, and to get their papers. Each morning the children of these small proprietors who are of school age are sent off to the nice white frame school-house in the neighborhood. They are comfortably dressed, and each has a little satchel to hold the books. On the Sabbath, no noise is heard. A solemn stillness reigns around. The children, clean, trim and happy, are sent to the Sabbath School. Later on the plain family carriage is brought out, and the father and mother and the elder daughters drive to church.

Take another road in this same region, the one leading to Sevierville, and stop on the eminence which the public highway crosses and gaze around. Wherever the eye turns, it rests in serene pleasure on white cottages, nestling in the hills, in the midst of green fields and pastures. These are for the most part the homes of ex-Union soldiers. They have transformed this country into a garden of beauty and fertility. Marked as is this change, the moral transformation is as striking. Intemperance is banished. Idleness is gone. Thrift, industry and morality prevail. And all over East Tennessee, in every county, just such changes as I have described, not always perhaps so marked, have been going on ever since the war. Literally

old things are becoming new. The church, the Sabbath School, temperance, industry and education have wrought this marvelous reformation. Much of it is directly traceable to the new ideas, new habits, new education learned in the war. More moral communities can scarcely be found in all the land than the ones just referred to, composed almost entirely of ex-Union soldiers. Similar changes have taken place in communities occupied by ex-Confederate soldiers.

Some of this amelioration and change is undoubtedly due to the natural progress going on all over the country. But whence came this spirit of progress? Did not the war develop it, in part at least? Were not the energy and the intellect of the nation stimulated into intense activity by the great conflict? Does not the marvelous progress of the country in wealth and improvements since the close of the Civil War prove the fact that new forces were set in motion by it? But, independent of this consideration, I insist that the army was a vast training school, an education in fact, for a majority of the Union soldiers from East Tennessee; that they came back to the pursuit of peace better, broader, more enlightened citizens, and that the changes I have noted were largely due to their travels, experience and training in the army. And so far as my observation extends, the same is true of the Confederate soldiers of this section, though for some years after the war they labored under serious disadvantages. As a general rule, they have certainly proved themselves to be good and valuable citizens.

Often the Union soldier and the Confederate soldier settled side by side. Both were brave; both were faithful to their cause; both had acted as honorable soldiers. They had been neighbors before the war. Each had chosen his side from honest convictions. When they returned they respected each other, and met as old friends. The Confederate, too, came back after four years of marching and fighting and suffering, a wiser and a better man. His fiery spirit

had been chastened by four years of war. He also had sown his wild oats. He had had enough of frolic and battle and blood. With the deepest intensity he longed for his old home, for peace, for the good old days of brotherly love. He and his Union neighbor at once became friends as of old. They visited each other. They were prompt in helping one another. They talked about the war as they rode to town, or sat together in the evening, or on Sabbath afternoons. They recalled their battles and their marches. They laughed at amusing incidents, or silent tears stole down their bronzed cheeks as they told of the sad fate of some fellow soldier who never came back. They had become members of the same church. Time wore on. Their eldest children were now grown. The son of the one is married to the daughter of the other. And thus the ties of friendship are cemented by the stronger ties of relationship.

Both these men have had enough of war. In talking of it they respect the motives which guided each other in 1861. They praise the courage displayed by the opposite side, and never disparage their late enemies. Each now votes according to his own political convictions.

All over East Tennessee just such cases as the above can be found. Brave Union soldiers and equally brave Confederate soldiers dwell together in peace, and all live the lives of good citizens. Peace has at last come to such neighborhoods. What a pity editors and politicians cannot see, cannot feel, its blessed influence in their own hearts. It was not the Confederate or Federal soldiers who kept alive the smouldering embers of the late unfortunate civil war, but ambitious politicians who had for the most part grown up since the war.

These old soldiers of East Tennessee, on both sides, are what their hero fathers were. Most of them are plain, independent farmers. As a class, with some exceptions, they are sober, industrious, thrifty and moral. Moral and religious sentiments prevail among them in a remarkable

degree. Temperance is the rule and drunkenness the exception. The observance of law and order is general. It would perhaps be hard to find a more orderly people anywhere than are these old soldiers of both armies. Most of them were stalwart men—tall, brawny, active, powerful. In height and weight, they were on an average considerably above those of the soldiers of any other state or country, excepting those of Kentucky.[1] In intellect, they

[1] In reference to the size and muscular and brain power of the soldiers of Tennessee (a large majority of whom were from East Tennessee) and Kentucky in the late Civil War, I copy the following table and remarks thereon. They disclose some remarkable facts.

COMPARATIVE SIZE OF SOUTHERN MEN.

A Table of the Measurement of Men in the Federal Army during the Civil War, compiled from the "Report of the Sanitary Commission," made at that time by B. A. Gould, and copied from Z. F. Smith's "History of Kentucky," recently published.

Nativity.	Number of men measured.....	Mean height in inches.....	Mean weight in pounds.....	Mean circumference in chest, full inspiration.	Mean size of head in inches around.....
Kentucky and Tennessee.....	50,334	68.605	149.85	37.83	22.32
Ohio-Indiana.....	220,796	68.169	145.37	37.53	22.11
New England.....	152,370	67.834	139.39	36.71	22.02
New York, New Jersey, Penn...	273,026	67.529	140.83	37.06	22.10
Michigan, Illinois and Missouri..	71,196	67.820	141.78	37.29	22.19
Free States west Miss. River....	3,811	67.419	.....	37.53	21.97
Canada.....	31,698	67.086	141.35	37.14	22.11
England.....	3,037	66.741	137.61	36.91	22.16
Ireland.....	83,128	66.951	139.18	37.54	.....
Germany.....	89,021	66.620	140.36	37.20	22.09

Dr. Wilkinson comments on these figures:

"It will be observed from the above table that the Southern men in the Federal army were greater in height, greater in weight, greater in the size of the chest, and greater in the size of their heads than the same measurements showed in either the Americans of the Northern army or the troops in this army natives of Europe. The latter numbered 255,979. The necessities of the South required the acceptance of volunteer soldiers without critical regard to their physical features, but it is reasonable to accept the

were naturally alert, bright, sagacious. In action, they were brave and daring. They delighted in perils and adventures. They had known danger in every form. Rough many of them undoubtedly were, with grizzly beard and long, shaggy hair; but in every breast there beat a warrior's heart.

Braver men than these never marched to battle. On every field they showed their courage. Many a hero whose name does not appear in official reports, nor in history, performed feats of valor which should render his name imperishable.

Whatever the world may think of the conduct of the Union men of East Tennessee in refusing to join their Southern brethren, there can be no difference of opinion as to the honesty of the intentions of the Union soldiers. What possible selfish motive could have induced them to expatriate themselves, and become exiles and wanderers for two, three, or even four years? What evil motive could have induced them to quit their families and homes, and undergo the perils and sufferings of a long journey through the mountains in search of the Federal army? Men do not do such things without powerful impelling incentives. Stated in the simplest words, it was love of the Union which made them refugees and exiles. They fled from a govern-

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average measurement of over 50,000 Southern men in the Northern army as that which would have been shown in the Southern troops had their measurements been taken. The greater size of the skull excites the logical conclusion that the native intellect of these 50,000 Southern soldiers must have been proportionately greater than that of the same number of Northern American troops, and the same of the allied foreign contingent. All brainologists declare that the skulls of the superior white race are larger than those of the Mongolians, Malayans, Hindoos, Africans and American Indians, from which it is reasonable to infer that this distinction must in the aggregate prevail in masses of the same race. The proper directing influence of Southern intellect in forming the Constitution of the United States, and the great influence for many years exerted in the legislative and administrative departments of this government by Southern men, incline to the belief that in these also the brain mass had the same ratio of excess."

ment they disliked. They sought protection under one they loved as dearly as life itself. The brave Southern people who demanded the right in 1861 of free speech and free thought in reference to the momentous questions of that period, and who claimed for themselves honesty of purpose in their course, surely ought to concede equal honesty of intention to others who by their conduct placed themselves beyond the reach of evil imputations. In all the land, neither North nor South, was there so conspicuous an example of suffering and sacrifices for the sake of principle as was manifested by these refugees of East Tennessee. There were no refugees among the Northern men. Conscriptions were not necessary to get these East Tennesseans into the army. In the history of nations, there was never exhibited a higher or more unselfish devotion to duty than that of these brave men. They fought for the right as they understood it, and their memory should be held in honor by their grateful countrymen through all coming time.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE UNION PARTY OF EAST TENNESSEE.

Antecedents of Union party in East Tennessee—Were supporters of General Jackson for the presidency—Wished Hugh Lawson White to be his successor—Jackson opposes the White movement—The Whig party—White's supporters become Whigs—Names of distinguished Whig leaders in East Tennessee—Names of Democratic leaders—Old history recalled—The Whig party one of wealth and education—Described by Democratic orators—A decided majority of the better classes in East Tennessee Whigs—What Mrs. Jefferson Davis said of Mississippi—Slaveholders as a class were Whigs—Teachings of Democratic leaders—Changes in the two political parties when civil war came on—A majority of Whigs were Union men—Three-fifths of Democrats vote for the Union—Estimate of changes—Overwhelming weight of talent on the Union side—In moral worth and respectability two parties finally about equal—The hope of the Republic.

It may be well to trace out briefly the antecedents of the Union party in East Tennessee. Who were these men and of what political origin? In General Jackson's races for the presidency an overwhelming majority of the people of East Tennessee were his supporters, though there were a few anti-Jackson men. In 1835, the people of the state, through its legislature, nominated for the presidency its own pure and able citizen, Judge Hugh Lawson White, of Knoxville, then a senator in congress, to succeed General Jackson. White had been one of Jackson's ablest defenders in the senate. Jackson, however, wished Martin Van Buren to be his successor, and took open ground for him. This interference gave grave offense to the friends of White. In the election of 1836, Mr. White's friends cast a large majority of votes for him, and carried the state against all the influence and patronage of Jackson's administration. White was more popular in East Tennessee than Jackson.

During this presidential contest the many elements of

opposition to the administration of Jackson throughout the country coalesced and came together, assuming the venerable, revolutionary name of Whig. As a party it was eminently respectable on account of its wealth, its education and its general worth. It was pre-eminent for the ability of its leaders. At its head stood Clay and Webster. Mr. Clay was the vital force that gave it strength and inspiration. He breathed into it his own intrepid spirit, and led it with unfaltering courage. He proclaimed certain great principles for the administration of the government, which he called the "American Policy." Many of Jackson's old followers in Tennessee, with John Bell, the rising young statesman, at their head, united with the Whig party. In East Tennessee the followers of Mr. White most naturally joined these. Keenly resenting the war made on him by General Jackson, they ardently supported Mr. Clay's policy. A majority of the people thus became Whigs, and in after years they never swerved from this faith. The leaders in this movement were well worthy of the large following they received. Well might the people follow such men as Colonel John Williams, Judge W. B. Reese, Chancellor Thomas L. Williams, Spencer Jarnegin, Judge E. Alexander, James A. Whitesides, John A. McKinney, Judge Robert J. McKinney, T. A. R. Nelson, John Netherland, Thomas D. Arnold, W. T. Senter and Wm. G. Brownlow, and at a little later period such men as W. H. Sneed, John H. Crozier, Joseph B. Heiskell, Horace Maynard, John Baxter, C. F. Trigg and John C. Gaut. The only leaders on the other side for whom even a plausible claim of equal ability could be made were Andrew Johnson, Landon C. Haynes, Thomas C. Lyon and Samuel Milligan.

Here then we have the antecedents of the Union party of East Tennessee. It was for the most part the old Whig party of 1835–6—the party that sprang up in opposition to General Jackson.

To show the character of this party, the material of

which it was composed, its moral and mental standing, I desire to recall a little almost-forgotten history. Away back in 1840 and 1844, Democratic orators were in the constant habit, in this state, of arraigning the Whig party as the aristocratic Federal party. It was denounced as purse proud and aristocratic and as an enemy of the common people. The Democratic party, it was said, was made up of the poor and laboring men. The rich and the proud and those who "wore broadcloth" were Whigs. In some form or another these sentiments were constantly heard from Democratic orators. In 1843, or 1844, one Barclay Martin, a Democratic orator from Middle Tennessee, came into the upper part of this region to make speeches. He told the people that the Democrats constituted the poor man's party, that it was made up of the laboring men, and of those who wore "copperas breeches and one gallows." He denounced the Whigs as aristocrats who looked down upon Democrats.

Andrew Johnson put forth ideas similar to these from the time he ceased to be a Whig. Indeed these sentiments were more or less common everywhere. The Whigs scarcely attempted to conceal the consciousness of their real or assumed superiority. They claimed for their party the best talents, the larger share of the wealth and intelligence of the land, and the best blood of the country. So it came to be very well understood before the war, all over Tennessee, and especially in East Tennessee, that the larger part of the riches and education in nearly every county belonged to the Whigs. And the fact was to a large extent that way. It was, indeed, so all over the land, with varying modifications. It was well recognized that a majority of the leading farmers in nearly every county, and in nearly every civil district in East Tennessee, were Whigs. A majority of the prominent citizens of nearly every town also belonged to that party. Of course there were many men of means and intelligence in the

Democratic party. But the general rule was as I have stated it.

On this point, Mrs. Jefferson Davis, in the memoirs of her late distinguished husband,[1] speaking of her father, W. B. Howell, a very large planter, says:

"His politics (this was in 1845) were what was then called a Whig, as indeed, were those of most of the *gentlefolk* of Natchez. Everybody took the 'National Intelligencer,' then edited by Messrs. Gales and Seaton, who were men of sterling honesty, with strong Federal views. They held Mr. Van Buren's name and fame as anathema. They believed all they published, and, as a consequence, the Whigs believed them. . . . General Jackson had removed the treasury deposits from the national banks, thereby ruining half the people of the South, and this added to the detestation felt by the 'best people' for the Democratic principles and theories." . . .

After meeting Jefferson Davis for the first time, Miss Howell (subsequently Mrs. Davis) wrote a letter to her mother giving her impressions of him, which concluded in these words: "Would you believe it, he is refined and cultivated, and yet he is a Democrat?"

What Mrs. Davis says of Natchez, and less directly of Mississippi, was true, it is believed, to a large extent, of nearly all the Southern States, excepting South Carolina. A majority of the slaveholders, as a class, were Whigs, and in 1860, Union men. Elsewhere I quote from a letter of "a Virginian," who was indorsed as one of the first men of the state, published in the "American Register," in which he affirms repeatedly, with an appeal to facts to sustain his affirmation, that the slaveholders of the South were Whigs—that they were the educated, the wealthy, the conservative class, and in 1861, the Union class. This was probably true in 1860, and in the early part of 1861. They were known as the "broadcloth party." This writer says:

[1] Vol. I, p. 189.

" . . . The rule was, the slaveholding people were Whigs and Union, the slaveholding politicians and the roaring rabble Secessionists." . . .

What "a Virginian" affirms of nearly all the Southern States, was certainly a fact in East Tennessee, namely, that a majority of the slaveholders and property owners were Whigs before the war.

From an early day, down to the Civil War, the teachings of the Democratic party, in East Tennessee, at least, were of such a character as tended to set the poor against the rich. The latter resented it, and gradually arrayed themselves against that party. Property is conservative, and naturally seeks to protect itself against attacks.

In the presidential election of 1860, Mr. Bell received in East Tennessee 22,145 votes, Mr. Breckenridge 18,713 and Mr. Douglas 1,377.

This does not include the vote of Union county which from some cause was omitted from the published tables. The Whig majority in this county was generally from 400 to 500, say 445. Adding the vote of Mr. Douglas to that of Mr. Breckenridge, which is assumed to have been composed nearly entirely of Democrats, the majority for Mr. Bell in East Tennessee was 2,055. This majority, when added to the 445 from Union county, gives a total Whig majority of 2,500. This, it is believed, is nearly the correct majority.

As the Union majority in June, 1861, was over 19,000, it is evident that there was a great change in the relative strength of the two old parties. It is a fact admitting of little doubt that the Whig party remained largly intact, while the Democratic party was seriously divided. A large number of Democrats in the first district, under the influence of Andrew Johnson, adhered to the Union, and a great many did so all over East Tennessee.[1] A consider-

[1] A remarkable change took place in Greene county, the home of Andrew Johnson. In the November presidential election the plurality of Mr. Breckenridge over Mr. Bell was 1,006 votes. In the following June the

able number of Whigs, on the other hand, especially in the counties of Carter, Washington, Greene, Cocke, Blount, Roane and Knox, joined in secession. As the Whig majority in East Tennessee was about 2,500, and the total vote in June was 48,800, that gives, in round numbers, a Whig vote of 25,650 and a Democratic vote of 23,150. Taking these figures as a basis of calculation, in order to reach the result manifested by that election, namely 14,800 votes for secession and a little over 34,000 against it, it was necessary that one-fifth of the Whigs should have voted for that measure, and three-fifths of the Democrats against it. No other proportions will give results so nearly corresponding to the election returns. Thus the proportion of one-fifth Whigs for secession and three-fifths Democrats for the Union, gives the result of 34,410 for the Union and 14,390 for secession, making together the number cast in the election. The actual result was 34,033 for the Union, and 14,872 for secession. These facts prove that my figures are nearly correct.

It thus appears that the Union party in East Tennessee in the June election of 1861 was composed of about 20,520 Whigs and of 13,890 Democrats, and the secession party of about 9,260 Democrats and 5,130 Whigs.

These are surprising results, particularly the large number of old Democrats who voted for the Union. But these figures are necessary in order to account for the well-known Union majority. The Whigs who thus joined the Confederacy were among the best men in the party, many of them being slaveholders. In Greene county, while a number of prominent Democrats remained loyal, many of them went into secession.

So the Whig or Union party remained largely as it had been in 1861. It lost a small part of its old followers, but gained a much greater number from the Democratic

Union majority was 1,947. It is a significant fact that Douglas only received thirty-eight votes in this county where the influence of Mr. Johnson was all controlling.

party. It thus appears that the great body of Union followers were the old Whigs of the times long ago. The Union party of East Tennessee, in 1861, was in fact the Whig party of 1860, with the addition of about three-fifths of the Democratic party, and the loss of about one-fifth of the Whigs. These figures are not exact, but nearly so.

At the close of the presidential canvass of 1860, there was a marked difference between the attitude of the Democratic and the Whig parties in reference to secession. The first, especially the Breckenridge wing, was already favorably inclined toward that measure. Every intelligent voter for Mr. Breckenridge who resided in the South ought to have known in November, 1860, as well as he knew in the following February, the designs of the secession leaders. The traditions and teachings of the party for many years previously all tended to enlist both his sympathy and his judgment on that side. The speeches and publications in the South, in 1860, were unmistakable in disclosing an unalterable purpose to dissolve the Union. It is manifest, therefore, that the predisposition on the part of Breckenridge Democrats to favor secession had to be overcome before they could become supporters of the Union. They had to change front. That more than one-half the party in East Tennessee did thus change front, shows more impressively than any other fact in his history the marvelous influence and power which Andrew Johnson exercised over the minds of his own people.

On the contrary, it was not necessary for the Whig party of East Tennessee to change a single principle, a single idea, in order to be on the side of the Union. It involved no change on their part. They had always faced in that direction. In espousing the Union cause in February, 1861, they were simply acting in harmony with all their past history and teachings. It is not a surprising fact, therefore, that only one-fifth of them abandoned the

standard of their fathers; rather, it is surprising that so many as one-fifth did so.

I have already stated that in the contest of 1861 the overwhelming weight of talent among the leaders in East Tennessee was on the side of the Union. This was clearly and unmistakably so. The only really prominent leaders in the secession party were Landon C. Haynes, Joseph B. Heiskell, W. H. Sneed, John H. Crozier, W. G. Swan, Thomas C. Lyon and D. M. Key. It is difficult, as it is at all times in such matters, to weigh and measure the exact proportion of moral worth and respectability, among the body of the people, which finally existed in the two parties. No fair-minded man, however, will claim that all of these were either on the one side or on the other. It was probably about equally divided. In this respect, the changes that occurred, on the whole, were possibly more favorable to the secession than to the Union party. While a majority of the larger slave owners finally became secessionists, there were many of that class who never yielded to that delusion. The largest as well as the third largest slaveholders in Knox county were Union men. Many non-slaveholders, in East Tennessee, were for secession, and many slave owners were bitterly and unalterably opposed to it. There was, in reference to this question, no certain rule or criterion by which the position of anyone could be judged in advance. The nearest approach to such a rule was that afforded by old party affiliations. Whigs were nearly certain to be loyal, while the Democrats were rent asunder; but there were many variations from this indefinite rule. It required moral as well as physical courage to resist the dominating spirit of secession. Only men of strength of character could do it. There were worthless men then, as there are to-day, in both parties. All I claim for the Union party in East Tennessee is an equality with their opponents in every element that constitutes an intelligent, a moral and a respectable people.

It is plain, honest, industrious farming citizens like

these, constituting a majority of the Union party of East Tennessee, as well as the larger part of the Democratic party, who are the wealth-producing class of the land. This great class numbers eight or ten millions of men in the United States. In the Civil War, it was this class, more than all others, which by its patriotism saved the government from disruption. In every time of danger it will always be the government's mainstay and support. Should agrarianism, communism, labor strikes and mob law at any time seize our large cities, as they seized Chicago in 1893, and threaten the stability and existence of both government and society, the strong bulwark against this lawless spirit will be found in the end to be the rural population. They own an interest in the soil. They love their little homes. By the simplest reasoning, this love of home is transferred to the government which protects their title to their homes. Their homes thus become the bond by which they are linked to the government. Lawlessness and anarchy, as they can see, threaten their security. They are, therefore, the friends of stability, order and good government. Naturally, inevitably, they are conservative, cautious and anti-revolutionary in sentiment. Selfish ambition has no place in their minds. Corruption has not found a lodgment in their hearts. In all things these are the most honest, the most patriotic, the most virtuous and conservative, and the best citizens of the republic. And if the sad day should ever come when there shall be in this country a wild upheaval and upturning of society, of everything sacred and valuable, the last defense of our institutions will rest with this vast and incorruptible farming population, such as are the honest farmers of East Tennessee of both parties.

CHAPTER XXVI.

WHY WERE THE PEOPLE OF EAST TENNESSEE LOYAL IN 1861?

Under certain conditions better for the people of East Tennessee to have gone with the South—Easier, safer and more popular than to remain loyal—The reasons for not joining the South—Vital principles of government and administration involved—No sufficient cause for secession—Views of the old Whig party—Secession a heresy—Free trade—Easy to be a Union man in the North—A fearful thing in the South—He incurred danger, hatred and odium—Washington's exalted integrity and fame interwoven with the Union—A majority of the people everywhere opposed to secession—Drawn into it by excitement—People of East Tennessee not under the influence of a slaveholding aristocracy—Love of country among a semi-mountainous people—But one supreme question—Hated changes—Secession meant a change—Drew their inspiration from the words and example of Clay and Jackson—Victory for the Union was won by local leaders in February, 1861—But little change afterwards—Leaders exactly suited to the crisis—The common people everywhere true until deserted by their leaders—The Union men of East Tennessee.

Party names are nothing, excepting so far as they represent ideas and principles. If there had been no important question as to the form of government and the fundamental ideas and principles on which it rested and on which it should be administered, involved in the contest of 1861, it would have been much better for the Union men of East Tennessee to have united their destiny with the people of the South, rather than make, under the most adverse circumstances, a desperate and unequal, and, in some respects, an unnatural struggle for the Union. Look at the facts. In common with the secessionists, the Union men lost their slaves—their property—in the struggle without receiving compensation therefor. The other property, which was taken from them for the support of the Union armies, was generally receipted for at about half of its market value, and often no receipt at all was given. They

suffered by persecutions and imprisonment as the Confederates never did. For some years after the war, they were the constant subjects of hatred and denunciation on the part of the Southern people, and of sneers and misrepresentations on the part of a portion of the Northern people. If the Southern Confederacy had succeeded, the brand of infamy would have rested on them forever. If their lot has been a hard one, notwithstanding they were on the winning side, what would it have been if the secessionists had been successful?

If the love of ease and the desire of popularity and high social position had controlled them, and especially the leaders, they would have joined their brethren of the South. It was easy to go in that direction, and hard to go in the other. Sympathy and a common brotherhood drew them toward their friends and kindred. To separate from them the tenderest ties of human nature had to be severed. It was like the parting of a family in a quarrel. In turning away from their neighbors and kindred, social ostracism, so tyrannical in the South, awaited them. Dangers encompassed them on every side. Perpetual infamy might be attached to their names. Exile might be, as it actually became to tens of thousands, their fate.

It was, therefore, easier, safer and more popular every way to be a secessionist than a Union man. A vast majority of the better classes in the cotton states, after the war began, for these very reasons, cast their fortunes with the secessionists. These would naturally mold the policies and control the destinies of those states. In Tennessee, too, after the June election, in 1861, it was evident that a majority of the ruling class had joined the South. This majority, it was seen, would govern the state. The Union men must remain in a minority. They must live under the supposed reproach of having adhered to the enemies of the South. They could not escape their environments, nor the consequences of their political acts and opinions. It mat-

tered but little that in East Tennessee the highest talents and an equal part of the wealth and moral worth were on the side of the Union. The loyal population formed less than one-third of the people of the entire state, and would, therefore, be controlled, as they have been, by the Southern element.

In every aspect of the case, so far as safety, social position, personal influence, and future advancement were concerned, loyalty to the Union threatened to become a serious drawback. There was no open highway leading in that direction for aspiring ambition. There was no easy road to promotion or social distinction. To abandon old party relations, and form alliances with a party so odious as the Republican party was in the South, in 1860–61, was abhorrent. To do so, all the deep-seated prejudices of a quarter of a century had to be uprooted and overcome. Besides this, and infinitely worse than this, the curses, the anathemas, the bitter denunciations of our Southern brethren who thought we were betraying them in their hour of supreme need, had to be endured. And yet more terrible was the withering, the annihilating public opinion of the South, which crushed out all open opposition to slavery and secession, and doomed to deepest infamy all who halted, hesitated or refused to blindly follow its trend.

So, I repeat, that if there had been no choice between the two forms of government, and the underlying principles on which they rested; if there had been no sacred memories, no glorious history to be surrendered; if there had been an assured guarantee—such as the old government gave by nearly a century of experience—of liberty, equality and stability, in the new government, it would have been much better for the Union men to join the South.

Why, then, did the loyal people of East Tennessee cling to the Union so tenaciously and so heroically in 1862? Different motives influenced different minds. Some had one motive, some another, and some many. No uniform reason can be given that is applicable to all. The reasons,

however, which influenced the minds of the more intelligent in the old Whig party may be stated nearly correctly. They were as follows:

First, but not most important, a majority of the people of East Tennessee had been disciples of Clay and Webster, both as to the theory and the administrative policy of the government. They knew that these theories and policies would be repudiated in a Southern Confederacy, and that the later but extreme views of Mr. Calhoun and others of the Southern school would prevail. This alone constituted with many a sufficient objection to secession.

Second. There was no adequate cause, as they believed, furnishing a justification for revolution and for a dissolution of the government. The utmost that could be said truthfully was that the people of the South undoubtedly had serious cause of complaint against a portion of the people of the North, on account of their nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law and their bitter and unceasing warfare against the institution of slavery.

Third. Granting that there were the gravest causes of complaint on the part of the South, secession was no remedy for any existing evil. It tended only to aggravate every wrong endured or complained of by the South. Under this head may be mentioned, as an illustration, the insecurity of slave property which would have obtained under the Southern Confederacy.

Fourth. The constitutional right of secession was absolutely and unqualifiedly denied. The right of revolution, when wrongs had become so serious as to be no longer tolerable by freemen, was freely admitted. But it was denied that at that time there existed any wrong justifying an immediate resort, without an earnest effort at conciliation and compromise, to the last right of an oppressed people—revolution.

Fifth. Individually, and this is true of every prominent Union leader, I was at that time the moderate friend of African slavery, as it existed in the South, and wished to

see that institution preserved. Speaking for myself, I had not then learned that it was a curse and not a blessing to the South. My conscience did not trouble me on the subject. I was a slave-owner, as my father and grandfather had been. I believed that secession would destroy slavery. In one of my speeches, in June, 1861, as shown in Chapter IX, I laid down the propositions that slavery could only exist in the Union, and by virtue of the constitution, and that if we cut loose from these, it would perish; that I was a friend to the Union, because in part, I was a friend of slavery; and that secession was only a short cut to emancipation.

Sixth. It was insisted that "peaceable secession" was a dream and would never be tolerated; that the people of the North would never permit the Union to be dissolved without an effort to save it; that a mighty war would be the result, and that the government, having both the wealth and the numerical strength sufficient, would put down the secession movement, and reduce the people of the seceding states to submission, and that slavery would perish in the conflict. How prophetic these words of June, 1861?

Seventh. It was urged that a government founded on the principle of secession and the doctrine of state's rights, as held in the South, could not permanently endure, and must sooner or later fall to pieces, or eventuate in anarchy.

Eighth. The thought of a cruel civil war, which was certain to result from secession, was viewed with horror by Union men. They wished, if possible, at least, to save this state from its multiplied evils.

Some of the Union leaders were ardent believers in a powerful and splendid central government, just in the administration of wise laws, with ample power to secure protection to each of its citizens, and respect for its majesty in every part of its wide dominions. Their reverence for the old government was unbounded. They grew sick at heart at the idea of being compelled to look upon its dis-

membered parts. They loved to linger on the magnificent picture of Mr. Webster in his reply to Mr. Hayne:

"When my eyes shall be turned to behold for the last time the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the broken and dishonored fragments of a once glorious Union; on states dissevered, discordant, belligerant; on a land rent with civil fueds, or drenched it may be in fraternal blood! Let their last feeble and lingering glance rather behold the gorgeous ensign of the republic, now known and honored throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original luster, not a stripe erased or polluted, nor a single star obscured."

The foregoing views were substantially those of the Union leaders of East Tennessee, in 1861, excepting Andrew Johnson, who perhaps held different views, as to one or two points. The form of the statement is nothing. The ideas alone are insisted upon.

These were some of the reasons which arose in the minds of the more thoughtful Union men. But there was a much larger class of men, who, though they might not reason so exactly, were yet capable of clear thinking. These had decided convictions upon the supreme question as to whether the Union should be preserved or destroyed. They needed no formal logical process to comprehend the importance of such a problem. Considerations of the highest and gravest import demanded the attention of these practical and thoughtful men. What were they to gain by destroying the Union? Would they be, in any possible contingency, better off, more prosperous, safer in their persons and property, more secure in their rights?

To the old Whig party, the claim on the part of the Southern States of the right to secede from the Union, at their own sovereign pleasure, was contrary to all its cherished convictions. Secession was as odious and as revolutionary as nullification. Both were, as they believed, destructive of all stable government. This doctrine, as taught in the South, contained within itself the

seeds of disintegration, weakness and dissolution. Anarchy would probably sooner or later follow in its train. A government founded on this idea must of necessity be weak and subject to frequent and violent revolutions. There could hardly be any long-enduring tranquillity. To men who believed in a strong central government, powerful enough to protect and defend all its parts, and all the people dwelling under it, however weak, or however remote from its center, and yet with ample local self-government in the states, enabling each to work out its own destiny in its own way, the Southern idea of the new government was fraught with evil only. The Whigs looked with startled fear on such a scheme. This leaves out of view a consideration of the sentiment of love for the Union, so strong in the people, and which had become a part of their very lives. No new government, however perfect, could ever be to them what the old one had been. No sacred memories and associations could ever be hallowed in their hearts as this one was. Sad and sorrowing would they have been if separated from the government of their first love.

Thoughtful minds also did not fail to see the evil consequences of the doctrine of free trade, proclaimed in the very constitution of the new government. To the Whigs of East Tennessee this seemed to be a fatal blow at the fondly anticipated development of their future industries. They could not therefore wisely overlook the consideration of this question of domestic policy. As has been said before, the question of slavery, on the one side, or of human freedom, on the other, was not a controlling one. The Union men were neither emancipationists nor slavery propagandists. Many of them were indeed small slaveholders. They believed slavery was safer in the Union than it would be out of it. But this belief alone did not make them cling to the Union. A higher sentiment and broader views animated and guided them. A patriotic, national spirit fixed them unchangeably in their noble

course. An enlightened and far seeing apprehension as to their future safety and welfare, combined with deep devotion to the old government, held them firmly in their loyalty, from which nothing could move or seduce them. Neither dangers, nor obloquy, nor prisons, nor any human agency or power ever made them waver in their stedfastness.

As intimated before, it was painful to separate from their section, their kindred and their brethren. At first it was much harder even than this, to incur the odium of allying themselves with the Republican and the Abolition parties (so universally hated in the South) even for the glorious purpose of saving the Union. But this was infinitely preferable to an alliance with the secession party for the purpose of destroying it. To encounter and endure this odium mere courage was not sufficient. Only high moral convictions and an overpowering sense of duty, an intense *amor patriae* were equal to this hard trial.

It was easy to be a Union man in Ohio or Pennsylvania, but difficult and dangerous to be one in the South. In the one case the person was in sympathy with his section; in the other, he stood in odious array against it. In the one case, there was no danger to be encountered, no sacrifices to be made; in the other, there were countless dangers and sacrifices to be met. In the one case, honors and rewards awaited him; in the other, stigma and social ostracism. In the one case, he was a patriot; in the other, a traitor to his section and kindred. In the one case, the doors to honor and position flew open at his approach; in the other, they were rudely closed in his face and locked against him.

Personal considerations all drew them toward the South; sentiment and political considerations drew them the other way. Sympathy and the ties of kindred and association drew them toward secession: patriotism and duty drew them the other way. Narrow sectionalism tempted them

one way; a spirit of broad national unity inclined them the other.

The term "Abolitionist," in 1860–61, in the minds of the vast body of the people of the South, was a term of the deepest reproach and infamy. An Abolitionist was regarded as a malicious enemy of the South, contemplating some diabolical evil to her people. In order to accomplish his purpose of freeing the slaves, he was ready to apply the torch to their homes, and to arm the slaves against their masters, as John Brown had tried to do. He was justly regarded by all parties in the South with loathing, because he was attempting to interfere with and destroy the value of a species of property just as much protected by the constitution as houses and lands. The Abolitionist who went beyond the use of reason and moral suasion to get rid of slavery was a revolutionist and an enemy to the constitution. Of course, intelligent people knew that there were not many Abolitionists of this class. The misfortune was that the large body of the people who had supported Mr. Lincoln were regarded in the South as Abolitionists, whereas in fact they were only "Free-soilers," or persons opposed to the extension of slavery. The news of Mr. Lincoln's election, therefore, aided by the extravagant and false statements as to his purposes, caused ominous forebodings everywhere in the South. Immediately after the election, there followed a solemn pause. No one knew what terrible calamity was about to occur. The bravest Union men were bewildered by the new and appalling situation they had to face. In Nashville, at the meeting of the electoral college in December, some of the strongest men who had voted for Mr. Bell were alarmed, unmanned and uncertain. It was only too evident even then that the shadow of slavery was creeping over and paralyzing the minds and hearts of men in large slaveholding communities.

If the most intelligent men in the state were fearful and uncertain as to the future, it was not surprising that the

rural population, who had less means of correct information, were perplexed at the new condition of things. They were in that state of doubt and apprehension as to their duty which might easily have made many of them the blind followers of secession leaders, if such men had first gotten their ears. But fortunately a great public meeting was held in Knoxville on the 8th day of December, an account of which is given elsewhere, at which the speakers on the Union side boldly declared their purpose to adhere to the government and to resist secession with all the ability they possessed. These utterances, together with the loyal resolutions almost unanimously adopted, touched the popular heart and mind and gave new hope and confidence to the doubting. From that hour the Union victory in East Tennessee was assured. The swelling tide of Unionism that day put in motion never for a moment ebbed nor flowed backward. This public meeting became, as is elsewhere shown, the turning point in the history of the Union canvass in East Tennessee.

Fortunately for mankind, the people of the United States had a grand and a good man to lead their armies in the Revolution and to administer the new government for the first eight years of its existence. Washington so impressed himself on the minds and hearts of the people as a virtuous and patriotic citizen, that his influence ever since has been almost supreme. With his name is associated the powerful central idea of nationality. No thought of him of a less comprehensive character ever enters the minds of men. This very idea has become a strong bond of national unity. It is impossible to estimate its value in giving permanency and stability to our government. The goodness of Washington sanctifies and hallows his mighty work. The common people, much more than scholars and statesmen, reverence the past. They are not innovators, not iconoclasts. They are slow to destroy and pull down that which is consecrated by sacred memories, and especially that which has been purchased with costly blood.

In application of these principles, I venture the assertion that, at the beginning of the late Civil War, a majority of the people were everywhere opposed to the disruption of our government. They were finally drawn into it in the cotton states, by the hurry, the excitement and the glare of military preparations and parades, and the dominating spirit of the slaveholding oligarchy. In these states the powerful slaveholders moulded and fashioned public opinion; the common people followed where they led. This was not the case in East Tennessee, where there were but few large slaveholders. Here the mass of the people were not dazzled and blinded by the overpowering influence of that class. While these people had no hostility against slavery and slaveholders, for many were slaveholders themselves, yet they had not that abject fear of them, that reverence for that institution, which characterized the non-slaveholding classes further South. This statement is true also, to a certain extent, of a majority of the people of the border counties of North Carolina, Virginia and Kentucky, and to a limited extent of North Alabama and North Georgia. But by the hot contagion of secession and the want of leaders, these people were soon overborne by the pressure and clamor of outside public opinion. Under its influence, especially in the states I have named, except Kentucky, the Union sentiment was soon stifled, and the people drifted into the current of secession. But in East Tennessee, though the outside pressure was tremendous, with daring leaders to cheer and encourage the people in maintaining their own inherent sentiments of loyalty, they stood unmovable and unshaken, amidst the raging storm which surrounded them.

Thus far, I have been stating in general terms, the reasons why a majority of the people of East Tennessee were loyal to the government during the Civil War. Some of these reasons were philosophical, and founded on general principles. Others were purely local. The latter were by far the most potent. These general principles

were more or less prevalent under similar conditions in all parts of the South. The fact was manifest, in 1861, that most of the common people, even in the seceding states, were opposed to secession. They had felt no heavy hand of oppression laid on them by the national government. The burdens they bore came from the states. They knew the national government only by its blessings. Aside from the alleged wrongs done, or threatened to the institution of slavery, there was not a good citizen from the capes of Delaware to the Rio Grande, who could point to a wrong he had endured from this source. In Virginia and Tennessee propositions to secede were at first voted down by an overwhelming majority. In Georgia a majority of the people were at first clearly against secession. In Texas, Arkansas and Louisiana there was always strong opposition to it. North Carolina was slow to give adherence to the Southern movement. In Alabama secession was arrested and held back for a long time. So warmly were the hearts of the people wedded to the old government, that it required the most extraordinary and startling events and means to draw them away from it. Mr. Gilchrist, a member of the legislature of that state, understood this when he warned Mr. Davis as we have elsewhere seen, that something had to be done to keep Alabama from returning to the Union.

In the end the work of secession was largely accomplished by fear and terrorism. The people were blindly driven into acquiescence in an act they hated, or doubted, by the wildest storm of passion and fury witnessed since the French Revolution.

But there were other reasons, besides those I have given, some of them almost purely local, why a majority of the people of East Tennessee were loyal to the Union. These people were a semi-mountainous race, and like all such people, the love of country among them was almost idolatrous. A majority of them were the descendants of the old Covenanters (the Scotch-Irish) who first settled

East Tennessee. The spirit of these brave Covenanters had descended to their posterity. The same love of liberty, the same love of country, the same love of home which animated them, also animated their children and grand-children.

These people had heard from their grandfathers how they had marched in 1780, across the mountains, under Sevier and Shelby and Campbell, and had destroyed the army of Ferguson. Some few still lingered who helped to win independence a second time under Jackson on the plains of New Orleans. And a yet larger number remained who had marched with Scott from Vera Cruz and had participated in the victory of Cerro Gordo and the triumphs around the City of Mexico. The descendants of these old heroes were to be found in every neighborhood. Naturally they supposed that the existence of the government, with all the liberties they enjoyed, was in part due to their patriotic ancestors. Thus the government came to be a part of their own possessions, just as the lands were which had descended from their fathers.

The affections of these people were not fixed on wealth, nor honor, nor distinction These things tend to lessen the love of country by bringing new and selfish objects before the mind. They knew that they were free under the government as it existed. They knew that not one man in all the land was oppressed by it. Its blessings, like the dew of heaven, silently descended on all. To lay a hostile hand on it was to commit treason and sacrilege, and to trample on the blood of their ancestors. Love of country was the strongest passion of their souls. It moved, thrilled and drew them, as love drew them to their wives and children.

With these people all other questions were insignificant in comparison with that of the preservation of the government. The dazzling glory of Washington mingled with all their ideas of it. The sacred memories of the Revolution still lingered in their minds and hallowed the govern-

ment wrought by it. The separate states were little more to them than their separate counties. They could not conceive of Washington fighting for Virginia alone. So these people reasoned, and so they felt. Fortunate it was that they had grasped and held fast to the idea of a powerful central government, instead of the narrow one of many small sovereignties.

Outside political issues had but little to do, in 1861, with the mass of the people of East Tennessee. There was but one supreme question: Should the government stand, or should it be destroyed? The question of slavery did not enter largely into their minds. Seven-tenths of the Union men were non-slaveholders. They cared little about that institution. Some of them were opposed to it on moral grounds. With some it was in no special favor, because associated with an aristocracy of wealth. Many, perhaps nearly every one of the Union men who were slaveholders, preferred the government to slavery. They cared nothing whether slavery were carried into the new territories or not. A majority of them were Whigs. They knew that secession was in its origin a Democratic dogma. They remembered that South Carolina would have left the Union long before, but for the iron will of General Jackson. They now saw that same state, that same Democratic party, leading in a second effort to disrupt the government.

They had been taught by their ancestors that King's Mountain was the turning point in the Revolution. They believed that to their ancestors the chief and highest honor of that brilliant achievement was due. They felt, therefore, that they had justly inherited a considerable share of the glory of winning American independence. Liberty to them was an heirloom, a priceless jewel, an inheritance bought with blood. It was something personal to themselves, something which belonged to them—their most precious possession. This liberty was wrapped up, embodied and made perpetual in the august government of

the United States. To touch it was to profane the sacred work of their ancestors and take away their birthright.

The people of East Tennessee knew that secession meant a change in the form of government. They were told by some of the leaders in the movement that slavery was to be the chief corner-stone of the new government. This new government was to constitute a splendid aristocracy of slaveholders. The people knew that this meant degraded white labor. Large slaveholding communities were always inimical to non-slaveholding white men. The latter class was regarded with little respect. Their labor was not wanted. Labor by white men was in low repute, if not dishonorable. The best lands would be appropriated for slave labor. Poor white men would be driven out by the imperious demands of slavery.

Rural people never lose their liberty without stern resistance. They love peace, though ready for war when it comes. They hate changes. Revolutions never originate with them. Such things are hatched in cities or in large manufacturing centers, among the ambitious, the restless, the desperate and the idle. Industrious men have no time for revolutionary plots. Such a people have no taste for war. The people of East Tennessee knew that secession, as Robert E. Lee said, meant "revolution" and "revolution was rebellion and war." A war to destroy the government was abhorrent to every feeling of their nature.

The Union men of East Tennessee drew their inspiration from the words and example of Clay and Jackson. Clay had been their idol as a political leader and the eloquent champion of the Union. Three times had he thrown himself between warring factions ready to rush to arms, and saved the country. Though they had quarreled with Jackson in politics and had denounced him bitterly, yet they honored the courage, the honesty and the lofty patriotism of this majestic person. He had by the exercise of his imperious will crushed nullification in 1832, and in his dying hours had declared that if the leaders in that scheme

had persisted in their course, he would have hanged them as high as Haman.[1]

Before the election of Mr. Lincoln, the hearts of Southern Democrats had been "fired," and their heads instructed, as Mr. W. L. Yancey had advised should be done, preparatory to the work of secession. The election of Mr. Lincoln was a foregone conclusion long before it took place. With many of the original movers in the scheme of disunion, his election was a cherished hope and wish. The announcement of his election was the signal for increased activity in hastening forward the work of preparation for the final acts of separation. There seemed to be a perfect understanding among all its advocates. In every town in the South where there were any sympathizers with this movement, they seemed to be inspired with new courage by the election of Mr. Lincoln.

It is remarkable what momentous consequences sometimes follow the action of a few persons or depend on even a single individual. The inauguration of the late Civil War was the work primarily of not exceeding fifty men. The chief of these—the most brilliant and the most daring of them—was William L. Yancey. To him above all others belongs the "bad eminence" of having caused the conflict. Governor Isham G. Harris almost alone is responsible for carrying the State of Tennessee out of the Union. Frank Blair and General Nathaniel Lyons, in a critical hour, saved Missouri from seceding. The past as well as the present status of East Tennessee was fixed in the winter of 1860–61 by less than a dozen men. Among these were Brownlow, Baxter, Trigg, Arnold, Netherland, Fleming, Carter and a half-dozen others. All the subsequent speaking in April, May and June by better-known men only confirmed the people in the opinions and resolutions they had formed under the teachings of these less distinguished leaders.

[1] Parton's "Life of Jackson," Vol. 1.

But after all the great, the supreme reason why a majority of the people of East Tennessee remained true to the old government was the fact that they had strong and determined leaders to encourage and stand by them, and share their perils. Notwithstanding their intense natural devotion to the Union, they would have yielded ultimately to Southern sentiment, to the wild outcry against the North, if brave men had not stood up and cheered them in their course. We have just seen that Mr. Johnson almost alone brought three-fifths of the Democratic party over from a position of sympathy for the South to one of unalterable adherence to the Union. Mr. Nelson, while he could not sway large masses as Mr. Johnson did, had the influence to control many separate individuals in his party. This was true also of many other Whig leaders.

Never perhaps were men better suited for such a grave occasion, and never did leaders appeal to more responsive, patriotic hearts. In the first canvass, in January and February, no more devoted and determined men than those named above existed anywhere. In March, or April, Johnson, Maynard, Nelson and Brabson returned home from congress and joined in the work which had been so ably, so fearlessly and so successfully carried on by the home leaders. Nowhere in the state could be found men combining such courage and ability to inspire and guide the people in the midst of the violent upheavel of 1861 as these. Little wonder the people stood firm under their brave words. Throughout the exciting and startling scenes of that wonderful period, the need and the influence of leadership were never more manifest.

The people of East Tennessee were naturally loyal. Besides they found they had leaders whom they could trust. The leaders, on the other hand, knew they could confide in the firmness and loyalty of the people. There was thus established between them reciprocal confidence and dependence. Each leaned upon and trusted the other.

Each if left alone would have been overwhelmed by the panic and the pressure.

The startling and rapidly succeeding events which happened between November, 1860, and May, 1861, were well calculated to unsettle and bewilder the coolest judgments. Strange and unheard-of things were transpiring every day. His was indeed a clear head who always knew, in that period of doubt and alarm, what was best to be done. Leaders were needed, as they always are in great emergencies, to instruct, to encourage and to direct the people as to the best policy to be pursued. Suppose there had been none such in East Tennessee in the winter of 1860–61, or in the meeting of December 8, 1860, what headway could the common people have made in stemming the surging tide of secession as it poured like an overflowing flood over them? They would have been swept away as stubble in a torrent. Those to command as well as those to follow are necessary in all important movements; the one to direct, the other to give power and momentum.

Western North Carolina and South-west Virginia were nearly as united for the Union until April, 1861, as East Tennessee. But when Sumter was fired upon the leaders rushed into secession. The people thus deserted became disheartened, and were scattered like sheep without a shepherd. Thousands of true Union men, who were thus abandoned by those they had trusted, soon became recruits for the Confederate army, and helped to swell its ranks. Thus these loyal regions were lost to the Union. The same state of sentiment, perhaps less distinctly, prevailed in North Alabama and in North Georgia.

But what better illustration can be given than is furnished by the example of our own state. In the February canvass, nearly every Whig leader, aided by a few Democrats, was earnestly and determinedly for the preservation of the Union. The state was carried in its favor by a majority of sixty-four thousand votes. Then came the firing

on Sumter, and "the sprinkling of blood in the faces of the people." This was followed by a wild panic, such as was scarcely ever seen before. Outside of East Tennessee, universal terror and fear prevailed. Passion ruled the hour. Men of mildest disposition, in many cases, became at once types of hatred. No man dared openly to declare himself a Union man. The venerable John Catron, an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, as we have seen, the friend and appointee of Jackson, fled from his state and from his home in Nashville in terror and despair, never to return until after the Federal occupation of Nashville. Return J. Meigs, eminent for his great worth and many virtues, and for his distinguished ability as a lawyer, terror stricken at the fury he saw around him, also fled as if from a community of lunatics.[1] All the old honored leaders of the Whig party deserted the people and the cause they professed to love and hastened over to secession. Balie Peyton, in deep gloom and despair, gave up the fight and became silent. And John Bell, in an evil hour, allied his fortunes with the South. City and country alike followed the example of these leaders. A wild storm of angry, unreasonable passion swept over the state.

Let it be kept in mind that the common people in none of these cases gave way until after their leaders had done so. When they found themselves standing alone, in a stirring crisis, with no one left capable of guiding them, most naturally they gave up the Union. And thus the cause of the Union was first deserted by its professed friends, and then by the people, in the States of North Carolina, Virginia and Tennessee. Had the leaders of these states, unitedly

[1] When the secession convention was in session at Columbia, South Carolina, a countryman who had never before been at the capitol asked the distinguished lawyer and Unionist, James C. Pettigru, to point out the lunatic asylum to him. Pointing to the church where the convention was in session, he exclaimed: "There it is; there it is; such a band of lunatics has never before been gathered together."

and heroically, stood like a wall between secession and the people, all of them might probably have been saved. But this required masterly courage. How far these leaders would have been equal to the high demands on them, I am unable to say. One of the first efforts of the enemies of the Union everywhere was to alarm, intimidate and terrorize all who opposed them. He that had the courage, in the winter and spring of 1861, to withstand the angry and despotic public opinion of the South, on the subject of slavery, was indeed made of heroic stuff.

In the latter part of 1860 and the early half of 1861, so strange, so startling, so unexpected, were the events—so out of line with anything known in previous experience—that all men in the South needed the support of others. This was especially the case with the large body of the people. It is no reflection on their intelligence to say so.

Fortunately the leaders in East Tennessee precisely met the grave demands of the occasion. They were not only men of ability, but also men of courage. Nothing could intimidate them. The people's instincts were right in the beginning, and it required but little argument to convince them as to their duty in the threatening emergency. As long as they could be kept free from a panic, all was safe. If the people had been sustained and encouraged in their patriotic instincts and opinions, in 1861, by strong leaders, a very powerful Union party might have been preserved in the very heart of the South. North Alabama, North Georgia, Western North Carolina, South West Virginia and Eastern Kentucky, combined with East Tennessee, would have formed a territory larger than any of the Southern States, save only Texas. All that was needed to have solidified that whole region into almost a compact union against secession was a half dozen able and dauntless men to take the lead in each of those sections. If there had been co-operation, as well as sympathy between the people of these adjacent sections, no man can now estimate the effect it would have had on the war or its dura-

tion. It is obvious that it would have been very wide-reaching in its results.

That the people of these regions would have been overborne and silenced in the end, as the people of East Tennessee finally were, admits of little doubt. Such united loyalty, however, covering a wide extent of territory, and a large population, animated by the same spirit and inspired by the same purpose, would not only have weakened the secession armies in the field, but its moral effect on the minds of men both North and South would have been most important.

When the leaders gave way, this Union party, as a force in the national contest, silently disappeared. The feeling of loyalty, however, was never entirely extinguished in North Carolina and Virginia, nor indeed in any of the regions I have named. The people soon became assimilated with the followers of the Confederacy, breathing their spirit and holding their opinions, and were forever lost as a party or a conservative element in those states. On the other hand, the Union men of East Tennessee, after the lapse of thirty-five years, stand out to-day as distinct in their political opinions and party relations as they did in June, 1861. Time has not modified, nor changed their views of government, nor of their duties as citizens in relation to it. They still revere the old Union with idolatrous devotion. Seldom in the history of nations has a people shown a higher, a sublimer love for a cause which they esteemed just and wise. No such splendid record of patriotic ardor can be found in our national annals. As long as unselfish patriotism, unyielding constancy, heroic courage and noble sacrifices for country excite admiration, so long will the conduct of these Union men of East Tennessee command the respect and challenge the homage of mankind.

APPENDIX.

DECLARATION OF GRIEVANCES ADOPTED AT THE GREENEVILLE CONVENTION.

We, the people of East Tennessee, again assembled in a convention of our delegates, make the following declaration in addition to that heretofore promulgated by us at Knoxville, on the 30th and 31st days of May last.

So far as we can learn the election held in this state on the 8th day of the present month was free, with but few exceptions, in no part of the state, other than East Tennessee. In the larger parts of Middle and West Tennessee no speeches or discussions in favor of the Union were permitted—Union papers were not allowed to circulate. Measures were taken in some parts of West Tennessee, in defiance of the constitution and laws, which allowed folded tickets, to have the ballot numbered in such manner as to mark and expose the Union votes. A disunion paper, the "Nashville Gazette," in urging the people to vote an open ticket declared that a "thief takes a pocketbook, or effects an entrance into forbidden places by stealthy means—a tory, in voting, usually adopts pretty much the same course of procedure." Disunionists, in many places, had charge of the polls, and Union men, when voting, were denounced as Lincolnites and Abolitionists. The unanimity of the votes in many large counties where, but a few weeks ago, the Union sentiment was so strong, proves beyond doubt that Union men were overawed by the tyranny of the military power, and the still greater tyranny of a corrupt and subsidized press. In the city of Memphis, where 5,613 votes were cast, but five free men had the courage to vote for the Union, and these were stigmatized in the public press as "ignorant traitors who opposed the popular edicts." Our earnest appeal made at the Knoxville Convention, to our brethren in the other divisions of the state, was published there only to a small extent and the members and names of those who composed our convention, as well as the counties they represented, were suppressed, and the effort made to impress the minds of the people that East Tennessee was favorable to secession. The "Memphis Appeal," a prominent disunion paper, published a false account of our proceedings, under the head—"THE TRAITORS IN COUNCIL"—and styled us who represented every county but two in East Tennessee "*the little batch of disaffected traitors*, who hover around the noxious atmosphere of Andrew Johnson's home." Our meeting was telegraphed to the "New Orleans Delta," and it was falsely said that we had passed a resolution recommending submission, if 70,000 votes were not cast against secession. The dispatch added that "THE SOUTHERN RIGHTS

MEN ARE DETERMINED TO HOLD POSSESSION OF THE STATE, THOUGH THEY SHOULD BE IN A MINORITY. Volunteers were allowed to vote in and out of the state, in flagrant violation of the constitution. From the moment the election was over, and before any detailed statement of the vote in the different counties had been published, and before it was possible to ascertain the result, it was exultingly proclaimed that separation had been carried by from 50,000 to 70,000 votes. This was to prepare the public mind to enable "the secessionists to hold possession of the state though they should be in a minority." The final result is to be announced by a disunion governor, whose existence depends upon the success of secession, and no provision is made by law for an examination of the vote by disinterested persons, or even for contesting the election. For these and other causes we do not regard the result of the election as expressive of the will of a majority of the freemen of Tennessee. Had the election everywhere been conducted as it was in East Tennessee, we would entertain a different opinion. Here, no effort was made to suppress secession papers, or prevent secession speeches or votes, although an overwhelming majority of the people were against secession. Here, no effort has been made to prevent the formation of military companies, or obstruct the transportation of armies, or to prosecute those who violated the laws of the United States and of Tennessee against treason. The Union men of East Tennessee, anxious to be neutral in the contest, were content to enjoy their own opinions and to allow the utmost latitude of opinion and action to those who differed from them. Had the same toleration prevailed in other parts of the state, we have no doubt that a majority of our people would have voted to remain in the Union. But, if this view is erroneous, we have the same (and, as we think, a much better) right to remain in the Government of the United States than the other divisions of Tennessee have to secede from it.

We prefer to remain attached to the government of our fathers. The Constitution of the United States has done us no wrong. The Congress of the United States has passed no law to oppress us. The President of the United States has made no threat against the law-abiding people of Tennessee. Under the Government of the United States, we have enjoyed as a nation more of civil and religious freedom than any other people under the whole heaven. We believe there is no cause for rebellion or secession on the part of the people of Tennessee. None was assigned by the legislature in their miscalled Declaration of Independence. No adequate cause can be assigned The select committee of that body asserted a gross and inexcusable falsehood in their address to the people of East Tennessee, when they declared that the Government of the United States had made war upon them. The secession cause has thus far been sustained by deception and falsehood: by falsehoods as to the action of congress, by false dispatches as to battles that were never fought and victories that were never won; by false accounts as to the purposes of the President; by false representations as to the views of Union men; and by false pretenses as to the facility with which the secession troops would take possession of the capitol and capture the highest officers of the government.

The cause of secession or rebellion has no charm for us, and its progress has been marked by the most alarming and dangerous attacks upon the public liberty. In other states, as well as our own, its whole course threatens to annihilate the last vestige of freedom. While peace and prosperity have blessed us in the Government of the United States, the following may be enumerated as the fruits of secession:

It was urged forward by members of congress who were sworn to support the Constitution of the United States and were themselves supported by the government.

It was effected without consultation with all the states interested in the slavery question, and without exhausting peaceable remedies.

It has plunged the country into civil war, paralyzed our commerce, interfered with the whole trade and business of the country, lessened the value of property, destroyed many of the pursuits of life, and bids fair to involve the whole nation in irretrievable bankruptcy and ruin.

It has changed the entire relations of states, and adopted constitutions without submitting them to a vote of the people, and where such a vote has been authorized, it has been upon the condition prescribed by Senator Mason, of Virginia, that those who voted the Union ticket "MUST LEAVE THE STATE."

It has advocated a constitutional monarchy, a king and a dictator, and is through the Richmond press at this moment, recommending to the convention in Virginia a restriction of the right of suffrage, and "in severing connection with the Yankees, to *abolish every vestige of resemblance to the institutions of that detested race.*"

It has formed military leagues, passed military bills and opened the door for oppressive taxation without consulting the people, and then in mockery of a free election has required them by their votes to sanction their usurpations under the penalties of moral proscription or at the point of the bayonet.

It has offered a premium for crime in directing the discharge of volunteers from criminal prosecutions and in recommending the judges not to hold their courts.

It has stained our statute book with the repudiation of Northern debts, and has greatly violated the constitution by attempting through its unlawful extension to destroy the right of suffrage.

It has called upon the people in the State of Georgia, and may soon require the people of Tennessee, to contribute all their surplus cotton, corn, wheat, bacon, beef, etc., to the support of pretended governments alike destitute of money and credit.

It has attempted to destroy the accountability of public servants to the people by secret legislation, and has set the obligation of an oath at defiance.

It has passed laws declaring it treason to say or do anything in favor of the Government of the United States, or against the Confederate States, and such a law is now before, and we apprehend will soon be passed by, the legislature of Tennessee.

It has attempted to destroy, and, we fear soon will, utterly prostrate the freedom of speech and of the press.

It has involved the Southern States in a war, whose success is hopeless, and which must ultimately lead to the ruin of the people.

Its bigoted, overbearing and intolerant spirit has already subjected the people of East Tennessee to many petty grievances; our people have been insulted; our flags have been fired upon and torn down; our houses have been rudely entered; our families subjected to insult; our peaceable meetings interrupted; our women and children shot at by a merciless soldiery; our towns pillaged, our citizens robbed, and some of them assassinated and murdered.

No effort has been spared to deter the Union men of East Tennessee from the expression of their free thoughts. The penalties of treason have been threatened against them, and murder and assassination have been openly encouraged by leading secession journals. As secession has thus been overbearing and intolerant while in the minority in East Tennessee, nothing better can be expected of the pretended majority, than wild, unconstitutional and oppressive legislation; an utter contempt and disregard of law; a determination to force every Union man in the state to swear to the support of a constitution he abhors, to yield his money and property to aid a cause he detests and to become the object of scorn and derision as well as the victim of intolerable and relentless oppression.

In view of these considerations, and of the fact that the people of East Tennessee have declared their fidelity to the Union, by a majority of about 20,000 votes, therefore we do resolve and declare:

RESOLUTIONS.

First. That we do earnestly desire the restoration of peace to our whole country, and most especially that our own section of the State of Tennessee should not be involved in civil war.

Second. That the action of our state legislature in passing the *so-called* "Declaration of Independence," and in forming the "Military League" with the Confederate States, and in adopting other acts looking to a separation of the State of Tennessee from the Government of the United States, is unconstitutional and illegal, and, therefore, not binding upon us as loyal citizens.

Third. That in order to avert a conflict with our brethren in other parts of the state, and desiring that every constitutional means shall be resorted to for the preservation of peace, we do, therefore, constitute and appoint O. P. Temple, of Knox, John Netherland, of Hawkins, and James P. McDowell, of Greene, commissioners, whose duty it shall be to prepare a memorial and cause the same to be presented to the General Assembly of Tennessee, now in session, asking its consent that the counties composing East Tennessee, and such counties in Middle Tennessee as desire to cooperate with them, may form and erect a separate state.

Fourth. Desiring, in good faith, that the general assembly will grant this our reasonable request, and still claiming the right to determine our own

destiny, we do further resolve that an election be held in all the counties of East Tennessee, and in such other counties in Middle Tennessee, adjacent thereto, as may desire to co-operate with us, for the choice of delegates to represent them in a general convention to be held in the town of Kingston, at such time as the president of this convention, or in case of his absence or inability, any one of the vice-presidents, or, in like case with them, the secretary of this convention may designate; and the officer so designating the day for the assembling of said convention, shall also fix the time for holding the election herein provided for, and give reasonable notice thereof.

Fifth. In order to carry out the foregoing resolution, the sheriffs of the different counties are hereby requested to open and hold said election, or cause the same to be so held, in the usual manner and at the usual places of voting, as prescribed by law; and in the event the sheriff of any county should fail or refuse to open and hold said election, or cause the same to be done, the coroner of such county is requested to do so; and should such coroner fail or refuse, then any constable of such county is hereby authorized to open and hold said election, or cause the same to be done. And if in any county none of the above-named officers will hold said election, then any justice of the peace or freeholder in such county is authorized to hold the same or cause it to be done. The officer or other person holding said election shall certify the result to the president of this convention, or to such officer as may have directed the same to be holden, at as early a day thereafter as practicable, and the officer to whom said returns may be made shall open and compare the polls and issue certificates to the delegates elected.

Sixth. That in said convention the several counties shall be represented as follows: The county of Knox shall elect three delegates; the counties of Washington, Greene and Jefferson, two delegates each, and the remaining counties shall each elect one delegate. . . . .

THE MEMORIAL

PRESENTED TO THE LEGISLATURE BY THE COMMITTEE ON BEHALF OF THE CONVENTION.

To the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee:

The undersigned, memorialists, on behalf of the people of East Tennessee, beg leave respectfully to show, that at a convention of delegates, holden at Greeneville on the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th days of June, instant, in which was represented every county of East Tennessee, except the county of Rhea, it was resolved:

"*First.* That we do earnestly desire the restoration of peace to our whole country, and most especially that our own section of the State of Tennessee shall not be involved in civil war.

"*Second.* That the action of the state legislature in passing the so-called 'Declaration of Independence,' and in forming the 'Military League' with the Confederate States, and in adopting other acts looking to a separation

of Tennessee from the Government of the United States, is unconstitutional and illegal, and therefore not binding upon us as loyal citizens.

"*Third.* And it was further resolved, 'that in order to avert a conflict with our brethren in other parts of the state, and desiring that every constitutional means shall be resorted to for the preservation of peace, we do, therefore, constitute and appoint O. P. Temple, of Knox, John Netherland, of Hawkins, and James P. McDowell, of Greene, commissioners, whose duty it shall be to prepare a memorial and cause the same to be presented to the General Assembly of Tennessee, now in session, asking its consent that the counties composing East Tennessee, and such other counties in Middle Tennessee as desire to co-operate with them, may form and erect a separate state.

The idea of a separate political existence is not a recent one, but it is not deemed necessary here to restate the geographical, social, economical and industrial reasons which have often been urged in support of it. The reasons which operated upon the convention and seemed to them conclusive was the action of the two sections, respectively, at the election held on the 8th instant to determine the future national relations of the state. In that election, the people of East Tennessee, by a majority of nearly twenty thousand votes, decided to adhere to the Federal Union, established prior to the American Revolution, and to which Tennessee was admitted in the year 1796; while the rest of the state is reported to have decided, by a majority approaching even more nearly to unanimity, to leave the Federal Union and to join the body politic recently formed under the name of the Confederate States of America. The same diversity of sentiment was exhibited, but less distinctly, at the election of the 9th of February last, when the people of East Tennessee decided by a heavy majority against holding a convention to discuss and determine our Federal relations, overcoming by nearly fourteen thousand the majority in the rest of the state in favor of such a convention.

This hopeless and irreconcilable difference of opinion and purpose leaves no alternative but the separation of the two sections of the state; for it is not to be presumed that either would for a moment think of subjugating the other or of coercing it into a political condition repugnant alike to its interest and to its honor. Certainly the people of East Tennessee entertain no such purpose toward the rest of the state. And the avowals of their Western brethren, in connection with their recent political action, have been too numerous and explicit to leave us in any doubt as to their views.

It remains, therefore, that measures be adopted to effect a separation, amicably, honorably, and magnanimously, by a settlement of boundaries, so as to divide East Tennessee, and any contiguous counties or districts which may desire to adhere to her, from the rest of the state, and by a fair, just and equitable division of the public property and the common liabilities. It has occurred to the undersigned, as the best method of accomplishing this most desirable end, that your body should take immediate action in the premises, by giving a formal assent to the proposed separation, pursuant to the provisions of section 3, article 4, of the Constitution

of the United States, and by convoking a convention representing the sovereign power of the people of the respective divisions of Tennessee, with plenary authority to so amend the constitution of the state as to carry into effect the change contemplated.

With a view to such action, or to action leading to the same result, the undersigned ask permission to confer with your body, either in general session or through a committee appointed for this purpose, so as to consider and determine the details more satisfactorily than could otherwise be done.

Awaiting a response to this memorial, the undersigned beg to add assurances of every endeavor on their part not only to preserve the peaceful relations heretofore subsisting between the people in the two sections of the state, but to remove, as far as possible, all causes of disturbance in the future, so that each may be left free to follow its chosen path of prosperity and honor, unembarrassed by any collision with the other.

O. P. Temple,
John Netherland,
Jas. P. McDowell."

LIST OF DELEGATES TO THE GREENEVILLE CONVENTION.

Anderson county. L. C. Houk.

Bledsoe. J. G. Spears.

Blount. W. T. Dowdell, H. J. Henry, J. R. Frow, Solomon Farmer, Lavater Wear, A. Kirkpatrick, F. M. Cruze.

Bradley. J. G. Brown, R. M. Edwards.

Campbell. J. A. Cooper.

Carter. A. Tipton, Wm. Marsh, L. Slagel, S. P. Hilton, L. Carter, W. B. Carter, H. Slagel, J. Emmet, D. Stover, J. Hendrickson, J. G. Lewis, W. J. Crutcher, J. Perry, S. P. Angel, V. Singletary, J. L. Bradley, B. M. G. O'Brien, C. P. Toncray, Robert Williams, John M. Smith, C. Wilcox, H. C. Smith.

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Claiborne. E. E. Jones, V. Myers, J. J. Bunch, J. J. Sewell, H. Sewell, F. Jones.

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Johnson. S. E. Northington, J. H. Norris, H. C. Northington, J. W. M. Grayson, L. Venable, J. H. Vaught, Alex. Baker, A. D. Smith, John Murphy, A. G. Shown, H. P. Murphy, Kemp Murphy, R. R. Butler, Samuel Howard, J. F. Norris.

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Monroe. Dr. B. Franklin, Wm. Heiskell.

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Hamilton. D. C. Trewhitt, S. McCaleb, Wm. Clift.

Marion. W. G. Brownlow (alternate).

McMinn. John McGaughey, A. C. Derrick, G. W. Bridges, M. D. Anderson.

Meigs. T. J. Matthews.

Polk. W. M. Biggs, W. J. Copeland.

Rhea. (Not represented.)

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Union. J. W. Thornburgh, Isaac Bayless, M. V. Nash.

Fentress. E. B. Langley (alternate).

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